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Abstract  
This thesis provides a theoretical basis for applying complexity theory to classroom learning. 
Existing accounts of complexity in social systems fail to adequately situate human 
understanding within those systems.  Human understanding and action is embedded within 
the complex systems that we inhabit.  As such, we cannot achieve a full and accurate 
representation of those systems.  This challenges epistemological positions which characterise 
learning as a simple mechanistic process, those which see it as approaching a view of the world 
͚as it is͛ and also positions which see learning as a purely social activity. 
This thesis develops a materialist position which characterises understandings as emergent 
from, but not reducible to, the material world.  The roles of embodied neural networks as well 
as our linguistic and symbolic systems are considered in order to develop this materialist 
position.  Context and history are shown to be important within complex systems and allow 
novel understandings to emerge.  Furthermore, shared understandings are seen as emergent 
from processes of response, replication and manipulation of patterns of behaviour and 
patterns of association.  Thus the complexity of learning is accounted for within a coherent 
ontological and epistemological framework. 
The implications of this materialist position for considering classroom learning are expounded.  
Firstly, our models and descriptions of classrooms are reconciled with the view of our 
understandings as sophisticated yet incomplete models within complex social systems.  
Models are characterised as themselves material entities which emerge within social systems 
and may go on to influence behaviour.  Secondly, contemporary accounts of learning as the 
conceptual representation of the world are challenged.   
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1 Introduction 
1.1 The Contribution of this Thesis 
This thesis seeks to: 
1. Establish an ontological and epistemological basis for the application of complexity theory 
to classroom learning. 
2. Evaluate the implications of this theoretical position in understanding classroom learning.  
Describing classroom learning as complex is compelling because it speaks of the 
unpredictability of classrooms and the rich nuances of how individuals learn.  However the 
application of complexity theory within education remains marginal.  We will see that 
complexity theory is an umbrella term for a broad range of approaches, understandings and 
models which originated within the natural sciences but which is increasingly associated with 
social systems.  There are considerable sites of conflict and contradiction in the ontological and 
epistemological claims made by complexity theorists and this is a barrier to its application to 
classrooms.   
As well as a lack of a coherent theoretical basis in itself, complexity theory in the social 
sciences has yet to resolve specific issues associated with human understanding1.  Firstly, we 
cannot dismiss or reduce the importance of understandings in relation to human action.  In 
applying approaches from the natural sciences many researchers reduce learning to a 
mechanistic process, or omit human understandings from their models altogether.  This will 
not suffice in relation to classrooms, where human understanding is the primary concern.  
Conversely, we cannot assume that our understandings are accurate and complete 
representations of the broader world.  In a complex system the smallest detail may determine 
how the system develops, so our understandings can never be complete.  The consequence of 
this is that we must redefine the relationship between our understandings and the world, 
which is no small task.  A further issue stems from recognition that human understandings are 
not purely individual, but that as a species we have the capacity to learn from each other and 
to use symbolic and linguistic systems to understand the world.  In Chapter 2 we shall expand 
upon and explore these issues as they occur within existing literature.  Here we are able to say 
that learning is about developing understandings of the world but complexity presents 
                                                          
1 We ǁill deǀelop ouƌ usage of the teƌŵ ͚uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg͛ iŶ Chapteƌ Ϯ; see GlossaƌǇ of KeǇ Teƌŵs at the 
end of this thesis.  
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significant challenges in situating these understandings.  The original contribution of this thesis 
lies in firstly expounding these challenges and secondly providing a solution to them. 
It should be noted from the outset however, that this thesis contains no primary evidence in 
relation to classrooms, nor does it engage in empirical enquiry.  The focus upon classrooms is 
intended to provide a conceptual frame in which to consider learning at the level of individuals 
and small groups of pupils, as well as teachers.  This frame allows the thesis to focus upon such 
learning without considering the interactions of large populations of people, or the broader 
͚leaƌŶiŶg͛ of eduĐatioŶal iŶstitutioŶs aŶd sǇsteŵs.  Whilst ŵaŶǇ of the aƌguŵeŶts ǁithiŶ the 
thesis might be applied to learning beyond the classroom, focusing upon the classroom as a 
specific system allows a more detailed description of the theoretical issues which face the 
application of complexity theory to learning.  In the concluding chapter we will lay out how 
engagement with real classrooms might further this thesis (see 8.3.2).  However, there are 
considerable theoretical issues to be addressed first. 
This introductory chapter is therefore concerned with elucidating the theoretical problems of 
applying complexity to classroom learning, as well as signposting the way that this thesis will 
approach the solution.  In Section 1.2 we will define complexity theory and in doing so 
highlight both the difficulties and appeal of bringing it to bear on classrooms.  Section 1.3 will 
consider further the issues in relating complexity theory to social systems, in which human 
understandings play a role.  Thus, by the time we get to Section 1.4 we will be ready to begin 
considering the solution and how we will approach it. 
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1.2 What is Complexity Theory? 
1.2.1 Deterministic Chaos 
Having outlined the focus of this thesis, the rest of this introductory chapter will establish the 
problem at hand.  We shall begin by developing a working definition of complexity through 
contrasting it to its historic precursor: deterministic chaos.  Exploring the subtle differences 
between chaos and complexity will allow us to expound the difficulties of defining complexity 
in a general way, which has bearing on how it may be applied to classrooms. 
Poincare is generally credited with first identifying deterministic chaos in the 1880s, through 
his work on the trajectories of three or more celestial bodies interacting through gravitational 
attraction.  He noted that the orbits can vary (be non-periodic) without a discernible pattern, 
despite being clearly defined by equations of motion.  Work at a similar time by Lyapunov 
iŶǀestigated ͚staďilitǇ͛ iŶ suĐh sǇsteŵs aŶd later mathematicians such as Birkhoff, Levinson and 
Smale built on these descriptions of dynamic systems (Gleik, 1987, p. 182).  However it was not 
until the advent of sufficiently advanced computers that the behaviour of such systems over 
time could be modelled.  Lorenz, working on a computer simulation of the weather in 1961 
rounded-off the values he entered into his computer to three decimal places instead of six, 
and found that the model quickly diverged to give a considerably different forecast of weather.  
This was followed by the work of Feigenbaum in describing mathematically the sudden 
divergence (bifurcation) of systems under certain conditions, providing a broad description of 
systems which tend towards what is now known as chaos.   
LoƌeŶz defiŶes ͞a ĐhaotiĐ sǇsteŵ as oŶe that is seŶsitiǀelǇ depeŶdeŶt oŶ interior changes in 
initial conditions͟ ;LoƌeŶz, ϭϵϵ3, p. 24) [original italics].  A system may be sensitive to the 
exterior environment, but this does not necessarily mean it is chaotic.  A chaotic system will 
evolve in a way that is sensitive to the variables interior to that system.  This evolution is the 
product of the interactions of variables in a nonlinear way.  In physics, linear dynamics refers 
to situations in which the variables only interact through addition and subtraction.  So if input 
A will produce output B, and input C will produce output D, then inputting A + C will produce B 
+ D.  The addition of the inputs simply leads to the addition of the outputs; the fact that both 
are occurring at the same time does not affect the output overall.  These systems can be 
described by linear mathematical equations.  An example of a linear system is a chord played 
on a piano.  Each note is not influenced by the others, the sound waves simply add together 
and our ear hears them all at once.  Nonlinear dynamics deals with situations in which this is 
not the case.  There are interactions between variables such that the output is influenced by 
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Figure 1a – A Lorenz Attractor 
the product of the inputs in some way.  These are described mathematically by nonlinear 
equations (e.g. containing terms An or AB) which mean that the output is not simply 
proportional to the input.  As Lorenz discovered in his weather models, a slight difference in 
inputs could lead to significantly different outputs.  As such the trajectory of a chaotic system 
quickly escapes our ability to discern a pattern and the system appears to be behaving in a 
random way. 
Despite appearances, a chaotic system is not random at all: it is determinate.  A chaotic system 
is mathematically determined by a set of nonlinear equations and as such, if we had sufficient 
computing power, we could predict the future of the system.  A phase diagram is often used to 
visualise the trajectory of a system, which plots different variables as different axes of a 
graph2.  Chaotic models that show no discernible pattern in these plots over the short term, 
may nevertheless display recognisable patterns in their trajectories over longer periods of 
time.  An attractor state is a state that a system tends towards over time such as an 
equilibrium position.  For example, a pendulum under the action of gravity and friction alone 
will always come to a standstill at its lowest point (known as a singularity).  A system may 
instead tend to an attractor that is a cycle of 
different states, and there are a host of other 
alternatives.  A strange attractor is one in which 
the system follows a chaotic trajectory, but 
nevertheless forms an overall pattern, with the 
trajectories being bound in a limited area of 
phase space, usually recognisable as a pattern 
or 3D shape.  The well-known attractor shown in Figure 1a was first described by Lorenz (1963) 
and is now commonly referred to as the Lorenz Attractor.  Lorenz (1993) describes the global 
weather system as having such an attractor: despite it being difficult for meteorologists to 
accurately predict the weather more than a few days in advance, we do know that on average 
it will be warmer and drier in the summer than in the winter in the UK.   
However, we must be very careful in labelling attractors and chaotic systems.  Whilst aspects 
of the global weather system can be described by mathematical formulae, there is no set of 
equations which are able to accurately describe the weather system as a whole.  Therefore the 
conclusion that the weather is a strange attractor is drawn only from analogy between 
mathematical models and our experience of the weather.  This is important as when social 
                                                          
2 Animation allows a 4th dimension to visualisations and colour a 5th, but a phase space can have any 
number of dimensions. 
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systems are described as strange attractors we must recall the analogical leap that is being 
made and judge the validity of such a relationship (see 1.2.2).  The equations used to make 
weather forecasts deal with structures on the scale of tens of kilometres and by necessity omit 
detail in order to enable computation.  So the sensitivity of the weather to initial conditions is 
seen within the mathematical approximations we have to it.  Lorenz (1993) is careful to discuss 
the weather as: 
͞aŶ eǆaŵple of aŶ iŶtƌiĐate dǇŶaŵiĐal sǇsteŵ, aŶd pƌeseŶt the Đase foƌ ďelieǀiŶg that 
its iƌƌegulaƌities aƌe ŵaŶifestatioŶs of Đhaos.͟ ;LoƌeŶz, ϭϵϵϯ, pϳϵͿ 
He draws on the success of mathematical simulations in predicting the weather over a few 
days and the sensitivity of these to initial conditions to conclude that the weather must also 
contain this initial sensitivity and thus be chaotic.  This inductive step is sound within the field 
in which Lorenz is applying it but must be brought into sharper focus for the purposes of this 
study.   
IŶ LoƌeŶz͛s defiŶitioŶ of Đhaos, quoted earlier in this section, he deliberately excludes the 
external influences acting upon the system, and yet he refers directly to the action of the sun 
in stimulating changes in the weather system (Lorenz, 1993).  Whilst this does not refute his 
assertion that the weather is a chaotic system3, it does illustrate the differences between a 
mathematical simulation in which the action of the sun is expressed by formulae, and the real 
system in which such influences cannot be precisely defined.  It is the extent to which a system 
can be defined by mathematical equations that will form part of our distinction between chaos 
and complexity. 
1.2.2 Chaotic Systems vs. Complex Systems 
Scientists will usually be dealing with one particular system which is well defined 
mathematically or physically and as such do not rely upon precise labels for those systems.  As 
far as definitions go therefore, complexity is the term used to describe systems in which 
individual aspects interact with each other and with environment such that behaviour or 
structure emerges which is not encoded in the interactions alone.   
To exemplify this consider the work of Christensen and Moloney (2005) who modelled a 
simple system in which sand is dropped at random on a flat grid.  Initially, a random 
configuration develops on the grid, but over time a pile will develop and then there will be 
                                                          
3 Lorenz does not appear to place specific meaning on the term complexity, the use of which developed 
later in the literature. 
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aǀalaŶĐhes as saŶd falls doǁŶ the pile.  The sǇsteŵ oƌgaŶises itself iŶto a ͚ĐƌitiĐal state͛4  in 
which the slope of the pile is maintained by avalanches. Although the avalanches are 
seemingly random, over a large timescale they show adherence to simple mathematical laws: 
the size of an avalanche is inversely proportional to how frequently they occur.  This may seem 
like a trivial system, but the implication is that a system which is driven only by the random 
dropping of sand organises itself into a critical state and follows simple mathematical rules in 
maintaining that state. Whereas chaos deals with how seeming disorder can in fact be 
governed by relatively simple mathematical principles, complexity theory (within the physical 
sciences at least) deals with how patterns emerge from the interaction of individual bodies or 
agents, only responding to their local environment. 
Osberg (2005, p.153) notes that in a chaotic system the iterated formula determining its 
development remains constant.  In complex systems however the rules or algorithms change 
over time.  Cilliers (1998, p.9) argues therefore that the algorithm which defines a complex 
system cannot be simplified without a loss of detail in the system.   Due to the sensitivity of a 
complex system to changes in its variables/elements, a model of such a system can be no 
simpler than the system itself.  However, as Osberg, Biesta & Cilliers (2008, pp. 218-219) 
caution, finding rules in a model should not be mistaken for evidence that there are rules in 
the complex system being modelled.   
‘eĐoŶsideƌ ChƌisteŶseŶ & MoloŶeǇ͛s ;ϮϬϬϱͿ saŶd gƌaiŶ sǇsteŵ.  Theƌe aƌe ƌules desĐƌiďiŶg the 
evolution of the system: a grain of sand is dropped at random; if the angle of the slope is 
greater than a critical angle then the grain will move; if this movement causes another slope 
greater than the critical angle then another grain will move; this will repeat until the system 
has ͚ƌelaǆed͛.  This ǁhole process is then iterated for another grain of sand being dropped.  
Whilst there are rules for the system, the shape of the sand pile and position of each grain of 
sand is not described by a set of elegant equations, and the outcome of an iteration will 
depend upon the state of the system prior to it.  Describing the system by the iterative process 
alone does not allow a complete description of the sand grain system; it instead provides a 
description of all possible sand grain systems.  A model run again using the same algorithm will 
produce a different sand pile.  In order to fully understand the system we need to know not 
only how the system evolves, but also the exact state of the system at that point5.  This is why 
Osberg (2005, p.154) notes that the history of the system is built into its structure.  Chaotic 
                                                          
4 Whilst ͚ĐƌitiĐal states͛ ŵight ďe seeŶ as ƌelated to the teƌŵ ͚attƌaĐtoƌ͛, the foƌŵeƌ is ŵaŶifest iŶ a 
physical system whereas the latter is a mathematically determined pattern. 
5 It is possible, but unlikely, that a system will come to exactly the same state by different processes. 
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systems are those determined wholly by mathematical equations or algorithms.  A die hard 
determinist may argue that the whole universe is determined by mathematics which is simply 
too complicated for us to understand.  However this is brought into question by quantum 
phǇsiĐs aŶd ďǇ PƌigogiŶe͛s iŶteƌpƌetatioŶ of Đoŵpleǆ sǇsteŵs (see 1.2.4) which both support 
the indeterminacy of complex systems.   
The ƌole of the ͚eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt͛ is also important to complex systems, whereas chaotic systems 
aƌe deteƌŵiŶed ďǇ the ͚iŶteƌŶal͛ dǇŶaŵiĐs, as the earlier quote from Lorenz (1993) shows.  
Complex systems respond to the environment in some way.  In the sand pile it is gravity and 
the stickiness of the sand that deteƌŵiŶes the ƌespoŶse of the pile, ďut the pile is ͚dƌiǀeŶ͛ ďǇ 
the addition of new sand grains, and responds accordingly.  Complex physical, chemical and 
biological systems are all driven by some gradient in the environment, be it concentration of 
solutions or the temperature gradient provided by the sun.  The system adapts to these 
external influences. 
This difference between complex and chaotic systems can be illustrated by returning to 
LoƌeŶz͛s suggestion that ͞ǁe aƌe ŵoƌe oƌ less foƌĐed to ĐoŶĐlude that the atmosphere itself is 
ĐhaotiĐ͟ ;LoƌeŶz, ϭϵϵ3, p.102).  Drawing on the discussion above we see that it is actually our 
models which are chaotic; the atmosphere itself is complex.  Lorenz (1993, p.182) discusses 
the faŵous ĐoŶjeĐtuƌe that a ďutteƌflǇ͛s wings are sufficient to alter the weather, and suggests 
the evidence is overwhelming, yet on the very same page maintains that there are equations 
governing the atmosphere.  We must assume that Lorenz recognises the difficulty of 
expressing equations for the behaviour of a butterfly.  Even supposing models may be 
produced in the future which are significantly advanced to consider the effect of a butterfly 
flappiŶg its ǁiŶgs at a ĐeƌtaiŶ tiŵe aŶd iŶ a ĐeƌtaiŶ spaĐe, the ĐƌuĐial poiŶt is that ǁe ǁoŶ͛t 
have an equation to predict when and where the butterfly will flap its wings.  There will always 
be unpredictable inputs to the system, and we cannot isolate it from these in such a way as to 
claim the system is determined by equations alone.  As such the study of real world systems 
should be considered complex and not chaotic in nature. 
Table 1a summarises the main differences between chaotic and complex systems, as we have 
defined them above: 
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Table 1a – Chaotic systems vs. Complex systems 
Chaotic Systems Complex Systems 
Determined by dynamic nonlinear equations. Determined by iterations or algorithms acting 
locally upon multiple elements. 
Self-contained. Influenced and driven by the environment. 
Determinate and reversible. Indeterminate, with the history of the system 
being important. 
May tend towards attractor states, including 
strange attractors, or diverge. 
Semi-stable stƌuĐtuƌes ŵaǇ ͚eŵeƌge͛ ǁhiĐh 
are capable of self-organisation and response 
to environment. 
 
1.2.3 Emergence 
Discussion of the differences between complex and chaotic systems alone does not highlight 
the key reason that the former are of interest to social scientists.  Despite the highly sensitive 
and unpredictable nature of the elements within complex systems, they often form semi-
stable structures, which show discernible patterns of behaviour over short periods of time. 
The sand pile will organise itself such that it has a slope with a critical angle, dependent upon 
the stickiness of the sand, but this can be arrived at in a large number of different ways.  This 
critical angle will then be maintained by random avalanches of varying size.  The self-
organisation of the system to a state of criticality illustrates through a very simple example the 
process of emergence.  Complex systems made of unpredictable elements often self-organise 
to a dynamically varying state, but one which is nevertheless of a particular structure.  This 
structure cannot be observed on the level of individual elements, but is tangible when the 
system is observed on some other level. 
Whereas chaotic systems develop seeming disorder from simple rules, complex systems 
develop ordered structures despite being made up of interacting elements which behave 
unpredictably.  The system has an emergent structure.  These structures are often able to 
maintain themselves (through some gradient of energy or matter), and evolve in response to 
their environment. The structure may then alter in response to a change in the environment, 
or remain stable in the face of that change.  The reason emergence is so interesting is that 
order appears to come from disorder, or from a previous form of order.   
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The aďseŶĐe of ͚top-doǁŶ͛ ƌules ŵeaŶs that the self-organisation of complex systems is a 
product of interactions in the immediate environment alone.  The organisation of ant colonies 
is one example that has amazed scientists for decades; each ant responds to pheromones in 
their environment but is ignorant of the system as a whole.  The ͚igŶoƌaŶĐe͛ of eleŵeŶts ǁithiŶ 
a complex system is important to understanding the emergence of such systems, and we must 
be careful in considering social systems in which participants may be to some extent aware of 
the system they occupy. 
Emergence refers to the development of new patterns, structures, dynamics or characteristics 
within a system.  Emergent properties evolve in an unpredictable way through the interaction 
of elements within that system and may be conceived of as a qualitative change in a system.  
As such, complex systems develop through causal processes which cannot be fully described.   
Goldstein (1999) provides a useful representation of how the concept of emergence developed 
historically, which is reproduced in Figure 1b. 
 
Here we see that a number of different disciplines and theories contributed to the 
development of emergence as a concept, although of course this is itself a model.  
Nevertheless, we see that emergence has a rich inheritance which ties it to chaos theory and 
 
Figure 1b – The Historic Development of Emergence as a Concept, Goldstein (1999, p 55). 
 
10 
 
nonlinear equations in mathematics, to evolutionary biology, to equilibrium dynamics, to 
networks and to many other fields.  Whilst it is broadly accepted that emergence developed in 
the mathematical, natural and computational sciences, its more recent application to social 
systems has meant that it has gathered other characteristics as it has developed and has 
become associated with concepts beyond the scope of traditional scientific endeavour.  We 
shall see in Chapter 2 that this is the case in education. 
To illustrate the diversity of different concepts, Table 1b shows some of the terminology 
associated with emergence within different fields.   
Table 1b – Concepts Associated with Emergence and their Source Domains 
Terminology Source Domain 
Bifurcation, control parameter, dissipative 
structure 
Far from equilibrium chemical systems 
Self-organised criticality Physics 
Chaos, fractal, attractor, power law Nonlinear mathematics  
Edge of chaos, fitness landscape Ecological modelling 
Distributed representation, small worlds, 
connectivity 
Networks 
Genetic algorithm, fuzzy logic, entropy of 
information 
Computer science 
Autopioesis Biology 
The difficulty in defining emergence stems from the fact that it is used as a label for the 
development of novel phenomena in a huge range of systems, and in each if these systems the 
descriptions of how emergence occurs vary, or in some cases, emergence is simply assumed to 
happen.  In Section 1.3 we will turn to the specific difficulties of defining emergence within 
classrooms.  Firstly however, we will make one further refinement to our working descriptions 
of complexity and emergence by considering how interactions are dynamic and why this 
makes complex systems unpredictable. 
1.2.4 Dynamics & Determinism 
Given the difficulty of defining emergence, it is useful to consider further why complex systems 
are unpredictable over long timescales.  In subsection 1.2.1 we described how complex 
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systems are nonlinear: multiple factors influence the situation so we cannot attribute a single 
cause to a particular outcome, and also a small change may have a large effect.  Complex 
systems are also dynamic, and this goes beyond simply saying that systems change over time.  
The use of the term dynamic recognises that there are temporal and spatial influences upon a 
complex system: it is not just how influences interact that determine how it will change, but 
also when and where those influences occur.  In a classroom therefore, something as subtle as 
where a teacher stands within a specific part of a lesson may influence the system: their 
influence is dynamic.   
Because the influences on a complex system are nonlinear and dynamic what emerges from 
them is unpredictable, and this is of key importance in this thesis6.  However this does not 
mean that such a system might suddenly jump into a completely different state (Lorenz, 1993).  
If a car were at 70mph and being controlled by a person with truly random behaviour then 
they could accelerate or brake at any point, but a car cannot instantaneously drop to 40mph or 
accelerate to 100mph.  This analogy helps us distinguish between complete unpredictability 
where one moment is independent of the last (as in two flips of a coin) and unpredictability 
where one of a multitude of things might happen next, but these are historically contingent.  
Complex systems have periods of relative stability, during which patterns may be discernible, 
yet in the long term they are unpredictable. 
Prigogine (1978, 1997) showed that for chemical systems, this unpredictability stems from the 
tiny fluctuations of microscopic particles that propagate through a system and cause 
qualitative change on a larger scale.  Prigogine argued that it is the fundamental randomness 
of these tiny fluctuations that make it impossible to predict how the change will occur.  If we 
adopt a view that emergence is the product of fundamental randomness in the universe, as 
Prigogine claims, then this is different from emergence as the deterministic development of a 
dynamic system according to both internal and external contingency.  In the former, which 
Osberg & Biesta (2004) denote as strong emergence, there will always be a randomness that 
threatens to alter the system unpredictably.  In the case of weak emergence, where the system 
is deterministic, there is in principle the possibility that a system could be controlled if the 
significant technical barriers to doing so were overcome.   
                                                          
6 We shall use complexity to argue against learning being characterised as a predictable process (see 
Chapter 7).  
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In order to demonstrate the difficulty of explaining emergence in relation to education, 
consider Osberg, Biesta & Cilliers͛ (2008) account of emergent curricula (which we will utilise in 
Section 7.3): 
͞The ƋuestioŶ is hoǁ ǁe ĐaŶ ƌepƌeseŶt the ďehaviour of the system in terms of a set of 
rules when its output is partially determined by sets of rules to which we have no 
aĐĐess ;see Cillieƌs, ϮϬϬϬď, ϮϬϬϭͿ͟ (Osberg, Biesta & Cilliers, 2008, p. 219) 
This characterisation directly cites Cilliers (2000) who concurs with the argument that: 
͞eŵeƌgeŶĐe does Ŷot iŶǀolǀe ŵetaphǇsiĐal ĐoŵpoŶeŶts… ǁe aƌe ŵeƌelǇ talkiŶg aďout 
properties that arise because of non-linear, dynamic interactions of which there are so 
ŵaŶǇ that ǁe ĐaŶŶot hope to ĐoŶtaiŶ all the iŶfoƌŵatioŶ iŶǀolǀed.͟ (Cilliers, 2000, p. 
42) 
Cilliers (2000) is concerned primarily with the status of rule-based models as useful but also 
limited in accurately representing the complex systems at hand.  What is of relevance here is 
that Cilliers characterises emergence both in his earlier works and in his collaboration with 
Osberg and Biesta as being the product of interactions so numerous and intricate that they 
cannot be fully described by anything but the system itself.  This ŵight ďe Đlassified as ͚ǁeak 
eŵeƌgeŶĐe͛ as Osďeƌg & Biesta (2004) see it, ǁheƌeas theǇ elseǁheƌe ĐleaƌlǇ side ǁith ͚stƌoŶg 
eŵeƌgeŶĐe͛: 
͞ĐoŵpleǆitǇ sĐieŶĐe is Ŷot ǁhollǇ ĐoŶĐeƌŶed ǁith ͚ǁeak͛ eŵeƌgeŶĐe. We ďelieǀe that 
PƌigogiŶe͛s ǁoƌk iŶ theƌŵodǇŶaŵiĐs is iŶĐoŵpatiďle ǁith ͚ǁeak͛ eŵeƌgeŶĐe aŶd iŶ faĐt 
suppoƌts a theoƌǇ of ͚stƌoŶg͛ eŵeƌgeŶĐe.͟ (Osberg & Biesta, 2004, p. 210) 
Cilliers is not relying upon fundamental randomness in explaining the difficulty in modelling 
complex systems, whereas this is how Osberg & Biesta see it.  There is tension between 
whether emergence is to do with chance or to do with the intricate (but ultimately 
determinate) interactions of the complex system and the environment.  This is far from 
resolved, and Batterman (1991) argues that followers of Prigogine have yet to provide a 
convincing argument for a random universe at the quantum level.  It is still possible that we 
could reduce such randomness (or probability) to a deterministic position if we had a better 
theory.  Even if this were the case though, it would be impractical, to say the least, to use this 
theory in everyday life (Richardson & Cilliers, 2001).  At the level of classrooms, emergence 
would be unpredictable either way.   
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So we do not know whether the universe is fundamentally random or not, but in effect it does 
not make much difference: the long term trajectory of a complex system is unpredictable 
either because of sub-atomic randomness, or because of the interaction with an environment 
that cannot be fully defined, or because of the minutiae of differences already inherent with 
the system which cannot be accounted for.  Of course, it could be all of these reasons or it 
could be none of them.  With our present understanding however, we must accept that 
complexity theory puts forward a strong case for recognising that, in the long term, complex 
systems are unpredictable. 
In providing a working definition of complexity we have shown that it has roots in nonlinear 
mathematical descriptions which describe chaos, but in contrast to these descriptions should 
not be seen as deterministic.  Emergence, as the central feature of complex systems, describes 
the development of novel structures which cannot be predicted in the long term due to the 
nonlinear and dynamic interactions which take place within a complex system and between 
that system and the environment, with or without fundamental indeterminacy at the 
subatomic level.  We will now consider why an account of emergence may be attractive to 
teachers and researchers, before considering the difficulties of developing such an account 
(Section 1.3). 
1.2.5 The Appeal of Complexity Theory in Education 
In education, emergence has been linked to many aspects of schooling already, for example 
school leadership (Morrison, 2002), in managing school systems (Mason, 2008), in relation to 
schooling and social conflict (Davies, 2004), in relation to action research (Radford, 2007; 
Phelps & Hase, 2002; Phelps & Graham, 2010) and in relation to pedagogy (Jess, Antecio & 
Malcolm, 2011; Mercer, 2013; Yoon, 2011).  In Chapter 7 we will relate emergence to curricula 
(Osberg & Biesta, 2004, 2007; Osberg, 2005; Osberg, Biesta & Cilliers, 2008). 
So why is emergence such an appealing theory in education?  It speaks to the current climate 
within schools whereby teachers are beginning to question whether learning follows the kinds 
of pathways that are implicit within approaches such as the National Strategies (DfES, 2003).  
Such approaches have focused on monitoring rather than developing expertise and capacity  
(Ofsted, 2010, p. 5) aŶd as suĐh ŵight ďe said to haǀe assuŵed a siŵple, ͚liŶeaƌ͛ ƌelatioŶship 
between teaching and learning. 
Hoǁeǀeƌ, the tide is tuƌŶiŶg toǁaƌds ͚eǀideŶĐe ďased teaĐhiŶg͛, ǁith goǀeƌŶŵeŶt suppoƌtiŶg 
the increase of randomised control trials in education (e.g. Goldacre, 2013) and funding 
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organisations such as the Educational Endowment Foundation (EEF) to the tune of £200m over 
the next 15 years to undertake research of this kind.  Furthermore, there is increasing 
attentioŶ ďeiŶg paid to Hattie͛s ;ϮϬϬϴ; ϮϬϭϭͿ ŵeta-aŶalǇsis ǁhiĐh ƋuaŶtifies the ͚iŵpaĐt͛ of 
aspects of teaching such as class size, the use of inquiry-based teaching, the use of homework 
etc.  Whilst it remains to be seen what influence this focus will have on teaching, it is often 
simply a sophisticated way of considering attainment: the results that pupils achieve.  This is 
not the same as learning.  So when Hattie (2008, p. 133) concludes that phonics instruction has 
aŶ ͚effeĐt size͛7 of 0.6 in developing phonological awareness, reading outcomes and spelling, 
indicating a very positive impact, he reduces the complexity of an expansive body of research 
to a single number.  Hattie is not alone in such reduction however: the Rose report in the UK 
(Rose, 2006) resulted in the use of systematic synthetic phonics becoming compulsory in early 
reading education.  However, Wyse & Styles (2007) argue that a vast body of evidence sees 
phonics as one amongst a range of strategies and is concerned with only a particular aspect of 
reading.  The renewed focus on evidence may be better than earlier attempts by policy makers 
to determine how learning occurs, as in the National Strategies, but there remains a significant 
risk of relying on simplistic and linear accounts of learning. 
Complexity theory offers an account of causation which goes beyond simple cause and effect.  
The concept of emergence brings with it a rejection of simple causality and predictability, and 
this is appealing to educationalists because it corresponds to their experience of classrooms.  
Classrooms and learning are unpredictable, sensitive to context, and do not proceed through 
simple rules.  However, it is far from straightforward to relate complexity theory to a social 
situation such as a classroom.  Drawing on the first sketch of complexity that has been 
developed within this section, we will now turn to some of those difficulties in order to 
elucidate the problem that this thesis sets out to resolve.   
  
                                                          
7 Effect size is calculated by Hattie as Effect size = [Mean treatment – Mean control ]/ Standard Deviation 
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1.3 Defining the Problem 
1.3.1 A General Theory of Complexity 
Complexity theory appears to offer a way to account for the failure of simple causal 
explanations and associated technocratic approaches to education.  However, it is a double 
edged sword in that the very account of unique histories, unpredictable development and 
nonlinear and dynamic causality which holds the appeal, also denies the possibility of 
mechanisms which are common to all complex systems.  We have already seen that different 
academic disciplines utilise different terminology in relation to complexity.  Furthermore, we 
have seen that complex systems themselves are unpredictable, unique and develop in novel 
ways such that full descriptions of them are never possible, because we cannot account for 
infinitesimal differences or randomness within the system or environment, which might cause 
change. 
There are those who insist that for these reasons, complexity cannot be seen as a coherent 
subject at all.  This opposition takes several different forms, for example, Castellani & Hafferty 
argue that: 
͞“oĐial ĐoŵpleǆitǇ theoƌǇ is ŵoƌe a ĐoŶĐeptual fƌaŵeǁork than a traditional theory.  
Traditional theories, particularly scientific ones, try to explain things.  They provide 
concepts and causal connections (particularly when mathematical) that offer insight 
iŶto soŵe soĐial pheŶoŵeŶa…soĐial ĐoŵpleǆitǇ theoƌǇ is a sĐieŶtifiĐ fƌaŵeǁoƌk.͟ 
(Castellani & Hafferty, 2009, p. 34) 
BǇ CastellaŶi & HaffeƌtǇ͛s oǁŶ defiŶitioŶ ǁe ŵight still see ĐoŵpleǆitǇ as a theoƌǇ ĐoŶtaiŶiŶg 
concepts and causal connections: dynamic, nonlinear interactions leading to the emergence of 
novel structures.  The difficulty comes in that it is not simple to substantiate the theory as each 
situation will proceed by different causal mechanisms, despite being nonlinear and dynamic. 
Such concerns that complexity is not a coherent theory led many to adopt the label of 
complexity science over complexity theory, and this can be seen as an attempt by some 
authors to show that complexity is of greater stature than being a single theory.  Drawing on 
Castellani & Hafferty, Byrne & Callaghan go further in characterising complexity as related to a 
specific ontological position: 
͞ǁheŶ ǁe saǇ ĐoŵpleǆitǇ ͚theoƌǇ͛ ǁe ŵeaŶ ďǇ theoƌǇ a fƌaŵeǁoƌk foƌ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg 
which asserts the ontological position that much of the world and most of the social 
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worlds consists of complex systems and if we want to understand it we have to 
uŶdeƌstaŶd it iŶ those teƌŵs.͟ (Byrne & Callaghan, 2014, p. 8) 
So to Byrne & Callaghan, complexity theory contains the assumption that the social world is 
complex.  As we shall see in Chapter 2, there is a large range of ontological and epistemological 
claims made in the name of complexity theory, many of them at odds with each other.  Byrne 
& Callaghan are at the forefront of complex realism (see Section 2.3).  However, in linking 
complexity theory with a particular ontological position, it is fair to say that they are making a 
claim about what they think complexity theory should be and not what it currently is.  There 
are subtly different ontological positions even from within the complex realism camp.  For 
example, Allen & Boulton (2011) aƌgue that ƌealitǇ ͚just is͛ aŶd that it is ouƌ ŵodels of it that 
should be labelled as complex.  As such whilst ontological claims are being made in discussing 
complexity theory, they are not necessarily the same claims. 
Furthermore, many of those who might be considered as complexity scientists are not making 
ontological claims at all.  If a modeller feels the phenomenon is best described by nonlinear 
equations or algorithms, they may develop such a model without labelling it as complex.  As 
such, an implicit ontology will most likely be inherited from the field they are working in.  In a 
sense this is where mathematical and computational modelling is at an advantage over the 
social sciences, because there is no need to define complexity.  One simply develops a model 
which may or may not be described as complex once it is developed. 
Therefore, whilst we can take froŵ BǇƌŶe & CallaghaŶ͛s defiŶitioŶ that it has aŶ oŶtologiĐal 
character, complexity theory must also include the broad range of philosophical claims which 
are made and models which are developed without an a priori assumption of complexity. 
In fact, by considering the development of individual models, some authors point out that 
because every system is unique, we cannot logically consider complex systems as a set of 
phenomena beyond their not being simple.   
͞UŶdeƌ this ǀieǁ a ͞“ĐieŶĐe of CoŵpleǆitǇ͟ ŵakes Ŷo ŵoƌe seŶse thaŶ a ͞“ĐieŶĐe of 
Non-‘ed ThiŶgs͟, siŶĐe ďoth ƌed oďjeĐts aŶd siŵple sǇsteŵs aƌe the eǆĐeptioŶ ƌatheƌ 
thaŶ the ƌule.͟ (Edmonds, 2013, p. 2) 
Edmonds is primarily concerned with modelling social systems in order to develop new 
understandings of them.  So whilst he makes the point that trying to define a coherent science 
of complexity is futile, like many others he upholds that scientific research into complex 
systems, with the reduction that this entails, is a worthwhile pursuit. 
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Here we see that there is a difference between a theory, which has an ontological character as 
an overarching framework, and individual models, which may have implicit ontological 
assumptions but which are developed in relation to particular phenomena.  In this thesis we 
shall pay particular attention to models and as such they need defining here (and in the 
Glossary).  We will consider a model as a specific representation of a phenomenon including 
the understanding an individual has, a verbal or written account, or a mathematical or 
computational description of the phenomenon.  The focus on models as specific 
representations of the real world will become important when we distinguish our 
understandings of complex systems from our understandings within complex systems (see 
1.3.3).   
In terms of this distinction between models and theories, mathematical model theory may be 
of assistance: 
 ͞A theoƌǇ adŵits a ǀaƌietǇ of ŵodels.  The theoƌǇ is Ŷot a theoƌǇ of aŶǇ oŶe ŵodel iŶ 
particular, but theorizes an aspect of anything that happens to be a model for that 
theoƌǇ.͟ (Holdsworth, 2006, pp. 146-7)  
Although we are clearly stretching the formal mathematics of model theory in adapting it for 
our use here, this suggests a theory is constituted by a set of models but also theorises which 
models are permissible.  Under this definition we might allow complexity theory to be the set 
of all models which describe emergence from nonlinear and dynamic interactions.  We cannot 
assume a bottom-up relationship whereby complexity theory is just a set of models however, 
because the premises of complexity theory, such as nonlinear interactions and emergence, will 
also shape new models as they are formed.  A teacher, having read about complexity theory, 
may develop a new model of their classroom, but this model in turn may go on to influence 
how we define complexity theory.   
Therefore in defining complexity theory as it stands, and the models which are permissible 
within it, we need to examine the ontological assertions being made, as well as the models 
ďeiŶg used.  Thus, BǇƌŶe & CallaghaŶ͛s Đlaiŵ that ĐoŵpleǆitǇ theoƌǇ is ĐoŶĐeƌŶed ǁith ƌeal 
social systems which are complex becomes one possibility which will be scrutinised in Chapter 
2.  Alongside such realist claims there are reductionist claims that the social world is governed 
ďǇ uŶdeƌlǇiŶg ƌules, theƌe aƌe ͚post-stƌuĐtuƌalist͛ Đlaiŵs that ǁe ĐaŶŶot kŶoǁ hoǁ the ǁoƌld 
works at all and there are claims that the world is socially constructed.  Thus the battleground 
is set for the evaluation of theoretical claims about complex systems.  The models that are 
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permissible in describing classroom learning will depend upon the theoretical basis of 
complexity theory, and this is the primary focus of this thesis. 
1.3.2 Importing Concepts 
Complexity theory is difficult to define due to the unique nature of each system and the 
difficulty of claiming simple causal processes which can then be tested.  We have also seen 
that we must consider specific models and ontological positions, as well as the premises which 
make up the theory.  However, there are two further significant issues which arise as we 
attempt to move complexity theory from the scientific domain to consideration of social 
systems such as classrooms.  In subsection 1.3.3 we will consider the significant challenge of 
situating our understandings within complex systems, as well as considering our 
understandings of complex systems.  First though, we shall discuss the difficulties of bringing 
concepts from other domains into the consideration of social settings. 
A significant issue within the educational literature is the misapplication of notions from the 
physical or natural sciences by importing them into a description of an educational system 
ǁithout ĐƌitiĐal uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg.  As a Đase iŶ poiŶt, take Gilstƌap͛s desĐƌiptioŶ of diffeƌiŶg 
complexity perspectives: 
͞The ͚edge of Đhaos͛ philosophǇ ǁould eŶĐouƌage teaĐheƌs aŶd adŵiŶistƌatoƌs to 
utilize these amplification and dampening mechanisms to help a school thrive at a far 
from equilibrium level that pushes toward the bifurcation point yet never quite 
ƌeaĐhes it…  CoŶǀeƌselǇ, a puƌe dissipatiǀe stƌuĐtuƌes philosophǇ aƌgues that 
transformation takes place by pushing an organization into a chaotic cycle that 
eventuates bifurcation. In this manner, teachers and administrators would apply 
positive and negative feedback loops with the intent of causing a bifurcation that leads 
the organization to a potentially higher level of development... Each philosophy 
iŶĐoƌpoƌates PƌigogiŶe͛s ;ϭϵϲϳ, ϭϵϴϬͿ ǁoƌk͟ (Gilstrap, 2007, p. 59) 
It is fair to say that the approaches Gilstrap suggests contain significant misunderstanding of 
the physics of dissipative structures and that furthermore there is horrible misappropriation of 
concepts to the field of education.  In the above quote we see that chaotic cycles/episodes, 
aŶd ďifuƌĐatioŶs aƌe ĐoŶfused ďut fuƌtheƌŵoƌe lead to aŶ uŶspeĐified ͚higheƌ leǀel of 
deǀelopŵeŶt͛.  Elsewhere in the paper Gilstrap refers to entropy dissipating from a system and 
suggests that a bifurcation leads to the advent of two stable systems, showing a 
misunderstanding of both entropy and bifurcation diagrams.  Energy is referred to but there is 
Ŷo ƋuestioŶiŶg of ǁhat eŶeƌgǇ ŵight ŵeaŶ iŶ eduĐatioŶ aŶd ͚stƌess͛ is introduced as a concept 
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wholly unrelated to the perturbations that Prigogine talked of.  Gilstrap equates equilibrium to 
stable forms, practices or structures in education and is aligning being far from equilibrium 
with change.  Whilst descriptions such as this are easily critiqued with a basic understanding of 
physics, they are also poteŶtiallǇ daŶgeƌous should a teaĐheƌ atteŵpt to iŶĐite a ͚ĐhaotiĐ 
episode͛ iŶ his oƌ heƌ Đlassƌooŵ.  
Gilstrap draws from management literature where there are a range of extrapolations from 
complexity science of this type.  For example Overman (1996) advocates managers loosening 
their tight control procedures to allow change to occur and McMillan (2008, p. 124) suggests 
that once provided with a strong vision for the future a company should be allowed to self-
organise towards this, in the same way that termites organise their societies towards survival.  
Whilst such concepts can be easily identified as unfounded, there are others which have 
pervaded the educational literature and which need more subtle critique.  One such concept is 
that of ͚the edge of Đhaos͛.  GoldsteiŶ (2011) argues that the notion that complex systems 
always organise themselves close to a state in which they would undergo emergence, the edge 
of chaos, is based upon computational biology in the early 1990s which suggested that this 
was the case for simulations of evolution.  However, many of these studies have since been 
shown to have been deficient in how they accounted for the process of computation.   
This is not a knockout blow for the notion however.  Models of avalanches, earthquakes and 
stock markets suggest that such systems are prone to self-organisation into a critical state 
(Christensen & Moloney, 2005; Sornette, 2003, 2006).  This critical state might be seen as 
ƌelated to ͚the edge of Đhaos͛ aŶd deŶotes a state iŶ ǁhiĐh ĐhaŶge is ŵost likelǇ to oĐĐuƌ.  IŶ 
surveying a large range of such models, Frigg (2003) concludes that self-organised criticality 
(SOC) should not be seen as a general theory: 
͞the Đlaiŵ that “OC is uďiƋuitous is iŵpossiďle to ŵaiŶtaiŶ siŶĐe ŵost “OC ŵodels aƌe 
gross oversimplifications and cannot in any way be considered realistic descriptions of 
their target system. Nevertheless, a lot can be learned from the construction and the 
use of “OC ŵodels͟ (Frigg, 2003, p. 630) 
We see therefore that in the case of a concept such as the edge of chaos, there is not a simple 
misinterpretation of scientific terms but instead there are layers of interpretation from both 
the scientists who develop models and social scientists who go on to interpret what these 
models might suggest about a social system.  This highlights the danger of attempting to 
describe a system such as a classroom as complex.  Essentially we must draw on models from 
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the scientific literature in order to make tentative models about how a system such as a 
classroom behaves. 
These difficulties are what prompt authors to argue that aspects of social systems can only be 
ƌelated to Đoŵpleǆ sǇsteŵs as ͞aŶalogǇ͟ ;“taĐeǇ, ϮϬϬϯa; ϮϬϬϱͿ oƌ ͞ŵetaphoƌ͟ ;BǇƌŶe & 
Callaghan, 2014, p.6).  This framing as analogy is problematic because it not only rests on the 
quality of the original models being useful but then on there being a correspondence between 
those models and the completely different social phenomena they are applied to.  As Frigg 
comments, scientific models are often gross oversimplifications so what might be considered 
by many as being hard science is no less a process of tentative model making.  If such models 
aƌe takeŶ, as “taĐeǇ suggests, as a ͞souƌĐe doŵaiŶ͟ foƌ aŶalogies about social systems we see 
that we are building models which are themselves inspired by models, but we are furthermore 
attempting to in some way justify those latter models without reference to the social systems 
at all.  When we make a statement about learning in classrooms, we need that statement to be 
accountable to what we see in classrooms, and not to models of evolution or earthquakes or 
to mathematical equations (this argument will be develop in Chapter 6). 
We have already shown that understanding models as specific accounts allows us to 
distinguish them from broader theoretical considerations of complexity.  We here further the 
notion that any description of a system should be labelled as a model.  This is the case no 
matter what the system, although of course we will focus on pupils and classrooms, and it is 
the case no matter whether the description is narrative, mathematical, computational or 
empirical.  With this premise, this thesis will develop a proper account of the roles of models in 
understanding complex systems and this will provide a basis for evaluating models of learning 
in classrooms.  Indeed, Keshavarez et al. (2010) suggest a number of ways in which schools do 
not behave the same as complex systems in the natural sciences, for example because 
although ͚ethos͛ ĐaŶ iŶflueŶĐe aĐtioŶ aŶd ĐoŶtƌol, it is not distributed across all agents.  As 
such we also need to be mindful that complexity might not be the best model of classrooms at 
all. 
1.3.3 Extrapolating from Complexity 
The characterisatioŶ of soĐial sǇsteŵs as ͚aŶalogous to͛ sĐieŶtifiĐ ŵodels Ŷot oŶlǇ ŵasks the 
need to justify such descriptions but it also results in authors being overzealous in 
extrapolating insights from their models to the broader world.  For example, following 
PrigogiŶe͛s pioŶeeƌiŶg ǁoƌk iŶ eǆplaiŶiŶg ĐoŵpleǆitǇ iŶ ĐheŵiĐal sǇsteŵs, he also ǁeŶt oŶ to 
consider how this could be applied to society.  Below we can see that just 15 pages after he 
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expresses caution about overstating the significance of his work, he gets caught up in doing 
just that:   
͞ǁe haǀe to ďe Đaƌeful; huŵaŶ ďeiŶgs aƌe Ŷot dǇŶaŵiĐ oďjeĐts͟ (Prigogine & Stengers, 
1984, p. 298) 
͞We Ŷoǁ kŶoǁ that societies are complex systems involving a potentially enormous 
number of bifurcations exemplified by the variety of cultures that have evolved in the 
ƌelatiǀelǇ shoƌt spaŶ of huŵaŶ histoƌǇ͟ (Prigogine & Stengers, 1984, p. 313) 
Whilst it should be recognised that Prigogine & Stengers did not adhere to the specific use of 
the term complexity that we do today, these quotes illustrate a tendency to stray into 
discussion of social systems, despite an awareness of the pitfalls of this.  Kohler proposes that: 
͞BeĐause ǁe see a fit ďetǁeeŶ soŵe of ouƌ aĐtioŶs aŶd the uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶgs that ǁe 
have built about the world, we are tempted to assume that all our actions, and those 
of others, are generated by those meanings and are (literally) meaningless without 
theŵ.͟ (Kohler, 2000, pp. 5-6) 
This might be reframed in the adage that if the only tool you have is a hammer, then every 
problem looks like a nail.  In education, this manifests as authors reconsidering existing notions 
of learning in light of complexity, as we do in this thesis.  But again we must guard against 
unsupported extrapolation. 
Several educationalists link emergence from interactions in complex systems with Vygotsky͛s 
(1978) account of learning through social interaction (Davis & Sumara, 2006; van Geert, 2000; 
Brown, 2013).  As a case in point, Jörg (2004, 2009) aƌgues that VǇgotskǇ͛s lateƌ ǁoƌk laid the 
fouŶdatioŶs of a ͞geŶeƌatiǀe theoƌǇ of deǀelopŵeŶt͟ foĐused upoŶ ƌeĐiprocal interactions in 
classrooms.  This, Jöƌg Đlaiŵs, alloǁs foƌ a ͞ƌethiŶkiŶg͟ of eduĐatioŶ as ͞aŶ eŵeƌgeŶt pƌoĐess 
esseŶtiallǇ deǀelopiŶg ǁithout a ĐeŶtƌal ageŶĐǇ, aŶd, theƌefoƌe ďeǇoŶd ƌeal ĐoŶtƌol͟ (Jörg, 
2009, p. 10).  Jörg moves from an argument about why we do not understand the role of 
interactions in the classroom (because they are complex), to arguing that the study of 
iŶteƌaĐtioŶs appƌoaĐhes ͞a Ŷeǁ, ĐoŵpleǆitǇ sĐieŶĐe of leaƌŶiŶg aŶd eduĐatioŶ͟ (Jörg, Davis & 
Nickmans, 2007, P. 145).  Importing terms from complexity is not enough to develop a new 
science: we need new models.  The appeal to a general form of complexity allows authors like 
Jöƌg to aƌgue, iŶ a seeŵiŶglǇ ƌeasoŶaďle ǁaǇ, foƌ appƌoaĐhes that ͞geŶeƌate͟ oƌ ͞haƌŶess͟ 
ĐoŵpleǆitǇ, oƌ suggest that ǁe ĐaŶ deǀelop a ͞full uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of ĐoŵpleǆitǇ͟ oƌ that ͞paƌt 
of the answer seems to be in developing the art of stepping outside the system we are in, and 
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taking a different view: a view from the outside.͟ (Jörg, 2004, p. 129).  Yet complexity is 
neither something that can be generated or harnessed, or that we can step outside of.   
Furthermore, in direct response to Jörg (2009), Biesta (2009) shows that talking about 
interactions is far from talking about a science of education.  Education involves purpose, 
process and content (Osberg & Biesta, 2008).  Because complexity theory shows how 
interactions lead to the emergence of dynamic structures, it is reasonable to suggest that 
interactions are important in understanding dynamics within the classroom.  However, we 
cannot jump from this suggestion to making claims about how learning occurs.   
The reason for the proliferation of loose models and analogies in relation to complexity in the 
social sciences is the lack of a sound theoretical framework in which to evaluate and critique 
models.  The concepts associated with emergence in Table 1b are consistent with the scientific 
domains that they are rooted within.  Only recently have there been attempts to understand 
and define the theoretical basis of complexity theory within the social sciences and there has 
been very little theoretical discussion in education to date.  Thus, by establishing a theoretical 
basis for complexity in education, and positioning models of classrooms within that 
framework, this thesis aims to provide a basis for the development of models which are 
appropriate to classroom learning (this is the focus of Chapter 6). 
1.3.4 Understanding Of Versus Understanding Within  
We have established that in defining a system such as a classroom as complex there are 
difficulties in relating specific models to theoretical positions, and there are difficulties in how 
we utilise concepts from the natural sciences in relation to social situations.  These are both 
issues with how we understand complex systems.  However, when we consider social 
situations as complex we encounter a further class of problems, namely, in how we situate 
human understanding.  Chapter 2 is devoted to exploring how existing positions characterise 
understanding and there we shall define the term more clearly.  Here however we shall take 
first steps in highlighting why this is not straightforward. 
In Section 1.2 we saw that nonlinear and dynamic influences mean that complex systems are 
unpredictable in the long term.  Accompanied with this insight is the realisation that because 
we cannot have an infinitely accurate representation of a complex system or its environment 
and/or because there is inherent randomness in the system, we cannot have complete 
understanding of complex systems.  This means that our understandings of complex systems 
are necessarily deficient.  This immediately opposes complexity theory to positivist 
epistemologies which claim we are devising truths about the world.  As we shall see in Chapter 
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2, accounts of complexity theory as pragmatic, post-structuralist, constructionist and realist 
are all advocated within the existing literature and are at odds.  We therefore need to situate 
our understandings of complex systems in order to find a road towards describing classroom 
leaƌŶiŶg as Đoŵpleǆ.  BǇ ͚situate͛, ǁe heƌe ŵeaŶ eǆploƌe the ĐhaƌaĐteƌ that is giǀeŶ to huŵaŶ 
understandings, the ontological positioning of them and the associated epistemology of how 
they are related to the world.  For example, we will see that agent based models assume a 
mechanistic process by which humans process inputs according to equations or algorithms 
(subsection 2.1.2).  The ontological assumption of this is that human understanding/processing 
oĐĐuƌs iŶ the ďƌaiŶ as a ŵateƌial pƌoĐess, aŶd that episteŵologiĐallǇ ageŶts ͚kŶoǁ͛ aďout the 
world through processing information by fixed rules.  Of course, this is not an adequate 
account of human learning, but by exploring the existing descriptions from the complexity 
literature we will identify the pitfalls and avenues open for describing learning in classrooms. 
As well as the difficulty of establishing which theoretical positions are commensurate with 
complexity theory, there is a seŶse iŶ ǁhiĐh soĐial situatioŶs aƌe ͚ŵoƌe Đoŵpleǆ͛ thaŶ Ŷatuƌal 
systems.  This is intuitively attractive, because not only are the humans within these systems 
different to one another and themselves complex, but there is also the necessary inclusion of 
systems of meaning which we see as particular to humans: language, resources, technology 
etĐ.  Despite this iŶtuitiǀe justifiĐatioŶ though, it is diffiĐult to estaďlish ǁhat a gƌeateƌ ͚leǀel of 
ĐoŵpleǆitǇ͛ ŵight ƌefeƌ to aŶd hoǁ ǁe ŵight judge the ƌelatiǀe Đomplexity of systems. 
What is clear however is that humans cannot be seen as being unaware of their surroundings 
in the same way as molecules in a chemical system, or ants within a colony.  Humans have 
understandings of their own, which influence the way they act and learn.  We have already 
argued that our understanding of complex systems can only be partial but when we recognise 
that humans are also part of complex systems we begin to see the problem at hand: humans 
within complex systems have partial understandings.  So humans are neither entirely unaware 
of their surroundings, nor are humans fully aware of the minutiae of their environment and 
influences upon it.  We also know that human understanding develops in the light of 
experience and we might define this as learning in the broadest sense.   
Our theoretical account must be able to situate (partial) understandings within complex 
systems and how these change over time, particularly in any account of learning.  We must 
also situate language, mathematics, art and everything else that contributes to human 
understanding within social systems.  This is no easy task and immediately highlights the 
challenges of describing social systems as complex.  We see therefore that in order to consider 
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our understandings of complex systems we must also situate our understandings within 
complex systems. 
It is easy to see that dealing with complex social systems quickly escapes the realm of 
traditional scientific endeavour and enters the domain of philosophy.  Ontological 
considerations around language and symbolic meaning relative to the real world rub up 
against epistemological considerations of how we understand the situations we are part of.  In 
Chapter 2 we shall see that there is considerable friction in existing accounts. 
However, what is arguably more challenging still is then turning the realisation that our 
uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶgs aƌe soĐiallǇ situated ͚iŶ oŶ itself͛ aŶd ƌeĐogŶisiŶg that the desĐƌiptioŶs ǁe 
propose of complex social systems must themselves be part of a social system.  So this thesis 
itself must be seen as the product of complex social processes, as indeed are all models.  
Wheƌeas lookiŶg at a ĐheŵiĐal sǇsteŵ ŵight alloǁ a detaĐhŵeŶt aŶd a seŶse of lookiŶg ͚fƌoŵ 
the outside͛, Ŷo suĐh pƌiǀileged positioŶs eǆists in relation to social systems.   
Therefore, before we can develop specific models of learning within a classroom there are 
considerable theoretical issues to be addressed.  As an opening position therefore we will 
characterise learning as the adaptation of understanding within a complex social system.  A 
Glossary of Key Terms is included at the end of this thesis to aid the reader.  Here we are using 
͚uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg͛ to deŶote the peƌĐeptioŶ of aŶ iŶdiǀidual ǁhiĐh ĐhaŶges ǁith eǆpeƌieŶĐe.  We 
will later relate this to shaƌed uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶgs aĐƌoss people aŶd ͚ĐoŶĐepts͛ ;Chapteƌ ϱ aŶd ϳ 
respectively).  As was posed in Section 1.1, the issue at hand is how we situate understandings 
within complex systems.  In Chapter 2 we will therefore consider how existing positions 
account for individual understandings, before considering shared understandings later in the 
thesis.  
We have thus set out the parts of the problem to be addressed within this thesis.  Firstly, 
complex systems as involving the nonlinear and dynamic interaction of influences are difficult 
to define by their very nature.  Each system is unique, sensitive and unpredictable over long 
timescales.  Social situations present considerable further challenges however.  The second 
challenge is that we cannot import descriptions and terminology from other domains because 
they are likely to be inappropriate in describing social situations which include language, 
technology, art, music and everything else which characterises humanity.  Thirdly, we cannot 
claim to be outside of the systems we are investigating.  As well as recognising that our 
understandings are necessarily incomplete we must also recognise that those understandings 
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are part of the very systems we wish to describe.  Describing classroom learning through the 
lens of complexity therefore requires first tackling these inherent theoretical difficulties. 
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1.4 The Thesis 
1.4.1 The Destination 
Having defined complexity theory and outlined the problems of applying it to classrooms we 
are now in a position to say something of the solution to these issues.  The thesis, that is, the 
argument being proposed in this work, is that reconciling complexity theory and learning 
requires the recognition that everything within a classroom has a material basis.   
We will show that the issues which plague existing accounts of social complexity stem from 
failure to situate learning as a material process which takes place within complex, yet material, 
systems.  This failure takes several forms.  Drawing upon what we will label post-structuralist 
discourses from the latter part of the last century, several authors have highlighted the 
dynamic and complex nature of our understandings in relation to the world (see Section 2.2).  
Complexity supports a view of our understandings as incomplete and as inherently linked to 
our linguistic and symbolic systems.  These systems are themselves complex and as such any 
simple relationship between the world and our understandings of it is to be challenged.  
However, the picture developed within post-structuralist accounts is of systems of 
understanding which are only tentatively linked to the complex world.  The separation of the 
real world and our understandings is problematic and we will show that it stems from 
dialectical philosophy.  A materialist frame allows us to see that our understandings are 
themselves emergent from the material world: from our brains, bodies and symbolic systems 
which are part of a single, material system. 
We also see a separation between our understandings and the world when both scientists and 
social scientists describe complex social systems (Sections 2.1 and 2.3 respectively).  Often the 
relationship between a model and the real world is not fully considered.  However, scientists 
who do engage with such issues fall into the trap of situating our descriptions as somehow 
outside of ƌealitǇ ͚lookiŶg iŶ͛.  Whilst theǇ aƌe ƌight to asseƌt the ƌealitǇ of the ǁorld, the 
resistance of complex systems to reduction means that we cannot justify the claim that some 
models are more accurate than others, because no model can precisely represent a complex 
system.  Furthermore we can no longer sustain the dualist position inherent in scientific 
modelling; if we separate models and the world then no account can be given for how the two 
interact.  A materialist frame cuts through these problems by recognising that our models and 
descriptions are also part of the material world and emerge in relation to the phenomena they 
describe.  Our understandings have a material basis in our brains and the symbolic artefacts 
(words, media, tools etc.) we use. 
27 
 
The final way in which existing positions do not adequately situate learning as material is in 
adopting the view that the social world is constructed in our minds (Section 2.4).  Such a view 
has appeal because it allows the role of social interaction in constructing shared 
understandings.  However, in considering complex systems we once again come to the issue of 
how our minds and the material world can be adequately separated, yet be seen as 
dynamically interacting.  Furthermore, by favouring the co-construction of meaning these 
positions cannot account for how we learn from the material world beyond social interaction.  
Characterising learning as a material process allows us to see learning from the social world as 
categorically the same as learning from the material world. 
A materialist position is thus able to account for how we learn from the world around us and 
from each other, yet situate this learning as emergent from the interactions of matter8.  
However, developing a materialist position in relation to social complexity is not as simple (or 
simplistic) as it may initially seem.  Describing ideas, understandings and models as material 
requires careful explanation and the overcoming of a number of barriers.  Firstly, a materialist 
position must be separated from any connotation of mechanistic or deterministic process.  
Seeing learning as having a material basis does not necessitate that it can be reduced to that 
basis.  As we have already discussed (in subsection 1.2.4), complex systems are indeterminate 
because of the importance of nonlinear interactions and sensitivity to context, even if we do 
not allow randomness at the subatomic level.  Thus combining a materialist view with 
understanding of complex systems escapes the need for determinism and allows novelty 
within social systems.  This will be important in considering how new understandings emerge 
from context in the classroom.   
We shall label the position developed in this thesis as complex materialism.  The adoption of a 
new title should not be seen as an act of arrogance however; it is intended to separate the 
positioŶ fƌoŵ ͚Đoŵpleǆ ƌealism͛ ǁhilst takiŶg ŵuĐh fƌoŵ it, as ǁell as sǇŶthesisiŶg it ǁith soŵe 
of the arguŵeŶts ǁhiĐh aƌe Đlassified as ͚post-stƌuĐtuƌalist ĐoŵpleǆitǇ͛ iŶ Chapteƌ Ϯ. The 
adoption of the term complex materialism also allows shorthand reference to the position 
developed within this thesis. 
Complex materialism avoids a mechanistic or determinist view of learning by situating 
emergence within a materialist frame.  Yet there are further barriers to be overcome.  In order 
to sustain a materialist position we are forced to explain how we have shared understandings 
                                                          
8 We ǁill defiŶe ͚ŵatteƌ͛ iŶ its ďƌoadest seŶse to iŶĐlude eŶeƌgǇ, foƌĐes aŶd otheƌ aspeĐts of the 
͚ŵateƌial͛ uŶiǀeƌse ;see ϯ.ϭ.ϭͿ. 
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of the world, without relying upon a realm of ideas beyond matter.  To resolve this we will 
explore processes by which we learn from each other and situate these within a materialist 
frame.  This will lead to an account of how we learn from patterns of behaviour and patterns 
of association through the adaptation of our brains.   
Within a materialist frame we must also characterise our models of classrooms as material.  
The implication within existing literature is that models can be improved by capturing more of 
the original phenomenon through empirical data (see Chapter 2).  However, this is challenged 
on two counts: firstly, in a complex system any specific detail may become important and thus 
a ͚ŵoƌe Đoŵpleǆ͛ ŵodel is Ŷo guaƌaŶtee of pƌediĐtiŶg hoǁ the oƌigiŶal pheŶoŵeŶoŶ ǁill 
develop; secondly, the implication is that our models are able to replicate the causal processes 
of complex systems but it is not clear why this should be the case.  The problem of modelling 
thus becomes an important theme within this thesis as we cannot separate learning within 
classrooms from learning about classrooms.  We will situate models as themselves having a 
material basis in brains, computers and media, and emerging within social systems (e.g. those 
of research, policy and practice).  Models of classrooms can be linked to what they model by 
the processes of their genesis and by humans evaluating the similarities between the two.  An 
analogy we shall return to several times is that of a photograph, which models a scene through 
responding to the pattern of light from the scene at its movement of genesis, but which is 
evaluated as a useful model by people after the event.  Consideration of models thus allows us 
to see the implications of complex materialism for researching and reflecting upon classrooms.   
In a complex, materialist frame we must recognise that our representations of the world are 
not accurate, complete understandings.  Nor are they related to a supernatural world of ideas 
or predetermined truths.  Both our individual understandings and our shared models should 
be seen as having a material basis in brains, bodies, symbols and tools.  They condition and are 
conditioned by human action and are therefore constantly developing.  Thus, the material 
world and the social world of understandings are one and the same: a world of complex 
interactions in which history, context and dynamics are ever important.  This offers a 
significantly different view of learning to those which dominate contemporary educational 
literature. 
1.4.2 Signposting the Route 
Having outlined some of the difficulties and necessary detours in developing the position of 
complex materialism, we will here sketch out how the structure of the thesis allows these 
themes to develop. 
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In Section 1.2 we developed a working definition of complexity theory and its appeal in 
education, whilst Section 1.3 began the process of defining the problem addressed within this 
thesis.  There we saw that the uniqueness of complex systems means that we cannot justify 
importing concepts from the natural sciences in exploration of classrooms.  Furthermore, we 
saw that social complexity presents a series of additional problems in that humans have partial 
understandings of the world, and that this makes problematic the distinction between 
understandings of complex systems and understanding within complex systems.  Chapter 2 
continues the process of elucidating the problem at hand, by considering existing accounts of 
social complexity.  It is divided into two parts in order to aid the reader.  Chapter 2a firstly 
considers the approaches that scientists use in complex social systems (Section 2.1).  It is 
simplistic to say that all scientists apply a reductionist view and many recognise the limitations 
of their models.  However, human understanding is not adequately accounted for in 
contemporary scientific models.  In Section 2.2 we will then turn to what might be considered 
as the opposite extreme of accounting for human complexity: linking it to post-structuralist 
discourse.  The consequence of this is that understandings are seen as dynamic, transient and 
limited, which brings into question whether our understandings can provide accurate 
representations of the world.   
Chapteƌ Ϯď foĐuses oŶ ͚the ŵiddle gƌouŶd͛ ǁheƌeďǇ authoƌs attempt to recognise the 
limitations of understandings but also recover the capacity to better improve those 
understandings.  In Section 2.3 the position known as complex realism is considered, which 
asserts the reality and complexity of the social world and the utility of social scientific methods 
in engaging with it.  The position of complex responsive processes, considered in Section 2.4, 
instead exemplifies a social constructionist epistemology which sees meaning as generated 
through social interaction.  Chapter 2 thus evaluates four positions: complexity science, post-
structuralist complexity, complex realism and social construction in complex systems.  Suffice 
to say here that whilst each of these approaches has merit, none of them adequately accounts 
for the processes of learning within complex systems.     
Through critique of positions within the existing literature we will develop a set of criteria for 
situating learning within a complex social system such as a classroom.  A theoretical position 
must do three things: it must be able to account for the role that the real world plays in 
developing our understandings, it must situate our understandings relative to this real world 
and it must account for how our models and understandings develop within complex social 
30 
 
systems.  Over Chapters 3, 4 and 5 we will develop the position of complex materialism to 
meet these criteria.   
Section 3.1 provides an initial overview of how complex materialism will resolve these issues 
and is intended to orientate the reader as to the arguments developed across Chapters 3, 4 
aŶd ϱ.  “eĐtioŶ ϯ.Ϯ outliŶes the ͚flat oŶtologǇ͛ ǁhiĐh is adapted fƌoŵ Deleuze͛s (2004a [1968]) 
materialist position and which sees our understandings as part of the material world.  This also 
provides us with first steps in accounting for how experience leads to the development of 
understanding, that is, to learning.  We will see that this immediately has advantages over 
social constructionist approaches in being able to account for learning beyond social 
interaction, but also that we can overcome some of the issues that post-structuralist 
complexity suffers from.   
Despite having immediate advantages over existing accounts of social complexity, the 
materialist position derived from Deleuze in Chapter 3 has two limitations.  Firstly, in 
desĐƌiďiŶg hoǁ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg Đoŵes fƌoŵ ƌepeated eǆpeƌieŶĐes, Deleuze͛s aĐĐouŶt laĐks the 
detail required to be of use to educationalists.  It requires explanation of both the specific 
processes by which learning occurs from experience and an account of how we learn from 
otheƌ people.  “eĐoŶdlǇ, Deleuze utilises a ŶotioŶ of ͚ǀiƌtual Đauses͛, ǁhiĐh oŶ fiƌst sight ŵight 
be seen as the potential for a past event to influence us in the present, and as a way of 
replacing the notioŶ of futuƌe ͚possiďilities͛ ;ǁhiĐh eǆist ďeǇoŶd the ŵateƌial ǁoƌldͿ.  Whilst we 
must elucidate the role this notion plays in a materialist framework, we will show that it may 
be overcome. 
Chapter 4 therefore sets out to provide a specific model for how we learn from experience and 
how this is a material process, whilst not relying upon virtual causes.  In Section 4.1 we will 
draw on existing accounts which link complexity theory to neuroscience and show that the 
brain can be considered as a complex system itself which adapts to stimuli.  Section 4.2 
expands this to consider models of how behaviour adapts to experience.  We will conclude 
that whilst we are still some way off understanding the specific details of how our brains and 
behaviour adapt, it is reasonable to characterise learning as a material process.  Furthermore, 
consideration of brain and behaviour as complex systems provides a concrete account of why 
our representations of the world cannot be seen as accurate and complete: we develop 
responses to the world which are distributed across our neural systems.  Thus we are able to 
situate learning as a material process within complex systems without appeal to anything 
beyond the interaction of matter.   
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By the end of Chapter 4 we will be able to situate learning as a material process and provide a 
model for how this involves the adaptation of brain and behaviour.  However, whilst this 
resolves the issues in situating learning within complex systems, it does not adequately 
describe classroom learning.  We must recognise that much of the learning we do is from other 
people and from the world of symbols and tools that humans have created.  Chapter 5 thus 
takes up the challenge of accounting for how we learn from each other.  This is not a 
straightforward task within a materialist frame because ǁe ŵust ƌeĐogŶise eǀeƌǇoŶe͛s 
experience as unique and account for our symbolic systems also being dynamic and complex.  
Building upon the model of learning developed in Chapter 4 we will show that pupils engage 
with patterns of behaviour and patterns of association which are repeated in classrooms.  
However, every instance of these patterns is unique in its context and history, and this allows 
for novel understandings to emerge.   
The position we have labelled complex materialism therefore contains a materialist ontology 
which is developed in Chapter 3, a specific account of how learning can be seen as adaptation 
of brain and behaviour to the material world in Chapter 4, and an extension of this to 
describing social learning in Chapter 5.  The synthesis of existing models of neural and social 
ĐoŵpleǆitǇ ǁith a ͚flat oŶtologǇ͛, iŶ ǁhiĐh ouƌ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶgs haǀe a ŵateƌial ďasis, aŶsǁeƌs 
the challenges of situating learning within complex social systems.   
However, in undermining the capacity to situate understandings as outside of social systems, 
we can no longer assume that models have a simple correspondence to the world they model.  
This has implications for describing and researching classrooms.  In Chapter 6 we will consider 
how the position developed in this thesis suggests that our models also have a material basis 
and are situated within complex social systems.  As such, Chapter 6 both meets the criteria of 
being able to situate our models (set out in Chapter 2), but also sheds new light on how 
teachers and researchers understand classrooms. 
Chapter 7 further considers the implications of complex materialism by relating it to existing 
discourses around learning.  Learning as a material and complex process is opposed to notions 
aƌouŶd the ͚effeĐtiǀeŶess͛ of leaƌŶiŶg ǁhiĐh seek to measure and control learning (Section 
7.1).  Notions of learning as the acquisition of concepts are also challenged by the account 
given in this thesis of understanding as emergent from brain, behaviour and context (Section 
7.2).  Finally, these objections to simplistic and representational notions of learning are 
brought together in order to both support and extend current critiques of curricula as 
representing the world (Section 7.3).  
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The structure of this thesis therefore supports the argument that learning within complex 
systems is best accounted for through a materialist frame.  This chapter and Chapter 2 identify 
the issues with existing accounts.  Chapters 3, 4 and 5 develop the solution: the position of 
complex materialism.  Chapters 6 and 7 consider the implications for describing classrooms 
and considering learning respectively.  Chapter 8, the conclusion and evaluation, will bring 
together the threads of the argument to show how this thesis presents a view of learning 
which exceeds contemporary accounts of social complexity and thus meets the focuses of 
establishing a theoretical basis for applying complexity theory to classroom learning and 
evaluating its implications.   
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2a Human Understanding in Complexity Science and Post-
Structuralist Accounts  
2.0 Chapter Introduction 
In Section 1.3 we considered the nature of the problem that this thesis attempts to overcome.  
Complexity theory challenges the assumptions of simple causal processes and also our capacity 
to fully predict or explain complex systems.  This is because influences interact in a nonlinear 
and dynamic way and are highly context-specific.  This also means that complex systems are 
difficult to define and this is especially true of social systems in which heterogeneous elements 
interact, many of which, for example individual humans, might be considered complex entities 
themselves.  As such, the key notion of emergence is yet to be clearly defined within social 
systems. 
However, perhaps the greatest challenge is in recognising that all our understandings are part 
of complex social systems, so the models we build of complex systems, must also be situated 
within complex systems.  Our understandings can only be partial and tentative.  This chapter 
will expound the difficulties in describing understandings of and within complex systems by 
undertaking a critical review of the existing literature.  This review is focused on the way that 
human understanding is characterised and situated in contemporary complexity research. 
IŶ suďseĐtioŶ ϭ.ϯ.ϯ ǁe highlighted the foĐus upoŶ ͚uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg͛ aŶd hoǁ it is ͚situated͛ ďut it 
is worthwhile repeating and expanding upon the use of these terms here.  The aim of this 
thesis is to provide a basis for describing how learning takes place within complex social 
systems, particularly classrooms.  As will become apparent however, the existing literature 
contains a range of different ways to include humans within complex systems.  In Section 2.1 
we shall see that they are treated as agents who process information and act according to 
algorithms; alternatively humans are seen as nodes within a network, or as obeying statistical 
relationships.  These aĐĐouŶts ĐaŶŶot ďe ĐoŶsideƌed to iŶĐlude ͚leaƌŶiŶg͛ though, ďeĐause theǇ 
eitheƌ ƌeduĐe huŵaŶ aĐtioŶ to fiǆed algoƌithŵs, oƌ doŶ͛t ĐoŶsideƌ thought pƌoĐesses at all ;e.g. 
when considering how network structure influences people).  It is worthwhile exploring these 
appƌoaĐhes hoǁeǀeƌ, ďeĐause theǇ alloǁ us to see ďoth the ͚state of the aƌt͛ iŶ teƌŵs of 
modelling but also to highlight the deficiencies and limitations of such approaches in relation 
to considering learning in classrooms.  In order to cast our net wide enough to explore 
contemporary literature we are forced to begin by considering how existing accounts of social 
ĐoŵpleǆitǇ ĐhaƌaĐteƌise huŵaŶ ƌespoŶse, thought, oƌ ƌelatioŶships.  The teƌŵ ͚uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg͛ 
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is thus used initially as a broad term to allow discussion of the myriad of ways that humans are 
considered in the existing literature. 
The teƌŵ ͚uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg͛ has two other advantages however.  Firstly, if we define learning as 
the ͚ŵodifiĐatioŶ of uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg͛ theŶ this broad definition allows us to include various 
processes which might not be traditionally labelled as learning, for example, when the 
ƌelatioŶs iŶ a Ŷetǁoƌk ĐhaŶge oǀeƌ tiŵe.  “eĐoŶdlǇ though, ͚uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg͛ is a teƌŵ ǁhiĐh 
captures not just how the agents or subjects within a model respond but also the nature of the 
models themselves. For example, we have argued against descriptions of social systems as 
͞ŵetaphoƌ͟ ;BǇƌŶe & CallaghaŶ, ϮϬϭϰ, p. 6) or ͞aŶalogǇ͟ ;“taĐeǇ, 2003a; 2005) to systems in 
the natural sciences.  These are accounts of our understanding of complex systems.  So the 
teƌŵ ͚uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg͛ ĐaŶ ďe used iŶ ƌelatioŶ to desĐƌiptioŶs of complex systems, as well as in 
relation to the responses of people within complex systems.  We will see within this chapter 
that complex realists (Section 2.3) and social constructionists (2.4) imply a difference between 
our models of complex systems and their accounts of human understanding within complex 
systems, whereas pragmatists (2.1.6) and post-structuralists (2.2.4) actively resist such 
separation.   
“iŵilaƌ to the deliďeƌate use of the ďƌoadest teƌŵ possiďle aƌouŶd huŵaŶ ͚uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg͛, this 
thesis ǁill ƌelǇ upoŶ the ǁoƌd ͚situate͛ to deŶote the ĐhaƌaĐteƌ that is giǀeŶ to huŵaŶ 
understandings by various authors.  Again, the separation of ontological and epistemological 
concerns is denied by pragmatists and post-structuralists, but complex realists favour 
ontological claims over epistemological claims, and social constructionists might be said to 
favour the converse.  As such the lines between ontology and epistemology are in contention, 
aŶd the teƌŵ ͚situate͛ is used as aŶ uŵďƌella teƌŵ to sigŶifǇ the theoƌetiĐal ĐhaƌaĐteƌ of eaĐh 
position, the exposition of which is the aim of this chapter. 
“iŵplǇ defiŶiŶg the teƌŵs ͚uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg͛ aŶd ͚situate͛ hiŶts at the huge diǀeƌsitǇ of 
theoretical considerations which will be covered within this chapter.  However, the links 
between contemporary approaches to describing human understandings and their theoretical 
basis is rarely clear.  For example, complexity scientists build specific models, and their 
theoretical underpinnings often go undiscussed (Section 2.1).  Similarly complex realism is 
associated with social science methodology which seeks to describe complex systems, for 
example through comparative case study (subsection 2.3.4).  The specific approaches used by 
these researchers colour their ontological and epistemological assumptions.  However, post-
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structuralists (2.2) and social constructionists (2.4) appear to have the converse issue in that 
the theoretical positions they develop come unstuck when applied to specific cases. 
The necessity of starting with broad terminology and exploring both specific models and 
broader theoretical accounts allows us to approach the breadth and diversity of existing 
complexity accounts.  However, it is worth reconsidering the destination of this thesis (as 
sketched in Section 1.4.1), as well as how this chapter allows us to approach that destination.  
In Chapter 3 we will begin to develop the position of complex materialism, which includes a 
materialist ontology and recognition that humans recognise patterns within the world, 
including within complex social systems.  The job of Chapter 2 therefore is to demonstrate the 
necessity of this position but also establish why existing accounts are lacking.  We will also 
show why only the proposed position is able to overcome these issues and adequately account 
for learning within complex systems. 
The classification of four distinct positions within the existing literature stems from Richardson 
& Cillieƌs͛ (2001) analysis of the state of complexity science at the turn of the century.  Their 
ĐlassifiĐatioŶs of ͞ƌeduĐtioŶist ĐoŵpleǆitǇ sĐieŶĐe͟, ͞soft ĐoŵpleǆitǇ sĐieŶĐe͟ aŶd ͞ĐoŵpleǆitǇ 
thiŶkiŶg͟ haǀe ďeeŶ ĐoŶsideƌaďlǇ adapted thƌoughout the doĐtoƌal studǇ.  The ƌesultiŶg fouƌ 
positions discussed in this chapter are organised into two subchapters in order to aid the 
reader.  Table 2 provides an overview of the main features and issues faced by the four distinct 
positions explored within this chapter. 
By contrasting the issues within existing accounts of human understanding within complex 
systems, this chapter will establish the need for a better theoretical position.  It will show that 
such a position must consolidate the need for reference to the real world and the recognition 
that our understandings within that world are dynamic and incomplete.  To do so requires an 
account of how our models relate to the social systems we wish to describe.  Such an account 
must pay attention to the limitations of understanding whilst allowing that the real world has a 
role to play in this understanding. 
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Table 2 – Overview of Complexity Approaches and Theoretical Issues 
 
 
 
 
  
Complexity 
Approach 
Features Theoretical Issues 
Complexity Science  Generation of models using 
scientific processes.  Often claims to be 
͚pƌagŵatiĐ͛. 
 
 Inherits positivist terminology 
suĐh as ͚uŶiǀeƌsal laǁs͛.   Models often lack empirical 
referents.  Theoretical basis of models 
often neglected. 
Post-structuralist 
Complexity Thinking 
 Rejection of 
representation.  Blurring of epistemology 
and ontology as 
mind/matter seen as same 
system.  Recognition that 
understandings are 
transient. 
 Rejection of empirical evidence 
removes criteria for assessing 
models.  Unable to resolve how people 
act in complex systems with 
only partial understandings. 
Complex Realism  Asserts the causal influence 
of macroscopic social 
entities, e.g. a classroom, 
school, society.  Asserts importance of 
empirical referents. 
 Inherits separation of mind and 
matter.  Aspires to ͚ŵoƌe ƌealistiĐ͛ 
models which is problematic in 
complex systems. 
Complex Responsive 
Processes 
 Mind situated as outside 
brain.  Accounts for shared 
understanding. 
 Equating minds and the social is 
untenable.  Cannot account for learning 
which is not social. 
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2.1 Complexity Science  
2.1.1 Defining Complexity Science 
In this section we will see that scientists situate human understanding in a variety of different 
ways: as algorithms which deteƌŵiŶe the ƌespoŶse of ͚ageŶts͛; as folloǁiŶg statistiĐal laǁs; as 
situated within networks which have causal influence.  We will see that the ontological and 
epistemological assumptions of complexity scientists are often unconsidered, despite claims of 
͚pƌagŵatisŵ͛.  As such complexity science provides a range of approaches for exploring human 
learning but these approaches must be better situated in a sound theoretical position. 
To begin defining complexity science approaches, we draw attention to an inheritance from 
ǁhat MoƌiŶ ;ϮϬϬϳͿ ƌefeƌs to as ͚ĐlassiĐal sĐieŶĐe͛.  That is, seekiŶg to defiŶe ŵatheŵatiĐal 
relationships between variables and then testing those relationships through empirical study.  
Furthermore, we might classify this as implying a positivist epistemology: that mathematical 
descriptions supported by empirical evidence are the source of authoritative knowledge about 
the world.  However, there is a performative contradiction in much of complexity science 
because complexity theory challenges the possibility of identifying precise mathematical 
relationships: multiple causes operate dynamically such that the emergence of new structures 
cannot be fully predicted.  As we saw in Chapter 1, complexity science developed from 
mathematical descriptions of chaos and as such there is a tension between the implications of 
complexity and the positivist framing of its precursors.  A number of authors therefore 
challenge the epistemological and ontological positions implicit in the work of complexity 
scientists (Richardson & Cilliers, 2001; Morin, 2007; Byrne & Callaghan, 2014).   
Richardson & Cilliers (2001) exeŵplifǇ this ǁith aŶ attaĐk oŶ ͞reductionist complexity science͟.  
Chaos theory has shown that simple mathematical algorithms can lead to highly complicated 
patterns.  Richardson & Cilliers argue that this has led many scientists to the conclusion that 
when we see complex patterns in the world, they must be caused by underlying rules.  Whilst 
they do indeed identify a logical error, this is a straw man argument.  Scientists do not justify 
their models in this way, as we shall illustrate in subsections 2.1.2 to 2.1.5.  Furthermore, 
Richardson & Cilliers dismiss the possibility of making decisions in daily life based upon 
equations9.  Whilst we will see in subsection 2.1.3 that some scientists use terms such as 
                                                          
9 RichardsoŶ & Cillieƌs disŵiss disĐussioŶ of a ͚theoƌǇ of eǀeƌǇthiŶg͛ in physics.  They misunderstand that 
this term does not denote an attempt to explain everything; it is used for attempts to link field theory 
and quantum theory to explain the behaviour of matter.   
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͚uŶiǀeƌsal laǁs͛ Đaƌelessly, they are referring to statistical relationships, not denoting the kind 
of blind positivism that Richardson & Cilliers imply. 
MoƌiŶ͛s (2007) distinction between restricted complexity and generalized complexity provides 
us with a more sophisticated attack upon complexity science:  
͞‘estƌiĐted ĐoŵpleǆitǇ ŵade possiďle iŵpoƌtaŶt adǀaŶĐes iŶ foƌŵalizatioŶ, iŶ the 
possibilities of modelling, which themselves favour interdisciplinary potentialities. But 
one still remains within the epistemology of classical science. When one searches for 
the ͞laǁs of ĐoŵpleǆitǇ͟, oŶe still attaĐhes ĐoŵpleǆitǇ as a kiŶd of ǁagoŶ ďehiŶd the 
truth locomotive, that which produces laws.  A hybrid was formed between the 
principles of traditional science and the advances towards its hereafter.  Actually, one 
avoids the fundamental problem of complexity which is epistemological, cognitive, 
paradigmatic.  To some extent, one recognizes complexity, but by decomplexifying it. 
In this way, the breach is opened, then one tries to clog it: the paradigm of classical 
sĐieŶĐe ƌeŵaiŶs, oŶlǇ fissuƌed.͟ (Morin, 2007, p. 10) 
MoƌiŶ͛s histoƌiĐal aĐĐouŶt ideŶtifies that ĐoŵpleǆitǇ sĐieŶĐe is pƌoĐeediŶg ǁith the teĐhŶiƋues 
aŶd episteŵologiĐal assuŵptioŶs of ͚ĐlassiĐal sĐieŶĐe͛.  The full iŵpliĐatioŶ of ĐoŵpleǆitǇ has 
not been realised: we cannot hope to find equations which describe the nonlinear and 
dynamic interactions of a system which has a rich history.  Furthermore, complexity challenges 
reduction within scientific practice by recognising that it is the minutiae of the system, linked 
in a nonlinear way, which may result in emergence of new structures.  Throughout Section 2.1 
ǁe theƌefoƌe suppoƌt MoƌiŶ͛s Đall foƌ a generalized complexity:  
͞But theŶ, ǁhat is ͞geŶeƌalized͟ ĐoŵpleǆitǇ? It ƌeƋuiƌes, I ƌepeat, aŶ episteŵologiĐal 
ƌethiŶkiŶg, that is to saǇ, ďeaƌiŶg oŶ the oƌgaŶizatioŶ of kŶoǁledge itself… The 
knowledge of the parts is not enough, the knowledge of the whole as a whole is not 
eŶough, if oŶe igŶoƌes its paƌts… the pƌiŶĐiple of ƌeduĐtioŶ is suďstituted ďǇ a pƌiŶĐiple 
that conceives the relation of whole-paƌt ŵutual iŵpliĐatioŶ.͟ (Morin, 2007, p. 6) 
In relation to human understanding of complex systems we must seek a new way to position 
our models, and recognise that positivist epistemology and reductionist approaches are 
severely limited.  In relation to human understanding within Đoŵpleǆ sǇsteŵs MoƌiŶ͛s ŶotioŶ 
of generalized complexity suggests that we require an ontological position which situates 
human understandings by recognising the complex relationships between part and whole of 
social systems. 
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Whilst the character of complexity science approaches cannot be fully resolved in such a short 
exploration, we define them here as those which inherit mathematical, computational and 
experimental approaches which are reductionist, yet are still being used in relation to complex 
systems.  Recognising that we cannot do justice to the full range of approaches which fit this 
definition, we will now turn to a few pertinent examples which will allow us to explore how 
human understanding is situated by complexity scientists. 
2.1.2 Humans as Agents 
Of particular relevance to this thesis is the class of approaches which situate humans as 
͚ageŶts͛ ǁithiŶ ĐoŵputatioŶal ŵodels.  Although a soĐial gƌoup ŵaǇ ďe ŵodelled as a siŶgle 
agent (for example classes within a school), or inanimate objects might be included as agents 
(for example textbooks or computers), of interest here is how human understanding is 
represented within such models.  We will argue that agent based models are yet to provide a 
coherent approach to modelling human understanding, and indeed the purpose of developing 
such models is not always clear.   
As was discussed in subsection 1.3.3, scientists tend to overstate the relevance of models, or 
use terminology which obfuscates the ŵodel͛s purpose.  As a case in point, Erdi (2008, pp. 144-
147) describes the Kermack-McKendrick model in which human ideas are passed on in the 
same way infections are.  Whilst at first glance this does not seem unreasonable, in relation to 
discussing classrooms we see that the transmission of ideas by physical contact or airborne 
particulates is a ludicrous misinterpretation of learning.  In his introductory text Erdi goes on to 
describe models for segregation, opinion formation, romantic relationships and drug dealing in 
order to demonstrate the common themes of such ĐoŵpleǆitǇ ŵodels.  These aƌe iŶ effeĐt ͚toǇ 
ŵodels͛ ǁhiĐh aƌe desigŶed to fuƌtheƌ the pƌaĐtiĐe of ŵodelliŶg, aŶd it is uŶfoƌtuŶate that 
scientists label these models according to what they are reminded of, rather than any 
reference to the phenomenon denoted.  Such models pervade the literature and provide 
training examples, as well as tools to develop new techniques.   
In relation to our focus upon how scientists situate human understanding, it is apparent that in 
such toy models, human understanding is given a simple mechanistic character.  We are 
ƌetuƌŶed to ‘iĐhaƌdsoŶ & Cillieƌs͛ ;ϮϬϬϭͿ aƌguŵeŶt that sĐieŶtists aƌe seekiŶg uŶdeƌlǇiŶg ƌules 
to explain complex patterns (see 2.1.1).  What toy models show is that simple rules can lead to 
complex patterns.  However, scientists are likely aware that these models are of little use in 
uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg the ͚ƌeal ǁoƌld͛.  “ĐieŶtists do not always pay due attention to how they model 
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understandings and human action because their primary concern is with the process of 
modelling.   
There are those who go ďeǇoŶd toǇ ŵodels though, aŶd deǀelop ŵoƌe ͚ƌealistiĐ͛ ŵodels of 
social understanding.  For example, Hill et al. (2011) developed an agent based model of the 
decision making within a baboon population, with reference to empirical data of a troop of 
chacma baboons.  By modelling range size, daily travel, energy and time budgets, Hill et al. 
desĐƌiďe hoǁ ĐoŵputatioŶal aĐtoƌs ŵoǀe ǁithiŶ a gƌid of ƌesouƌĐes, afteƌ ͚ǀotiŶg͛ ǁhetheƌ 
they should move on.  Research on primate behaviour, cognitive processes and social 
structures was employed and the model was run with a range of starting conditions to assess 
the influence of the model variables on the way the computer baboons behaved.  The 
conclusioŶ to Hill et al.͛s papeƌ disĐusses hoǁ the Đoaƌse ǁaǇ iŶ ǁhiĐh the eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt is 
presented, the sampling approach within the empirical data and difficulties in knowing how 
decisions are actually made led to the disparities found between the empirical data and 
modelling output.   
This example of a social model, albeit it with baboons, exemplifies the interdisciplinary 
approach coveted within complexity science.  However, this leads to difficulties in ascertaining 
what the model is for.  There is certainly an aspect of the model being developed in order to 
refine modelling processes, forming the motivation for the involvement of a computer 
scientist.  The authors also argue that the model adds to a ͞growing body of evidence͟ about 
how decisions are made in primate societies, but there are no stronger arguments presented 
for what is actually learned about baboon behaviour, despite the other two authors being a 
biologist and an anthropologist.  It is clear that the authors are stimulated and engaged by the 
problem and have attracted funding by a body equally engaged with it.   
Theƌe aƌe tǁo keǇ issues at haŶd theƌefoƌe.  FiƌstlǇ, hoǁ does suĐh a ͚ƌealistiĐ͛ ĐoŵpleǆitǇ 
model situate social understandings within complex systems, and secondly how does it aid our 
understanding of complex social systems?  In answer to the first issue we see that the 
understanding of the baboons above is given a mechanistic character: they respond to the 
eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt ;iŶĐludiŶg theiƌ eŶeƌgǇ ͚Ŷeeds͛Ϳ aŶd to eaĐh otheƌ aŶd take aĐtioŶ.  The decision 
making process is determined by sophisticated algorithms.  If we allow that primate brains are 
themselves complex (see Chapter 4) then we see that this is a considerable reduction of the 
processes involved and denies the importance of individual histories and relations.  As to the 
positioning of understanding within this model, it is evident that the decisions are seen as 
emerging from real processes within the brain in relation to the environment.  Within the 
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theoretical position developed in Chapter 3 we will uphold this characterisation of 
understanding and decision making as a material process.   
GiǀeŶ that the algoƌithŵs used iŶ Hill et al.͛s ŵodel aƌe Ŷot aďle to ƌeĐƌeate the ĐoŵpleǆitǇ of a 
primate brain, we also approach our second issue: what do such models tell us about complex 
social systems? In this case what does the model tell us about baboon decision making and 
troop behaviour?  To clarify this we must examine the epistemological claim that being able to 
recreate empirical data within a model tells us something about how the real world 
phenomenon actually behaves.  So in the case of the baboon troop, the researchers invested 
time in considering how the baboons might make decisions to move within their territory.  The 
implication is that if they had been able to recreate the empirical data then the scientists 
would be able to say something about the way that baboons actually behave.  Because they 
didŶ͛t ƌeĐƌeate the eŵpiƌiĐal data, the sĐieŶtists theŵselǀes ĐoŶĐlude that theǇ do Ŷot know 
enough about these processes.   
The scientists appear to be implying that this sort of model allows the generation of 
hypotheses about the causes of behaviour, from the empirical data.  This is a tall order in a 
complex system because we know that even if there is the slightest difference between the 
model and the phenomenon being modelled, then they may proceed in very different ways.  
Effectively, modellers are attempting to backwards engineer causes from observations. 
This is the case in the modelling of a range of human systems.  For example, ͚ĐoŵpleǆitǇ 
eĐoŶoŵiĐs͛ ;Cƌistelli et al., ϮϬϭϭ; Aƌthuƌ, ϮϬϭϯͿ is concerned with demonstrating that simplistic, 
macro-level economic models have failed and that agent-based and evolutionary models may 
provide better understandings.  In anthropology, Kohler & Gumerman (2000) present a volume 
iŶ ǁhiĐh ͚aƌtifiĐial soĐieties͛ aƌe used to eǆploƌe soĐial situatioŶs suĐh as MesolithiĐ foƌagiŶg, 
Anasazi cultural change, the impact of raiding on settlement patterns in Oaxaca, Mexico and 
the political impact of marriage in Polynesian society.  Kohler (2000) makes the case that such 
ŵodelliŶg alloǁs the possiďilitǇ of ͚geŶeƌatiǀe soĐial sĐieŶĐe͛, in which we are able to provide 
possible mechanisms for the evolution of norms, values and social institutions by modelling 
them.  Furthermore, modelling may allow augmentation of traditional social science, for 
example in replacing the often simplistic reliance upon social variables, such as 
industrialisation, wealth or population density, with more sophisticated understanding of 
social interactions and coevolution.  It may also, Kohler suggests, allows social scientists the 
capacity to deal with differing levels of analysis: genetics; relationships; behaviour; social 
structure and understand how they interact. 
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Kohleƌ͛s aƌguŵeŶts highlight the poteŶtial ďeŶefits of ageŶt ďased ŵodelliŶg, ďut he does Ŷot 
fully explain how these models relate to the phenomenon being modelled.  Byrne & Callaghan 
(2014, p. 40) aƌgue that ͚geŶeƌatiǀe͛ ŵodelliŶg ofteŶ ƌesults iŶ ͞aďstƌaĐtioŶ ǁithout aŶǇ 
eŵpiƌiĐal ƌefeƌeŶt͟.  This is the Đase ǁith toǇ ŵodels, ǁhiĐh haǀe the puƌpose of deǀeloping 
techniques, but Byrne & Callaghan also take aim at large scale projects which produce models 
to explain existing models10.  Models such as those above pertaining to baboon troops and 
Polynesian societies are related directly to empirical data.  However, such models seek to 
generate understandings about social systems without having a clear epistemological 
grounding.  The scientific domain, of which complexity science is a subset, appears to have a 
ĐeƌtaiŶ ͚iŶteƌŶal ĐoŶsisteŶĐǇ͛ iŶ that sĐieŶtists theŵselves define the problems that they 
investigate.  Within the existing complexity science literature this manifests as agent-based 
models which generate new understandings, but not necessarily understandings of 
phenomena in the real world.   
We need to better situate the relationship between models and what is being modelled, 
before we can apply such techniques to classroom learning.  Exploration of agent-based 
models has therefore shown us that it is possible to situate understandings and actions within 
complex systems as being part of the material world.  However we have questioned the 
reduction to mechanistic processes which models rely upon.  In relation to our understanding 
of complex social systems therefore we see that agent-based models are able to generate new 
understandings, but these understandings need to be related to the phenomena being 
modelled through clear epistemological consideration.  
2.1.3 Humans as following Laws 
We saw in subsection 2.1.1 that Richardson & Cilliers (2001) deny the possibility of equations 
being able to describe our everyday lives.  In the light of our discussion of agent-based models, 
this might now be seen as an objection to being able to use equations or algorithms to 
describe our decision making processes, or the influence of the environment.  However, a 
different class of models exists which seek to describe the statistical properties of the social 
world through equations.  These models rely upon power laws, which are equations that 
contain exponential terms.  For example: �ሺ�ሻ = ���  [eqn 1] 
                                                          
10 Byrne & Callaghan (2014, pp. 52-55) exemplify this with a large scale project by the UK Engineering 
aŶd PhǇsiĐal “ĐieŶĐes ‘eseaƌĐh CouŶĐil ;EP“‘CͿ Đalled ͚CoŵpleǆitǇ “ĐieŶĐe iŶ the ‘eal Woƌld͛ ǁhiĐh 
actually involves a set of sociologists collecting data, from which agent based models will be produced, 
followed by equation based models being produced from those models.  
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Where some function f(x) contains a term of x to the power of α.  So for example if we 
consider the volume of a cube v in relation to the length of each side x, we have a power law 
with k=1 and exponent α=ϯ  � = �3   [eqn 2] 
This might also be considered as a scaling relationship because as we increase the length of 
each side of a cube x, the volume increases as the cube of x. 
Zipf͛s (1932) demonstration that word frequencies in the English language follow a power law 
such that the second most common word is used one half as frequently as the most commonly 
used word.  The third most common word is used one third as frequently as the most common 
word, the fourth one fourth and so on11.  The ƌeleǀaŶĐe of suĐh a ͚laǁ͛ to this thesis hoǁeǀeƌ is 
in highlighting that despite the complexity of the English language, words appear to obey a 
statistical relationship. 
More recently, a range of quantities have been explored in relation to population which 
illustrate such models (Bettencourt, Lobo, Helbing, Kuhnert, & West, 2007).  For example, 
cities with larger populations require fewer petrol stations per person.  The length of road 
surface and electrical cables per person also reduces (power laws describing them have 
exponents less than 1).  This indicates that as cities become larger, the efficiency of these 
networks increases; more people are able to use the same infrastructure.  Human needs such 
as jobs, housing, water and electricity usage all scale roughly linearly with the size of a city 
(exponents are approximately 1) as each individual requires these.  However, the number of 
patents, those employed in research and development, the total wages and size of bank 
deposits within the cities investigated all increase per person in larger cities (exponents greater 
thaŶ ϭͿ, suggestiŶg that ͚iŶŶoǀatioŶ͛ oƌ ͚pƌoduĐtiǀitǇ͛ iŶĐƌeases ǁith size of ĐitǇ. 
The consideration of social scaling laws is widespread within the complexity science literature 
and has been used to consider urban development (Bettencourt, 2011; Batty, 2012), stock 
markets, (Mandelbrot, 1963; Mandelbrot & Hudson, 2004; Liu et al., 1999; Gabaix et al., 2003), 
and internet traffic (Crovella & Bestavros, 1997; Rybski, 2004).  Furthermore, investigating how 
poǁeƌ laǁs ǀaƌǇ oǀeƌ tiŵe alloǁs ĐoŶsideƌatioŶ of ͚ĐƌitiĐal eǀeŶts͛ suĐh as Đƌashes iŶ stoĐk 
markets (Sornette, 2003, 2005; Johansen & Sornette, 2010).  Such analysis can also distinguish 
between word of mouth popularity of bestselling books, which grows steadily, and short spikes 
                                                          
11 Zipf (1932) proposed an exponent of -1 but Gonçalvesa & Gonçalvesa (2005) suggest that the 
exponent actually varies by author and genre. 
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in sales due to advertising (Deschatres & Sornette, 2005).  Also, analysis of power laws shows 
how computer users update their software (Maillart, Sornette, Frei, Duebendorfer, & Saichev, 
2011) and the response of religiously motivated attacks to world events (Roehner, et al., 
2004).   
The salient point here is that despite the complexity of social life, human behaviour can be 
described by statistical relationships.  These relationships can be related to complex systems in 
a number of ways.  Firstly, by recognising that power law distributions denote processes of 
feedback which are common to complex systems (Miller & Page, 2007: 26-53).  Secondly, 
models suggest that power laws occur when there are networks of interactions within social 
systems (Barabási & Albert, 1999; Arbesman, Kleinberg, & Strogatz; 2009) 12 .  Such 
relationships between structure and statistical equations go hand in hand with terminology 
which implies a positivist epistemology: 
͞“ĐaliŶg laǁs tǇpiĐallǇ ƌefleĐt, aŶd ofteŶ ƌeǀeal, the geŶeƌal pƌiŶĐiples uŶdeƌlǇiŶg the 
stƌuĐtuƌe of a phǇsiĐal pƌoďleŵ͟ (West, Brown, & Woodruff, 2002) 
The sense in which such scientists are making positivist claims about the authority of equations 
oƌ aƌe seekiŶg ͚uŶdeƌlǇiŶg pƌiŶĐiples͛ in relation to the social world is pushed further when 
they publish papers with titles such as ͞Life͛s UŶiǀeƌsal “ĐaliŶg Laǁs͟ (West & Brown, 2004).  
However, closer inspection reveals that this positivist framing stems from biological studies in 
which metabolic rate, body mass, circulatory systems, genome length and heart rate can all be 
described by power laws with similar exponents (Brown et al, 2002) and these similar 
eǆpoŶeŶts aƌe desĐƌiďed as ͚uŶiǀeƌsal͛ (Goldenfeld, 1992, p. 16).  Social properties such as the 
sĐaliŶg iŶ uƌďaŶ ƋuaŶtities do Ŷot displaǇ this ͚uŶiǀeƌsalitǇ͛ hoǁeǀeƌ (Bettencourt, Lobo, 
Helbing, Kuhnert, & West, 2007, p. 7303). 
Investigation of power laws clearly has an inheritance from positivist science; even the term 
͚laǁs͛ iŵplies that ouƌ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of complex social systems is aimed at uncovering 
ŵatheŵatiĐal ƌelatioŶships ǁhiĐh ͚uŶdeƌlie͛ the soĐial world.  However, a more detailed 
evaluation shows that scientists recognise that these statistical relationships vary over time 
and with the exact system being looked at.  For example, urban scaling laws may be different 
in the developing world compared to the cities in the developed world (Bettencourt et al., 
ϮϬϬϳͿ, aŶd ĐoŵpaƌisoŶ of diffeƌeŶt ͚ĐƌitiĐal eǀeŶts͛ suggests that statistiĐal ƌelatioŶships aƌe 
                                                          
12 We ŵust Ŷote the ͚iŶteƌŶal ĐoŶsisteŶĐǇ͛ of these sĐieŶtifiĐ ŵodels oŶĐe agaiŶ hoǁeǀeƌ, as to geŶeƌate 
them hypothetical network models are used to recreate power laws: models are used to support 
models. 
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dynamic and therefore can only tentatively represent the social systems they pertain to.  
Furthermore, Sornette (2009) cautions that many relationships may appear to follow a power 
law relationship when they do not, and Clauset, Shalizi, & Newman (2006) at length explain the 
difficulties of fitting power laws to empirical data. 
Nevertheless power laws may offer techniques which allow us to describe complex social 
situations such as classrooms at the statistical level.  The issue is that, as with agent-based 
modellers, scientists who use power laws are not clear about their own epistemological 
positions and inherit implicit positions from the field they work in.  Thus we further the appeal 
made at the end of subsection 2.1.2 for a sound epistemological position to be established for 
our understanding of complex systems. 
How do scientists who consider power laws situate our understandings within complex 
systems though?  The simple answer is that they do not situate human understanding as 
relevant at all.  Indeed, the implication is that despite the complexity of social life, we 
necessarily obey certain statistical relationships.  Whilst this fits well with a positivist 
epistemology we see that, as with all statistical models, we are imposing equations on the real 
world using particular datasets.  Whilst we might propose reasons (such as feedback and 
network structure) for why statistical relations such as power laws fit complex systems, they 
tell us nothing about human understanding within such systems. 
2.1.4 Humans within Networks 
Network models graphically represent the relations between members of a social group, but 
can also include inanimate objects, or even different influences on an individual (e.g. Thagard, 
ϭϵϴϵͿ.  The ƌelatioŶs oƌ ĐoŶŶeĐtioŶs aƌe ofteŶ ͚ǁeighted͛ to ƌepƌeseŶt the strength of the 
connection: for example how many times people communicate through an online social 
network (Scellato et al, 2011) or the transactions between corporations (Iino et al, 2010).  
Moƌe ƌeĐeŶtlǇ, the ͚ĐhaƌaĐteƌ͛ of ĐoŶŶeĐtioŶs is ďeiŶg iŶǀestigated within networks, for 
example whether communication between internet users is positive or negative ;Gligoƌijeǀića, 
et al., 2013). 
As mentioned above, network models offer explanations for the presence of power laws in 
social settings.  Network models can also be used in relation to agent-based models to 
consider the network of influences upon an agent.  However, network analyses are premised 
on different ontological assumptions to agent-based models and statistical power laws.  
Wellman (1988) argues that network analysis has a theoretical content beyond being just a 
methodology in that relations or connections come to define the system.  He highlights the 
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assuŵptioŶ that ƌelatioŶs aƌe ŵoƌe iŵpoƌtaŶt thaŶ ͚attƌiďutes͛ such as age or gender.  Along 
these lines, Carolan (2014) proposes that network analysis is premised upon an ontology of 
͚ƌelatioŶal ƌealisŵ͛.  This has sǇŶeƌgǇ ǁith the ĐoŶĐeƌŶs of soŵe soĐial theoƌists:  
 ͞ǁhat eǆist iŶ the soĐial ǁoƌld aƌe ƌelatioŶs – not interactions between agents or 
intersubjective ties between individuals, but objective relations which exist 
'independently of individual consciousness and will'͟ (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 
1992, p. 97) 
The ontological assumption that relations or connections are real entities has implications for 
how human action and understanding is characterised.  Byrne & Callaghan argue that: 
͞these [Ŷetǁoƌk] tools iŶ aŶd of theŵselǀes do Ŷot haǀe pƌediĐtiǀe ĐapaĐitǇ ďeĐause 
those that do attempt prediction necessarily assign causal power to connections, deny 
agency, and do not have the capacity for coping with emergence.  When social 
network analysis is deployed as part of a multi-method approach to researching 
complexity it can be very useful indeed.  On its own it can generate descriptions but 
ĐaŶŶot get ďeǇoŶd this.͟ (Byrne & Callaghan, 2014, pp. 205-6) 
Their argument sets connections and agency as separate however and this needs careful 
consideration.  Much of network analysis is concerned with network structure.  In terms of 
individual agency of people within a network, we might conclude that how they are connected 
influences the agency they have within the system, whilst accepting that it does not account 
for individual choice or creativity.  The relative interconnectedness of an individual and their 
͚positioŶ͛ ŵaǇ ǁell iŶflueŶĐe theiƌ leaƌŶiŶg ǁithiŶ a Đoŵpleǆ sǇsteŵ.  Foƌ eǆaŵple, Paƌadoǁski 
et al. (2012) mapped the network of interactions both within a group of foreign students living 
in Germany and the interactions beyond that group: interactions with native speakers.  They 
found that those that interacted most within the group did not advance their language scores 
as much as those with lower inter-group interaction levels.   
The connectedness of an individual within a system is likely to have (nonlinear and dynamic) 
causal influences upon both the individual and the system as a whole.  The overall stability of 
complex systems has been related to the interconnectedness of networks, an insight gained 
through study of network structure in relation to biodiversity (McCann, 2000; Williams, 2008; 
Dunne, Williams & Martinezet, 2004), regulatory systems in the body (Whitacre, 2010) and 
electricity grids (Solé, Rosas-Casals, Corominas-Murtra & Valverde, 2008).  Whilst it is not the 
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same as individual agency therefore, there is likely to be a reciprocal relationship between 
individual connectivity and influence upon a social group as a whole. 
Furthermore, beyond analysis of structure alone, contemporary techniques in statistical 
inference predict how network structure will continue to develop over time and how 
understandings diffuse throughout networks (Carolan, 2014).  As such there are aspects of 
both prediction and explanation within network approaches.   
What is Đleaƌ fƌoŵ BǇƌŶe & CallaghaŶ͛s oďjeĐtioŶ hoǁeǀeƌ, is that eŵeƌgeŶĐe Ŷeed Ŷot Đoŵe 
about through relations at all.  What is missing from network analysis is the complexity of 
individual minds, the characteristics of individuals (age, gender, skill, confidence etc.) and also 
the role of the environment.  All models are necessary reductions, but network models situate 
human understandings within complex systems as being solely determined by relations, albeit 
dynamic ones.  Network models provide insight, but do not account for the unique histories of 
individuals and the nuanced responses they will have to the relations they inhabit.   
Network analysis assumes the ͞relational realism͟ that Carolan (2014) denotes and in so doing 
shares with agent based models an implicit ontology of causal processes within the real world.  
In the classroom there would be considerable methodological difficulties in defining 
relationships between pupils, teachers and objects.  For example, body language, proximity, 
tone of voice, and a whole host of environmental influences would need to be represented.  
Nevertheless, the implication is that these influences should be seen as real and having 
nonlinear and dynamic causal power on learning.  Network analyses situate understanding 
within complex systems as being influenced by real relations, although the influence is not 
related to individual thought processes. 
In terms of epistemology, again natural scientists themselves rarely make their assumptions 
clear.  However, inherent in the representation of relations is an empirical understanding: that 
our understanding of relations comes from observation and/or empirical data about the real 
world.  Network models situate our understanding of complex systems as through the 
identification and investigation of relations within the social world.  This, like all modelling, is 
necessarily an abstraction, but provides us with an understanding of how we might situate 
learners within a classroom. 
2.1.5 Understandings in Complexity Science 
In subsection 2.1.1 we argued that complexity science has inherited practices and ways of 
thinking that do not fully recognise the impossibility of precise, mathematical descriptions 
48 
 
which describe emergence in social systems.  However, this is not necessarily because natural 
scientists are unaware of the limitations of their models.  Instead, we have seen that there are 
a range of different aims, epistemologies and ontologies at work, often implicitly bound in the 
field of study rather than explicitly defined.  Models are developed as training examples, to 
develop techniques or, more cynically, just because scientists are interested.  We have thus 
noted a ĐeƌtaiŶ ͚iŶteƌŶal ĐoŶsisteŶĐǇ͛ whereby models are related to other models rather than 
to empirical data.   
In terms of how complexity science situates understandings within complex systems, human 
understanding and action is afforded a mechanistic response in agent based models, is 
neglected in power laws and is reduced to relations in network models.  However, each 
approach assumes real causal influence amongst people and with the environment and we can 
thus say that human understanding is being characterised as part of the real world: a realist 
ontological grounding.  The issue is that each approach reduces human response: to 
mechanism; to obeying laws; to relations.  None of these characterisations of human 
understanding are useful to educationalists.   
Whilst scientific approaches do not adequately situate human understandings within complex 
systems, we have seen that there are also issues in justifying how models enhance our 
understandings of complex systems.  Looking past the language deployed by those considering 
power laws we see that statistical relations vary with context so claims of universal laws are 
misguided.  Agent based modellers appear to be trying to generate hypotheses of microscopic 
causes by recreating macroscopic phenomena but this is no guarantee of helping us 
understand real systems.  Network models appear to have empirical referents but it is far from 
siŵple ƌelatiŶg a ͚ĐoŶŶeĐtioŶ͛ to Đausal iŶflueŶĐe.  It is Đleaƌ that the utilitǇ of ŵodels iŶ 
relation to real systems needs much greater resolution. 
Although there is very little discussion of these concerns within scientific literature, those that 
do enter into such discussions tend to rely on an appeal to ͚pragmatism͛ ;EdŵoŶds, ϭϵϵϵ, 
2012, 2013; Feilzer, 2012).  The appeal to pragmatism is worth brief consideration because 
liŶks aƌe ŵade ǁithiŶ the liteƌatuƌe Ŷot just to the eǀeƌǇdaǇ seŶse of ͚ďeiŶg pƌaĐtiĐal͛, ďut also 
to pragmatism as formal philosophical system (e.g. Davis & Sumara, 2006: 73).  Feilzer, argues 
that: 
͞Pƌagŵatisŵ … sidesteps the ĐoŶteŶtious issues of truth and reality, accepts, 
philosophically, that there are singular and multiple realities that are open to empirical 
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iŶƋuiƌǇ aŶd oƌieŶts itself toǁaƌd solǀiŶg pƌaĐtiĐal pƌoďleŵs iŶ the ͚͚ƌeal ǁoƌld͛͛͟ 
(Feilzer, 2010, p. 8) 
Such a definition has consideƌaďle ĐoŶtƌadiĐtioŶ ǁithiŶ it, aŶd the speeĐh ŵaƌks aƌouŶd ͞ƌeal 
ǁoƌld͟ aĐkŶoǁledge that Ǉou ĐaŶŶot sidestep disĐussioŶ of ƌealitǇ aŶd talk aďout the ƌeal 
ǁoƌld at the saŵe tiŵe.  Feilzeƌ goes oŶ to pƌopose that it is ƌealitǇ ͚as it is eǆpeƌieŶĐed͛ ǁhiĐh 
is iŵpoƌtaŶt to pƌagŵatists.  This fits ǁith PieƌĐe͛s pƌagŵatist ŵaǆiŵ that ǁe should ĐoŶsideƌ 
the ͚pƌaĐtiĐal ĐoŶseƋueŶĐes͛ of ŵodels iŶ oƌdeƌ to ĐlaƌifǇ ideas (Hookway, 2013; Haack 1976).   
A closer look at pragmatism, as a school of thought, reveals that it does not attempt to 
sidestep philosophical claims at all though.  As Feilzer adŵits, pƌagŵatists aƌe ͞aŶti-dualists͟.  
Rather than arguing for a subjectivist position in which knowledge is purely in the mind, or an 
objectivist position where knowledge is about a separate real world, pragmatists question this 
seperation: 
͞The ŵiŶd-world scheme does indeed only offer two options: objectivity or 
subjectivity. The crucial question, however, is not which option to choose. The far 
more important question is whether the mind-world scheme is itself inevitable or 
whether it is possible to think about knowledge and reality in a different way, starting 
fƌoŵ diffeƌeŶt assuŵptioŶs. JohŶ DeǁeǇ͛s theoƌǇ of kŶoǁiŶg does pƌeĐiselǇ this. ... 
Dewey put forward a framework which starts with interactions – or as he later 
preferred to call it: transactions – taking place in nature and in which nature itself is 
uŶdeƌstood as ͞a ŵoǀiŶg ǁhole of iŶteƌaĐtiŶg paƌts͟ ;DeǁeǇ ϭϵϮϵ, p.ϮϯϮͿ͟ ;Biesta, 
2011, p.5) 
Biesta (2011) explains furtheƌ that DeǁeǇ͛s ͚tƌaŶsaĐtioŶal theoƌǇ of kŶoǁiŶg͛ situates leaƌŶiŶg 
as arising from the interaction of an organism with its surroundings.  The very notion of 
epistemology is brought into question because having knowledge of the world implies some 
seperation of world and mind.  Whilst appeal to pragmatic concerns might be seen as a way to 
sidestep philosophical discussion, Dewey, a key name in pragmatism, is actually developing a 
particular philosophical standpoint.  He brings into relief the seperation of mind and matter 
and proposes that our understandings, including our models, should be situated within the 
natural world. As Olssen suggests:   
͞DeǁeǇ͛s appƌoaĐh ĐoŶĐeptualises paƌt aŶd ǁhole iŶ a dǇŶaŵiĐ iŶteƌaĐtioŶ, posits the 
learner as interdependent with the environment, as always in a state of becoming, 
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giving rise to a dynamic and forward-looking notion of agency as experiential and 
Đollaďoƌatiǀe.͟ ;Olssen, 2011, p. 19) 
DeǁeǇ͛s foƌŵ of pƌagŵatisŵ at least, develops an account of solving problems through being 
part of the material world.  It is therefore far from inert in theoretical terms.  
Davis & Sumara (2006, p. 73) argue that the pragmatists pre-eŵpted the ͚seŶsiďilities͛ of 
complexity theory, and we will explore their account in the next section.  We can here support 
CastellaŶi & HaffeƌtǇ͛s ;ϮϬϬϵͿ Đlaiŵ that complexity science as a field is itself a complex 
system: there are a range of interacting practices and approaches, a micro-diversity of 
epistemological and ontological assumptions and self-referential elements.  By recognising 
that human understanding is situated within complex systems in this way we explain why 
models may be coherent with other models rather than clearly relating to the empirical world.   
However, explaining is not justifying.  Having seen that pragmatism does not allow us to 
sidestep theoretical concerns at all, we maintain the argument within this thesis that a sound 
theoretical basis is needed in order to situate human understanding in social systems such as 
classrooms.  What has been brought into question is the separation of ontology and 
epistemology, and this will form the starting point for considering what we will label as post-
structuralist complexity thinking.  
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2.2 Post-structuralist Complexity 
2.2.1 Complexity Thinking 
The presentation of different modelling approaches in Section 2.1 showed that complexity 
scientists operate without clearly defining their epistemological and ontological assumptions.  
We are now in a position to recognise the way in which Morin (2007) described such 
appƌoaĐhes as ͚ƌestƌiĐted ĐoŵpleǆitǇ͛.  AgeŶt ďased, Ŷetǁoƌk aŶd poǁeƌ laǁ ŵodels pƌoĐeed 
ǁith the tools aŶd ŵaŶǇ of the assuŵptioŶs of ͚ĐlassiĐal sĐieŶĐe͛ iŶ that theǇ seek to uŶĐoǀeƌ 
mathematical relationships which describe complex systems.  IŶ liŶe ǁith MoƌiŶ͛s Đall foƌ a 
͚generalized complexity͛, Richardson & Cilliers propose that there is a category of complexity 
theoƌǇ appƌoaĐhes ǁhiĐh theǇ laďel as ͚ĐoŵpleǆitǇ thiŶkiŶg͛, aŶd ǁhiĐh iŶǀolǀes: 
͞a fuŶdaŵeŶtal shift iŶ the ǁaǇ seŶse is ŵade of our surroundings is necessary: the 
liŵited aŶd pƌoǀisioŶal Ŷatuƌe of all uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg has to ďe ƌeĐogŶized.͟ (Richardson 
& Cilliers, 2001, p. 8) 
Although Richardson & Cilliers (2001) proposed that complexity thinking was the least well 
represented within the literature, it now accounts for a large proportion of educationalists 
who consider complexity theory today.  These authors claim that the shift in how we position 
our own understandings is to be achieved by aligning complexity theory with a post-
structuralist position (Davis & Sumara, 2006; Cilliers, 1998; Osberg & Biesta, 2004).   
The term post-structuralist is used here to denote authors who label themselves as such, and 
who are labelled as such by others.  We will develop the use of the term more clearly in 
relation to the accounts of Davis & Sumara (2006) and Cilliers (1998, 2005) in subsections 2.2.2 
and 2.2.3 respectively.  However, it is worth outlining here the lineage from Saussure, to 
Derrida and in turn to Davis & Sumara and Cilliers.  Saussure13 criticised linguistic theories 
based around rules which relate phenomena (the signified) to the labels we have for them 
(signifiers).  Instead of there being a direct correspondence between the two (representation), 
Saussure proposed that the meaning of a signifier is determined within a system of 
interrelated signifiers.  For example we only understand what a table is on account of its 
relation to a chair, a stool, a bench but also in relation to a tree or any other object.  Although 
Saussure focused upon linguistics his work was interpreted as being about meaning and this 
was taken up by several continental philosophers, including Derrida. 
                                                          
13 Saussure might be described as a structuralist as he developed a theory of meaning as arising within a 
system of relations.  Derrida is thus a post-structuralist in the sense of following Saussure but 
questioning static relations. 
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We see that ǁith “aussuƌe͛s ǁoƌk ǁe aƌe alƌeadǇ ƌelatiŶg ŵeaŶiŶg to a sǇsteŵ of interrelated 
teƌŵs. Deƌƌida added ͚ŵoǀeŵeŶt͛ to “aussuƌe͛s ǁoƌk ďǇ aƌguiŶg that the ŵeaŶiŶg of a teƌŵ is 
not just related to a system of terms but that those relations are dynamic.  Thus there can 
never be any complete resolution of them, only temporary and provisional meanings which 
eŵeƌge dǇŶaŵiĐallǇ.  Daǀis & “uŵaƌa aŶd Cillieƌs see paƌallels ďetǁeeŶ Deƌƌida͛s sǇsteŵ of 
meaning and complex systems because both are dynamic and emergent, and both are 
incompressible in the sense of not being reducible to rules.  
We will now turn to how Davis & Sumara situate learning within classrooms, and will argue 
that there is a tension between the way that they situate learning within complex systems and 
their resistance to accounting for how we understand those systems.  In subsection 2.2.3 we 
ǁill ĐoŶsideƌ Cillieƌs͛ ŵoƌe thoƌough liŶkiŶg of ĐoŵpleǆitǇ aŶd post-structuralism, whilst also 
highlighting some of its limitations. 
2.2.2 Complexity Thinking as Analogy – Davis & Sumara’s Approach 
Daǀis & “uŵaƌa͛s ;ϮϬϬϲͿ aĐĐouŶt of Đlassƌooŵs as a Đoŵpleǆ sǇsteŵ has ďeeŶ dƌaǁŶ oŶ ďǇ 
teachers and researchers (e.g Sinclair, 2004; Sullivan, 2009) and is influential around the world.  
They situate learning as being within a nest of complex systems (see figure 2a) in which 
different levels of analysis can be seen 
as developing over different timescales.  
Subjective understanding can be seen as 
interacting with the classroom as a 
whole, with the curriculum and with 
slower changes in the subject itself, for 
example the field of mathematics.  They 
pƌopose that ŵatheŵatiĐal ͚oďjeĐts͛ 
and curriculum structures are often 
seeŶ as ͚oďjeĐtiǀe kŶoǁledge͛ ďut aƌe iŶ 
fact dynamic themselves.  Davis & 
Sumara use this to undermine accounts of learning as the direct relationship between 
objective knowledge and the subjective understanding of individuals.  They furthermore 
explain that the boundaries of these systems are not clear cut. 
It is evident that Davis & Sumara situate human understandings as within nested complex 
systems and they use this as a frame for critiquing accounts of learning as focused upon a 
particular level of analysis.  For example, they suggest that Piaget͛s ǁell known educational 
 
Figure 2a – Nested Complex Systems of School 
Mathematics as represented in Davis & Sumara 
(2006, p. 91) 
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theories are ĐoŶĐeƌŶed ǁith the ͚self-oƌgaŶisatioŶ͛ of ĐogŶitioŶ aŶd that VǇgotskǇ͛s theoƌies 
were concerned with the interactions between the social world and individuals; therefore 
͞DiffeƌeŶt pƌoĐesses aƌe at ǁoƌk, aŶd diffeƌeŶt ĐoŶĐeƌŶs arise at the two levels of 
organization͟ (Davis & Sumara, 2006, p. 65).  TheǇ pƌopose that ďǇ ͞leǀel-juŵpiŶg͟ teaĐheƌs 
and researchers can frame different discourses as pertaining to different levels of analysis.  
However, they note: 
͞CoŵpleǆitǇ thiŶkiŶg is Ŷot a ŵetadisĐouƌse that seeks to offeƌ totalized eǆplaŶatioŶs, 
but an umbrella notion that enables researchers to note profound similarities across a 
diǀeƌsitǇ of pheŶoŵeŶa͟ ;Daǀis & “uŵaƌa, ϮϬϬϲ: ϭϮϳͿ  
This is wheƌe the ĐƌaĐks ďegiŶ to appeaƌ iŶ Daǀis & “uŵaƌa͛s aĐĐouŶt hoǁeǀeƌ.  Whilst theǇ 
Đlaiŵ that ĐoŵpleǆitǇ thiŶkiŶg is Ŷot a ͚ŵetadisĐouƌse͛, theǇ use it to suggest that ĐoŵpleǆitǇ 
has shaƌed ͚seŶsiďilities͛ ǁith a ƌaŶge of positioŶs, iŶĐludiŶg ĐoŶstƌuĐtiǀisŵ, cognitivism, 
phenomenology, psychoanalysis, structuralism, pragmatism and post-structuralism.  Yet no 
umbrella notion could admit these different accounts without recognising the clear tensions 
between them14.  Whilst there may be a lineage between these positions and complexity 
thinking, the issue is that ĐoŵpleǆitǇ thiŶkiŶg is looselǇ defiŶed iŶ Daǀis & “uŵaƌa͛s aĐĐouŶt.   
This will be further expounded by considering their account of emergence, which we argued is 
a key premise of complexity theory (subsection 1.2.3).  In the natural sciences emergence is 
associated with a macroscopic change in the properties of a system and this can be clearly 
deliŶeated ǁithiŶ eŵpiƌiĐal data oƌ ŵodels.  Hoǁeǀeƌ, ͚eŵeƌgeŶĐe͛ to Daǀis & “uŵaƌa is 
associated with interesting events which cannot be traced to an individual aspect of the 
system but develop from the coming together of people.  Davis & Sumara propose that 
focusing on emergence allows education and educational research to become about 
͞eǆpaŶdiŶg the spaĐe of possiďilities͟ (Davis & Sumara, 2006, p. 135).  Specifically, they focus 
on the relationships between internal diversity and redundancy; between neighbour 
interactions and control; between randomness and coherence.  At length they explain these 
terms and how emergence is to be found between these opposites.  This situating of 
eŵeƌgeŶĐe as ďeiŶg ͚ďetǁeeŶ͛ diffeƌeŶt possiďilities seeŵs to steŵ fƌoŵ the post-structuralist 
ƌejeĐtioŶ of ďiŶaƌǇ opposites.  Take Deƌƌida͛s aĐĐouŶt of deconstruction: the practice of 
identifying tensions within a text:  
                                                          
14 For example, post-structuralism was a direct reaction against phenomenology (Howells, 1999).   
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͞a kiŶd of geŶeƌal stƌategǇ of deĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ…is to aǀoid ďoth ŶeutƌaliziŶg the ďiŶaƌǇ 
oppositions of metaphysics and simply residing within the closed field of these 
oppositioŶs͟ (Derrida, 2002, p. 41) 
Rather than relying upon empirical evidence or even a model of how emergence occurs, Davis 
& Sumara are defining emergence in relation to post-structuralist concerns.  As well as lacking 
empirical foundatioŶ, the ĐoŶĐept of ͚eŵeƌgeŶĐe͛ ǁithiŶ Daǀis & “uŵaƌa͛s teǆt has 
considerable dangers associated with it if we apply it to classrooms.  The deliberate search for 
aŶd pƌoŵotioŶ of ͚eŵeƌgeŶĐe͛ ďǇ opeŶiŶg a ͚spaĐe of possiďilities͛ ŶegleĐts the pƌoďaďilitǇ that 
unwanted events will also develop.  Classrooms are carefully controlled by teachers not to 
stifle pupils but to maintain some control over the learning that takes place.  Furthermore 
control is important for the safety and security of pupils, so whilst Davis & Sumara are not 
suggesting we have no control, they are not making clear the need to be critical in responding 
to harmful patterns which might emerge also.   
Within Daǀis & “uŵaƌa͛s ǁoƌk, ͚eŵeƌgeŶĐe͛ as a ĐoŶĐept takes oŶ a ǀeƌǇ diffeƌeŶt ŵeaŶiŶg to 
the development of new structures or relations which defines it in the sciences; it is associated 
ǁith the ͚plaǇ͛ ďetǁeeŶ ďiŶaƌǇ opposites.  This is further evident when Davis & Sumara (2006, 
p. 153) propose that ĐoŵpleǆitǇ thiŶkiŶg pƌeseŶts ͞ǀital siŵultaŶeities͟ in relation to 
education: knower/knowledge, of transphenomenality/transdisciplinarity/interdiscursivity, of 
representation/presentation, of affect/effect and of education/research.  Again we see that 
complexity is deliberately being used as a way of blurring the boundaries.  The conclusion 
seems to be that because complexity theory draws attention to the limitations of 
understandings and because post-structuralist discourses reject binary opposites then we can 
see all suďjeĐtiǀe uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶgs as ǀalid aŶd all as ͚eŵeƌgeŶt͛.   
Whilst Davis & Sumara situate learning as within complex systems the issue comes with their 
account of our understanding of complex systems.  Davis & Samara admit that whilst they 
suggest that Đlassƌooŵs aŶd ďƌoadeƌ eduĐatioŶal sǇsteŵs aƌe Đoŵpleǆ pheŶoŵeŶa ͞the 
evidence to support such suspicions is sparse and based largely on analogies made to research 
conducted in other domains͟ (Davis & Sumara, 2006, p. 79).  The issue is that they actively 
resist attempts to define complex systems.  In introducing a range of notions in the natural 
sciences (e.g. self-organization, scale-free networks, nested organisation), they note that: 
 ͞ǁe ƋualifǇ the disĐussion by highlighting the artificiality of any attempt to analyse 
complexity.  The suggestion here is not that complexity can be reduced to these 
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aspects, but that these aspects are useful for helping observers identify and make 
sense of complex structures and dǇŶaŵiĐs.͟ (Davis & Sumara, 2006, p. 80) 
Yet there is an apparent performative contradiction within their text: by saying that complex 
systems are resistant to analysis they undermine their own claims that classrooms are 
complex.  Daǀis & “uŵaƌa ďƌush oǀeƌ this ǁith appeal to a ͞ƌeasoŶaďle ĐoŶseŶsus͟ as to ǁhat 
constitutes a complex phenomenon and the utility of considering different viewpoints. 
Davis & Sumara open themselves up to the charge of relativism by offering no account of how 
learning emerges or even a justification of the way in which systems are complex.  They rely 
heavily upon narrative accounts of particular situations in which they, rather subjectively, 
conclude that emergence occurred.  Whilst narrative accounts should not be dismissed per se, 
relying upon loose analogy to general aspects of complexity (self-organisation, nested systems 
etc.) means that very little is actually said about how learning emerges in classrooms.  This 
looseness also means that the differences of opposing accounts are glossed over and 
substitutes post-structuralist opposition to binary terms for an account of how learning occurs. 
In conclusion, Davis & Sumara situate learning as emergent within (nested) complex systems; 
however they are unsuccessful in describing such systems as complex.  By attempting to link 
complexity theory with post-structuralist accounts they have obfuscated any appeal to the 
processes that take place in real systems.  Whilst these processes are likely unique to each 
system we should not shy away from investigating and understanding them.  We cannot claim 
that learning is emergent from a nest of complex systems through analogy to systems in the 
natural sciences alone, or through a loose appeal to the ͚seŶsiďilities͛ of post-structuralist 
discourses.   
2.2.3 Complexity Thinking as Deconstruction – Cilliers’ Approach 
Cilliers (1998, 2005) develops much closer links between deconstruction and complexity 
thinking than Davis & Sumara do.  Whilst not setting out to evaluate deconstruction in its own 
ƌight, aŶ eǀaluatioŶ of hoǁ Cillieƌs dƌaǁs oŶ Deƌƌida͛s ǁoƌk ǁill alloǁ us to eǆpouŶd tǁo 
aƌguŵeŶts of ƌeleǀaŶĐe to this thesis.  FiƌstlǇ, Cillieƌs ;aŶd DeƌƌidaͿ ƌejeĐt ͚ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ͛, that 
is, the assumption that our thoughts and language correspond directly to features of the real 
ǁoƌld.  As ǁe suggested iŶ suďseĐtioŶ Ϯ.Ϯ.ϭ, “aussuƌe͛s ǁoƌk ĐhalleŶged the siŵple 
ĐoƌƌespoŶdeŶĐe of sigŶifieƌ aŶd sigŶified, aŶd Deƌƌida͛s deĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ fuƌtheƌ ĐhalleŶges suĐh 
a relation.  Secondly, both Derrida and Cilliers are concerned with the boundaries of our 
understanding.   
56 
 
Figure 2b – A simple neural network
 
In drawing on complexity science, and in particular neural network models, Cilliers and his 
colleagues suggest that ĐoŵpleǆitǇ theoƌǇ ŵight pƌoǀide ͞a ŵodeƌŶist aƌgument for 
affiƌŵatiǀe postŵodeƌŶisŵ͟ (Richardson, Cilliers & Lissack, 2001, p. 536).  By this they mean 
that complexity theory provides support for post-structuralist accounts of understanding as 
situated within a network of influences, as well as being bounded in that our understandings 
are limited.  This is of direct relevance to how we might situate learning within a classroom. 
Cilliers (1998) forms his argument by first considering the technical issues of representation 
within neural networks, drawing upon his background as a computer scientist, and then by 
explicitly discussing the relationships between these arguments and post-structuralism.  We 
will here outline the basis of the argument15. 
A complex neural network may be considered as a series 
of nodes connected by neurons such that they are highly 
interconnected.  The use of the term ͚complex͛ here 
denotes that each node is only responding to signals 
from the neurons it is directly connected to, yet these 
connections are nonlinear in that multiple nodes are 
connected to each other, and the signals which travel 
between them arrive dynamically: at varying times.  The 
system as a whole is able to respond to its environment 
because the relationships between nodes change over 
time. 
In a neural network the relative strength, the weight of connections between nodes both 
determines and is determined by the response of the network to stimuli.  Such neural 
networks adapt to the inputs they are exposed to and so develop responses.  However, those 
responses are not pre-programmed and they could not be seen by looking at the structure of 
the network.  There are no specific representations of objects or actions and therefore no 
direct correspondence between the structure and the response to the world.   
The majority of modern day computers utilise what is denoted as Von Neumann architecture,  
that is, they step through rules and processes in sequence.  Even though contemporary quad 
core computer processors divide up tasks so rules can be stepped through by four processors 
at once, the system is still stepping through a set of rules to respond to input.  Neural networks 
                                                          
15 Cillieƌs͛ aĐĐouŶt of Ŷeuƌal fuŶĐtioŶ ǁill also ďe iŵpoƌtaŶt iŶ Chapteƌ ϰ, ǁheƌe it ǁill ďe the staƌtiŶg 
point in developing a model of learning. 
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are different in that they do not have rules and their response is determined by the network 
structure alone.  This means that neural networks are much better at recognising and 
responding to patterns than traditional computers16.  The important thing here is that their 
relationship to the stimuli they respond to is not one of simple representation: Cilliers defines 
distributed representation as the way in which meaning is diffuse within complex networks and 
thus intangible.   
This is the pƌiŵaƌǇ site of oǀeƌlap ǁith Deƌƌida͛s aĐĐouŶt aŶd as suĐh ǁe ǁill Ŷoǁ tuƌŶ to 
elucidating this link before discussing the implications of distributed representation for how 
we position understanding.  Cilliers links the weight of connections in neural networks directly 
to the notion of trace, which is attributed to Derrida.   
͞the tǁo teƌŵs – ͚ǁeight͛ aŶd ͚tƌaĐe͛ – can in this context be used to describe each 
other.  To think of weights in a neural network as traces ;iŶ Deƌƌida͛s seŶseͿ helps to 
understand how meaningful patterns in a network result primarily from the condition 
of the weights.  To think of traces in language as weights helps us to conceive of them 
Ŷot a soŵethiŶg epheŵeƌal, ďut as soŵethiŶg aĐtual, alďeit aĐtualitǇ that is spaƌse.͟  
(Cilliers, 1998, p. 46) 
Cillieƌs goes oŶ to eǆplaiŶ hoǁ Deƌƌida͛s ĐoŶĐept of différance presents an analogy to the 
dǇŶaŵiĐs of a Đoŵpleǆ sǇsteŵ.  As a Ŷeuƌal Ŷetǁoƌk geŶeƌates a patteƌŶ of aĐtiǀitǇ, ͚tƌaĐes͛ of 
the activity flood through the system and propagate back through feedback loops, altering 
both the response of the system aŶd the sǇsteŵ itself.  Cillieƌs ĐleaƌlǇ ƌeads Deƌƌida͛s ǁoƌk as 
an explanation for the way in which meaning is distributed across a network and how this calls 
into question representation, that is, the direct correspondence between the world and our 
thoughts or social structures.  It is not immediately clear whether Cilliers is talking about brains 
as neural networks, or linguistic systems, or social systems, and we will return to this 
ambiguity shortly (subsection 2.2.4).  However, here we will further consider the relationship 
ďetǁeeŶ Cillieƌs͛ aƌguŵeŶts aŶd Deƌƌida͛s ǁoƌk oŶ difféƌaŶĐe.  Cillieƌs iŶteƌpƌets difféƌaŶĐe as 
describing the way in which the meaning of words (more accurately signs) is related to the 
differences between all other words, but also how this meaning is endlessly differed, both 
                                                          
16 Such neural networks have applications in number plate recognition (Draghici, 1997), sales and 
marketing forecasts (Kuo & Xue, 1999) and predicting the path of pedestrians (Johnson & Hogg, 1996).  
TheǇ ĐaŶ also ďe used foƌ ͚data-ŵiŶiŶg͛, ǁheƌeďǇ patteƌŶs aƌe seeŶ iŶ large data sets (Craven & Shavlik, 
1997; Castellani & Hafferty, 2009).  This is used to discern purchase trends in order to make suggestions 
in online marketing, or to detect fraudulent transactions with credit cards. 
 
58 
 
temporally and spatially, in a complex system of meaning.  Each word contains a trace of all 
other words because they are interlinked. 
Theƌe aƌe tǁo poiŶts to Ŷote aďout this iŶteƌpƌetatioŶ of Deƌƌida͛s ǁoƌk.  FiƌstlǇ, Deƌƌida͛s 
works never explicitly defined such a system of différance.  Derrida (1968) used différance as 
part of a word game in which both to differ and to defer were implicated by the use of the 
French différer.  This is intended to put the word somewhere between the passive and active, 
something Cilliers claims is true of complex systems.  Différance has further dimensions 
however.   
͞It is Ŷot the ƋuestioŶ of a ĐoŶstituted diffeƌeŶĐe heƌe, ďut ƌatheƌ, ďefoƌe all 
determination of the content, of the pure movement which produces difference.  The 
(pure) trace is différance.  It does not depend on any sensible plenitude, audible or 
visible, phonic or graphic.  It is, on the contrary, the condition of such plenitude.  
Although it does not exist, although it is never a being-present outside of all plenitude, 
its possiďilitǇ is ďǇ ƌights aŶteƌioƌ to all that oŶe Đalls sigŶ͟ (Derrida, 1976, p. 62) 
[original italics] 
This characterises Deƌƌida͛s ŶotioŶs of difféƌaŶĐe aŶd tƌaĐe as a ĐƌitiƋue of ideŶtitǇ ďeiŶg 
inherent within an object.  Derrida (1978, p. 118) furthermore suggests that trace constitutes 
presence by relating to both the past and the ͚uŶfoƌeseeaďle͛ futuƌe. 
The difficulty of reading Derrida, which is inherent in the project of critique he undertakes, 
ŵeaŶs that it is eƋuallǇ diffiĐult to eǀaluate Cillieƌs͛ liŶkiŶg of ǁeight to tƌaĐe aŶd difféƌaŶĐe to 
a complex network.  Thinking of traces as something actual is helpful, but misses some of the 
sense in which Derrida considered the term.  In a complex neural network, of the type Cilliers 
considers, weight is a measure of the electrical conductivity of a neuron or of its 
interconnectivity.  Although this weight will change in the future and has changed in the past, 
due to the diffuse system of changing interconnects, it is haƌd to ĐoŶĐlude ͞it does not exist͟ 
as Derrida claims of traces in the above quote.  There is a sense in which Derrida is using 
différance and trace in a way which is ephemeral, despite Cillieƌs͛ atteŵpts to ƌeduĐe this.  
Différance is not just a system of differences to other things but also something essential; as 
Glendinning (2011, p. 62) pƌoposes, ǁhat Deƌƌida ĐoŶǀeǇs is a ͚self-diffeƌeŶĐe͛.   
By making the physical system of a neural network analogous to the ephemeral system of 
difféƌaŶĐe Cillieƌs tƌaŶslates Deƌƌida͛s ǁoƌd plaǇ iŶto ĐoŶĐepts ǁhiĐh ŵake seŶse outside of 
continental philosophy and allow it to be married to insights from complexity science.  We 
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ŵight thus alloǁ the loss of soŵe of Deƌƌida͛s iŶitial iŶteŶtioŶ as ǁe seek aŶ aĐĐouŶt of 
understanding within complex systems. 
The keǇ iŶsight gaiŶed fƌoŵ Cillieƌs liŶkiŶg Deƌƌida͛s aĐĐouŶt of ŵeaŶiŶg to the way networks 
process information, is that ŵeaŶiŶg is ͚distƌiďuted͛ thƌoughout the Ŷetǁoƌk.  This is iŵpoƌtaŶt 
to our discussion of how we situate understanding within a complex social system for two 
reasons.  Firstly, it refutes a simple relationship between the world and our understandings of 
it.  Our understandings are mediated by linguistic systems which are themselves dynamic and 
complex.  Secondly, because linguistic systems and social relations are networks, humans are 
situated within such networks.  This means that individuals are part of distributed systems and 
will not be able to fully understand the systems they inhabit; they have access to only a small 
aspect of the system.  We shall return to the limitations of understanding in subsection 2.2.5.  
However, first we will consider exactly what Cilliers means by distributed systems.   
2.2.4 The Ontology of Meaning  
Deƌƌida͛s ǁoƌk ǁas pƌiŵaƌilǇ ĐoŶĐerned with language and meaning within it.  Cilliers 
iŶteƌpƌets the ͚distƌiďuted͛ Ŷatuƌe of ŵeaŶiŶg ǁithiŶ laŶguage as aŶalogous to the distƌiďuted 
processing conducted by artificial neural networks.  However, Cilliers (1998) also considers 
how brains operate in this way, how a (postmodern) society might be considered as a complex 
system and how scientific knowledge17 is limited.  As with Daǀis & “uŵaƌa͛s positioŶ 
(subsection 2.2.2), we cannot rely upon analogies to define how a system is complex.  Cilliers is 
Ŷot Đleaƌ aďout eǆaĐtlǇ ǁhat it is that is ͚distƌiďuted͛ oƌ suďjeĐt to difféƌaŶĐe iŶ these ǀaƌious 
sǇsteŵs.  He uses the teƌŵs ͚distƌiďuted ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ͛, ͚distƌiďuted ŵeaŶiŶg͛ aŶd 
͚distƌiďuted ĐoŶtƌol͛ iŶteƌĐhaŶgeaďlǇ iŶ diffeƌeŶt paƌts of his ǁoƌk and this leaves ambiguity.   
This ambiguity can be further explored if we consider how a classroom practitioner might 
apply such a critique.  What is distributed within a classroom?  Control over learning is 
certainly distributed if we consider that pupils must engage with materials and each other to 
learn.  We might be able to further claim that learning is distributed because the total learning 
of the whole classroom is not present in any one individual.  However, Cilliers relates meaning 
to identity as well:   
͞If, geŶeƌallǇ speakiŶg, the ŵeaŶiŶg aŶd fuŶĐtioŶ of a ĐoŵpoŶeŶt iŶ a Đoŵpleǆ sǇsteŵ 
is the result of relationships of difference, this would also hold for social systems. In 
this ĐoŶteǆt theŶ, the ŶotioŶ ͞ŵeaŶiŶg͟ ĐaŶ ďe used to iŶdiĐate the ideŶtity of the 
                                                          
17 Cillieƌs folloǁs LǇotaƌd͛s ;ϭϵϴϰͿ aŶalysis of why science cannot know everything, as part of the 
͚postŵodeƌŶ ĐoŶditioŶ͛. 
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system. Thus, the identity of a person or an institution is the result of constrained 
differences. Identity is therefore an emergent property resulting from the diversity in 
the sǇsteŵ, aŶd Ŷot soŵethiŶg ǁhiĐh eǆists iŶ aŶ a pƌioƌi fashioŶ.͟  (Cilliers, 2010, p. 
13) 
Again, how might an educationalist apply such a notion of identity?  We might see the identity 
of a pupil as defined by their relationships to other pupils, for example a teacher may identify a 
pupil in terms of their relative attainment or participation within the class.  We might also 
suggest that a Đlass has aŶ ͚ideŶtitǇ͛ ǁhiĐh is defiŶed Ŷot ďǇ aŶǇ siŶgle ŵeŵďeƌ ďut ďǇ the 
relationships and interactions between them. 
The issue is that by drawing oŶ Deƌƌida͛s ĐƌitiƋue of ŵeaŶiŶg ǁithiŶ a laŶguage sǇsteŵ aŶd 
applying it to neural networks, brains, science and society, we arrive at a very general critique 
of ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ oƌ ideŶtitǇ.   What Cillieƌs offeƌs theƌefoƌe is a geŶeƌalisatioŶ of Deƌƌida͛s 
critique of meaning to claim that within a complex system we cannot consider meaning or 
identity or control or learning as situated within individual nodes, people or other aspects of 
the sǇsteŵ.  IŶ this ǁaǇ, Cillieƌs͛ ĐoŵpleǆitǇ thiŶkiŶg is a foƌŵ of deĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ.  IŶ Deƌƌida͛s 
teƌŵs it ƌesists aŶǇ ŶotioŶ of ͚pƌeseŶĐe͛ ǁhiĐh is iŶheƌeŶt iŶ a ĐoŵpoŶeŶt of a sǇsteŵ.   
Deƌƌida͛s pƌojeĐt of deĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ iŶǀolǀes a ƌaŶge of stƌategies to highlight aŶd ĐhalleŶge 
assumptions within texts and language itself18.  However, Cilliers focuses on just one aspect: 
the constant deferring of meaning and system of traces.  He makes this concrete in the 
relationships between nodes or between people.  In relating meaning in language and identity 
in social and neural systems though, Cilliers (1998, 2001) drifts into talking about them 
interchangeably.  In proposing why meaning/control/identity are distributed we are able to 
critique representation as the notion of simple correspondence between a neural structure 
and the world, or between a linguistic signifier and what is signified.  However, this general 
appƌoaĐh to ĐƌitiƋue, ǁhiĐh is also iŶheƌeŶt iŶ Deƌƌida͛s pƌojeĐt, does Ŷot alloǁ us to ƌelate 
understanding and the world.  Cilliers is claiming that our understanding is emergent in a 
complex system but also that the systems in the world are complex.  However, Bhaskar draws 
atteŶtioŶ to ͚episteŵiĐ fallaĐǇ͛: 
͞This ĐoŶsists iŶ the ǀieǁ that stateŵeŶts aďout ďeiŶg ĐaŶ ďe ƌeduĐed to oƌ aŶalǇsed 
in terms of statements about knowledge; i.e. that ontological questions can always be 
                                                          
18 Derrida (1976, 1978) aims to highlight binary opposites and turn them around, for example by 
showing that speech is favoured over writing or that male is favoured over female within a text.  He also 
considers the genealogy of concepts within texts. 
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transposed into epistemological terms. The idea that being can always be analysed in 
teƌŵs of ouƌ kŶoǁledge of ďeiŶg, that it is suffiĐieŶt foƌ philosophǇ to ͚tƌeat oŶlǇ of the 
network, and not what the Ŷetǁoƌk desĐƌiďes͛͟ (Bhaskar, 2008 [1975], p. 26) 
Bhaskar is here quoting Wittgenstein (1961, ϲ.ϯϱͿ iŶ talkiŶg aďout ͞the network, and not what 
the network describes͟, but this takes on a literal character in Cillieƌs͛ ǁoƌk ǁheƌeďǇ he Đlaiŵs 
that our understandings are emergent within networks of meaning, but also that the world 
itself contains complex networks.  Indeed, in much of Cilliers͛ work he moves between 
considering understandings and ͚real systems͛ as complex, without adequate delineation.   
In contrast to Bhaskar however, Cilliers (2002) argues that a distinction between the 
epistemological and ontological is a false one.  If we say that systems in the real world are 
complex then we must accept that our meaning is also constituted by a complex system of 
relations, as Derrida concludes. As we are subjects in a complex world, we must accept that: 
͞the suďjeĐt is Ŷot aŶ iŶdepeŶdeŶt ǁhole, Ŷot a fƌee floatiŶg ego that ŵakes 
͞suďjeĐtiǀe͟ oďseƌǀatioŶs oƌ deĐisioŶs.  It is a Đoŵpleǆ thiŶg iŶ itself, ĐoŶstituted 
thƌough the ǁeď of ƌelatioŶships ǁith otheƌs aŶd the ǁoƌld.͟ (Cilliers, 2002, p. 80)  
The tendency for Cilliers to shift between talking about the complex systems from which our 
understandings emerge, and the systems that understandings pertain to, is born of a belief 
that the two cannot be separated.  Cilliers sees the brain itself as a complex system which 
adapts through interaction with the world.  As such, if we accept that understanding comes 
from the brain then this is a further nail in the coffin of a distinction between ontology and 
epistemology.   
The insistence on relations to the real world leads writers such as Byrne & Callaghan (2014, p. 
57) to ĐoŶĐlude that ͞Cillieƌs is iŶ pƌaĐtiĐe a ǀeƌǇ ƌealist soƌt of post-ŵodeƌŶist͟.  Although 
Cilliers insists on the real world, and the role of our brains in understanding that real world, he 
does not adequately situate our understandings.   The issue is that in wanting to describe a 
specific situation, such as classroom learning, we cannot rely upon a general deconstruction of 
identity or meaning.  We need to consider the ways in which the systems involved are 
complex.   
We shall ƌetuƌŶ to Bhaskaƌ͛s aƌguŵeŶts iŶ ƌelatioŶ to the Đoŵpleǆ realist position in Section 
Ϯ.ϯ, aŶd hoǁ this ƌelates to Cillieƌs͛ positioŶ.  Cillieƌs͛ ǁoƌk ƌejeĐts a siŵple ƌelatioŶship 
between mind and matter, and also between ontology and epistemology.  However, by 
conflating mind and matter he is not able to recognise the differences between systems, and 
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so offers a general critique rather than an account of how systems such as brains and 
classrooms might develop.  We ǁill shoǁ iŶ the Ŷeǆt suďseĐtioŶ that this is ďeĐause Deƌƌida͛s 
approach of deconstruction, which Cilliers relies upon, is unable to make affirmative 
statements about the world. 
2.2.5 Boundaries and Ethics  
In developing a critique of there being a simple correspondence between brain, language and 
world Cilliers sees each of these as complex systems.  Not only are the relationships between 
these systems complex, but if humans are just a small part of a social system then we do not 
have access to a complete understanding of that system.  This can be argued from a network 
perspective, as Cilliers does, but also from recognition that the influences upon an individual 
are nonlinear and dynamic within a complex social system.   
Cilliers attempts to address the problem of how we situate understandings within such 
systems by appeal to the boundaries of our understanding.  This might be seen as an extension 
of Deƌƌida͛s ĐoŶsideƌatioŶ of ŵeaŶiŶg ďut the diffeƌeŶĐe ďetǁeeŶ the two accounts is one of 
degree and of origin.  Derrida is not denying meaning but questioning its certainty and there is 
thus an implication of boundaries to our understanding.  However Cilliers makes boundaries 
central to the discussion of meaning. 
͞if aŶ iŶfiŶite Ŷuŵďeƌ of iŶteƌaĐtioŶs haǀe to ďe considered, the production of 
meaning will be indefinitely postponed.  This, we know, is not the case.  Meaning is 
geŶeƌated iŶ ƌeal tiŵe.͟ (Cilliers, 2002, p. 81) 
Cilliers (2002) argues that in order to make meaning, there must be boundaries in order to 
reduce the complexity of the system: we cannot deal with the whole universe at once.  He 
therefore argues that meaning is established relative to the boundaries we impose in our 
consideration.  Boundaries allow meaning by providing reference points but do not deny the 
possibility of information from outside the system becoming relevant19.  So he adds to his 
deconstructive approach the role of boundaries in making sense of the complex systems in the 
real world, and within which we live.   
By adding a notion of boundaries Cilliers attempts to do two things.  Firstly, he is suggesting 
that because people are able to appreciate the boundaries of statements made about the 
world, we are able to communicate with each other.  The implication is that we do not need to 
                                                          
19 Cillieƌs ;ϮϬϬϮͿ ĐoŶtƌasts ďouŶdaƌies to ͚liŵits͛, ǁhiĐh aƌe iŵpeƌŵeaďle iŶ the seŶse ǁe ĐaŶ kŶoǁ theŵ 
oŶlǇ ͚fƌoŵ the iŶside͛. 
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deconstruct every statement we make, or understand the full network which gives it meaning: 
ǁe just Ŷeed to aĐĐept that theƌe aƌe ďouŶdaƌies to the ͚tƌuth͛ of ǁhat ǁe aƌe saǇiŶg.  The 
seĐoŶd puƌpose of aŶ appeal to ďouŶdaƌies iŶ Cillieƌs͛ ;ϮϬϬϮ, ϮϬϬϱa, 2005b) account is to argue 
against the charge of relativism.  Within boundaries, there are statements which are truer than 
otheƌs.  Fuƌtheƌŵoƌe, ǁe ĐaŶ assess this ͚iŶ ƌeal tiŵe͛ ǁithout reference to an infinite deferral 
of meaning.  Here we see that Cilliers approaches a coherence view of truth: that rather than 
being determined by simple correspondence to the world, our statements and understandings 
are coherent within the boundaries of our understanding.  Indeed, Cilliers (2005a) warns of the 
daŶgeƌs of ͞aĐadeŵiĐ gƌoupies͟ aŶd of ͞ǀague gƌoupspeak͟ aŶd ĐoŶĐludes that: 
͞IŶ soŵe ;post-modern) circles a vague kind of chatter, employing a shared vocabulary 
iŶ aŶ uŶĐƌitiĐal ǁaǇ, has ďeĐoŵe aĐĐeptaďle͟ (Cilliers, 2005a, p. 262) 
Cilliers instead advocates concepts which are communicated clearly.  This does not mean they 
have an indisputable identity, they are modest claims, but this does not mean that they must 
be vague or weak either.  Cilliers argues that limits enable knowledge; otherwise we would 
have to include the whole universe in any statement.  However knowledge is also fragile 
because we exclude something from it which may be important.  Complex systems have 
structure because of their constraints, and meaning in complex systems is similarly bounded 
but contingent.  However, this begs a number of questions about boundaries: how do we 
defiŶe these ďouŶdaƌies ͚iŶ ƌeal tiŵe͛?  Aƌe the ďouŶdaƌies deteƌŵiŶed ďǇ the iŶdiǀidual oƌ 
socially?  To what extent do we have control over them?   
Cilliers contends that the way we draw boundaries is necessarily an ethical process (Cilliers, 
2004; 1998, pp. 136-140).   
͞Whateǀeƌ ǁe do has ethiĐal iŵpliĐatioŶs, Ǉet ǁe ĐaŶŶot Đall oŶ eǆteƌŶal pƌiŶĐiples to 
resolve our dilemmas in a final way. The fact that some form of ethics is unavoidable 
seeŵs to ďe a ǀeƌǇ iŵpoƌtaŶt iŶsight fƌoŵ ĐoŵpleǆitǇ theoƌǇ.͟ (Heylighen, Cilliers & 
Gershenson, 2007, p. 17) 
Whilst this thesis is not aimed at an ethical understanding of action in complex systems per se, 
ǁe ǁill eǆploƌe these aƌguŵeŶts iŶsofaƌ as theǇ defiŶe Cillieƌs͛ positioŶiŶg of uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶgs 
within complex systems. 
Heylighen, Cilliers & Gershenson (2007) argue that complexity theory challenges the ideal of a 
fixed and correct moral code.  However, they also contend that complexity theory cannot 
devise a better moral system, it is instead concerned with the realisation that in every complex 
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social system, we are always making ethical choices.  Cilliers (2004) highlights the limitations of 
ďoth ďliŶdlǇ folloǁiŶg fiǆed ƌules ;the ͚ŵodeƌŶist͛ pƌojeĐtͿ aŶd ĐoŶǀeƌselǇ of eǀeƌǇoŶe aĐtiŶg 
oŶ pƌiǀate ŵoƌal deĐisioŶs.  He dƌaǁs oŶ LǇotaƌd͛s (1984) description of power to conclude 
that in a complex social system any attempt to draw boundaries will disregard those outside of 
those boundaries.  Cilliers (2010) furthers his argument by highlighting the need to respect the 
diversity which is necessary to the survival of any complex system.  This draws on arguments of 
͚the diffeƌeŶĐe ǁithiŶ͛ ǁhiĐh oƌigiŶate fƌoŵ Deƌƌida aŶd aƌe less thaŶ satisfaĐtoƌǇ. 
Whilst Cillieƌs͛ aĐĐouŶt of ethiĐal aĐtioŶ ͞ƌesoŶates stƌoŶglǇ ǁith post-structural and Derridean 
ethiĐs͟ ;Heylighen, Cilliers & Gershenson, 2007, p. 17) it provides a rather amorphous account 
of hoǁ the ďouŶdaƌies of ouƌ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg aƌe ƌeĐogŶised ͚iŶ ƌeal tiŵe͛ aŶd hoǁ theǇ 
determine our understandings within complex systems.  Kunneman (2010) argues that there is 
a teŶsioŶ iŶ Cillieƌs͛ ǁoƌk ďetǁeeŶ ƌejeĐtiŶg aŶǇ ŵetaphǇsiĐal oƌ tƌaŶsĐeŶdeŶt ďasis of 
͚eǆteƌŶallǇ iŵposed͛ ŵoƌal Đodes aŶd the ĐapaĐitǇ of huŵaŶs to ŵake deĐisioŶs at all20.  In 
developing a notion of meaning as emergent yet bounded, Cilliers provides no criteria by 
which to choose one approach over any other.  We are not able to adequately situate how we 
understand and act in the world.   
2.2.6 Dialectics and Madness 
We will argue here that the issue that Cilliers has in situating understandings is inherited from 
Derrida.  This issue can be seen in Biesta͛s ;ϭϵϵϴ, ϮϬϬϭͿ disĐussioŶ of the ƌole of Deƌƌida͛s 
ethics in relation to a just education.  He argues that: 
͞Just eduĐatioŶ has to ďe oŶ the outlook foƌ the iŵpossiďle iŶǀeŶtioŶ of the otheƌ. The 
otheƌ, Deƌƌida ǁƌites, ͞is Ŷot the possiďle." The otheƌ is ͞pƌeĐiselǇ ǁhat is Ŷot 
iŶǀeŶted͟.͟ Biesta (1998, p. 409) 
Without seekiŶg to eǆploƌe Deƌƌida͛s ŶotioŶ of ͚otheƌŶess͛ heƌe, ǁe see that ͚ethiĐal͛ deĐisioŶs 
made within complex systems are defined in reference to deconstruction.  By following 
Derrida, post-structuralists like Cilliers and Biesta get stuck in a trap of having to accept either 
the constant deferral/difference of meaning, or they have to construct boundaries which pay 
atteŶtioŶ to the ͚otheƌ͛ ǁhiĐh sits outside ouƌ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg.  Whilst defeŶsiďle as the practice 
of deconstruction, this offers no way forward in situating our understandings within a complex 
system or proposing what we do, let alone what we should do: 
                                                          
20 KuŶŶeŵaŶ pƌoposes a huŵaŶist solutioŶ, ďut this ƌests oŶ KaŶtiaŶ aŶd AƌistoleaŶ ŶotioŶs of ͚good͛ 
being defined outside of the system.  Furthermore, Smith & Jenks (2005, 2006) show that complexity 
rejects humanist assumptions that we can use rational or scientific means to fully understand complex 
systems.  
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͞The iŶstaŶt of deĐisioŶ is ŵadŶess, saǇs Kieƌkegaaƌd.  This is paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ tƌue of the 
iŶstaŶt of the just deĐisioŶ that ŵust ƌeŶd tiŵe aŶd defǇ dialeĐtiĐs.  It is a ŵadŶess.͟  
(Derrida, 1990, p. 967) 
It is unsatisfactory to accept that our understandings within complex social systems are born of 
͚a ŵadŶess͛, oƌ that ǁe Ŷeed to iŶĐlude a seŶse of ǁhat ǁe do Ŷot kŶoǁ.  The ƌeĐogŶitioŶ that 
we can never have complete understanding and that our normative values emerge is in 
ĐoŶfliĐt ǁith aŶǇ atteŵpt to ŵake ethiĐal deĐisioŶs.  Cillieƌs͛ uŶtiŵelǇ death iŶ ϮϬϭϭ ŵeaŶs he 
did not fully develop his ethical position and we are thus left with a critical position which 
draws attention to boundaries, but inherits the difficulties that Derrida had in saying anything 
useful about action.  It is worth exploring these limitations further, because doing so reveals 
that the issue is ontological.  As we noted at the end of subsection 2.2.5, Cilliers does not 
adequately account for how our understandings relate to the real world.  We will see that this 
is because he inherits from Derrida the ƌeŵŶaŶts of Hegel͛s dialeĐtiĐ.  Highlighting this issue 
here will point us to the solution developed within Chapter 3, that a materialist ontology is the 
oŶlǇ ǁaǇ to esĐape the uŶteŶaďle ŶotioŶ of ͚otheƌŶess͛. 
A full discussion of Hegel͛s philosophy lies well beyond the scope of this thesis.  However, 
elucidating features of it will allow us to see the impact it has had on post-structuralist 
complexity.  Although theƌe aƌe ŵaŶǇ iŶteƌpƌetatioŶs of Hegel͛s ǁoƌk, the ͚tƌaditioŶal ƌeadiŶg͛ 
is that Hegel saw the universe as comprising of a single essence or Spirit, the development of 
which involves the resolution of opposites (Redding, 2014; Rosen, 1974).  In relation to human 
thought, which is seen as part of this process, this manifests as the resolution or negation of 
ďiŶaƌǇ opposites.  Foƌ eǆaŵple, Hegel sees the ŶotioŶ of ͚ďeiŶg͛ as defiŶaďle only in relation to 
its opposite: ͚ŶothiŶgŶess͛.  These, Hegel argues, can be resolved through a more universal 
concept of ͚ďeĐoŵiŶg͛.  IŶ the saŵe ǁaǇ, the ĐoŶĐepts of ͚ƌed͛ oƌ ͚gƌeeŶ͛ ĐaŶ ďe Ŷegated 
thƌough the uŶiǀeƌsal ĐoŶĐept of ͚Đolouƌ͛ ;‘eddiŶg, 2014).  Whilst we might see Hegel as 
maintaining a monist position in which the world is Spirit therefore, he sees thought as a 
process by which we can achieve some universal, transcendent understanding.  It is this that 
Derrida (1968, 1976) takes exception to. 
Grebe (2010) examines how the HegeliaŶ ŶotioŶ of ŶegatioŶ iŶfoƌŵed Deƌƌida͛s ŶotioŶ of 
difféƌaŶĐe aŶd iŶ tuƌŶ Cillieƌs͛ desĐƌiptioŶ of ĐoŵpleǆitǇ thiŶkiŶg.  Derrida rejects the negation 
or resolution of binary opposites.  However, Grebe argues that Derrida does not fully do away 
with the importance of opposites.  We can see this in his notion of traces, which relies on 
irreducible differences in the world.  Traces are continually deferred such that meaning 
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ďeĐoŵes ƌelatioŶal ǁith ďoth spatial aŶd teŵpoƌal diŵeŶsioŶs.  Cillieƌs͛ desĐƌiptioŶ of Ŷeuƌal 
Ŷetǁoƌks is also a ƌelatioŶal sǇsteŵ ǁhiĐh dƌaǁs oŶ Deƌƌida͛s difféƌaŶĐe and relies upon a 
network of differences.  Gƌeďe aƌgues that Hegel͛s dialeĐtiĐ position has been inherited by 
Derrida and Cilliers and as such we must assess the influence of this upon complexity thinking. 
͞IŶ oƌdeƌ to see the ŶegatiǀitǇ iŶheƌeŶt iŶ the deĐoŶstƌuĐtiǀe pƌaĐtiĐe ;aŶd theƌefoƌe 
its Hegelian roots), it is necessary to show hoǁ Deƌƌida͛s desĐƌiptioŶ of the sǇsteŵ, 
and of the process by which meaning is generated within a system, implies both an 
iŶheƌeŶt iŶstaďilitǇ of ŵeaŶiŶg, aŶd a ͞ďeǇoŶd͟ ;͞outside͟ oƌ ͞ƌeŵaiŶdeƌ͟Ϳ to this 
system.  This transcendental moment in his thought is the source of its critical power, 
since a trace of the outside and therefore the radically other or new (something which 
is not implied by the system itself) always enters into the system and disrupts the 
deteƌŵiŶatioŶ that oĐĐuƌs ǁithiŶ.͟ (Grebe, 2010, pp. 104-105) 
Deƌƌida͛s ǁoƌk ďoth atteŵpts to oǀeƌĐoŵe HegeliaŶ dialeĐtiĐs ďut is at the saŵe tiŵe ŵade 
possible by it.  Barnet (1998) argues that Derrida rejects Hegelian negation within philosophy 
and much of his work is devoted to showing that the resolution of opposites is not possible.     
͞ĐoŶfliĐtualitǇ of différance – which can be called contradiction only if one demarcates 
it ďǇ ŵeaŶs of a loŶg ǁoƌk oŶ Hegel͛s ĐoŶĐept of ĐoŶtƌadiĐtioŶ – can never be totally 
ƌesolǀed͟ Deƌƌida (2002, p. 44)   
Here we see that Derrida acknowledges the ͚loŶg͛ path fƌoŵ Hegel to différance but refutes 
the ƌesolutioŶ that Hegel͛s dialeĐtiĐs desĐƌiďe.  Deƌƌida ͚ďloĐks͛ the ƌesolutioŶ of ďiŶaƌǇ 
opposites by showing that there is constant deferral of meaning.  However, Barnet and Grebe 
both suggest that Deƌƌida takes fƌoŵ Hegel a ǁaǇ of iŵagiŶiŶg difféƌaŶĐe aŶd ͚otheƌŶess͛ 
which is central to the process of deconstruction. 
The ƌeleǀaŶĐe of suĐh disĐussioŶ iŶ this thesis is iŶ ƌeĐogŶisiŶg that Cillieƌs͛ aĐĐouŶt of ouƌ 
bounded understanding within complex social systems owes an inheritance to dialectic 
ŵetaphǇsiĐs, alďeit oŶe that is ͚ďloĐked͛.  We see that iŶheƌeŶt iŶ Cillieƌs͛ desĐƌiptioŶs aƌe the 
seŶse of ͚otheƌŶess͛, of soŵethiŶg outside of the ďouŶdaƌies, of ŵeaŶiŶg as ďeiŶg defiŶed 
outside of the situation at hand.  There are thus two issues with post-structuralist complexity 
as it stands.  Firstly, it has inherited an untenable notion of dialectic which means that our 
understandings within complex social systems must be related to some unknowable 
͚otheƌŶess͛.  This is highlǇ pƌoďleŵatiĐ.  “eĐoŶdlǇ, dƌaǁiŶg oŶ deĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ has ƌeplaĐed a 
full account of how specific systems interact and how understandings emerge for brain, 
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language and the broader world.  We will argue that this can be resolved through adopting 
Deleuze͛s oŶtologiĐal sǇsteŵ ǁheƌeďǇ ǁe see uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶgs as paƌt of a sǇsteŵ iŶ ǁhiĐh 
everything is real and meaning is defined in specific contexts (see Chapter 3). 
The strength of the post-structuralist complexity account should not be overlooked however.  
BǇ ƌelatiŶg Deƌƌida͛s aĐĐouŶt to Ŷeuƌal Ŷetǁoƌks Cillieƌs is aďle to shoǁ that uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg is 
not situated within an individual person or node, nor is it achieved through the simple 
ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ of the ǁoƌld ͚as it is͛.  This is aŶ advance on scientific accounts of complexity 
which do not account for their ontological and epistemological basis at all.  The post-
structuralist account gives us a basis for challenging the separation of epistemology and 
ontology, which is also challenged by Pragmatists such as Dewey (subsection 2.1.5).  On a less 
philosophical level however, post-structuralist complexity provides a reason why learning is 
not a simple process: because understanding is situated within a network of connections 
within the social and physical world.  To recover these positive aspects of the post-structuralist 
account, from the untenable dialectic position it inherits, we require a reaffirmation of what is 
real and how understandings relate to reality.  As such we will now consider whether this 
might be achieved by the ontological position of complex realism. 
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2b Human Understanding in Complex Realist and Constructionist 
Accounts 
2.3 Complex Realism 
2.3.1 The Middle Ground  
Reconsidering the orientating frame introduced in Section 2.0, we have already examined 
what Richardson & Cilliers (2001) deŶoted as ͚ƌeduĐtioŶist ĐoŵpleǆitǇ sĐieŶĐe͛ ;“eĐtioŶ Ϯ.ϭͿ 
and the post-stƌuĐtuƌalist appƌoaĐhes ǁhiĐh gƌeǁ out of ͚ĐoŵpleǆitǇ thiŶkiŶg͛ ;Ϯ.ϮͿ.  We Ŷoǁ 
tuƌŶ to ‘iĐhaƌdsoŶ & Cillieƌs͛ thiƌd ĐategoƌǇ: ͚soft ĐoŵpleǆitǇ sĐieŶĐe͛.  Within this category are 
those who see the social world as intrinsically different from the material world and thus 
conclude that complexity can at best be a metaphorical tool to develop new understandings of 
social systems. 
In this thesis we will consider two different positions, both of which can be seen to have grown 
out of what Richardson & Cilliers called soft complexity science.  In Section 2.4 we will explore 
“taĐeǇ͛s (2003a, 2005) account of the complexity of social constuction.  Here however we will 
consider what is denoted within the literature as complex realism (Harvey & Reed, 1996; 
Byrne, 1998).  Complex realism underpins a range of methodological approaches which assert 
the importance of the real world.  Byrne & Uprichard make clear: 
͞We aƌe Ŷot suggestiŶg a positiǀist oƌ aŶti-social constructionist approach to causality 
here, but rather that materiality needs to be brought back and made central in 
discussion about social causalitǇ.͟  BǇƌŶe & UpƌiĐhaƌd ;ϮϬϭϮ, p. 124) 
Coŵpleǆ ƌealisŵ has a liŶeage that dƌaǁs oŶ Bhaskaƌ͛s (2008 [1975]) critical realism, and is 
then combined with complexity theory by Harvey & Reed (1996) before being most fully 
developed by Byrne (Byrne, 1998; Byrne & Callaghan, 2014).  Harvey & Reed situate complex 
ƌealisŵ as a ͚ŵiddle gƌouŶd͛ ďetǁeeŶ positiǀist, ƌeduĐtioŶist appƌoaĐhes aŶd ǁhat theǇ Đall 
͚postŵodeƌŶ͛ appƌoaĐhes to complexity: 
͞“uĐh a dǇŶaŵiĐ ƌealisŵ is Đapaďle of sustaiŶiŶg the paƌtiĐulaƌitǇ aŶd pluƌalitǇ of the 
soĐial ǁoƌld ǁhilst pƌeseƌǀiŶg ƌatioŶal ĐaŶoŶs of sĐieŶtifiĐ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg.͟ (Harvey & 
Reed, 1996, p. 297) 
The above quote illustrates the desire to allow the dynamic, nonlinear and context-specific 
nature of social causality but also to preserve scientific rigour.  This gives away both the main 
ĐoŶjeĐtuƌe of Đoŵpleǆ ƌealisŵ ďut also its ŵaiŶ pƌoďleŵ.  BǇ failiŶg to ƋuestioŶ the ͞ƌatioŶal 
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canons of scientifiĐ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg͟, Đoŵpleǆ ƌealisŵ fails to situate the ŵodels it seeks to 
produce as themselves within complex systems.  For all the issues with post-structuralist 
complexity theory, it does recognise that the models we have of the world are themselves 
complex entities.  Yet there can be little doubt that complex realism is opposed to 
͚postŵodeƌŶ͛ disĐouƌses:  
͞ĐoŵpleǆitǇ, iŶduĐtiǀelǇ fouŶded as it is, is Ŷot iŶŶoĐeŶt iŶ ŵetatheoƌetiĐal teƌŵs.  It 
does have ontological and epistemological implications, implications which make it 
essentially part of the realist programme of scientific understanding and inquiry.  
Moreover, the account it offers challenges in the most fundamental way the 
postmodern view of the nature of social science and the potentials of its appliĐatioŶ.͟ 
(Byrne, 1998, p. 7) 
͞IŶ the Đase of postŵodeƌŶitǇ ǁe haǀe to aĐĐept that the foƌŵ of soĐial aĐtioŶ is 
absolute social inaction – the disengagement of the intellectual project from any 
commitment to any social programme whatsoever – bone idleness promoted to a 
ŵetatheoƌetiĐal pƌogƌaŵŵe.͟ (Byrne, 1998, p. 45) 
The seĐoŶd Ƌuote ƌelates to the issue ǁe saǁ iŶ “eĐtioŶ Ϯ.Ϯ ǁheƌeďǇ Cillieƌs͛ foƌŵ of 
complexity thinking is unable to say anything about action in a complex system.  However, the 
discourse has matured and Byrne & Callaghan (2014) are respectful to Cilliers in particular, 
whilst maintaining the importance of considering the real word, rather than just focusing on 
the limitations of understanding.  As we saw earlier, Byrne & Callaghan (2014, p. 57) suggest 
that Cilliers is ͞a very realist sort of post-modernist͟, but we might say that ĐoŶǀeƌselǇ BǇƌŶe͛s 
realism has a post-structuralist character:   
͞We aƌe dealiŶg Ŷot ǁith laďels ǁhiĐh eǆist outside of people aŶd situatioŶs, ďut ǁith 
the Ŷoise, souŶd aŶd sŵoke of thiŶgs iŶ aĐtioŶ.͟ (Byrne, 2011, p. 135) 
͞It is possiďle to ǁoƌk ǁith fuzzǇ set ŵeŵďeƌships and with multi value rather than 
ďiŶaƌǇ attƌiďutes.͟ (Byrne, 2011, p. 140) 
The ƌelatioŶship ďetǁeeŶ BǇƌŶe͛s aŶd Cillieƌs͛ positioŶ is aŶ iŵpoƌtaŶt oŶe, ďoth ďeĐause theǇ 
are key figures within the complexity literature and also because they give substantial 
accounts which allow us to see the differences between post-structuralist complexity and 
complex realism.  This difference centres on the way reality is accounted for and we will 
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engage with this shortly.  First though, we must lay out exactly what complex realists are 
saying about reality. 
2.3.2 The Mechanisms of Social Systems 
BǇƌŶe & CallaghaŶ aƌgue that Đoŵpleǆ ƌealisŵ iŶĐludes ͞the oŶtologiĐal positioŶ that ŵuĐh of 
the ǁoƌld aŶd ŵost of the soĐial ǁoƌld ĐoŶsists of Đoŵpleǆ sǇsteŵs͟ (Byrne & Callaghan, 2014, 
p. 8).  To elucidate this position it is worthwhile considering Bhaskaƌ͛s ĐƌitiĐal ƌealisŵ21, which 
Harvey & Reed (1996) draw upon in defining complex realism. 
Bhaskaƌ͛s (2008 [1975]) position asserts the reality of mechanisms within the social world, and 
states that because mechanisms are real they can therefore be investigated through scientific 
processes.  This is similar to the ontological implications of network science (subsection 2.1.4) 
in that the relations between people are real and can be investigated.  Critical realism 
hoǁeǀeƌ, asseƌts the ƌealitǇ of ŵeĐhaŶisŵs ǁhetheƌ theǇ aƌe ͚aĐtualised͛ oƌ Ŷot22.  This leads 
Srnicek (2007), to argue that Bhaskar inherits a notion of representation in assuming that 
mechanisms in the world can be represented by science.  This is in opposition to the post-
structuralist rejection of representation (subsection 2.2.4). 
In developing complex realism, Harvey & Reed (1996) argue that social systems are a subset of 
what we would now call complex systems23: 
͞the gƌouŶdiŶg of dissipatiǀe soĐial sǇsteŵs iŶ Ŷatuƌe aŶd iŶ the dǇŶaŵiĐs of 
deterministic chaos demands a materiality interpretation of dissipative soĐial sǇsteŵs͟ 
(Harvey & Reed, 1996, p. 206) 
However, Reed & Harvey argue that: 
͞soĐieties aŶd theiƌ iŶstitutioŶal aĐtiǀities aƌe ĐoŶstƌuĐted ďǇ the ĐolleĐtiǀe aĐtioŶ of 
human beings, and, thus, are profoundly influenced by the way in which humans 
subjectively define themselves and their actions.  This fundamental difference has 
alƌeadǇ ďeeŶ eǆpƌessed iŶ Bhaskaƌ͛s ĐƌitiĐal Ŷatuƌalist paƌadigŵ.͟ ;Harvey & Reed, 
1996, p. 206) 
So the reality and complexity of social systems is asserted by complex realism, but the role of 
subjective understandings is also recognised.  Byrne (1998, p. 37) admits that he does not 
                                                          
21 We touĐhed upoŶ Bhaskaƌ͛s positioŶ iŶ suďseĐtioŶ Ϯ.Ϯ.ϰ iŶ ƌelatioŶ to ͞episteŵiĐ fallaĐǇ͟.  
22 Bhaskaƌ͛s positioŶ shaƌes ĐhaƌaĐteƌistiĐs ǁith DeLaŶda͛s ;see ϲ.ϭ.ϮͿ iŶ disĐussiŶg ͚teŶdeŶĐies͛ ǁhiĐh 
are ͞poǁeƌs ǁhiĐh ŵaǇ ďe eǆeƌĐised ǁithout ďeiŶg fulfilled oƌ aĐtualized.͟ (Bhaskar, 1975, p. 45). 
23 HaƌǀeǇ & ‘eed ƌefeƌ to deteƌŵiŶistiĐ Đhaos, as ǁell as ŶotioŶs of ͚edge of Đhaos͛ ǁhiĐh haǀe siŶĐe 
been challenged during the development of complexity theory, see subsection 1.2.2. 
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ƌeseƌǀe the teƌŵ ͚ƌeal͛ foƌ Đausal ŵeĐhaŶisŵs as Bhaskaƌ does, ďut uses it ŵoƌe ďƌoadlǇ.  This 
allows Byrne and his collaborators to assert that causality within social systems should be 
treated as real and discernible, despite being nonlinear and dynamic. 
Byrne & Uprichard (2012) consider ͞useful complex causality͟ in the sense of how complex 
realism allows an understanding of causality within complex social systems.  Put simply, they 
argue that agent based modelling is limited because it cannot account for the complexity of 
relations within and between subsystems, or with systems outside of the one being 
considered.  Likewise a focus on variables at the statistical level neglects the importance of 
Đausal iŶteƌaĐtioŶs ǁithiŶ the sǇsteŵ.  Theiƌ solutioŶ is to foĐus oŶ iŶǀestigatiŶg siŵilaƌ ͚Đases͛ 
and discern the characteristics which are shared in cases that maintain their structure and the 
characteristics of those that develop in specific ways.  For example, by considering all schools 
that aƌe deeŵed to ďe failiŶg theǇ ĐaŶ Đoŵpaƌe those that addƌess this aŶd those that doŶ͛t.  
The state of the system is considered as an emergent property of its previous state, so 
investigating these states in a range of similar systems allows detection of important causal 
influences.  IŶ a seŶse theŶ, BǇƌŶe & UpƌiĐhaƌd do Ŷot Ŷeed Bhaskaƌ͛s iŶsisteŶĐe oŶ 
mechanism.  By asserting that complex social systems are real and that there is complex 
causality, they develop methodological approaches which are aimed at discerning the 
parameters of systems, which correlate to those systems developing in certain ways.   
However, Byrne and his collaborators do have something to say about the autonomy of 
different levels of reality.  Their claims can be compared to what Sawyer (2004, 2005) 
describes as a ͚soĐial ŵeĐhaŶistiĐ͛ appƌoaĐh, ǁhiĐh iŶǀolǀes ĐoŶsideƌiŶg the iŶteƌaĐtioŶs of 
agents on a particular scale, and then seeing how these lead to emergence at some other 
scale.  Sawyer suggests that: 
͞OŶĐe soĐial pƌopeƌties eŵeƌge, theǇ haǀe aŶ oŶtologiĐal status distiŶĐt fƌoŵ theiƌ 
ƌealiziŶg ŵeĐhaŶisŵs ǁhiĐh ŵaǇ paƌtiĐipate iŶ Đausal ƌelatioŶs.͟ (Sawyer, 2004, p. 
261) 
However, Byrne & Callaghan disagree with Sawyer͛s formulation: 
͞ǁhat “aǁǇeƌ ĐaŶŶot adŵit is soĐial stƌuĐtuƌe, the eǆisteŶĐe of ĐolleĐtiǀe soĐial 
entities which persist in some way over and above the actions of individual humans 
and have a reality beyond them, albeit a time limited reality – the esseŶĐe of Bhaskaƌ͛s 
ƌealist uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of ŵeĐhaŶisŵ.͟ (Byrne & Callaghan, 2014, p. 46) 
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As we see from the quote above, Sawyer does admit the autonomy of social properties.  The 
subtle difference between the two accounts is that Sawyer insists on structure being emergent 
from micro-causes.  In contrast, Byrne & Callaghan are arguing that even if we allow that social 
pƌopeƌties haǀe eǀolǀed iŶ histoƌǇ aŶd haǀe Đausal poǁeƌs todaǇ theŶ “aǁǇeƌ͛s aĐĐouŶt is too 
ďouŶd to the ͚ďottoŵ-up͛, ageŶt ďased ŵodelliŶg ǀieǁ of soĐial eŵeƌgeŶĐe.  PƌoĐess, ƌelatioŶs 
and conscious agency are important to Byrne & Callaghan beyond the interaction of individual 
agents.  So whilst the accounts of Sawyer and of Byrne & Callaghan agree that real causal 
power should be attributed at the individual and collective level of social systems, the latter 
account goes beyond seeing causality as purely involving agent interactions.  
In order to reconcile the causal influence of macroscopic social systems (e.g. a classroom) and 
the agency of individuals, Byrne & Callaghan (2014, Chapter 5) argue that human agency is 
situated within what Bourdieu calls fields.  These fields both orientate agency and evolve as 
people exercise that agency24.  What is important here is how Byrne & Callaghan use 
Bouƌdieu͛s soĐiologiĐal theoƌǇ to ĐoŶsideƌ hoǁ ouƌ ǀieǁs of the ǁoƌld are situated within 
social fields: how our understandings are within social complex systems.  Yet they also 
maintain the capacity of our models to capture something of real causal processes and for us 
to develop understandings of complex systems.  In asserting that social entities have complex 
causal influence, we are forced to better define the status of our models relative to these 
entities.     
2.3.3 Models and Metaphors in Complex Realism 
IŶ ƌelatiŶg Đoŵpleǆ ƌealisŵ to Bouƌdieu͛s ǁoƌk, Byrne & Callaghan suggest: 
͞The status of theoƌǇ theŶ is that it deǀelops ͚ŵodels͛ of systems of relations, which 
stand, as all models do, as metaphors of reality.  It is just this relationship between the 
episteŵologǇ aŶd eŵpiƌiĐal iŶǀestigatioŶ that ŵakes Bouƌdieu͛s ǁoƌk ĐoŵpelliŶg foƌ 
complexity theory, in which the aim is to achieve scientific laws, expressed as normic 
stateŵeŶts that ĐaŶ ͚giǀe ƌeasoŶed sĐieŶtifiĐ aĐĐouŶts of ƌealitǇ͛ ;‘eed aŶd HaƌǀeǇ 
ϭϵϵϮ: ϯϱϳͿ͟ ;BǇƌŶe & CallaghaŶ, ϮϬϭϰ, p. 110) 
Byrne & Callaghan (2014, p. ϭϭϳͿ see thƌee keǇ aspeĐts of oǀeƌlap ďetǁeeŶ Bouƌdieu͛s aĐĐouŶt 
and this approach to compleǆitǇ:  theoƌǇ is ͞disĐuƌsiǀe with͟ the system; it is empirically based; 
it seeks local explanations which recognise the significance of interactions, emergence and 
ageŶĐǇ.  As ǁe saǁ ǁith BǇƌŶe & UpƌiĐhaƌd͛s ;ϮϬϭϮͿ appƌoaĐh to considering cases rather than 
                                                          
24 We ǁill fuƌtheƌ disĐuss Bouƌdieu͛s ŶotioŶs lateƌ, aŶd suggest that the positioŶ iŶ this thesis pƌoǀides a 
more concrete account of human agency (subsection 5.1.3).   
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variables, the point is that understanding of complex social systems is to be achieved by 
engaging with the particularities of social systems and not by reducing them to variables, agent 
based models or a priori descriptions of the system at hand.  This is a powerful insight and 
allows complexitǇ to ďe ĐoŶsideƌed ͚as it is͛.   
However, theƌe is a teŶsioŶ heƌe iŶ that uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg is seeŶ as ďouŶd to the soĐial ͚fields͛ 
which people inhabit, yet we can have clear representation of the real world.  The issue with 
the complex realist position is that it does not hold up a mirror to itself and recognise that the 
models that social scientists develop are themselves situated within social systems.  We will 
develop this further here by showing that complex realist accounts situate models as somehow 
͚outside͛ ƌealitǇ.  The ƌefeƌeŶĐe to ŵodels as ŵetaphoƌs iŶ the aďoǀe Ƌuote suggests this, but 
so too do claims for representation: 
͞aŶ oŶtologiĐal take oŶ ĐoŵpleǆitǇ theoƌǇ, the Đoŵpleǆ ƌealism proposed by Reed and 
Harvey and endorsed by us absolutely requires us to understand the world as being of 
a paƌtiĐulaƌ foƌŵ, aŶ esseŶtiallǇ ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶal positioŶ.͟ ;BǇƌŶe & CallaghaŶ, ϮϬϭϰ: 
68) 
What is left unresolved is how models of complex social systems relate to the real world: what 
kind of representation is being argued for?  What do Byrne & Callaghan (2014, p. 117) mean by 
theoƌǇ ďeiŶg ͞disĐuƌsiǀe ǁith͟ ƌealitǇ?  Assuming that complex realists admit that research, 
policy and practice are themselves complex social systems, we are left with a tension between 
soĐial uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶgs ďeiŶg oƌieŶted ďǇ soĐial ͚fields͛ aŶd the Đlaiŵ foƌ a realist epistemology.  
Whilst this does not mean that representing the real world is impossible, it does undermine 
the implication that our descriptions of the social world correspond in a simple way to the 
ǁoƌld ͚as it is͛.  This is Ŷot just a philosophical issue however; it limits our capacity to evaluate 
why some models of social systems are better than others. 
As ǁe saǁ iŶ suďseĐtioŶ Ϯ.ϯ.Ϯ, BǇƌŶe & CallaghaŶ͛s (2014, p. 8) form of complex realism 
iŶĐludes ͞the oŶtologiĐal positioŶ that ŵuĐh of the ǁoƌld aŶd ŵost of the soĐial ǁoƌld ĐoŶsists 
of complex systems͟.  However, Allen & Boulton (2011) offer a slightly different form of 
Đoŵpleǆ ƌealisŵ iŶ that ƌealitǇ ͚just is͛, aŶd that it is ouƌ ŵodels which should be labelled as 
complex.  Allen & Boulton are concerned with why some complexity models are better than 
others.   They argue that there is a hierarchy of complexity models relative to how well they 
represent reality (see Figure 2c). 
 
74 
 
 
Without going into detail, their argument is that successive assumptions lead to greater 
reduction and ͚less ƌealistiĐ͛ ŵodels of ƌealitǇ.  The distinction between whether reality 
contains complex systems, or whether it is our models that are complex, can be attributed to 
ǁhetheƌ the teƌŵ ͚ĐoŵpleǆitǇ͛ is used iŶ a geŶeƌal seŶse, oƌ to ƌefeƌ to a sĐieŶtifiĐ disĐipliŶe.  
However, Byrne, Callaghan, Allen and Boulton are all claiming that approaches such as case 
study and modelling are able to represent the social world.  What remains problematic is how 
we are to evaluate models of complex social systems: how some are more realistic than 
others. 
Byrne & Callaghan (2014, p. 6) Đlaiŵ that ͞AŶǇ desĐƌiption of reality is metaphorical͟ and in 
subsection 1.3.2 we outlined how this makes any criteria for evaluating models problematic; if 
models only need be analogy or metaphor then broad interpretation is permissible.  In an 
earlier account, Byrne (1997) discusses computer based simulations: 
͞“iŵulatioŶs aƌe iŶteƌestiŶg aŶd useful ďeĐause theǇ iŶǀolǀe the ĐƌeatioŶ of ŵodelled 
systems which are analogous in a fundamental way with the social systems which are 
  
Reality 
Evolutionary Complexity Models 
Stochastic Non-linear Dynamics 
Probability Distributions 
e.g. Power Laws 
Deterministic Non-Linear 
Dynamics 
Assumptions of boundaries and 
classification within system 
Assumptions of structural  
stability and fixed variables 
Take most probable path at 
every stage of evolution 
͚Solǀe͛ eƋuations to  
find stable  state 
Figure 2c – Representation of Successive Assumptions in Modelling, adapted from                 
Allen & Boulton (2011) 
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ouƌ ĐoŶĐeƌŶ as soĐiologists… Theƌe still ƌeŵaiŶs the issue of ǁhetheƌ ǁe ĐaŶ ŵodel 
closely enough to achieve the kind of predictive power of the old analogue engineering 
models, which is the issue of robust chaos, but as analogies simulations have very real 
possiďilities.͟ (Byrne, 1997) 
There are a couple of telling points in this quote.  Firstly there is the sense of being able to get 
͚Đlose eŶough͛ to ƌealitǇ thƌough ŵodels, soŵethiŶg ǁhiĐh eĐhoes AlleŶ & BoultoŶ͛s ĐoŶcerns.  
Both accounts claim that we can develop more realistic models in the sense of models which 
capture more of the dynamics of the real world.  However, we discussed in Chapter 1 the 
difficulty of this in relation to complex systems.  Because the minute detail of a system may be 
highly significant in the future, any assumption, reduction or abstraction may lead to a model 
behaving in a very different way to the phenomenon being modelled (see 1.2.1).  The point is 
that all models are deficient because they are not the original system.  Without entering into a 
detailed ĐƌitiƋue of AlleŶ & BoultoŶ͛s hieƌaƌĐhǇ, it is diffiĐult to ŵaiŶtaiŶ that aŶǇ oŶe 
assuŵptioŶ is ŵoƌe pƌoďleŵatiĐ thaŶ aŶotheƌ.  This diffiĐultǇ iŶ defiŶiŶg ǁhat a ͚ŵoƌe ƌealistiĐ͛ 
model entails may be one of the reasons that Byrne insists on models being metaphor or 
analogy.  The issue is that we must assess the relationship between models and reality on the 
grounds of whether they are useful to us, rather than through any criteria of them being 
realistic representations of reality.   
͞Models ǁhiĐh eŶgage ǁith data do haǀe a ĐoŶŶeĐtioŶ ǁith ƌealitǇ agaiŶst ǁhiĐh theiƌ 
isoŵoƌphisŵ ǁith ƌealitǇ ĐaŶ ďe assessed.͟ (Byrne & Callaghan, 2014, p. 52) 
Whilst a relationship between models and reality is to be upheld, complex realists do not give 
an adequate account of what this relationship is.  Models of complex social systems must be 
themselves situated within social contexts.  This is what leads Cilliers to note that modelling is 
always an ethical process (subsection 2.2.5).   
Asserting the importance of reality in our social models stands complex realism as opposed to 
puƌelǇ suďjeĐtiǀe aĐĐouŶts, oƌ ͞aďstƌaĐtioŶ ǁithout aŶǇ eŵpiƌiĐal ƌefeƌeŶt͟ ;BǇƌŶe & 
Callaghan, 2014, p. 40).  In defending against such positions, complex realism retreats towards 
the ͞ƌatioŶal ĐaŶoŶs of sĐieŶtifiĐ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg͟ ;Harvey & Reed, 1996).  However, following 
the work of post-structuralists such a Cilliers there can be no going back.  Although we will not 
expand upon it any further here, the issue is that historically the ͚ƌatioŶal ĐaŶoŶs͛ of sĐieŶĐe 
have seen understandings as somehow outside of the real world: different to the matter they 
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pertain to25.  AƌguaďlǇ, the iŶsisteŶĐe of Đoŵpleǆ ƌealists oŶ ͚ŵoƌe ƌealistiĐ͛ ŵodels iŵplies 
that ŵodels aƌe soŵethiŶg otheƌ thaŶ ƌeal.  This ƌeĐalls DeǁeǇ͛s argument (see subsection 
2.1.5) which reveals that the mind-world scheme offers only subjectivity or objectivity (Biesta, 
2011).  In arguing against subjectivity, complex realists have sided with objectivity.  In so doing 
they have denied one of the main insights from applying complexity theory to social systems, 
namely, that our understandings are not objective.  Boulton notes that: 
͞ŵaŶǇ ĐoŵpleǆitǇ ŵodelleƌs of soĐial sǇsteŵs do Ŷot ƌeallǇ hold suĐh a stƌiĐt ƌealist 
ontology about the world; they do not really think the world is entirely objective, real, 
viewable in the same way by anyone and everyone. To the extent that they would 
articulate it, they would say that modelling gives useful information, that more 
suďjeĐtiǀe aspeĐts of huŵaŶ life aƌe haƌd to iŶĐlude, aŶd that suĐh ͚ƌeal͛ ŵodels aƌe a 
step forwards to gain some understanding of complex situations and point to possible 
futuƌes aŶd outĐoŵes.͟ (Boulton, 2011, p. 107) 
Complex realism attempts to reclaim the importance of investigating real social systems in the 
world, despite their resistance to analysis.  It also recognises the importance of subjective 
understanding in those systems and the causal influence of social structures beyond 
individuals. All of this will be upheld in the position developed in this thesis.  However, what is 
lacking in complex realism is an account of how the models we build of classrooms are also 
context-specific and must be judged relative to modelling as a social practice.  Complex realism 
draws heavily on critical realism, which argues against the epistemic fallacy (see 2.2.4): 
͞This ĐoŶsists in the view that statements about being can be reduced to or analysed 
in terms of statements about knowledge; i.e. that ontological questions can always be 
tƌaŶsposed iŶto episteŵologiĐal teƌŵs.͟ (Bhaskar, 2008 [1975], p. 26) 
However, in analysing critical realism, Bouwel argues that its advocates are guilty of an 
ontological fallacy: 
͞ǁe ǁaŶt to ǁaƌŶ foƌ [siĐ] aŶ ontological fallacy: taking an a priori ontological stance 
which transposes or reduces epistemological and methodological matters into an 
ontological matter.  Analogous to the epistemic fallacy it points at a failure to sustain 
                                                          
25 This is the case with Plato͛s ͚peƌfeĐt foƌŵs͛ aŶd DesĐaƌtes͛ theoƌǇ of ŵiŶd, ďoth of ǁhiĐh aƌe dualist 
positioŶs, as ǁell as ǁith ͚self-realising Spiƌit͛ iŶ Hegel͛s dialeĐtiĐ. 
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adeƋuatelǇ the distiŶĐtioŶ ďetǁeeŶ oŶtologǇ aŶd episteŵologǇ.͟ ;VaŶ Bouǁel, ϮϬϬϯ, 
p. 85) 
VaŶ Bouǁel͛s aƌguŵeŶt is that ďǇ pƌesupposing the reality of mechanism in the social world, 
Bhaskar focuses methodology upon analysis of those mechanisms.  Whilst complex realists do 
not place such an onus on mechanism, by making an ontological statement about the 
complexity of the real world they fail to adequately account for the impact on epistemology: 
they fail to clearly situate our models of the social world within that world. 
Post-structuralist accounts recognise the limitations of our understandings within complex 
social systems; however they are not able to account for how we make sense of the real world 
(see Section 2.2).  Conversely, complex realism makes claims for the complexity of the real 
world and the importance of relating our models to that real world.  However, it does not 
adequately account for how our models of the real world are mediated by the social systems 
we inhabit.  We will argue in Chapter 3 that a materialist account resolves these issues by 
recognising that both our understandings and the phenomena they pertain to are real entities 
which interact.   
However, before developing the solution to these issues we must consider one further 
possibility.  If mind and matter cannot be separated in complex social systems, why should we 
choose matter over mind? 
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2.4 Social Construction in Complex Systems 
2.4.1 Construction in the Real World 
We saw above that complex realists do not adequately account for how models relate to the 
world they seek to model.  However, what is clear is that human agency is related to social 
entities which have real causal power, and that these entities co-evolve with individuals.  In 
this picture, human action is situated as important in the construction of social entities.  To 
repeat a quote from subsection 2.3.2: 
͞soĐieties aŶd theiƌ iŶstitutioŶal activities are constructed by the collective action of 
human beings, and, thus, are profoundly influenced by the way in which humans 
subjectively define themselves and their actions.  This fundamental difference has 
alƌeadǇ ďeeŶ eǆpƌessed iŶ Bhaskaƌ͛s Đƌitical naturalist paƌadigŵ.͟ ;Harvey & Reed, 
1996, p. 206) 
This view of social institutions as constructed by those within them is implicit in much of the 
work of complex realists.  Maxwell (2012, p. 11) argues that critical realism should be seen as 
͞oŶtologiĐal ƌealisŵ plus episteŵologiĐal ĐoŶstƌuĐtiǀisŵ.͟  IŶ ǁhiĐh Đase, the iŶheƌitaŶĐe fƌoŵ 
critical realism in complex realist positions extends to an implication that social structures are 
constructed. 
We will here distinguish between social constructivism and social constructionism by 
recognising that the former refers to how individual understandings are developed through 
experience with the world (including social interactions), whereas constructionism refers to 
the development of social entities by multiple people.  In the realist frame, we see that social 
constructionism is about the development of social entities which have real causal power 
beyond individuals.  However, this implies a distinction between what is individual and what is 
social, which in turn begs the question as to whether these can be separated. 
By advocating the autonomous causal agency of entities such as a school or a social class, 
complex realists necessarily see these entities as more than the aggregate of individual 
understandings.  As we have seen, complex realists retain a separation of our understandings 
and what those understandings pertain to, so their account opens up the possibility that mind 
inhabits a separate ontological category to the real world.  Furthermore, we have seen that 
Cillieƌs͛ foƌŵ of post-structuralism falls short of explaining how the real world and our 
understanding of it are related (subsection 2.2.6).  Therefore, both complex realist and post-
structuralist accounts of complex social systems allow mind to be considered as ontologically 
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distinct from the material world.  We thus need to evaluate whether social construction can 
explain the relationship between individuals and social entities within complex systems.   
This is not just important from a theoretical perspective however; it also brings us firmly into 
the realm of learning theories, which are of direct relevance to this thesis.  Commonly cited 
models of learning, such as those of Piaget (1929), Bruner (1966, 1978, 1983), and Vygotsky 
(1978) are denoted as constructivism within contemporary educational literature.  Whilst 
these do not present a single view of learning (Shayer, 2003), a discussion of social 
constructionism here will allow us to engage with these dominant discourses in Chapter 7.  
We will show that social construction provides an account of how we come to have shared 
understandings of the world, and highlights the importance of social interactions in this.  
However, we will also see that it is impossible to maintain that either individual minds or social 
entities inhabit a separate ontological category to the material world.  In order to mount this 
ĐƌitiƋue ǁe shall ĐoŶsideƌ “taĐeǇ͛s theoƌǇ of leaƌŶiŶg as iŶǀolǀiŶg ͞Đoŵpleǆ ƌespoŶsiǀe 
pƌoĐesses͟ ;“taĐeǇ, 2001, 2003a, 2003b, 2005).  Stacey attempts to define learning within 
complexity theory and his position is therefore suitable in highlighting the difficulties of 
considering social construction within complex social systems. 
2.4.2 Complex Responsive Processes 
Stacey (2001, 2003a, 2003b, 2005) develops the model of complex responsive processes to 
describe how the interaction of individuals simultaneously results in their learning but also the 
͞patteƌŶiŶg͟ of soĐial ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ.  Theƌe aƌe esseŶtiallǇ thƌee iŶgƌedieŶts to this: Elias͛s 
account of poǁeƌ ƌelatioŶs, Mead͛s sǇŵďoliĐ iŶteƌaĐtioŶisŵ, and complexity models:  
͞The theoƌǇ of Đoŵpleǆ ƌespoŶsiǀe pƌoĐesses dƌaǁs togetheƌ Elias͛ pƌoĐess soĐiologǇ 
aŶd Mead͛s sǇŵďoliĐ iŶteƌaĐtioŶisŵ as ǁaǇs of tƌaŶslatiŶg aŶalogies fƌoŵ the 
complexity sciences iŶto a theoƌǇ of huŵaŶ aĐtioŶ.͟ (Stacey, 2003a, p. 17) 
For Mead (1934), ǁheŶ oŶe aŶiŵal gestuƌes to aŶotheƌ theǇ ͞Đall foƌth͟ iŶ that otheƌ a 
response and this constitutes a social act.  Humans are aware of the possible responses in 
otheƌs aŶd this alloǁs theŵ to ƌeĐogŶise ǁhat Mead Đalled ͚sigŶifiĐaŶt sǇŵďols͛ suĐh as 
shouting, because it allows the person shouting to embody the fear or anger in the person 
being shouted at.  Furthermore, because humans use a sophisticated language system, they 
ĐaŶ pƌediĐt a ƌaŶge of ƌespoŶses to aĐtioŶs.  “taĐeǇ thus defiŶes ŵiŶd as the ͞sileŶt ƌole-plaǇ͟ 
that huŵaŶs eŶteƌ iŶto ǁheŶ aŶtiĐipatiŶg eaĐh otheƌ͛s ƌespoŶses. 
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͞The pƌiǀate, sileŶt ĐoŶǀeƌsatioŶ of a body with itself is the same process as public, 
vocal conversation between bodies and in this sense mind is always a social process 
eǀeŶ though it is the iŶdiǀidual ĐoŶduĐtiŶg the pƌiǀate sileŶt ĐoŶǀeƌsatioŶ.͟ (Stacey, 
2001, p. 227) 
He dƌaǁs oŶ Mead͛s distiŶĐtioŶ ďetǁeeŶ the ͞I͟ ǁhiĐh is iŶdiǀidual aŶd the ͞ŵe͟ ǁhiĐh is the 
embodiment of a generalised other which allows this self-conversing.  We might therefore see 
the ͞ŵe͟ aŶd the generalised other as constituting the social sphere. 
To eǆplaiŶ hoǁ this distiŶĐtioŶ of ͞I͟ aŶd ͞ŵe͟ deǀelops iŶ ĐhildƌeŶ, “taĐeǇ (2003a, p. 98) talks 
of how they understand, through play, that they can hide things from others.  The child 
develops a ĐapaĐitǇ to ͞ďe aloŶe ǁith otheƌs͟, that is, to iŵagiŶe hoǁ otheƌs ŵight ƌespoŶd 
and to be self-aware.  Furthermore, Stacey argues that this is an important part of 
development as it allows a child to demark his/her inner world and that which is outer: the 
distiŶĐtioŶ ďetǁeeŶ ͞I͟ aŶd ͞ŵe͟.  AŶ eǆaŵple of “taĐeǇ͛s thiŶkiŶg is ƌeǀealed iŶ his aĐĐouŶt of 
how a child may become attached to a comforter or blanket: 
͞IŶ Mead͛s seŶse, hoǁeǀeƌ, the ďlaŶket is Ŷot a sǇŵďol at all ďeĐause it is Ŷot a 
gesture made by the child calling forth a response in another or in himself.  The symbol 
is the Đhild͛s gestuƌe to the oďjeĐt aŶd the iŵagiŶed ƌespoŶse of that gestuƌe.͟ (Stacey, 
2003a, pp. 97-98) 
Such a blanket becomes part of the silent role-play that a child undertakes in learning how to 
invoke a generalised other and this is part of the development of that other.  Therefore we are 
to understand the generalised other to be what allows self-awareness.   
Mead͛s ǁoƌk is ǁidelǇ Đƌedited with being the inspiration for symbolic interactionism (Hier, 
2005) which has fallen into and out of favour over the last 50 years (Fine, 1993).  Whilst the 
critique below may also be levelled at symbolic interactionism therefore, we shall here confine 
aŶalǇsis to hoǁ Mead͛s ŶotioŶs aƌe used ďǇ “taĐeǇ iŶ deǀelopiŶg his aĐĐouŶt of Đoŵpleǆ 
responsive processes. 
IŶ additioŶ to Mead͛s ǁoƌk, the ǁoƌk of Elias (2000 [1939]) is important to Stacey because it 
recognises that although social reality is constructed through interactions, power relations 
emerge which account for social structures; as global patterns of society become more 
complex so too do individual lives (Stacey, 2005, pp. 41-44).  Elias͛s work thus recognises that 
theƌe aƌe soĐialisiŶg iŶflueŶĐes ǁhiĐh haǀe eǀolǀed aŶd ǁhiĐh pƌoǀide ͞stƌesses͟ aŶd the Ŷeed 
for self-ĐoŶtƌol.  The stƌeŶgth of ĐoŵďiŶiŶg Mead͛s ƌespoŶsiǀe pƌoĐesses with Elias͛s notions of 
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power relations is, according to Stacey, that it allows us to understand how the individual 
influences the social, whilst themselves being socialised. 
If we are to conceive of the individual and social as the same thing, what is missing is an 
account of how patterns are imparted and develop over time.  Stacey believes that complexity 
science paves the way forward on this by providing a causality in which fluctuations lead to 
systemic change.  
͞LeaƌŶiŶg is the aĐtiǀitǇ of iŶteƌdependent people and can only be understood in terms 
of self-organizing communicative interaction and power relating in which identities are 
poteŶtiallǇ tƌaŶsfoƌŵed.͟ (Stacey, 2003b, p. 331) 
Stacey draws on the work of Prigogine and biological models (such as those of Kauffman and 
Allen) from the turn of the century, which show that semi-stable states may emerge from 
fluĐtuatioŶs.  He sees this as ͞aŶalogous" to hoǁ ŵeaŶiŶg iŶ soĐial situatioŶs is also pƌoŶe to 
dynamic emergence. 
In considering the relevance for teachers, Stanley (2009) characterises complex responsive 
processes as a learning theory, and the implication is that understanding a classroom as the 
site of shared gestures would influence the way teachers behave: 
͞As a soĐial aĐt, the ͞gestuƌe-and-ƌespoŶse͟ stƌuĐtuƌe of iŶteƌaĐtioŶ ďetǁeeŶ studeŶts 
or teachers-and-students constitutes meaning for all involved (in some way and even 
for other listeners) as every gesture by one person calls forth a gesture by another. 
The co-emergent meaning lies in the relational nature of the classroom every affect 
pƌoŵpts aŶ effeĐt aŶd so oŶ.  Wheƌe ŵeaŶiŶg does Ŷot ƌest ǁithiŶ aŶǇ ͞paƌt͟ of the 
gesture-and-ƌespoŶse stƌuĐtuƌe, i.e., ͞ǁithiŶ͟ the individual, meaning does arise as a 
ƌesult of iŶteƌaĐtioŶ ;that ďegets fuƌtheƌ iŶteƌaĐtioŶͿ͟ (Stanley, 2009, p. 37) 
We thus see that complex responsive processes as a theory of learning suggests a co-
construction of meaning and resists meaning being situated in specific parts of the system, in 
eĐho of ouƌ eaƌlieƌ disĐussioŶs aƌouŶd distƌiďuted ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ aŶd its iŵpoƌtaŶĐe iŶ Cillieƌs͛ 
work (subsection 2.2.4).  Learning is not something which happens in individual minds but 
which emerges through interaction.  In this way, Stanley suggests, the rich histories of 
Đlassƌooŵs pƌoǀide ͞values, beliefs, traditions, habits, routines and pƌoĐeduƌes͟ (Stacey 2003a, 
p. 65), which change slowly over time but which provide coherent patterns of thought.   
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The stƌeŶgth of aŶ aĐĐouŶt suĐh as “taŶleǇ͛s is that it foĐuses teaĐheƌs aŶd ƌeseaƌĐheƌs oŶ the 
interactions within classrooms and gives an understanding of shared meaning and historic 
context.  It also provides ways of reconceptualising aspects of practice.  For example, Stanley 
considers the role of the teachers in preparing lessons as one of self-reflexivity in which they 
bring forth in themselves the possible responses of pupils.  On the surface therefore, complex 
responsive processes are able to account for shared understanding within classrooms and also 
the emergence of new understandings over time. 
However, we will now turn to the issues with such a social constructionist account of learning.  
Firstly, we will see that in order for meaning to change over time there must be some appeal 
to interactions in and with the real world.  As with the account of complex realism, we will see 
that if you have both a real world and minds interacting with it, then any attempt to separate 
them must fail.  Secondly, we will see that equating the individual and social is untenable, as it 
ƌelies oŶ the HegeliaŶ ŶotioŶ of ͚paƌadoǆ͛. 
2.4.3 The Generalised Other and Hegelian Paradox 
Complex responsive processes refer to the development of the individual and social as the 
same system, through the gesture-response of interacting people.   Stacey also refers to the 
importance of history in the co-construction of meaning and the evolution of social norms.  
However, it is far from clear whether the components of this argument fit together.  Most 
ŶotaďlǇ, theƌe is a teŶsioŶ ďetǁeeŶ “taĐeǇ͛s iŶteƌpƌetatioŶ of gestuƌe-response in Mead, and 
the social evolution attributed to Elias (both most fully developed in Stacey (2003a)).  In order 
to allow the kind of social evolution that Elias discusses we must have a generalised other that 
is both shared and undergoing change, but it is not clear how this can be the case. 
Stacey (2001) argues against seeing the social as some supra-individual system and as such we 
must conclude that when an interaction changes the meaning of a shared notion, this meaning 
is not changed for everybody in society.  Thus there must also be a dynamic aspect to complex 
responsive processes: the generalised other must vary over time and space.  There must be 
geographical variation in understanding and indeed it seems that the generalised other must 
be different for everybody, as it is context-specific.  Conceived of in this way, mind can still be 
seen as social in that we are able to predict the actions of others.  However, when you make 
the generalised other dynamic by allowing that different people at different times have 
different understandings, you have to accept the influence of the real, temporal and spatial 
world.  You also undermine the notion that the social is shared. 
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The generalised other iŶ Mead͛s work provides an account of how we come to share 
understandings and is linked by Stacey to the adherence to social norms that Elias talks of.  
However, given that people experience different interactions in their lives, and that young 
people learn how to deploy this generalised other over time, it is untenable that there is a 
single generalised other that we all share.  We must accept that this other is different for 
diffeƌeŶt iŶdiǀiduals aŶd this soŵeǁhat ǁeakeŶs “taĐeǇ͛s Đlaiŵs that ŵiŶds ĐoŶstitute the 
social sphere.  The social becomes the aggregate of individual minds, and this does not allow 
causal agency of social entities beyond the specific interactions of minds. 
Stacey (2003b, 2005) seems to be aware of the difficulty of equating the individual with the 
soĐial.  Hoǁeǀeƌ he atteŵpts to ƌesolǀe it ďǇ dƌaǁiŶg oŶ the uŶteŶaďle ŶotioŶ of ͚paƌadoǆ͛ 
which he claims comes from Hegel and which in turn influenced American pragmatists 
including Mead and Elias: 
͞ǁhat is ƌeƋuiƌed is a diffeƌeŶt logiĐ, suĐh as the dialectical logic of Hegel.  In this kind 
of logic, the word paradox means the presence together at the same time of 
contradictory, essentially conflicting ideas, none of which can be eliminated or 
resolved.  Indeed it is this conflict that gives rise to the transformation that is central to 
Hegels͛ dialeĐtiĐal logiĐ.͟ (Stacey, 2003b, p. 5) 
Hoǁeǀeƌ, “taĐeǇ distaŶĐes his ŵodel of Đoŵpleǆ ƌespoŶsiǀe pƌoĐesses fƌoŵ Hegel͛s 
ŵetaphǇsiĐs iŶ ĐlaiŵiŶg that ďoth Mead aŶd Elias adopted the HegeliaŶ ŶotioŶ of ͞self-
ƌealisatioŶ͟ ďut iŶ teƌŵs of huŵan consciousness, not absolute Spirit (Stacey, 2003a, p. 214).  
This ͞self-ƌealisatioŶ͟ is eǀideŶt iŶ the sepaƌatioŶ of the ͞I͟ aŶd the ͞ŵe͟ iŶ Mead͛s aĐĐouŶt 
and we have already seen that separating what is individual from what is social is difficult, to 
saǇ the least.  BǇ ƌelatiŶg to Hegel͛s logiĐ ǁe aƌe ďeiŶg asked to see the ͞I͟, ǁhiĐh alloǁs 
ĐoŶsĐious deĐisioŶ as soŵehoǁ pƌiǀileged oǀeƌ the ͞ŵe͟, ǁhiĐh is soĐial.  This sepaƌatioŶ is 
intended to account for aspects of human behaviour such as deception, whereby there is 
ĐoŶsĐious oƌ ͚suď-ĐoŶsĐious͛ deĐisioŶ oŶ the paƌt of aŶ iŶdiǀidual to ŵaŶipulate the aŶtiĐipated 
response of another.  However, in an account of how the individual and the social are the 
saŵe thiŶg ǁe aƌe ďeiŶg asked to aĐĐept that the ͞I͟, the ͞ŵe͟ aŶd the soĐial aƌe all aspeĐts of 
the same entity: a trinity of the self/mind/social.  EduĐatioŶalists aƌe to aĐĐept that ͞leaƌŶiŶg 
occurs as shifts in meaning and it is simultaŶeouslǇ iŶdiǀidual aŶd soĐial͟ (Stacey, 2003b, p. 8).   
Even if we were able to adopt such a logic, and there is no motivation for doing so, two 
significant problems remain.  Firstly, by recognising that mind is different to different people, 
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we still reduce the social to the aggregate of individual minds.  Secondly, there is no account of 
the role the real world plays in developing understandings.   
In considering the first problem, we see that different people have different experiences which 
will condition their responses and the responses they anticipate from others.  Beyond this 
though we also expect different responses in different spheres of our lives: from family, 
colleagues, and friends.  Furthermore, we know how people close to us might respond in 
paƌtiĐulaƌ ǁaǇs: a ǀeƌǇ speĐifiĐ ͚otheƌ͛ ƌatheƌ thaŶ a geŶeƌalised oŶe.  Theƌe ŵust ďe soŵe 
sense in which mind is individual therefore, even if we accept that mind is the predicting the 
ƌespoŶse of otheƌs.  This ďƌeaks doǁŶ the sepaƌatioŶ of ͞I͟ aŶd ͞ŵe͟ iŶ Mead͛s ǁoƌk, ďeĐause 
they must both be individual and context-specific.    
The generalised other aŶd the ͞ŵe͟ aƌe ƋuiĐklǇ ƌeduĐiďle to a ƌeĐogŶitioŶ that huŵaŶs ĐaŶ 
empathise with each other.  This is an important aspect of social learning, but it is not 
sufficient to define social entities such as classrooms.  The issue at hand is that we cannot 
account for the causal powers of social entities through empathy alone.  Whilst empathy 
allows us to anticipate the responses of others (following Mead), and our capacity to use this 
to deceive, manipulate and coerce explains aspects of human behaviour (the power relations 
that Elias discusses), it does not allow for the causal power of social entities.  For example, 
applǇiŶg “taĐeǇ͛s aĐĐouŶt to a Đlassƌooŵ ;as Stanley does) suggests that for the teacher, the 
social is made up of the anticipated responses of their class.  Experienced teachers will 
aŶtiĐipate diffeƌeŶt ƌespoŶses iŶ diffeƌeŶt pupils, ƌatheƌ thaŶ aŶǇ ͞geŶeƌalised͟ ƌespoŶse.  At 
best we can argue that teaĐheƌs plaŶ foƌ aŶ ͚aǀeƌage͛ pupil ǁithiŶ the Đlass ďut this is Ŷot the 
saŵe as a speĐifiĐ Đlass of pupils haǀiŶg a Đausal iŶflueŶĐe oŶ the teaĐheƌ͛s plaŶŶiŶg.   
If we look on a larger scale the problem becomes more pronounced.  Rather than afford 
somethiŶg suĐh as ͚sĐhool ethos͛ ǁith a ƌeal Đausal iŶflueŶĐe upoŶ aŶ iŶdiǀidual pupil, ǁe ŵust 
accept that pupils are actually influenced by the specifics of their relationships with people in 
the school.  Social construction accounts for how people interact through anticipating each 
otheƌ͛s ƌespoŶses, but it reduces the social world to the aggregate of such social interaction.  
Rather than having a direct influence on individuals therefore, the influence of macroscopic 
social entities is manifest through myriad individual interactions.  In recognising that the 
generalised other is actually a host of specific others, we see that individuals must be 
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constantly anticipating the responses of many others in real time26.  It seems unlikely that 
people are constantly calculating the responses of everyone in a classroom. 
We will develop an alternative explanation in this thesis: that human brains are able to 
respond to patterns of behaviour in others without the need for a dialectic generalised other.  
What is important here though is the conclusion that complex realism is not compatible with 
social construction: the latter cannot provide social entities with autonomous causal powers.  
Complex realism advocates the (complex) causal power of social entities, but on its own does 
not give an account of how social entities arise and how they influence individuals.  
Conversely, social construction cannot afford causal powers to anything beyond individual 
interactions and the empathy involved in these. 
We have already seen that social construction, after Stacey, has a number of issues.  Firstly it 
does not adequately support the separation of individual agency and the shared 
understandings of people within complex social systems.  Secondly, it draws on an untenable 
͚HegeliaŶ logiĐ͛ to tƌǇ aŶd eƋuate the soĐial ǁoƌld ǁith eŵpathǇ iŶ iŶdiǀiduals.   “oĐial 
construction does not fit with either an account of dynamic social complexity, or with 
ontological realism.  However, this mismatch between realism and social understandings 
highlights a further issue, namely, that social construction does not adequately account for the 
role of the real world in the development of our understandings.  This is worthwhile 
considering further as it highlights the difficulties of social construction as an account of how 
we develop understandings: how we learn. 
2.4.4 The Real World as Socialising 
Because Stacey focuses on how understanding comes about through social interaction, he 
does not give a clear account of the role of the real world in developing such understandings.  
Stacey does not appear to be denying a world external to humans (as extreme forms of social 
construction might).  This is evident from his reference to complex responsive processes being 
related to the evolution of the body (Stacey, 2003a, p. 242) and also in passing references such 
as to a Đhild͛s ďlaŶket as disĐussed aďoǀe oƌ to ͞aƌtefaĐts used ďǇ ŵeŵďeƌs of oƌgaŶisatioŶs iŶ 
theiƌ ǁoƌk togetheƌ͟ (Stacey, 2003b, p. 2).  However, he clearly separates the social mind from 
the body:   
͞The theoƌǇ of Đoŵpleǆ ƌespoŶsiǀe pƌoĐesses holds that ŵiŶd is Ŷot iŶside a peƌsoŶ, 
does not contain representations, does not involve the retrieval of memories from a 
                                                          
26 This echoes post-structuralist accounts in which meaning is constantly deferred (see subsection 2.2.5).  
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stoƌe soŵeǁheƌe aŶd is Ŷot geŶetiĐallǇ pƌogƌaŵŵed oƌ deteƌŵiŶed ďǇ iŶstiŶĐts.͟ 
(Stacey, 2003a, p. 101) 
Mind is being characterised as beyond the material of brains but it is not clear how this is the 
case.  By showing that mind, as the imagined response of others, is different to different 
people, we are forced to accept social understanding must differ across time and space.  This is 
self-evident when we consider that human understanding has been different throughout 
history and differs throughout the world.  In this sense then, social understanding is linked to 
spatial and temporal aspects of the material world.   
Beyond this though, even constructivist theories of learning, which might be seen as linked to 
the social constructionist position, account for learning from the real world.  For example, both 
Bruner (1983) and Vygotsky (1978) discuss the role of other people in supporting learning so at 
the very least we must account for the happenstance of these interactions in time and space.  
Furthermore, take Piaget͛s ;ϭϵϮϵͿ aĐĐouŶt of hoǁ ĐhildƌeŶ leaƌŶ fƌoŵ assimilating new 
experiences: the child actively constructs their understanding of the world through play and 
experimentation.   
Consider the example of a ball, which could be said to be part of a role-play that children 
undertake in playing the game of football.  This has many social aspects in terms of the rules 
and status of the game, in terms of relationships to teammates and opposition and in terms of 
the goal of deceiving and outplaying the opposing team.  However, in learning how to kick a 
ball the child is experiencing not just a social role-play but is also learning about how a ball 
responds when kicked, about how muscles are used to produce such a kick and about the 
influence of wind and rain on the ball.  People learn through interacting with the world outside 
of social interaction. 
Even within the social world though, it is not easy to define what is social within learning.  For 
example, how are we to interpret the capacity of children to learn by watching the actions of 
others (Bandura, Rusec & Menlove, 1966)?  This might be construed as invoking a generalised 
other, but in the case of watching the television we cannot see it as a social interaction in the 
sense of co-constructing meaning.  Images, audio and written text must be seen as a stimulus 
foƌ a ͚sileŶt role-plaǇ ǁith oŶeself͛, Ŷot to ŵeŶtioŶ aƌt foƌŵs and ancient artefacts.  These 
media certainly have a social aspect to them in terms of a shared symbolic language but this 
stretches to breaking point the notion of a generalised other.   
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The issue is not in what we should define as social or otherwise however, it is in the claim that 
we must distinguish between learning through social interactions and through learning in the 
real world.  It takes a separation of mind as social and brain/body as individual to maintain 
this.  We will show in this thesis that seeing the social world as part of the material world is the 
ǁaǇ to ƌesolǀe this ǁithout the oŶtologiĐal diffiĐulties seeŶ iŶ “taĐeǇ͛s positioŶ. 
Humans have at least the capacity that all primates do to learn about our environment and 
solve new problems.  Therefore the real world must have a role in shaping us as individuals 
because we have different experiences to each other, social or otherwise. Yet, we share 
symbolic language and have shared understandings of the world and this must also come from 
social interactions over time.  This is the difficulty that social constructionists like Stacey seem 
to be trying to get at: that we have shared understanding yet are individuals.  What they omit 
however is the role of the objects and symbols (in the sense of letters, sounds, numbers etc.) 
that we interact with in socialising us.  This is particularly true when we consider the education 
of young people, who are being socialised in the norms and understandings of the world they 
are born into, through their experiences. 
Social constructionism attempts to separate our social learning from the material world.  
Whether we place a special emphasis on human agency, or on empathy, or on social 
structures, or on symbolic language, it is impossible to escape the fact that these are all part of 
the same system and are all part of the material world.  It is folly to try and distinguish 
between what is socially constructed and what is a consequence of our interactions with the 
real world.  In doing so we quickly lose the ability to distinguish and become lost in attempts to 
separate mind and matter.  We also imply an anthropocentric view that we are somehow 
different from the material world, and that our understandings and social structures are 
somehow supernatural. 
If we accept that we are part of a material world, and we must, then we must also accept that 
our understandings and social structures are part of that real world.  We cannot support a 
view that the construction of human understandings is anything other than the interaction of 
matter. 
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2.5 Chapter Conclusion – Situating Human Understanding 
In this chapter we have critically evaluated four strands of the contemporary complexity 
literature: complexity science, post-structuralist complexity, complex realism and social 
construction.  As outlined in the introduction to the chapter, the range of concerns and 
approaches, as well as the differing positions in relation to ontology and epistemology, mean 
that complexity theory is a broad church, even when restricted to considering social systems.  
By way of concluding this chapter we will consider the issues that each of the four existing 
positions face, and how these inform the position which is developed across Chapters 3, 4 and 
5. 
IŶ ƌelatioŶ to ďoth ‘iĐhaƌdsoŶ & Cillieƌs͛ ;ϮϬϬϭͿ ĐategoƌǇ of ͞ƌeduĐtioŶist͟ ĐoŵpleǆitǇ sĐieŶĐe, 
and MoƌiŶ͛s ;ϮϬϬϳͿ Đlaiŵ that ŵuĐh of ĐoŵpleǆitǇ sĐieŶĐe is ͞ƌestƌiĐted͟, ǁe saǁ iŶ “eĐtioŶ Ϯ.ϭ 
that complexity science adopts methods and assumptions that do not fully recognise the 
difficulty of representing a complex system.  However, this is not necessarily because scientists 
are blind to the issues that nonlinear, dynamic social systems present.  Instead we should see 
complexity science as itself a complex field (Castellani & Hafferty, 2009).  The motivations for 
developing models include the honing of techniques and developing models which are 
͚iŶteƌŶallǇ ĐoŶsisteŶt͛ ǁith eǆistiŶg aĐĐouŶts, ƌatheƌ thaŶ just seeking to provide accurate 
accounts of the social world.  The variety of approaches and motivations within complexity 
science means that there is no coherent account of how we are to consider human 
understanding within social systems, nor a clear account of the epistemological assumptions 
used in developing models of such systems.   
Agent based models, power law models and network models have different ontological and 
epistemological foundations from each other, although all adhere to our definition of 
complexity science (see 2.1.5).  Agent based models characterise understanding as the 
processing of algorithms by brains, implying interaction with the modelled environment.  As 
faƌ as the episteŵologǇ of these positioŶs is eǆpƌessed, ŵodels aƌe atteŵptiŶg to ͚ďaĐkǁaƌds 
eŶgiŶeeƌ͛ Đauses fƌoŵ the soĐial phenomena being explored.  Power laws describe statistical 
relationships and as such are not concerned with the specifics of human understanding at all.  
Such models are couched in language which implies the uncovering of laws, although in reality 
power laws are context-specific statistical relationships.  Network models however have a 
different set of ontological assumptions in that they require that relations between people 
have causal power, whilst not presently being able to explain the role of individual agency 
within these networks of relations.     
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What is required is a theoretical position which is able to account for such a variety of models 
and modelling approaches.  We have already achieved elements of this.  By proposing that 
complexity science as a field should be seen as a complex system, we situate the models and 
practices as being motivated by social concerns, as much as a quest to describe the world as it 
is.  Rather than epistemological claims that models represent reality or that laws are being 
uncovered, we see that models must be positioned within the social realm.  However, this 
needs further development in order to relate models to the world that they seek to model, 
and allow critique of models which do not have empirical correlates.  This is not to say that 
models deployed to teach students or to develop techniques have no place, it is instead to 
seek clarity in how models of social systems, such as classrooms, are to be related to those 
systems.   
We saw in subsection 2.1.5 that complexity scientists appeal to pragmatism to escape 
disĐussioŶ of oŶtologiĐal aŶd episteŵologiĐal ĐoŶĐeƌŶs iŶ faǀouƌ of ǁhat is ͚pƌaĐtiĐal͛.  
Hoǁeǀeƌ, Đloseƌ iŶspeĐtioŶ of pƌagŵatisŵ, paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ DeǁeǇ͛s aĐĐouŶt ;Biesta, ϮϬϭϭ; Olssen, 
2011) reveals that it is concerned with arguing against the separation of objectivity and 
subjectivity, and in this sense might be seen to anticipate the work of post-structuralist 
complexity thinkers (Section 2.1).  Davis & Sumara and Cilliers provide accounts of how we 
cannot sustain the distinction between our understandings and the world which they pertain 
to.  However, we saw that we cannot justify the links between post-structuralism and 
ĐoŵpleǆitǇ oŶ the ďasis of ͚aŶalogǇ͛ aloŶe, as this undermines any attempt to evaluate 
desĐƌiptioŶs aŶd alloǁs poteŶtiallǇ haƌŵful ŶotioŶs suĐh as atteŵptiŶg to ͞pƌoŵote 
eŵeƌgeŶĐe͟ ;suďseĐtioŶ Ϯ.Ϯ.ϮͿ.  This, oŶĐe agaiŶ, highlights the Ŷeed foƌ a Đleaƌ positioŶiŶg of 
our understandings relative to the social and natural world. 
Cillieƌs͛ ŵoƌe Đaƌeful liŶkiŶg of ĐoŵpleǆitǇ aŶd Deƌƌida͛s deĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ ;suďseĐtioŶ Ϯ.Ϯ.ϯͿ 
showed that meaning cannot be characterised as the direct correspondence between the 
world as it is and our accounts of it.  Meaning instead is determined in différance to the system 
of symbolic language that we use to make sense of the world.  Such an account recognises that 
understandings are partial.  Hoǁeǀeƌ, ďeĐause of the ƌeliaŶĐe upoŶ Deƌƌida͛s foƌŵ of liteƌaƌǇ 
ĐƌitiƋue, Cillieƌs͛ aĐĐouŶt desĐƌiďes a sǇsteŵ iŶ ǁhiĐh ŵeaŶing is constantly deferred and it is 
impossible to make affirmative statements about the world.  We saw in subsection 2.2.5 that 
Cilliers attempts to overcome this by appeal to the boundaries of understanding and our 
statements within those boundaries.  However we are still left with the intangibility of these 
boundaries.   
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There is another issue with Cilliers drawing on Derrida though.  Because Derrida considers 
systems of meaning and language, whereas Cilliers draws on artificial neural networks, brains 
and social systems, Cilliers does not make clear the differences between these systems, or 
properly define what he considers to be within the real world.  For example, how do brains, 
social systems and systems of meaning interact?  We have proposed that the difficulties that 
Cillieƌs͛ aĐĐouŶt faĐes, ďoth iŶ teƌŵs of ďeiŶg uŶĐleaƌ aďout hoǁ sǇsteŵs ƌelate to eaĐh otheƌ, 
and the need to constantly consider what is outside boundaries of understanding, are 
iŶheƌited fƌoŵ Deƌƌida͛s foƌŵ of deĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ.  As ǁe aƌgued iŶ suďseĐtioŶ Ϯ.Ϯ.ϲ, Deƌƌida͛s 
account is unable to fully escape Hegel͛s untenable dialectic positon.  Theƌefoƌe ǁhilst Cillieƌs͛ 
account provides a clear synergy between post-structuralism and complexity, and describes 
how our understandings are partial and tentative, these features must be uncoupled from 
such metaphysics.  What is required is an account of partial understandings and distributed 
representation without the need for constant deferral of meaning.  We must better situate our 
understandings relative to the real world. 
In contrast to both complexity science and post-structuralist approaches, complex realism is 
clear in the importance of the real world.  It asserts the reality of social entities which have 
causal power, for example the influence of a classroom on those within it.  This clear 
ontological positioning allows the development of methodologies which seek to explore the 
complexity of the world as it is and thus reinstate the importance of empirical evidence.  This is 
to be upheld in the complex materialist position. 
Coŵpleǆ ƌealisŵ has its fouŶdatioŶs iŶ Bhaskaƌ͛s ;ϮϬϬϴ [ϭϵϳϱ]Ϳ ĐƌitiĐal ƌealisŵ, although the 
importance of mechanism is downplayed in favour of methodologies which compare cases in 
which change occurs to those in which it doesŶ͛t ;BǇƌŶe & UpƌiĐhaƌd, ϮϬϭϮͿ.  “uĐh appƌoaĐhes 
recognise the nonlinear, dynamic and sensitive nature of complex social systems and in this 
seŶse oǀeƌĐoŵe MoƌiŶ͛s ;ϮϬϬϳͿ defiŶitioŶ of ͞ƌestƌiĐted ĐoŵpleǆitǇ͟, saǀe foƌ iŶ oŶe ƌegaƌd.  
By making the ontological argument primary, complex realists do not fully develop an account 
of epistemology: they do not position their models as also being part of social systems.  In 
ƌeiŶstatiŶg soĐial sĐieŶĐe͛s ĐoŶĐeƌŶ foƌ iŶǀestigatiŶg ƌeal sǇsteŵs, Đoŵpleǆ ƌealisŵ ƌeturns to 
the implication that our models correspond to reality in a simple way.  Despite Byrne & 
CallaghaŶ ;ϮϬϭϰͿ dƌaǁiŶg upoŶ Bouƌdieu͛s ŶotioŶ of huŵaŶ ageŶĐǇ as ďeiŶg ĐoŶditioŶed ďǇ 
the ͚soĐial fields͛ people iŶhaďit, theƌe is Ŷo ƌeĐogŶitioŶ that as social scientists our models 
must also be conditioned in this way.  This tension is manifest in Allen & BoultoŶ͛s ;ϮϬϭϭͿ 
atteŵpts to desĐƌiďe hoǁ soŵe ŵodels aƌe ͚ŵoƌe ƌealistiĐ͛ thaŶ otheƌs, iŵplǇiŶg a ĐapaĐitǇ foƌ 
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models to approach reality.   This is the very position that post-structuralist accounts manage 
to undermine. 
The theoretical position developed in this thesis will assert the importance of the real world 
and seek to link models and descriptions to it, as well as uphold the methodologies that Byrne 
& Uprichard (2012) develop to explore social systems.  However, what is required is a way to 
reconcile a realist ontology with the insight that our models and descriptions are socially 
situated.  We cannot return to an epistemology which assumes that our models describe the 
world as it is, without the mediation of the linguistic and symbolic systems we deploy.   
Whilst complex realists do not provide a sufficient account of how we come to develop 
understandings in the world, their drawing on critical realism suggests a link to social 
constructionism (Maxwell, 2012).  Social construction provides a process by which people 
come to have shared understandings, by invoking a generalised other (after Mead, 1934).  
Stacey (2001, 2003a, 2003b, 2005) develops the model of complex responsive processes which 
brings together this generalised other with recognition of the power relations which exist in 
the world and the development of complex social systems.   
However, in developing this form of social construction a tension arises between the capacity 
of people to call forth this generalised other and the realisation that in a dynamic system the 
responses people expect from each other will be context-dependent.  Whilst Stacey situates 
mind as outside of individual bodies therefore, this leads to the social world being the 
aggƌegate of the aŶtiĐipated ƌespoŶses of people.  This shaƌes ǁith Cillieƌs͛ aĐĐouŶt a Ŷeed to 
ĐoŶstaŶtlǇ pƌoĐess ŵeaŶiŶg ǁithiŶ a sǇsteŵ iŶ ƌeal tiŵe, ďut also shaƌes ƌeliaŶĐe upoŶ Hegel͛s 
metaphysics.  Whilst the importance of empathy in shared understanding is to be upheld, this 
ĐaŶŶot ďe ďased oŶ a ͚logiĐ͛ of the soĐial ďeiŶg siŵultaŶeouslǇ peƌsoŶal aŶd shared. 
Social construction, as developed by Stacey, is not able to attribute social entities with causal 
influence beyond the aggregate of individual interactions.  It also focuses too heavily on the 
role of social interactions and in so doing neglects the role of the real world in developing our 
understandings.  The temporal and spatial influence of how we come into contact with others 
will determine how our understandings develop over time and in this sense the real world 
influences us.  Additionally however, we learn by engaging with the world beyond social 
interaction.  Even if our interpretation of these experiences is influenced by our prior social 
experience, they cannot be said to be purely social interactions.  We need a position which is 
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able to not only situate our understandings relative to the real world, but also describe how 
they are influenced by that world. 
In bringing the various threads of this chapter together it becomes apparent that a theoretical 
position capable of underpinning social complexity must do three things: it must be able to 
account for the role that the real world plays in developing our understandings; it must situate 
our understandings relative to this real world; it must account for how our models and 
understandings are themselves within complex social systems.  Over the next three chapters 
we will develop a theoretical position capable of fulfilling these three criteria.  This will allow 
us to see how real, social systems and our understandings within them can be described using 
complexity theory.  In Chapter 8, we will then be able to show how the position developed 
overcomes the issues faced by the existing accounts of social complexity which have been 
discussed in this chapter. 
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3 Complex Materialism 
 
3.0 Chapter Introduction  
We concluded our review of existing literature with criteria for a theoretical position capable 
of situating learning within a complex social system such as a classroom.  Over Chapters 3, 4 
and 5 we will develop the position of complex materialism to meet these criteria, before 
discussing its implications in Chapters 6 and 7. 
At first approximation, complex materialism contains two aspects.  Firstly, it asserts that 
everything in the world has a material basis.  This includes the heterogeneous elements of a 
classroom: objects, text, music, images, speech, even thoughts.  This may initially seem like a 
more extreme view than that held by complex realists therefore (section 2.2), because it 
stresses the fundamental role of the material which constitutes the world.  Indeed, the use of 
the term materialism is intended to distinguish between the position developed here and 
complex realism.  However, the word complex, reminds us that the material world is not 
reducible.  Emergent structure and patterns cannot be traced back to the exact context of 
their formation, nor reduced to their material components.  This begs the question as to how 
they can have influence, and how it is that we recognise and respond to macroscopic patterns 
in the world. 
This brings us to the second aspect of complex materialism, namely a description of how our 
brains are able to respond to, replicate and manipulate patterns.  We will show that there is a 
relation between the neural patterns within our brains and the spatial and temporal patterns 
which exist across all scales of the material world.  Again, this is not to imply the possibility of 
ƌeduĐtioŶ; ďƌaiŶs do Ŷot haǀe a siŵple ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ of the ǁoƌld ͚as it is͛.  Hoǁeǀeƌ, ďǇ 
seeing brains as part of the material world we can account for how our understandings adapt 
to the world around us, and in turn how this shapes our influence on the world.  Combined 
with a materialist position, understanding brains as adaptive allows us to assert the influence 
of patterns across all temporal and spatial scales and include the heterogeneous aspects of a 
classroom.  We will thus describe how pupils learn within classrooms and highlight the 
context-specific and nonlinear nature of this learning.  However, we will also recognise the 
unique and irreducible way in which learning takes place and thus the limitations of any 
theoretical account of learning.   
These ideas need considerable clarification, and to that end Section 3.1 will provide a first 
sketch of complex materialism and how it answers the requirements developed in Chapter 2: 
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explaining the role the real world plays in learning; situating our understandings relative to this 
real world; accounting for how our models are themselves within complex social systems.  This 
first sketch is intended to orientate the reader rather than fully elucidate the position being 
proposed.  Following this initial orientation, Section 3.2 will outline the materialist position 
being adopted.  Chapter 4 will then draw on contemporary understanding of brain function to 
show how learning should be considered a material process.  Whilst this will provide an 
account of how individuals learn, Chapter 5 will expand on this to describe how people come 
to have shared understandings.  Thus, complex materialism will be developed over the next 
three chapters.  We shall turn to the implications for researching classrooms in Chapter 6, and 
the implications for how we view classroom learning in Chapter 7. 
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3.1 A First Sketch of Complex Materialism 
3.1.1 Social Complexity in the Material World 
Complex materialism can be seen as the combination of an ontological position which asserts 
that everything in the world has a material basis, and an epistemological position which 
recognises that our brains form distributed representations of the world around us.  We will 
here consider the materialist position, before developing it further in Section 3.2.   
The oŶtologiĐal staŶĐe of this thesis is iŶspiƌed ďǇ Deleuze͛s ;ϮϬϬϰa [ϭϵϲϴ], ϮϬϬϰď [ϭϵϲϵ]Ϳ 
monist position which asserts the reality of all aspects of the world: objects, our thoughts, our 
emotions, our social relations, music, art etc.  These are all fundamentally constituted by a 
siŶgle ͚ŵateƌial͛.  Deleuze worked within the tradition of continental philosophy and as such in 
͚tƌaŶslatiŶg͛ his ideas iŶto the aŶalǇtiĐ tƌaditioŶ aŶd ƌelatiŶg to ĐoŵpleǆitǇ theory we will 
provide concrete accounts of the processes involved, aŶd uŶdouďtedlǇ iŶteƌpƌet Deleuze͛s 
work in a way which would be unpalatable to scholars of it.  Nevertheless, we are aiming at a 
theoretical position equal to learning in complex social systems, rather than the advancement 
of philosophy itself.    
To ďegiŶ this ͚tƌaŶslatioŶ͛ iŶ eaƌŶest, ǁe ǁill suggest that ǁhilst Deleuze sees the ǁoƌld as 
constituted ďǇ ͞puƌe diffeƌeŶĐe͟ ;Deleuze, ϮϬϬϰa [ϭϵϲϴ]Ϳ, his aĐĐouŶt is ĐoŵŵeŶsuƌate ǁith 
contemporary scientific views, such as that of string theory.  String theory proposes that all 
energy and matter can be accounted for by the existence of one-dimensional strings at the 
subatomic level.  The specific details of string theory are of secondary importance to the point 
that the ŶotioŶ of ͚puƌe diffeƌeŶĐe͛ ĐaŶ ďe ƌeplaĐed ďǇ ĐoŶteŵpoƌaƌǇ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶgs of 
matter27.  What complex materialism takes from Deleuze is a ͚flat oŶtologǇ͛ iŶ ǁhiĐh ŵiŶd, 
matter, and all aspects of the natural and social world are considered to be within the same 
ontological category.    
Adopting a monist position is important to classrooms because it allows that the 
heterogeneous elements of a complex social system can influence our understandings, be they 
music or ideas or text books.  In so doing it allows us to escape the separation of mind and 
matter which haunts existing accounts of social complexity.  Post-structuralist accounts 
(Section 2.2) are not able to resolve what is real and what is not; complex realists (2.3) situate 
their models outside of the social systems they explore; social construction (2.4) is unable to 
                                                          
27 Physicists are currently trying to link gravity, as described in general relativity, with quantum theory to 
pƌoǀide a ͚theoƌǇ of eǀeƌǇthiŶg͛, aŶd stƌiŶg theoƌǇ is a ĐaŶdidate foƌ suĐh a theoƌǇ.  Hoǁeǀeƌ, the 
arguments within this thesis would be sustained should physicists come up with a different account of 
the ͚ŵateƌial͛ ǁhiĐh ĐoŶstitutes the uŶiǀeƌse.  
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sustain the social mind and individual thought, or account for matter.  The separation of mind 
and matter in a complex system is difficult because they must be seen to be interacting in 
nonlinear and dynamic ways.  If we accept that people learn through interaction with the real 
world then it becomes problematic to describe where the material world ends and a world of 
ideas begins, as well as how they influence each other.  Recognising that our minds are 
constituted by the material of our brains/bodies resolves these issues, and we will explore this 
further in Section 3.2. 
The assertion that the universe consists of a single material may at first seem unpalatable, as 
we understand that there are different objects in the world, but also that we have ideas and 
dreams which do not appear to have a material reality at all.  As Harman questions: 
͞if the uŶdeƌǁoƌld is tƌulǇ uŶfoƌŵatted, theŶ it is haƌd to see ǁhǇ it should suddeŶlǇ 
be broken into parts by a human, who really ought to be just sleekly fused into the 
uŶfoƌŵatted plasŵa as eǀeƌǇthiŶg else.͟  (Harman, 2011, p. 61) 
In response to this we see that monism, the world being made of a single material, does not 
ŶeĐessitate it ďeiŶg ͞uŶfoƌŵatted plasŵa͟.  CoŶteŵpoƌaƌǇ sĐieŶtifiĐ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg is that 
after the big bang there were tiny differences in the distribution of material across the 
universe which, over cosmic timescales, resulted in the world as we see it today.  Only the 
presence of subatomic particles and gravity in space and time is needed to account for the 
complexity of the world, and furthermore approaches such as string theory hope to provide a 
singular account of this.   
Hoǁeǀeƌ, HaƌŵaŶ͛s ƋuestioŶiŶg of hoǁ the ǁoƌld is ͞ďƌokeŶ iŶto paƌts ďǇ a huŵaŶ͟ is Ŷot so 
easily answered, and indeed the history of philosophy contains many proposals for why this is 
the case28.  Deleuze͛s ;ϮϬϬϰa [ϭϵϲϴ]Ϳ solutioŶ is that ǁheŶ ǁe eŶĐouŶteƌ siŵilaƌ eǆpeƌieŶĐes 
within the world, we associate them with a concept.  So thought is seen as a material response 
to experience in the material world.  Whilst taking this as the starting point, we will develop 
suĐh a pƌoposal ǁith appeal to ďoth Cillieƌs͛ ŵodel of distƌiďuted ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ iŶ the ďƌaiŶ 
(touched upon already in subsection 2.2.3) and the support for this model within 
contemporary neuroscience.  Chapteƌ ϰ ǁill thus detail hoǁ the ĐoŵďiŶatioŶ of Deleuze͛s 
metaphysics and models of distributed representation within the brain allow us to describe 
                                                          
28 For example, Plato postulated a supernatural world of ideal forms which exist beyond the material 
world.  Kant instead proposed that reason is structured with categories, such as cause and effect, which 
condition our experience.  Deleuze (2004a [1968]) stands against both of these in disallowing ideas or 
reason to pre-exist experience.    
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how humans come to understand the world within complex social systems.  As intimated 
above, drawing on Deleuze overcomes the separation of mind and matter which troubles the 
existing accounts of social complexity.  However, combining this with a model of brain function 
tƌaŶslates Deleuze͛s ŵetaphǇsiĐal aĐĐouŶt iŶto a phǇsiĐal oŶe aŶd pƌoǀides Đleaƌ ŵeĐhaŶisŵs 
for how this happens. 
3.1.2 Situating Understandings 
In a first sketch of how human understanding comes about therefore we will here propose 
that our experiences result in electrical patterns in the brain which condition our response to 
the world.  Cilliers͛ ;ϭϵϵϴͿ aĐĐouŶt of distƌiďuted ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ alloǁs us to eǆplaiŶ hoǁ 
human brains respond to and understand the world without treating knowledge as anything 
other than a response of the brain to experience.  So our experiences influence brain structure 
in a complex way and this explains how we respond to the world whilst being part of it.  In a 
crude way therefore we might say that learning is related to the adaptation of our brains to 
the world we experience.  However, we must recognise that our biology and evolutionary 
history play a role in determining how our brains develop and respond, as well as our 
experiences. 
This does not paint a complete picture, because it does not account for how we come to have 
shared understandings, or utilise a shared symbolic language.  BǇ ͚shaƌed uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶgs͛ ǁe 
here mean the capacity of humans to respond in similar ways and to empathise with each 
other.  This thesis will go as far as proposing that these shared understandings come about 
through interaction with each other and with patterns within the social world.  In Chapter 5 we 
will define these patterns more clearly, here however we will assert that these patterns have a 
material basis.  Learning from each other includes empathy, imitation and coordination 
through our shared biology29.  Learning from the material world involves us being able to 
respond to associations between heterogeneous aspects of the material world: words, images, 
ďehaǀiouƌs aŶd ĐoŶteǆt.  “o, foƌ eǆaŵple, the ǁoƌd ͚footďall͛ ďeĐoŵes assoĐiated ǁith the 
rules of a game but also a set of associated behaviours.  In this way our understandings adapt 
to the experience of events in the real world.  However this is not a one way street, our 
understandings and actions result in the manipulation of the material world, including the 
symbols and media within the human realm.  In this sense therefore, the theoretical position 
developed in this thesis is not inert in relation to theories of learning, and we will see in 
Chapter 7 how it allows critique of existing notions of learning within classrooms. 
                                                          
29 Mirror-systems within the brain are likely involved in social interaction (Tognoli et al., 2007; van 
Baaren et. al, 2009), suggesting an evolutionary basis for shared understanding. See Section 5.2 
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In developing a materialist position, we see that classrooms are what Deleuze (2007) calls a 
͞hodgepodge͟ of ďƌaiŶs, oďjeĐts aŶd sǇŵďols.  “haƌed ŵeaŶiŶg is eŵeƌgeŶt fƌoŵ these 
hodgepodges but we need not see it as anything other than material in nature.  To elucidate 
this consider the dying out of a language, which has undoubtedly happened many times in 
human history.  If everyone speaking the language dies, and no symbolic representation of the 
language remains, then the language: the words, modes of expression and patterns of 
association die out also.  A system of meaning such as a language is thus constituted by the 
electrical activity of the brains which sustain it and the symbols and media within the material 
world which encode it.  We do not need a language to die out to see that systems of meaning, 
be they linguistic, mathematical or artistic, develop over time and that this development 
relates to interactions within the material world. 
However, this does not mean that we can reduce a system of meaning to its material basis.  As 
was outlined in Section 1.2, complex systems cannot be reduced for a variety of reasons: 
firstly, nonlinear causality means that we cannot discern clear causal links between parts of 
the system.  Secondly, the importance of the history in complex systems means that small 
details may (or may not) come to determine their future trajectory.  Thirdly, complex systems 
are open to the environment, so cannot be isolated for the purpose of description30.  Fourthly, 
we have no way of reducing or explaining brain patterns, so if we accept that they constitute 
part of the social world there is further difficulty in reduction.  These reasons mean that in 
practice, we could never reduce a complex social system.  However, notions such as quantum 
indeterminacy suggest it may not be possible in principle either (see subsection 1.2.2 for a full 
account of this).  We thus see that under complex materialism, the social world is material but 
not reducible. 
If we cannot reduce complex social systems to the material that constitutes them, then how 
might we maintain the causal influence of macroscopic social entities31: how does a classroom 
influence a pupil?  In answer to this we will explain how humans develop responses to patterns 
within the world, but how this is not confined to any specific scale of analysis.  In Chapter 4 we 
ǁill outliŶe Cillieƌs͛ ŵodel of hoǁ ďƌaiŶs do this aŶd then consider the contemporary support 
for such a model.  We will suffice to say here that the brain is capable of delineating 
macroscopic social entities, as well as specific people, or objects within them. This is due to 
                                                          
30 For example, new words are added to the English language each year, corresponding to new 
understandings in the soĐial ǁoƌld ďut also Ŷeǁ ͚disĐoǀeƌies͛ iŶ the Ŷatuƌal ǁoƌld.  A laŶguage as a 
complex system must thus be considered as open to these environments. 
31 This is a primary concern for complex realists such as Byrne & Uprichard (2012) and Sawyer (2004).  
See subsection 2.2.3   
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distributed representation, which we discussed in subsection 2.2.3.  A pupil does not need to 
have a detailed representation of a classroom, or even notice much of the detail, to form a 
response to it.  In this way macroscopic entities such as ͚sĐhool ethos͛ oƌ ͚being ǁoƌkiŶg Đlass͛ 
may leave an impression on a person and might have an impact.  That impact though will be 
conditioned by their previous experiences (which will determine the configurations already in 
their brain) and the experiences they have in relation to the social entity.  So whilst we may 
say that macroscopic social entities do have causal influence on people, this influence will not 
be the same for everyone, because they have different histories and will experience different 
contexts. 
We are thus developing a mechanism by which social entities have a causal influence on 
people, which is not the same as saying that social entities have causal influences on each 
other.  In Chapter 6 we will further explore how this position differs from the complex realist 
position, whilst still asserting the reality of the social world and the importance of empirical 
evidence.  This will be developed in relation to the third requirement of a basis for learning in 
complex systems: that our models and descriptions of social systems are situated within those 
systems. 
3.1.3 Situating Models 
Having situated our understandings as emergent from our brains/bodies, and in turn from our 
experiences within the social and natural world, we will be in a position to consider how the 
models32 we develop of classrooms fit into this picture.  The issue at hand is that throughout 
Chapter 2 we argued that models should be related to empirical evidence rather than 
suppoƌted ďǇ appeal to ͞aŶalogǇ͟ oƌ ͞ŵetaphoƌ͟ ;see Daǀis & “uŵaƌa, ϮϬϬϲ; “taĐeǇ, ϮϬϬϯa; 
Byrne & Callaghan, 2014).  We also noted that complexity scientists develop models which 
have ͚iŶteƌŶal ĐoŶsisteŶĐǇ͛ to otheƌ ŵodels, rather than a clear predictive capacity (see 
subsection 2.1.5).  Yet we disallowed the implication from complex realists that some models 
are more realistic than others, on the basis of this necessitating a separation of our models and 
the phenomena they relate to (Section 2.3).  The thorny problem we thus arrive at is how we 
account for the success of models in allowing us to describe, explain and predict what will 
happen in complex social settings.  Once we have taken away any appeal to our models 
existing beyond the material world, or being able to replicate the dynamics of complex 
                                                          
32  The teƌŵ ͚ŵodel͛ deŶotes iŶdiǀidual uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶgs ďut also ǁƌitteŶ desĐƌiptioŶs, gƌaphiĐal 
representations, mathematical abstractions and computational models, dance, music, painting, 
sĐulptuƌe, etĐ.  The ĐƌiteƌioŶ is that a ͚ŵodel͛ is in some way a representation of a phenomenon in the 
real world (see Glossary). 
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systems (which are sensitive, nonlinear and dynamic) then it is not a simple problem to 
resolve.   
We will show in Chapter 6 that the model of brain function developed (in Chapter 4) is able to 
explain how models can recreate important aspects of phenomena.  This requires two steps.  
Firstly, we must recognise that models are real entities which have material basis in the brains 
that use them and their symbolic representations (words, equations, computer code, images 
etc.).  This means that models are able to interact with the phenomena but also to influence 
people.  Models and the social phenomena interact, so a model of a classroom both affects 
and is affected by that classroom.  The second step however is recognising that the criterion of 
a good model is that we recognise it as similar to the phenomenon. 
A photo might be seen as a better representation of a scene than a drawing.  The pattern of 
light that is iŶĐideŶt oŶ oŶe͛s eǇes ǁheŶ ǀieǁiŶg a photogƌaph Đoƌƌelates ŵoƌe ĐloselǇ to the 
patteƌŶ of light fƌoŵ the ͚ƌeal͛ sĐeŶe thaŶ iŶ the dƌaǁiŶg.  It is possible to have a model that 
recreates something of the original phenomenon, but this is not because of a supernatural link 
between the model and the phenomenon.  Both model and phenomenon are real entities and 
they may have similar properties in some respect.  A photo is formed from a pattern of light in 
the original scene and thus has a material relation to the scene at the point of its genesis.   We 
must recognise however that we as observers conclude that the model and the phenomenon 
are similar in an aspect that we find important to us.  A photograph promotes a similar pattern 
of light, but tells us nothing of the dynamics, smell, feel or location of what is in the image, nor 
how it might look from any other angle.  In other circumstances a drawing may be judged as 
better, by highlighting certain features or perhaps providing a map of the scene. 
We are thus able to recover the requirement that our models have empirical correlates.  If a 
model recreates more of the original phenomenon then we will judge it as a better model.  It is 
within the human realm that this judgement is conducted however; we recognise and judge 
the similarities in models and the modelled phenomena because our brains have evolved to 
recognise patterns.  This will be developed further in Chapter 6. 
Combining an ontological position which allows us to see that models are real entities, with 
the realisation that our brains recognise similarities, allows us to position our models as part of 
the complex social systems we inhabit.  It also allows us to see why models which are 
empirically related to the phenomena at hand are likely to be better than those that are not: 
because they will likely replicate more of the patterns seen within the phenomenon.  
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Furthermore, whilst maintaining the importance of developing models which replicate more of 
the dynamics within the original phenomenon, we are able to recognise that the judgement of 
this is still a normative one.  We can never recreate a complex social situation, but some of our 
descriptions are better than others.        
In developing this first sketch we have covered a lot of ground quickly and throughout the rest 
of this chapter, and in the chapters to follow, we will lay out these arguments more clearly and 
with greater justification.  In Section 3.2 we will develop the materialist position which allows 
us to situate our understandings and systems of symbolic language within the material world.  
In Chapter 4 we will then develop the model of brain function which explains how humans 
come to develop understanding of the world around us: how we learn.  Chapter 5 will use 
these components to then explain why we are able to respond to, reproduce and manipulate 
patterns in the classroom.  This will account for our shared understandings. 
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3.2 Deleuze’s Materialism and Social Complexity 
3.2.1 The World of Intensive Differences 
In this section we will expand upon the initial sketch of a materialist position from subsection 
ϯ.ϭ.ϭ. We ǁill do so ďǇ fiƌst outliŶiŶg Deleuze͛s positioŶ ;suďseĐtioŶs ϯ.2.1 to 3.2.5) and then 
considering how it overcomes the difficulties that social constructionist accounts face (in 3.2.6) 
and the reliance upon a constant deferral of meaning in post-structuralist accounts (in 3.2.7).   
In an interview, Deleuze says: 
͞I feel myself to be a pure metaphysician.... Bergson says that modern science hasn't 
found its metaphysics, the metaphysics it would need. It is this metaphysics that 
iŶteƌests ŵe͟ ;VillaŶi, ϭϵϵϵ, p. 139),  
Deleuze aimed at a theoretical underpinning of contemporary science, but it is noteworthy 
that he drew upon notions from complexity science as it developed33.  As such, we might read 
his challenges to ontological and epistemological accounts of philosophers such as Kant and 
Hegel as a suggestion that they are unable to support complexity science.  We have already 
stƌaǇed iŶto these ͚ŵetaphǇsiĐal͛ disĐussioŶs ;e.g. iŶ subsection 2.2.6) and must do so again in 
oƌdeƌ to highlight the diffiĐulties that ĐaŶ ďe oǀeƌĐoŵe ďǇ dƌaǁiŶg oŶ Deleuze͛s sǇsteŵ.  This 
will in turn allow us to situate learning within classrooms without separating mind and matter 
in an untenable way and without accepting that meaning is constantly deferred and 
iŶĐoŵplete.  Hoǁeǀeƌ, ǁe aƌe Ŷot heƌe aiŵiŶg at a full desĐƌiptioŶ of Deleuze͛s ǁoƌk, instead 
seekiŶg to iŶteƌpƌet aŶd ͚tƌaŶslate͛ it foƌ the puƌposes of ĐoŶsideƌiŶg soĐial ĐoŵpleǆitǇ.   
In line with Derrida, Deleuze seeks to overturn reliance upon identity as being inherent in 
objects.  That is, that the identity of a cup is to do with soŵe iŶheƌeŶt ͚ĐupŶess͛ which our 
representations of cups capture34.  In subsection 2.2.3, we saw that Derrida attempts to 
overcome identity by showing that a cup can only be defined in différance to a dynamic system 
of other identities.  We also there proposed that the difficulty Cilliers inherits from this account 
is that meaning is always elusive because it is constantly deferred.  Derrida claimed he was 
working at the margins of the philosophical territory staked out by Hegel, whereas Deleuze 
sought to take Hegel ͞head oŶ͟ ďǇ ĐoŶstƌuĐtiŶg aŶ alteƌŶatiǀe ŵetaphǇsiĐs (Marks, 1998, p. 
16).   
                                                          
33 For example Deleuze ;ϭϵϵϱ, p. ϮϵͿ deĐƌiďes PƌigogiŶe͛s ŶotioŶ of ďifuƌĐatioŶ as aŶ eǆaŵple of the 
͞iŶeǆaĐt ďut ĐoŵpletelǇ ƌigoƌous ŶotioŶs͟ shaƌed ďǇ sĐieŶtists, philosopheƌs and artists. 
34 “uĐh a ǀieǁ ŵight ďe ƌelated to Plato͛s ďelief iŶ ideal foƌŵs, ǁhiĐh ƌeal oďjeĐts aƌe iŵages of. 
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Deleuze͛s positioŶ is ŵoŶist suĐh that the ǁoƌld is ͞a uŶiǀoĐitǇ͟ ĐoŶstituted ďǇ ͞diffeƌeŶĐe iŶ 
itself͟ (Deleuze, 2004a [1968]).  BǇ this he ƌefeƌs to the ͚suďstaŶĐe͛ of the ǁoƌld as iŶfiŶitesiŵal 
differences of two categories: intensive differences and virtual differences35.  We shall explore 
virtual differences in subsection 3.2.5, here focusing upon how intensive differences allow for 
a materialist position.   
Deleuze defines intensive differences as being what drives processes within the world.  
IŶteŶsiǀe pƌopeƌties iŶ sĐieŶĐe aƌe those ǁhiĐh ͚ĐaŶŶot ďe diǀided͛ suĐh as teŵpeƌatuƌe.  If a 
mug of tea at 70C is divided into two volumes then each will remain at 70C.  The volume of 
the tea however is an extensive property; if there is 300ml of tea it may be divided into two 
cups of 150ml.  Deleuze emphasises that intensive differences are often organised as critical 
points, a notion which is familiar to complexity science.  Intensive differences thus constitute 
the points at which there is a qualitative change, the transition points in the world.  Although 
we experience intensive difference, we conceive of it as subordinated to extensive difference: 
͞ǁe kŶoǁ iŶteŶsitǇ oŶlǇ as alƌeadǇ deǀeloped ǁithiŶ eǆteŶsitǇ, aŶd as Đoǀeƌed oǀeƌ ďǇ 
Ƌualities.͟ (Deleuze, 2004a [1968], p. 281). 
The notion of the material world being constituted of ͞puƌe diffeƌeŶĐe͟ is ƌatheƌ aďstƌaĐt.  As 
noted in section 3.1.1 though, we can move it onto a firm grounding by relating it to a 
contemporary view from physics, such as that offered by string theory.  Intensive differences 
are the infinitesimal diffeƌeŶĐes ǁhiĐh eǆist iŶ the ͚ŵateƌial͛ of the ǁoƌld.   
3.2.2 The Image of Thought 
We are yet to develop a position capable of overturning the inherent identity of objects 
however.  To do so we need to account for how we understand the world of intensive 
differences, whilst being part of it.  Deleuze argues that our understanding comes from our 
experience of the world.  However, Deleuze situates this experience as prior to concepts: 
͞The eƌƌoƌ of all effoƌts to deteƌŵiŶe the tƌaŶsĐeŶdeŶtal as ĐoŶsĐiousŶess is that they 
think of the transcendental image of, and in the resemblance to, that which it is 
supposed to gƌouŶd͟ ;Deleuze, ϮϬϬϰď [ϭϵϲϵ], pp. 120-121) 
Deleuze is aƌguiŶg agaiŶst KaŶt͛s ŶotioŶ that ouƌ ŵiŶds ĐoŶditioŶ ouƌ eǆpeƌieŶĐes ;“ŵith, 
2009).  For Deleuze, the empirical is the immanent experience we have of the world.  Here, 
immanent is contrasted to transcendental, which Buchanan explains through analogy to a 
swimmer being able to navigate by the (immanent) currents they experience rather than the 
                                                          
35 The teƌŵs ͚ǀiƌtual diffeƌeŶĐes͛ aŶd ͚ǀiƌtual Đauses͛ aƌe used iŶteƌĐhaŶgeaďlǇ ǁithiŶ Deleuze͛s ǁoƌk. 
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(transcendental) stars (Buchanan & Webb, 2013).  However, we must also include seeing and 
hearing things at distance in this ͚iŵŵaŶeŶt͛ eǆpeƌieŶĐe, ƌeŵoǀiŶg the ĐoŶŶotatioŶ of phǇsiĐal 
proximity from the English word.   
If theƌe is Ŷot a sepaƌate ƌealŵ of ͚ideal foƌŵs͛ as Plato Đlaiŵs, aŶd ouƌ eǆpeƌieŶĐes aƌe Ŷot 
pre-conditioned by our minds, as Kant claims, then Deleuze must establish how we come to 
understand the regularities in the world through our immanent experience.  He does so with 
appeal to the notion of a multiplicity.  Within our empirical experience we encounter 
phenomena which are similar enough to be attributed to the same concept.  Deleuze (2004a 
[1968], p. 2) paints a picture of this using the concept of a festival: each instance of the festival 
is entirely different yet the concept associated with the multiple instances is the same.  A 
multiplicity is thus multiple instances of a similar experience.  It is not defined by an ideal form, 
or pre-conditioned by the mind, but by the repetition of different instances which are 
nevertheless associated with the same concept.   
͞“uĐh aŶ ideŶtitǇ, pƌoduĐed ďǇ diffeƌeŶĐe, is deteƌŵiŶed as ͞ƌepetitioŶ͟.  ‘epetitioŶ iŶ 
the eternal return, therefore, consists in conceiving the same on the basis of the 
diffeƌeŶt.͟  Deleuze (2004a [1968], p. 51)  
This deteƌŵiŶatioŶ of ideŶtitǇ is desĐƌiďed as ͚ŶoŵadiĐ͛ iŶ that it is Ŷot pƌe-determined.  
Deleuze gives the analogy of a mathematical set, whereby the members of a set are not 
determined by some universal rule but by evaluating a potential member as it is found.  In 
Chapter 4 we will explore how the notion of the multiplicity can be both grounded and 
developed through the recognition that brains are conditioned by patterns in the world.  Here 
though, we take from Deleuze the argument that concepts are not pre-determined but are the 
result of experience in the world.   
This begs the question as to why we share the same concepts however, rather than all humans 
having vastly different ideas about the world.  We might still maintain that in the above 
account concepts are prior to experience.  Baugh (1992, pp. 139-140) explains that Deleuze 
ƌeĐogŶises ͞ǀeƌtiĐal͟ ƌelatioŶships ďetǁeeŶ the ǁoƌld aŶd ĐoŶĐepts, ͞hoƌizoŶtal͟ ƌelatioŶships 
ďetǁeeŶ ĐoŶĐepts aŶd ͞diagoŶal͟ oƌ ͞tƌaŶsǀeƌsal͟ ƌelatioŶships to otheƌ ĐoŶĐeptual sǇsteŵs.  
People experience the world but interpret it in relation to the conceptual systems already in 
place in society.  Deleuze (2004a [1968]: Chapter 3) goes further however in describing an 
͞iŵage of thought͟ ǁhiĐh ĐoŶtaiŶs the ĐoŶĐepts that aƌe dƌaǁŶ upoŶ iŶ desĐƌiďiŶg ouƌ 
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experiences36.  Deleuze situates genuine thought as being able to contrast our immanent 
experiences to our existing conceptual frameworks: the image of thought.  As Spangenberg 
explains of Deleuze͛s positioŶ: 
͞Apaƌt fƌoŵ the oƌdeƌlǇ, stƌuĐtuƌed aŶd ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶal ǁaǇ of ouƌ haďitual thiŶkiŶg, 
there are always the chaos of chance happenings, and the irrationality and complexity of 
their ever-shifting origins and outcomes.  We try to deal with the chaos and contradictory 
nature of pure difference by imposing structures, creating hierarchies, conceiving of things 
as ͚the saŵe͛ fƌoŵ oŶe ŵoŵeŶt to the Ŷeǆt, usiŶg defiŶitioŶs to liŵit ŵeaŶiŶgs, aŶd 
ignoring new and potentially creative experieŶĐes.͟ (Spangenberg, 2009, p. 93) 
We will return to how we come to have shared understandings in Chapter 5.  Here however, it 
is important to distinguish between our thoughts being conditioned by ideal forms (Plato) or 
categories within our minds (Kant) and the notion that individuals come to utilise the 
conceptual system into which they are born and which is constantly developing.  To Deleuze, 
dynamic systems of thought are materially constituted and condition individual 
understandings.  This already provides an account of our understandings within the world 
being conditioned by both our experiences in the natural world, but also by our experiences in 
the social world.  As such we see that learning in a classroom includes both interactions with 
the world and with accounts of it which are already in the social realm. 
3.2.3 Immanence 
IŶ oƌdeƌ to ďetteƌ uŶdeƌstaŶd the ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶ of Deleuze͛s positioŶ iŶ the deǀelopŵeŶt of 
complex materialism we will here situate it within a broader philosophical narrative.  In this 
subsection we will consider how Deleuze derives his monist position of immanence and pure 
difference (see 3.2.1).  In the next subsection we will explore how he develops his empiricism 
fƌoŵ ǁhiĐh the ͚iŵage of thought͛ is deǀeloped ;ϯ.Ϯ.ϮͿ. 
Deleuze dƌaǁs his ŵoŶist positioŶ fƌoŵ “piŶoza, ǁho opposed DesĐaƌtes͛ sepaƌatioŶ of ŵiŶd 
aŶd ďodǇ.  “piŶoza deǀelops ͞God aŶd Natuƌe͟ as paŶtheisŵ aŶd this leads to Deleuze͛s ŶotioŶ 
of a plane of immanence:  
͞What is iŶǀolǀed is Ŷo loŶgeƌ the affiƌŵatioŶ of a single substance, but rather the 
laying out of a common plane of immanence on which all bodies, all minds, and all 
iŶdiǀiduals aƌe situated.͟ (Deleuze, 1988 [1970], p. 122) 
                                                          
36 Deleuze uses the image of thought primarily in relation to existing philosophical understandings.  
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“piŶoza desĐƌiďes a dǇŶaŵiĐ ǁoƌld iŶ ǁhiĐh ͞the iŶdiǀidual is Ŷot to ďe uŶdeƌstood locally as a 
kind of point among points, but dynamically as a harmonization or divergence of more or less 
sǇŵpathetiĐ ƌegioŶs of eǆteŶsioŶ iŶ ŵotioŶ͟ (Witmore, 2008, p. 106).  Thus the distinction 
between an individual or object and its environment is blurred as both are in flux.  Such a 
notion finds immediate appeal in relation to complexity theory in which form and structure are 
seeŶ as dǇŶaŵiĐ aŶd teŵpoƌaƌǇ.  Hoǁeǀeƌ Deleuze͛s ŶotioŶ of iŵŵaŶeŶĐe ƌeƋuiƌes us to look 
beyond form and structure: 
͞It is oŶlǇ ǁhen immanence is no longer immanence to anything other than itself that 
ǁe ĐaŶ speak of a plaŶe of iŵŵaŶeŶĐe.͟ (Deleuze, 2005 [1995], p. 27) 
“piŶoza͛s paŶtheisŵ ǁas fuƌtheƌed ďǇ BeƌgsoŶ, ǁho distinguished the quantifiable from the 
͚ƋualitǇ͛ of eǆpeƌieŶĐe.  He argued that the world of objects and forms is constituted in 
extended space and is thus quantifiable.  Bergson uses the example of a flock of sheep, which 
can be enumerated despite being a homogenous multiplicity, because they are distinct 
spatially (Lawlor & Moulard 2013).  In contrast, our sensations are qualitative and pertain to a 
heterogeneous multiplicity which Bergson sees as fundamental in the world.  This allowed him 
to consider time in relation to a qualitative change in sensation, which breaks ǁith KaŶt͛s ǀieǁ 
of time and space as being extensive. 
To Bergson, time is not separated into quantifiable moments which are distinct from each 
other:  past, present and future are part of the same duration.   
͞puƌe duƌatioŶ eǆĐludes all idea of juǆtapositioŶ, ƌeĐipƌoĐal eǆteƌioƌitǇ aŶd eǆteŶsioŶ͟ 
(Bergson, 1946, p. 192) 
Famously Bergson became engaged in a bitter dispute with Einstein about the nature of time.   
However, as Canales (2005) highlights, BeƌgsoŶ did Ŷot deŶǇ the aĐĐuƌaĐǇ of EiŶsteiŶ͛s theoƌǇ 
of relativity but instead drew attention to necessary differences in perception which would 
aĐĐoŵpaŶǇ tiŵe dilatioŶ.  Whilst BeƌgsoŶ͛s ĐoŶĐeptioŶ of tiŵe ǁas disŵissed ďǇ sĐieŶtists iŶ 
the early twentieth century, it pre-empted aspects of quantum physics (de Broglie, 1941) and 
is iŶstƌuŵeŶtal iŶ ďoth ĐoŵpleǆitǇ theoƌǇ aŶd iŶ Deleuze͛s oŶtologǇ.  As Osďeƌg (2015) shows, 
the ŶotioŶ of eŵeƌgeŶĐe oǁes ŵuĐh to BeƌgsoŶ͛s ƋuestioŶiŶg of tiŵe as deteƌŵiŶate aŶd 
proceeding mechanistically. 
Deleuze (1988 [1966]) deƌiǀes the ŶotioŶ of ͚puƌe diffeƌeŶĐe͛ fƌoŵ BeƌgsoŶ, aŶd the 
iŵpoƌtaŶĐe of iŶteŶsiǀe diffeƌeŶĐes.  Hoǁeǀeƌ, Deleuze ƌeplaĐes BeƌgsoŶ͛s duƌatioŶ ǁith the 
event which is less reliant upon human sense.  The notion of the event brings together 
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BeƌgsoŶ͛s duƌatioŶ ǁith “piŶoza͛s ŵoŶisŵ, as ǁell as LeiďŶiz͛s ideas oŶ ideŶtitǇ (Smith 2005).  
Deleuze thus distinguishes between historical time (Chronos) and the time of the event (Aion): 
͞Wheƌeas ChƌoŶos ǁas liŵited aŶd fiŶite, AioŶ is uŶliŵited, the ǁaǇ the futuƌe and 
past aƌe uŶliŵited, aŶd fiŶite like the iŶstaŶt.͟ (Deleuze, 2004b [1969], p. 189) 
We shall return to the notion of the event and how it might be enlisted in challenging 
ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ iŶ suďseĐtioŶ ϲ.Ϯ.ϲ.  Heƌe hoǁeǀeƌ ǁe aƌe aďle to see hoǁ Deleuze ͞tries to 
develop a metaphysics adequate to contemporary mathematics and science—a metaphysics in 
which the concept of multiplicity replaces that of substance, event replaces essence and 
virtuality replaces possibility.͟ (Smith & Protevi, 2015) 
We have alreadǇ Ŷoted the possiďilitǇ of ƌeplaĐiŶg ͚puƌe diffeƌeŶĐe͛ ǁith ŶotioŶs fƌoŵ stƌiŶg 
theoƌǇ ;see ϯ.ϭ.ϭͿ.  We ŵight also Ŷote Deleuze͛s fƌeƋueŶt use of diffeƌeŶtial ĐalĐulus to 
describe the infinitesimal qualitative differences in the world (e.g. Deleuze (2004a [1968], p. 
57)Ϳ.  BǇ adoptiŶg Deleuze͛s ŵetaphǇsiĐal sǇsteŵ ǁe aƌe thus aďle to see hoǁ the ǁoƌld is 
ĐoŶstituted of a siŶgle, dǇŶaŵiĐ ͚ŵateƌial͛, aŶd hoǁ this is ĐoŵŵeŶsuƌate ǁith ĐoŶteŵpoƌaƌǇ 
complexity theory.  In subsection 3.2.6 we will see how this monist position overcomes social 
constructivist views of complexity and in subsection 3.2.7 how it allows us to escape the issues 
of Cillieƌs͛ poststƌuĐtuƌalist ĐoŵpleǆitǇ aĐĐouŶt.  
3.2.4 Empiricism 
Finding a solution to the philosophical issues with existing forms of social complexity is 
esseŶtial iŶ this thesis.  Hoǁeǀeƌ it is pƌiŵaƌilǇ aďout leaƌŶiŶg, aŶd thus Deleuze͛s aĐĐouŶt of 
how humans develop an understanding of the world is central.  In subsection 3.2.2 we 
ĐoŶsideƌed the ͚iŵage of thought͛ and we are now in a position to situate this in the broader 
philosophical narrative that Deleuze draws upon, primarily the work of Hume and Nietzsche.  
We can now recognise the importance of difference and repetition, and the origins of this in 
BeƌgsoŶ͛s aĐcount of sense making: 
͞seŶsatioŶs aŶd tastes seeŵ to ŵe to ďe oďjeĐts as sooŶ as I isolate aŶd Ŷaŵe theŵ, 
and in the human soul there are only processes. What I ought to say is that every 
sensation is altered by repetition, and that if it does not seem to me to change from 
day to day, it is because I perceive it through the object which is its cause, through the 
ǁoƌd ǁhiĐh tƌaŶslates it.͟ (Bergson, 1913, p. 131) 
Whilst BeƌgsoŶ͛s aĐĐouŶt joiŶed a HegeliaŶ oŶtologǇ iŶ pheŶoŵeŶologǇ aŶd stƌuĐtuƌalisŵ 
(Osberg 2015), Deleuze iŶstead liŶked it to “piŶoza͛s ŵoŶisŵ aŶd Huŵe͛s eŵpiƌiĐisŵ to 
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develop an account of thought beyond human sensation alone.  Deleuze takes from Hume the 
emergence of understanding from the difference and repetition of experience: 
͞The pƌiŶĐiple of habit as fusion of similar cases in the imagination and the principle of 
experience as observation of distinct cases in the understanding thus combine to 
pƌoduĐe ďoth the ƌelatioŶ aŶd the iŶfeƌeŶĐe that folloǁs͟ (Deleuze, 2005 [1995], p. 41) 
UnderstaŶdiŶg eŵeƌges fƌoŵ the Ƌualitatiǀe ŵultipliĐitǇ, the ͚puƌe diffeƌeŶĐe͛ of eǆpeƌieŶĐe.  
However, as noted in 3.2.2, Deleuze also recognises social aspects of learning.  He explains 
hoǁ ͚huŵaŶ Ŷatuƌe͛ iŶǀolǀes ideŶtities, ƌelatioŶs aŶd iŶstitutioŶs as ͚aƌtifiĐe͛.  Thƌough ƌeadiŶg 
Hume, Deleuze claims, we are able to see that both identities and relations are external to 
each other.  In a monist world which is in flux we see that our understandings are not fixed or 
related to some other realm of knowledge but are constantly changing through our 
experience.  
͞Thus the eŶtiƌe ƋuestioŶ of ŵaŶ is displaĐed iŶ tuƌŶ: it is Ŷo loŶgeƌ, as ǁith 
knowledge, a matter of the complex relation between fiction and human nature; it is, 
rather, a matter of the relation between human nature and artifice (man as inventive 
speĐiesͿ.͟ (Deleuze, 2005 [1995], p. 47) 
Ouƌ eŵpiƌiĐal eǆpeƌieŶĐe ǁithiŶ the ǁoƌld ĐoŶditioŶs ouƌ ͚passioŶs͛ aŶd ͚tastes͛ as ǁell as ouƌ 
understandings: we learn from the world around us.  However, in drawing on Nietzsche, 
Deleuze shows that we need not return to a determinist view, nor do we replace fixed 
identities (Being) with an intractably dynamic world (Becoming): 
͞BeĐoŵiŶg is Ŷo loŶgeƌ opposed to BeiŶg, Ŷoƌ is the ŵultiple opposed to the OŶe 
(these oppositions being the categories of nihilism).  On the contrary, what is affirmed 
is the One of multiplicity, the Being of becoming.  Or, as Nietzsche puts it, one affirms 
the ŶeĐessitǇ of ĐhaŶĐe.͟ (Deleuze, 2005 [1995], p. 86) 
It is this affirmation which allows us to haǀe ageŶĐǇ iŶ the ǁoƌld.  IŶ ĐoŶsideƌiŶg NietzsĐhe͛s 
eternal return: the prospect of time repeating itself, we are forced to affirm the world we 
eǆpeƌieŶĐe, ďut ͞NietszĐhe͛s seĐƌet is that the eternal return is selective͟ (Deleuze, 2005 
[1995], P. 88, original italics).  Deleuze takes fƌoŵ NietzsĐhe the ͚Yes͛ of affiƌŵatioŶ ǁhiĐh ǁill 
ďe iŵpoƌtaŶt iŶ opposiŶg it to Deƌƌida͛s defeƌƌal of ŵeaŶiŶg iŶheƌeŶt iŶ Cillieƌs͛ aĐĐouŶt ;see 
subsection 3.2.7). 
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IŶ iŶtƌoduĐiŶg Deleuze͛s fiŶal ǁoƌk, ‘ajĐhŵaŶ suggests that Deleuze͛s ͚last ŵessage͛ Đaŵe at a 
time when philosophy was facing difficulty:  
͞As ǁith BeƌgsoŶ, oŶe Ŷeeded to agaiŶ iŶtƌoduĐe ŵoǀeŵeŶt iŶto thought ƌatheƌ thaŶ 
trying to find universals of information or communication – in particular into the very 
iŵage of the ďƌaiŶ aŶd ĐoŶteŵpoƌaƌǇ ŶeuƌosĐieŶĐe.͟ (Rajchman 2005, p. 20) 
IŶ dƌaǁiŶg oŶ Deleuze͛s ǁoƌk, aŶd its philosophiĐal liŶeage, this thesis deǀelops a dǇŶaŵiĐ 
view of thought, and learning in particular.  One which rejects universals and yet does so 
thƌough dƌaǁiŶg oŶ ĐoŶteŵpoƌaƌǇ ŶeuƌosĐieŶĐe to shoǁ that Deleuze͛s ideas ĐaŶ ďe ŵade 
concrete and practical. 
3.2.5 Virtual Differences 
Deleuze challenged, on a philosophical level, accounts of our understandings as related to 
some other realm or a priori categories of reason.  In developing this challenge he used the 
notions of intensive differences, from which our understandings emerge, but also of virtual 
differences, to which we now turn.  We will focus upon two reasons that Deleuze relies upon 
virtual difference: firstly to allow us to overcome the need for a separate world of 
͚possiďilities͛, ǁhiĐh is Ŷo loŶgeƌ peƌŵissiďle iŶ a ŵateƌialist aĐĐouŶt, aŶd seĐoŶdlǇ that it 
allows for human agency.  These functions are both important to an account of how people act 
within complex social systems such as classrooms.  We will therefore explore Deleuze͛s virtual 
causes here, but with a view to ultimately overcoming their metaphysical character and 
providing a more concrete account of human agency in this thesis.  
In a dualist or dialectic metaphysics there can be a world of possibilities, in which the actual 
world follows one particular path.  In a monist system this realm of possibilities is disallowed, 
so the world is not one actuality in a sea of possibility: it is all there is.  As Smith (2009) notes, 
Bergson proposed that we wrongly assume that nonbeing exists before being, and Deleuze 
takes up this objection as he derives his position from Bergson (see 3.2.3).  IŶ Deleuze͛s 
system, virtual differences thus ƌeplaĐe ͚possiďilities͛ ďǇ pƌoǀidiŶg soŵethiŶg ǁithiŶ the 
material world which might allow novel forms and ideas.  DeLanda (2002, 2011) makes the 
ǀiƌtual ŵoƌe ĐoŶĐƌete ďǇ desĐƌiďiŶg ͞ĐapaĐities͟ aŶd ͞teŶdeŶĐies͟37.   For example, water has 
the tendency to evaporate if heated above 100C (at atmospheric pressure), but chemical 
elements have the capacity to form novel combinations with other elements (DeLanda, 2002, 
p. 62).  This provides a useful starting point for dispensing with a separate realm of 
                                                          
37 We ǁill dƌaǁ oŶ DeLaŶda͛s iŶteƌpƌetatioŶ of the ǀiƌtual iŶ ƌelatioŶ to ŵodels, iŶ suďseĐtioŶ ϲ.ϭ.Ϯ 
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possibilities.  Material entities have capacities and tendencies which play a role in how they 
interact and develop, so novel forms are allowed without being pre-existent possibilities.   
Deleuze however seems to be using virtual differences in relation to human agency in a way 
that DeLanda does not fully capture.  As Williams (2006) argues, historic situation is more 
iŵpoƌtaŶt iŶ Deleuze͛s ǁoƌk thaŶ iŶ DeLaŶda͛s ͚tƌaŶslatioŶ͛ iŶto sĐieŶtifiĐ teƌŵs.  Smith (2009, 
p. 34) explains that to Deleuze ͞A ǀiƌtual idea is Ŷot a ĐoŶditioŶ of possiďle eǆpeƌieŶĐe, ďut the 
geŶetiĐ eleŵeŶt of ƌeal eǆpeƌieŶĐe.͟   This endows virtual causes with a way of both avoiding 
͚possiďilities͛ and being related to agency.  Consider the claim that:  
 ͞The virtual is fully real in so far as it is virtual.  Exactly what Proust said of states of 
ƌesoŶaŶĐe ŵust ďe said of the ǀiƌtual: ͞‘eal ǁithout ďeiŶg aĐtual, ideal ǁithout being 
aďstƌaĐt͟; aŶd sǇŵďoliĐ ǁithout ďeiŶg fiĐtioŶal.͟ (Deleuze, 2004a [1968], p. 260) 
[original italics] 
The reference to Proust presents a way into thinking of the virtual.  Ansell-Pearson (2005) 
desĐƌiďes the Ŷaƌƌatoƌ iŶ Pƌoust͛s À la recherche du temps perdu contemplating how aspects of 
the present, such as uneven paving stones, prompt the recall of a place such as Venice.  The 
memory of Venice does not contain the paving stones in the present, yet the coming together 
of the memory and the present creates a reaction in the narrator.  Deleuze sees in this the 
͚ĐƌǇstallisatioŶ͛ of the past iŶ the pƌeseŶt suĐh that ǁheŶ the ǀiƌtual diffeƌeŶĐe is aĐtualised it 
evokes the idea of Venice.  In language familiar to complexity theory, we might say that the 
virtual allows the importance of the historic path that a system has taken: an indiscernible 
diffeƌeŶĐe ǁhiĐh ŵaǇ iŶflueŶĐe the futuƌe tƌajeĐtoƌǇ of the sǇsteŵ.  Yet iŶ ďeiŶg ͚ǀiƌtual͛ ǁe do 
not need to ascribe the idea of Venice to some other realm, the virtual is present38 in the real 
world.  Virtual difference therefore is constantly ready to be actualised but is not a property of 
iŶteŶsiǀe oƌ eǆteŶsiǀe diffeƌeŶĐes, Ŷoƌ is it soŵe dualist ͚possiďilitǇ͛, it is ͞ƌeal ǁithout ďeiŶg 
aĐtual͟. 
Deleuze & Guattari (2004b [1980]) later use various devices for elucidating the virtual, the 
ŵost poǁeƌful of ǁhiĐh is the ͞BodǇ ǁithout OƌgaŶs͟ ;BǁOͿ.  TheǇ atteŵpt to isolate the 
ŶotioŶ of ͚ďodǇ͛ fƌoŵ the suŵ of all oƌgaŶs, thus ĐƌeatiŶg a ĐoŶĐept ǁhiĐh is ďoth iŶsepaƌaďle 
from material reality (in this case the organs) but is nonetheless a (virtual) entity in itself.  
                                                          
38 As Ŷoted iŶ suďseĐtioŶ ϯ.Ϯ.ϯ, Deluze͛s ŶotioŶ of event overcomes a linear notion of time.  Badiou 
(2006) draws attention to the implication that either there is no present or that all is present.  This 
speaks to nonlinear causality and will be expanded upon in 8.3.2. 
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Another example they use is to illustrate this is ͚capital͛, which is inseparable from ͚capitalism͛ 
and from ͚commodity͛ but is nevertheless not equal to both.  Again, the notion of capital is 
something which exists only as part of other concepts, but is nevertheless formative in how 
these concepts develop. 
͞Thus, BǁO is iŶdeed a uŶitǇ, ďut Ŷot a uŶitǇ iŶ the tƌaditioŶal ŵetaphǇsiĐal seŶse – 
namely, a unity whereby diverse elements are gathered by a transcendent and/or 
privileged element (e.g., the judgement of God). Thus, the BwO in not an other which 
ƌestoƌes a lost uŶitǇ oƌ pƌeseŶĐe; it is a ͚stƌaŶge uŶitǇ͛ ǁheƌeďǇ ͚aŶaƌĐhǇ aŶd uŶioŶ aƌe 
oŶe,͛ oƌ it is the ĐoŶsisteŶĐǇ necessary for the emergence of identifiable, non-strange 
uŶities.͟ (Bell, 2006, p. 162) 
Within this thesis we will ultimately overcome the need for virtual differences by showing that 
concepts such as capital or body, or the recall of Venice, can all be accounted for by the 
conditioning and response of the brain within the real world (see subsection 4.2.3).  We 
cannot dismiss virtual causes out of hand however.  Firstly, any materialist mechanism for 
social learning must also be able to account for how humans can be inspired by past events 
and experiences, which stimulate creative processes in the present.  We will show that this can 
be recovered from an account of brain function.  Secondly however, we must recognise the 
role virtual difference plays in accounting for possibilities in a materialist frame.   
We ǁill Ŷot eŶgage fullǇ ǁith ǁhetheƌ Deleuze͛s ŵetaphǇsiĐal sǇsteŵ is aďle to do aǁaǇ ǁith a 
ǁoƌld of possiďilities, oƌ ǁhetheƌ DeLaŶda͛s ĐapaĐities aŶd teŶdeŶĐies aƌe sufficient to explain 
this in the broader world.  What is of direct relevance to this thesis is the need for any account 
of learning within a social system to allow that past experiences might influence the present, 
and for human agency to situated within complex systems.  We will show (in Chapter 4) that 
this may be achieved through the recognition that our brains have been conditioned by 
experience, so past events shape future response.  Furthermore, the relation between 
experience as manifest in our brains and the fine detail of a specific context means that novel 
thoughts and behaviours are always possible.  Whilst we shall develop it only in relation to 
human understandings in this thesis, complexity theory thus provides a way of accounting for 
the novelty of human understandings and action.  Human agency can be related to the 
emergent response of brains within the material world, without reducing that agency to a 
mechanistic or deterministic process.  The importance of both considering and overcoming 
Deleuze͛s ŶotioŶ of ǀiƌtual diffeƌeŶĐes iŶ this thesis is iŶ ďeiŶg aďle to situate huŵaŶ 
individuality and creativity in complex social systems.   
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3.2.6 Materialism versus Social Construction 
Before we develop more concrete mechanisms for learning in classrooms, it is worthwhile here 
eǆploƌiŶg hoǁ adoptiŶg ;aŶd adaptiŶgͿ Deleuze͛s ŵetaphǇsiĐal sǇsteŵ is already able to 
overcome some of the issues faced by existing accounts of social complexity, as explored in 
Chapter 2.  Here we will argue that a materialist position resolves the untenable separation of 
mind and matter that social constructionists rely upon (expounded in Section 2.4).  In the next 
subsection we will deal with the unpalatable notion from post-structuralist complexity thinkers 
that meaning is constantly deferred and can never be resolved (from Section 2.2). 
IŶ “eĐtioŶ Ϯ.ϰ ǁe used “taĐeǇ͛s ;2001, 2003a, 2003b, 2005) ŶotioŶ of ͞Đoŵpleǆ ƌespoŶsiǀe 
pƌoĐesses͟ to shoǁ the iŶĐoŵŵeŶsuƌaďilitǇ of soĐial ĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ aŶd ĐoŵpleǆitǇ theoƌǇ.  
Drawing on Mead͛s ;ϭϵϯϰͿ desĐƌiptioŶ of ͚sigŶifiĐaŶt sǇŵďols͛ ǁhiĐh alloǁs a ĐapaĐitǇ of aŶ 
iŶdiǀidual ͞I͟ to aŶtiĐipate a soĐial ͞ŵe͟, ǁe saǁ that iŶ a Đoŵpleǆ sǇsteŵ it is iŵpossiďle to 
distinguish between individual and social aspects of mind, because they must both be part of 
the same dynamic and nonlinear system.  Equating the individual and social either removes 
the agency of individuals or it removes any sense in which the social is greater than the 
aggregate of those iŶdiǀiduals.  The ͚HegeliaŶ logiĐ͛ of this, which Stacey inherits from Mead, 
only serves to make the argument even less convincing. 
As well as failing to adequately explain what constitutes the social world though, social 
constructionist accounts fail to deal with the influence of the real world in shaping our 
understandings.  If we admit the reality of the world, and we must, then we must also admit 
that humans are able to learn outside of social interactions.  Our understandings are 
influenced by both the natural world but also by interacting with human artefacts such as 
architecture or ancient texts, which are difficult to classify as social interactions.  The issue at 
hand therefore is that in attempting to equate the social world to our minds, social 
constructionists are unable to situate these minds within a real world. 
A monist and materialist position inspired by Deleuze cuts straight through this, by upholding a 
͚flat oŶtologǇ͛ iŶ ǁhiĐh ouƌ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶgs haǀe a ŵateƌial ďasis.  As Ŷoted ǁe ǁill pƌoǀide a 
specific process for this shortly, but at the philosophical level we can already see that if our 
understandings are treated as material entities then there is no issue with a complex 
iŶteƌaĐtioŶ ďetǁeeŶ the ƌest of the ǁoƌld aŶd these uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶgs.  Deleuze͛s ;ϮϬϬϳͿ teƌŵ 
͞hodgepodge͟ giǀes us a way of denoting the heterogeneous elements of a classroom: people, 
music, textbooks, conversations, ideas, videos etc.  If ideas and social interactions are seen as 
ontologically different from textbooks and videos then we would require a convincing account 
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of how the world of ideas and the material world influence each other in nonlinear and 
dynamic ways.  It is not only impossible to distinguish between mind and matter in such an 
account, it is highly anthropocentric to assume that only conscious animals have access to this 
separate world of ideas.  Situating mind as material, as Deleuze does, brushes away these 
issues in one sweep. 
What about human agency though?  How can material alone account for the creativity and 
individuality of humans, or our capacity to plot, plan and scheme?  Again, the answers will 
come when we flesh out how humans interact with their environment, drawing upon their 
past experiences.  Deleuze uses virtual causes to account for human agency and creativity, and 
in situating these virtual causes as material he allows for minds to be creative without appeal 
to a supernatural realm.  In Chapter 4 we will expand on the contention that the unique 
histories of individuals allow them to have unique interactions with the specifics of a context, 
without the need for virtual causes.  Complexity allows that novel understandings may develop 
though complex interactions within the world39.  In accounting for human originality there is 
no need to appeal to divine inspiration, absolute Spirit, ideal forms or cosmic self-realisation. 
3.2.7 Materialism versus Deferred Meaning 
We have argued that a separation of mind and matter is not tenable in a complex system, 
because there can be no boundary between them.  This echoes the concern of post-
structuralist thinkers that the world and our understandings are not related by simple, fixed 
ƌelatioŶships.  We saǁ iŶ suďseĐtioŶ Ϯ.Ϯ.ϯ that Deƌƌida oďjeĐted to ͚ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ͛, that is, the 
assumption that our thoughts and language correspond directly to features of the real world.  
Cilliers develops this by showing that our linguistic systems can be seen as networks, in which 
the meaning of a term can only be resolved in relation to all other terms.  Furthermore, these 
networks are dynamic and therefore can never be fully resolved.  Cilliers describes a system in 
which meaning is constantly deferred and he opposes the possibility of absolute truths in 
favour of recognising meanings as contingent and bounded (see subsection 2.2.5).   
Despite a capacity to explain the limitations of understanding and the importance of context 
within a classroom, the post-structuralist account was found lacking in a number of ways.  
Firstly, if meaning is constantly deferred then how are we ever to decide how to act in a 
classroom?  Similarly how can we position learning if full understanding is never achieved?  
Cillieƌs͛ appeal to ŵakiŶg ďouŶded aŶd ĐoŶtiŶgeŶt stateŵeŶts fails to ƌesolǀe this, as defiŶiŶg 
                                                          
39 This holds whether we see the world as fundamentally random or simply too complex to comprehend 
(see subsection 1.2.4), 
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ďouŶdaƌies is itself pƌoďleŵatiĐ.  “eĐoŶdlǇ, ǁe shoǁed that Deƌƌida͛s aĐĐouŶt fails to fully 
escape the untenable Hegelian notion of negation within a dialectic system (subsection 2.2.6).  
BǇ shoǁiŶg that ŵeaŶiŶg is ĐoŶstaŶtlǇ defeƌƌed Deƌƌida, aŶd ďǇ assoĐiatioŶ Cillieƌs, ͚ďloĐks͛ 
any resolution of the dialectic relationships that Hegel describes, but these relationships are 
not disposed of.  Thirdly, by considering language, meaning, and human relationships as 
complex networks, Cilliers is not able to see the differences between these systems or how 
they interact. 
Having now descƌiďed Deleuze͛s positioŶ, ǁe aƌe aďle to uphold Maƌks͛ ;ϭϵϵϴ, p. 16) argument 
that Deleuze takes Hegel ͞head oŶ͟, aŶd to see the diffeƌeŶĐe ďetǁeeŶ this aŶd Deƌƌida͛s 
deconstruction:      
͞It is the diffeƌeŶĐe ďetǁeeŶ plaǇiŶg a DeƌƌideaŶ gaŵe Ǉou ĐaŶ Ŷeǀeƌ ǁiŶ aŶd a DeleuzeaŶ 
gaŵe Ǉou ĐaŶ Ŷeǀeƌ lose.  It is the diffeƌeŶĐe ďetǁeeŶ No aŶd Yes.͟ (Bearn, 2000, p. 441) 
Derrida and Deleuze both reject the existence of fixed relationships between our 
understandings aŶd the ǁoƌld.  Cillieƌs deǀelops Deƌƌida͛s positioŶ ďǇ aƌguiŶg that ŵeaŶiŶg is 
emergent from a dynamic network of relationships.  So in a classroom, we might take this on 
the conceptual level of an individual child and say that a new concept must be related to all 
the other concepts that a child holds and becomes part of their dynamic system of 
uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg.  AlteƌŶatiǀelǇ oŶ a ǁhole Đlass leǀel, ǁe ŵight saǇ that a paƌtiĐulaƌ Đhild͛s 
understanding develops within a dynamic network of understandings within the class.  As we 
have already concluded, Cilliers is not clear about the specific system we are to apply this 
philosophical system to.  The point however is that the meaning of a concept, or the learning 
of an individual, can never be fully resolved: we cannot make affirmative statements about a 
Đhild͛s uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg.  This is ǁhat Bearn is referring to as a Derridean game you can never 
win: to make a claim about learning you must understand the full complexity of the specific 
context, and this is impossible. 
In outlining a materialist position we must also recognise the role of context; indeed the 
insight from complexity is that context can never be ignored.  However, because Deleuze sees 
concepts as eŵeƌgiŶg fƌoŵ ouƌ ͞iŵŵaŶeŶt͟ eǆpeƌieŶĐe ǁe ĐaŶ see the uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg a Đhild 
has as a real entity in its own right.  The understanding has emerged, within a specific context, 
but we do not need to see it as incomplete or unresolved: it exists.  Here affirmation, the Yes, 
which Deleuze derives from Nietzsche become important (see 3.2.4).  We are still very much 
working in the abstract here and over the rest of this thesis we will clarify how we can see an 
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understanding as a material entity and provide a model for how they emerge: how learning 
takes plaĐe ;Chapteƌ ϰͿ.  The iŶteŶtioŶ heƌe hoǁeǀeƌ is to shoǁ hoǁ adaptiŶg Deleuze͛s 
positioŶ alloǁs us to esĐape the philosophiĐal issues faĐed ďǇ Cillieƌs͛ aĐĐouŶt: that ŵeaŶiŶg 
can never be resolved; that we do not escape a Hegelian metaphysics; that we cannot be 
specific about the systems involved. 
Let us ƌeĐoŶsideƌ Cillieƌs͛ use of a Ŷeuƌal Ŷetǁoƌk as aŶalogous to Deƌƌida͛s sǇsteŵ of tƌaĐe 
and différance (subsection 2.2.3).  Cilliers (1998, 2010) argues that in such a system, where 
traces are analogous to the weighting of neural connections, we cannot see meaning as 
related to the specific nodes within the network; it is instead distributed across the system.  As 
noted, it is not clear which network Cilliers is talking about, but if we take an individual child to 
be a node in a network, we see that the understanding that the class has of a 
problem/situation cannot be assigned to any one child.   The mistake Cilliers makes however is 
in therefore arguing that meaning is constantly deferred and is unresolvable: in following 
Derrida he gets caught up in rejecting meaning entirely. 
͞Deƌƌida is uŶaďle to saǇ Yes, ďeĐause he thiŶks Yes ŵust alǁaǇs haǀe a poiŶt.  He 
does not realize that the true Yes is pointless.͟ (Bearn, 2000, p. 441) 
In arguing against our understandings being fixed representations of the world Derrida, and in 
turn Cilliers, sees our understandings as ephemeral and meaning as intangible.  Deleuze does 
not deny that understanding is dynamic and fleeting, but he positions it as real.  New 
understandings are determined by our experiences and existing understandings within specific 
contexts.  We do not need to deny the existence of meaning at all, or defer it indefinitely.  At a 
specific moment within a classroom each individual person will have a specific understanding, 
aŶd the Đlass as a ǁhole ǁill haǀe ǁhat ǁe ŵight Đall aŶ ͚uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg͛: a ŵaĐƌosĐopiĐ 
response to the situation at hand.  Whilst we will later flesh out what this means in relation to 
individuals (Chapter 4) and classrooms (Chapter 5), here we see that the response of a pupil, or 
of a class as a whole, is real and context-specific.  
Whilst we will not here enter into a full discussion of how Deleuze͛s sǇsteŵ oǀeƌĐoŵes Hegel͛s 
dialectics, we must explain briefly how it overcomes notions of fixed identity and surpasses 
Cillieƌs͛ post-stƌuĐtuƌalist aĐĐouŶt of ĐoŵpleǆitǇ.  EllƌiĐh͛s (1996) critique of Deleuze will 
proǀide a juŵpiŶg off poiŶt foƌ this.  He deĐoŶstƌuĐts Deleuze͛s ƌeliaŶĐe upoŶ the ŶotioŶ of 
͚diffeƌeŶĐe iŶ itself͛ oƌ ͚puƌe diffeƌeŶĐe͛ aŶd ĐoŶĐludes that foƌ theƌe to ďe a diffeƌeŶĐe theŶ 
the very concept of difference must have some fixed identity.  However, Bell (2006) points out 
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that Ellrich (and by extension Derrida) are missing the way in which Deleuze considers identity 
as part of a dynamic system.  Ellrich assumes some correspondence between an experience 
and the meaning it is given, in the same way that a blueprint corresponds to a building.  Rather 
than assuming a simple relationship between phenomena and understanding, Deleuze & 
Guattari make reference to ͚geŶetiĐ Đauses͛, in parallel to the way in which an organism need 
not resemble its genetic material  (Deleuze, 2006 [1962]; Deleuze & Guattari (2004b [1980], p. 
59).  People experience the world but interpret it in relation to the patterns of understanding 
already in place, mediated through the shared biology of human perception.  In this way 
Deleuze has released concepts from networks of relations, but still characterises 
understanding as emergent.  The nature of relations as autonomous entities is brought into 
question. 
By considering multiplicities Deleuze focuses on the development of concepts from a series of 
uŶiƋue eǆpeƌieŶĐes ǁhiĐh aƌe ͚ƌepeated͛.  IŶ Deleuze͛s sǇsteŵ ǁe aƌe aďle to affiƌŵatiǀelǇ 
denote something from our empirical experience: meaning emerges in the moment.  To 
illustrate this consider how we might identify a pigeon.  BǇ Deƌƌida͛s aĐĐouŶt, its identity 
would depend upon its relation to all other birds and indeed other species in the ecosystem.  
Pigeon number 101 is not a magpie nor a parrot or a cat and it is not the same as pigeon 102.  
However Deleuze allows us to see that ďǇ ͚eǆpeƌieŶĐiŶg͛ a seƌies of pigeoŶs, eǀeŶ if ǁe had 
Ŷeǀeƌ seeŶ a ďiƌd ďefoƌe, ǁe ǁould ďe aďle to assoĐiate the utteƌaŶĐe ͚pigeoŶ͛ ǁith this seƌies 
of experiences.  Furthermore pigeon 101 would be a unique instance of the concept of 
pigeons, first experienced in a particular context.  Whereas a Derridean viewpoint would 
contest that we are not able to assign any fixed identity to individual pigeons, the Deleuzean 
viewpoint suggests we do not need to, because it is our immanent experience that generates 
understanding.  
As both Marks (1998) and Hayden (1995) argue, Deleuze succeeds in meeting Hegel head on.  
We do not need a dialectical system in which meaning must be resolved, but nor do we need 
to appeal to a separate world of ideal forms as Plato does, or the pre-conditioning of our 
experiences as Kant suggests.  By positioning human understanding as a part of the material 
world we are able to develop an account of social complexity which overcomes the issues 
faced in the existing literature (detailed in Chapter 2).  Our understandings are emergent and 
dynamic, and so too is the macro-level response of a social entity such as a class to its 
eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt.  Deleuze͛s positioŶ has a Ŷuŵďeƌ of adǀaŶtages oǀeƌ Deƌƌida͛s as a fouŶdatioŶ 
for complexity thinking.  Whilst not denying the dynamic or contextual nature of meaning, 
117 
 
Deleuze is able to break free of the need for constant deferral of meaning or appeal to a 
network of relations.   
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3.3 Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined a materialist position and has also begun to show how this position 
overcomes the issues faced by other accounts of social complexity.   Section 3.1 provided a 
first sketch of the arguments which will be developed across the rest of this thesis.  There are 
three aspects to this, which answer three issues arising from our evaluation of existing 
literature in Chapter 2: an account of the role that the real world plays in developing our 
understandings, a description of how our understandings relate to the real world and an 
account of how our models and understandings are themselves within complex social systems.  
Each of these was dealt with in turn, to orientate the reader and to introduce the solutions at 
first approximation.   
The positioŶ outliŶed, ǁhiĐh ǁe haǀe Đalled Đoŵpleǆ ŵateƌialisŵ, adopts Deleuze͛s ͚flat 
oŶtologǇ͛ ďǇ aƌguiŶg that ouƌ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶgs should ďe seeŶ as paƌt of the ŵateƌial ǁoƌld.  
The initial sketch of this within subsection 3.1.1 was developed further in Section 3.2 in 
ƌelatioŶ to Deleuze͛s ŵoŶist sǇsteŵ, and its lineage within philosophical thought.  Whilst we 
noted what needs to be made more concrete in our account so far, what is to be sustained is 
that our concepts are not related to a supernatural realm but arise from our experiences in the 
world.  By seeing the heterogeneous elements of classrooms as having a material basis we see 
that experience of the social world is not ontologically different from experience of the natural 
world.  Our experiences thus allow novel thoughts as well as existing patterns of 
understanding.  As such, we approach an account of classroom learning, the development of 
understanding, as being emergent from the interplay of experience and existing conceptual 
systems within the classroom.  This account is commensurate with complexity as it sees 
learning as emergent from interactions within the material world, but rejects any fixed or 
predetermined link between our understandings and that world. 
In subsection 3.2.6 we showed that seeing our understandings as material immediately 
addresses the problems that social constructionists (such as Stacey) have.  Individual 
understandings and social understandings need not be related by a dialectical relationship if 
we see both as part of a material world.  The social world is made up of individual 
understandings as well as symbolic artefacts, but both can be seen as having a material basis.  
Thus, learning is the interaction of brains with the real world; it is material interacting with 
material, which is unproblematic.   
The overcoming of the issues faced by post-stƌuĐtuƌalist aĐĐouŶts ;suĐh as Cillieƌs͛Ϳ ǁas Ŷot so 
straightforward, as we had to account for how meaning is contextual and how Hegelian 
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metaphysics is overcome (subsection 3.2.7Ϳ.  UŶdeƌ Deleuze͛s sǇsteŵ ǁe do Ŷot Ŷeed to defeƌ 
indefinitely to a dynamic network of relations which place understanding outside of our reach.  
Instead, we see that understandings emerge from specific contexts, but are nevertheless real 
entities.  This means that the understanding of an individual child or the behaviour of a 
particular class can be treated as part of the material world.  Whilst the dynamics are 
ĐoŵpletelǇ diffeƌeŶt, a Đhild͛s uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of a classroom does not need to be assigned a 
different ontological category to a complex chemical system or the weather.  Whilst we can 
never know them precisely, they can be investigated, influenced and described as aspects of 
material reality. 
As such we have developed a materialist position and linked it to complexity theory, as well as 
showing how this overcomes some of the issues in the existing literature, namely the social 
constructionist position and post-structuralist complexity position.  However, there is still 
much work to be done in defining complex materialism and evaluating it in relation to 
classrooms.  We are yet to answer the difficulties that complex realists have in situating their 
models, or provide a firm basis from which complexity science may proceed in relation to 
social settings.  Both of these will be reconsidered in Chapter 6. 
Firstly however, we will turn to the problems of how we can consider our understandings to be 
ŵateƌial.  Deleuze͛s positioŶ suggests that understandings are emergent from the material 
world, and therefore has the potential to provide a theoretical basis with which to underpin 
complexity theory.  Conversely however, contemporary complexity theory has the capacity to 
both further the philosophical discussion begun by Deleuze, but also to provide specific 
descriptions of the processes involved.  In Chapter 4 we will account for the relation between 
brains and the world they experience.  Doing so will overcome the notion of virtual causes that 
Deleuze relies upon in relation to human agency.   In Chapter 5 we will then develop an 
aĐĐouŶt of hoǁ ǁe ĐaŶ see ͞the iŵage of thought͟ as ŵateƌial.  Togetheƌ, Chapteƌs ϰ aŶd ϱ 
will not only support the theoretical position of complex materialism outlined in this chapter, 
but will also allow us to develop an account of learning within the classroom.   
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4 Learning as a Complex System 
4.0 Chapter Introduction  
Complexity theory poses a challenge to any position which situates our understandings as 
outside the material world.  In Chapter 3 we argued that a materialist position overcomes the 
issues of seeing the mind as a social entity as social constructionists do (Section 2.4) and also 
the issues of deferred meaning which trouble post-structuralist accounts (Section 2.2).  Whilst 
seeing understandings as emergent from the material world answers questions on the 
philosophical level, what is required is a more specific account of how this can be the case.  If 
we characterise our understandings as material then what form do they take, where do they 
reside, how do they develop?  We will explain how our understandings can be seen as material 
in two senses.  Firstly, in this chapter we will model understandings as electrical patterns 
within brains, embodied within human behaviour and response.  Secondly, in Chapter 5 we will 
show how our understandings are manifest in the material of the human sphere: our symbolic 
language; media; artefacts; technologies.  We will thus explain how understandings emerge 
and develop within the material world. 
In Section 4.1, we will dƌaǁ upoŶ Cillieƌs͛ ;ϭϵϵϴ, ϮϬϬϱͿ ŵodel of Đoŵpleǆ Ŷeuƌal Ŷetǁoƌks to 
show how this provides the basis for a model of individual learning as the adaptation of neural 
networks within the brain.  We will explore how such a model allows us to see learning as the 
adaptation of brains to classroom contexts.  Whilst this thesis contains no primary empirical 
evidence, by drawing on neuroscience, cognitive science and child development we will build 
the case for a material account of learning within classrooms.  Furthermore we will overcome 
the Ŷeed foƌ ǀiƌtual Đauses iŶ Deleuze͛s sǇsteŵ.  
In building such a case however we must be mindful of two things.  Firstly, that the process by 
which a specific pupil learns within a specific context will be unique.  The insight from 
complexity is that the historic detail of a system as well as the minutiae of the context at hand 
may lead to novel processes (this was introduced in subsection 1.3.1).  Whilst we will propose 
a model of brains and behaviour adapting in relation to the context of classrooms, the way 
that learning takes place within a specific classroom can only be described through 
investigation of that classroom.  In this thesis we can only propose tentative and general 
models. 
This brings us to the second point we must be mindful of: that we are proposing models.  In 
Chapter 6 we will develop further the relation between models and the systems they model.  
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Here we must recognise that the details of the model we propose in this chapter will likely be 
challenged over time as new empirical evidence is developed.  However, the salient point is 
that a materialist model can be developed which recognises the context-specific and dynamic 
nature of learning within classrooms.  Furthermore, this model allows the insights from 
complexity theory to be brought to bear on classroom learning. 
  
122 
 
4.1 The Brain as Complex 
4.1.1 The Brain as a Neural Network 
IŶ suďseĐtioŶ Ϯ.Ϯ.ϯ ǁe saǁ hoǁ Cillieƌs ƌelated aƌtifiĐial Ŷeuƌal Ŷetǁoƌks to Deƌƌida͛s 
deconstruction.  Here we will focus upon how Cilliers draws on experience as an electronic 
engineer in developing a model of human brains as artificial neural networks.  This will allow us 
to take first steps in proposing a process for how human understanding adapts to the material 
world and can itself be considered to have a material basis.   
To explain how neural networks adapt, Cilliers (1998) 
gives an example of a computational neural network 
ǁhiĐh ŵaǇ ďe ͚taught͛ to ĐoŶǀeƌt pƌeseŶt tense verbs 
to past tense.  A present tense verb is presented as 
the input to the network, and the correct past tense 
verb is presented as the output.  Between the input 
and output layer of nodes there is a sufficiently large 
number of interconnected nodes through which a 
signal may travel.  The operator then adjusts the 
strength of the connections (by adjusting the electrical 
conductivity) until the input of a present tense verb 
leads to the output of the associated past tense verb.  
This is not by programming the rules of tense into the system: it is by adjusting the network 
until the right answer is produced each time a new verb is presented.  In this sense the 
͚tƌaiŶiŶg͛ is a pƌoĐess of tƌial aŶd eƌƌoƌ, although aŶ algoƌithŵ is ofteŶ used to ƌeduĐe the error 
at each node. 
OŶĐe this sǇsteŵ has ďeeŶ tƌaiŶed it is aďle to ŵake aŶ ͚eduĐated guess͛ at output fƌoŵ 
previously unseen input; it responds based on its structure.  In this way the abilities of a 
network are determined by the weights of connections between the input and output layer.  
Cilliers desĐƌiďes suĐh a Ŷetǁoƌk as a ͚feedfoƌǁaƌd͛ Ŷetǁoƌk aŶd ƌepƌeseŶts it 
diagrammatically as a series of node points joined in layers from the input to output layers (see 
Figuƌe ϰaͿ.  This tǇpe of Ŷetǁoƌk is ͚tƌaiŶed͛ ďǇ alteƌiŶg the stƌeŶgth of ĐoŶŶeĐtioŶs uŶtil it 
converges on a solution.  After the training phase however, these networks are able to 
ĐoŶtiŶue ͚leaƌŶiŶg͛ ďeĐause the stƌeŶgths of ĐoŶŶeĐtioŶs ĐoŶtiŶue to ďe adjusted ďǇ theiƌ 
usage within the system. 
Fig 4a – Representation of a simple 
feedforward network.
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As noted in subsection 2.2.3, neural networks do not have rules or predetermined programs: 
they simply respond according to the internal structure of the system and are able to 
recognise patterns.  As such, neural networks have applications in sales and marketing 
forecasts (Kuo & Xue, 1999) and image processing, for example Johnson & Hogg (1996) show 
how a system can be trained to predict where a person will walk.  Cillieƌs͛ aĐĐouŶt of a siŵple 
feedforward network does not fully acĐouŶt foƌ these ͚ƌeal life͛ sǇsteŵs hoǁeǀeƌ aŶd pƌoǀides 
a very simplistic view of artificial neural networks.  Even a relatively simple number plate 
recognition system (Draghici, 1997) requires feedback between different aspects of the system 
and a sufficient level of interconnectedness to ensure a reliable output.    
Neǀeƌtheless, suĐh Ŷetǁoƌks haǀe ƌeleǀaŶĐe to huŵaŶ leaƌŶiŶg.  CoŶsideƌ ElŵaŶ͛s (1995) work 
in which neural networks were trained to predict the next word in a sentence, using a set of 
10,000 sentences, drawing on 29 nouns and verbs.  Of particular interest here is the network 
structure after training, which revealed internal dynamics that reflected differences between 
nouns and verbs, but further into animate and inanimate nouns and transitive, intransitive and 
optionally transitive verbs.  However, it also displayed differences in how it responded to 
words in different contexts (e.g. boy as subject vs boy as object). 
͞Thus, a Ŷetǁoƌk state did Ŷot ĐoƌƌespoŶd to a word per se, as a traditional 
representational analysis might expect, but rather to the outcome of processing a 
ǁoƌd ǁithiŶ a paƌtiĐulaƌ ĐoŶteǆt.͟ (Beer, 2000, pp. 91-92) 
This means that a relatively simple artificial network displayed what Cilliers terms ͚distributed 
representation͛.  There is a correspondence between the world and the structure of the 
network which responds to it, but it is not a straightforward correspondence.  The 
representation is distributed across the network such that no specific node or neuron can be 
seen to correspond to an aspect of the input, nor is a linear process or equation determining 
the way the network responds.  The system learnt through engaging with multiple examples 
and was then able to use its internal structure to respond to new information, without drawing 
on predetermined rules.  It also has implications for considering the role of context in learning, 
which we will develop shortly (subsection 4.1.5).   
Here it is ŶoteǁoƌthǇ that ĐoŶsideƌiŶg the ďƌaiŶ iŶ this ǁaǇ eĐhoes Deleuze & Guattaƌi͛s 
(2004b [1980], p. ϱϵͿ ĐoŶteŶtioŶ that eǆpeƌieŶĐe ďe seeŶ as a ͚geŶetiĐ Đause͛ iŶ the seŶse that 
our brain structure does not replicate experience in a simple way (see 3.2.7).  The current state 
of a neural network when it receives new stimuli will influence how the network adapts and 
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therefore the history of the network/learner is important.  Furthermore, the network/learner 
will respond to stimuli in the broadest sense, so the context is important.  For example, when 
looking at a scene the background would influence the response as well as objects in the 
foreground; when identifying a word, tone and volume are important.  Whilst the model needs 
further development, it is already possible to relate human learning to a material process in 
which brains adapt within specific contexts.  We also see that our understandings do relate to 
the real world but should not be seen as truths in which we have accurate representations of 
reality.  
Accepting, for the moment, that the first sketch of neural networks presented above is 
incredibly simplistic, we need to consider whether this relates to learning in humans.  Cilliers 
notes that the field of artificial neural networks grew from early understandings in 
neuroscience and that the fields have continued to develop in reference to each other, 
although exploration of artificial neural networks has also developed as a field in its own right.  
Primarily, artificial neural networks are based upon the work of Hebb (1949) who proposed a 
physiological basis for learning (Grossberg, 1982).   
4.ͳ.ʹ Hebb’s Law 
Heďď͛s laǁ pƌoposes that thƌough ĐoŶtiŶued stiŵulatioŶ of oŶe ŶeuƌoŶ ďǇ a ŶeaƌďǇ Ŷeighďouƌ, 
the efficiency of the path between these two neurons is increased.  Computational scientists 
have used this as the principle for developing models of neural networks in which a number of 
ŶeuƌoŶs aƌe joiŶed at ͚Ŷodes͛.  The Ŷodes ĐaŶ ďe desigŶed so that theǇ ƌespoŶd to aŶ electrical 
signal in a specific way.  For example, the electrical signal from an input neuron could be 
continuously added to previous inputs, to provide a growing signal at an output neuron.  In this 
ǁaǇ the ŶeuƌoŶ ŵodels Heďď͛s laǁ ďǇ iŶĐƌeasiŶg its output according to further input40.  Thus, 
artificial neural networks provide models for how learning takes place within the brain.   
͞Clusteƌs of iŶfoƌŵatioŶ fƌoŵ the eǆteƌŶal ǁoƌld floǁ iŶto the sǇsteŵ.  This 
information will influence the interaction of some of the components in the system – it 
ǁill alteƌ the ǀalues of the ǁeights iŶ the Ŷetǁoƌk.  FolloǁiŶg Heďď͛s ƌule… if a ĐeƌtaiŶ 
Đlusteƌ is pƌeseŶt ƌegulaƌlǇ, the sǇsteŵ ǁill aĐƋuiƌe staďle ǁeights that ͚ƌepƌeseŶt͛ that 
cluster, i.e. a certain pattern of activity will be caused in the system each time that 
specific cluster is present.  If two clusters are regularly present together, the system 
will automatically develop an association between the two.  For example, if a certain 
                                                          
40  Most ĐoŵŵoŶlǇ hoǁeǀeƌ, ŵoƌe sophistiĐated ͚ŶoŶliŶeaƌ tƌaŶsfeƌ fuŶĐtioŶs͛ aƌe used iŶ 
computational models to represent the functioning of neurons and it is these that are adjusted in the 
training phase of an artificial network. 
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state of affairs regularly causes harm to the system, the system will associate that 
condition with harm without having to know before hand that the condition is 
haƌŵful.͟ (Cilliers, 1998, p. 93) 
Here Cilliers describes how Hebbian learning occurs in a neural network and how feedback 
alloǁs a sǇsteŵ to deǀelop ͚ŵeaŶiŶg͛ suĐh as haƌŵ, ǁithout that ďeiŶg pƌedeteƌŵiŶed.  Theƌe 
aƌe tǁo fuƌtheƌ poiŶts of iŶteƌest heƌe: fiƌstlǇ, Cillieƌs͛ use of iŶǀeƌted Đoŵŵas iŶ desĐƌiďiŶg 
representation indicates his argument around distributed representation (see last subsection).  
Secondly, the use of the word clusters to describe information is not developed by Cilliers, but 
we will relate it to patterns in the material world in Chapter 5.  
If we are to adopt such a model for human learning however, as Cilliers does, we need to first 
of all ƋuestioŶ hoǁ ǁell Heďď͛s laǁ is suppoƌted ďǇ ĐoŶteŵpoƌaƌǇ ŶeuƌosĐieŶĐe.  Whilst Heďď 
;ϭϵϰϵͿ postulated that ͚sǇŶaptiĐ kŶoďs͛ joiŶiŶg the tǁo ŶeuƌoŶs deǀeloped oƌ got laƌgeƌ iŶ 
association with this increased association, it was later shown that chemical neurotransmitters 
aƌe ƌespoŶsiďle foƌ tƌaŶsfeƌƌiŶg sigŶals ďetǁeeŶ ŶeuƌoŶs.  This does Ŷot ĐoŶtƌadiĐt Heďď͛s laǁ, 
but the association of synapses must be related to increased production of neurotransmitter 
by the pre-synaptic neuron or increased sensitivity by the post-synaptic neuron.  Antonov et al. 
(2003) have shown that in Aplysia (a marine gastropod), synaptic association may be described 
as Hebbian.  Sylwester (1995) suggests that Heďď͛s laǁ ĐaŶ ďe assoĐiated ǁith the 
development of dendrites41 on the post-synaptic neuron, which allow a greater amount of 
neurotransmitter to be detected and cause the neuron to fire more readily.   
Gazzaniga, Ivry & Mangun (2002) report studies in rabbits that support such mechanisms and 
in mice it has been possible to chemically block the increase in strength of such neural 
pathways, termed as long-term potentiation (LTP), leading to the mice not being able to form 
new spatial memories.  However, they caution that further studies (e.g. Sauceier & Cain, 1995) 
have found that these chemicals did not prevent mice that had been pre-trained to swim to a 
platform from adapting this strategy to swimming to a platform in a maze.  The implication is 
that the post-synaptic receptors were important in devising strategies but not in creating new 
maps using those strategies. 
Further research suggests that it is not just individual neurons, but groups of neurons which 
adapt.  Freeman (1994b) argues that when a rabbit learns to respond to stimulus, there is 
                                                          
41 more accurately N-mthyl-D-aspartate (NMDA) receptors. 
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irreversible change in only some synapses42, which leads to a heightened sensitivity of groups 
of neurons.  Edelman (1993) supports this in arguing that learning is associated with the 
modification of populations of neurons:   
͞“ǇŶaptiĐ ĐhaŶges do Ŷot ƌepƌeseŶt iŶfoƌŵatioŶ that is stoƌed iŶ iŶdiǀidual ĐoŶŶeĐtioŶs 
between single neurons, as in connectionist models.  Instead, signals act, often 
heterosynaptically, to select variant populations of synapses that connect cells within and 
ďetǁeeŶ Ŷeuƌal gƌoups͟ (Edelman, 1993, p. 117) 
EdelŵaŶ is aƌguiŶg that iŶ ĐoŶŶeĐtioŶist ŵodels, suĐh as Cillieƌs͛, theƌe aƌe huŶdƌeds of 
neurons which adapt individually.  However in the human brain there are billions of neurons 
and selection is at the group level.  Whilst this challenges the reliance of artificial neural 
network models on Heďď͛s laǁ, it does Ŷot undermine an account of brains as adaptive to 
experience. 
Even study of artificial neural networks has suggested that Heďď͛s laǁ aloŶe ĐaŶŶot aĐĐount 
for learning: there must also be a mechanism for neural pathways becoming weaker if they are 
iŶaĐtiǀe.  This alloǁs the sǇsteŵ to ͚foƌget͛ aŶd pƌoǀides the ŶeĐessaƌǇ plastiĐitǇ to adapt to 
Ŷeǁ situatioŶs.  Heďď͛s laǁ has ďeeŶ ŵodified ǁithiŶ ǁhat is kŶoǁŶ as BCM theoƌǇ to include 
such mathematical functions (Bienenstock, Cooper & Munro, 1982).  Such models of neural 
deǀelopŵeŶt ƌeŵaiŶ at the foƌefƌoŶt of ŶeuƌosĐieŶĐe aŶd as suĐh Cillieƌs͛ ĐoŶŶeĐtioŶist ŵodel 
of learning, which he applies to human brains, is tentatively supported by contemporary 
neuroscience. 
Despite being a tenet of neuroscience siŶĐe the ϭϵϱϬs, Heďď͛s Laǁ still has Ŷot aĐĐuŵulated a 
large amount of scientific evidence to support it.  This is likely due to the experimental 
difficulties of seeing neural development within a living creature (Freeman, 1994a).  Whilst 
aƌtifiĐial Ŷeuƌal Ŷetǁoƌks, ďased oŶ Heďď͛s laǁ, aƌe uŶdouďtedlǇ ŵuĐh siŵpleƌ thaŶ huŵaŶ 
brains, there is evidence from experimental work that the brain adapts to stimuli in a 
sophisticated way.  
4.1.3 The Brain as a Complex Adaptive System 
It is clear that human brains do not behave in the same way as the simple neural networks that 
Cilliers builds his arguments upon.  So is it reasonable to consider the brain as a complex 
adaptive system?  The European Union have recently launched a huge project, costing 1.2 
                                                          
42 Those between the excitatory neurons but not between input and excitatory neurons. 
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billion euros, into the workings of the human brain43 and there is still considerable work to be 
done in developing models of how the human brain learns.  As such, this thesis does not 
attempt to develop a comprehensive model for brain function.  Instead, we are here 
concerned with demonstrating that it is plausible to model the brain as a self-organising, 
complex system and that this is able to account for learning within a materialist frame.   
It is apparent that artificial neural networks, mathematical models and experimental works 
with animals are being brought together in understanding learning as the self-organisation of 
brains as complex systems.  Syntheses of works in these different areas, such as those by Arbib 
(1995) and Reimann & Spada (1995) show that although there is much to be learnt from each 
field, there is as of yet no convergent understanding of how brain function is related to 
learning.  This is not surprising if we consider the complexity of the brain and of human 
consciousness, as well as our appreciation of the inability to reduce complex systems.  In order 
to suppoƌt Cillieƌs͛ ĐoŶteŶtioŶ that ouƌ ďƌaiŶs adapt to eǆpeƌieŶĐe theƌefoƌe, ǁe ǁill ďegiŶ ďǇ 
ĐoŶsideƌiŶg FƌeeŵaŶ͛s ŵodel of the brain as a complex adaptive system.  This supports much 
of Cillieƌs͛ aƌguŵeŶt ǁith ƌelatioŶ to adaptatioŶ fƌoŵ eǆpeƌieŶĐe, ďut ǁill also alloǁ us to 
answer some of the critiques levelled at neural network models.  
Freeman (1999) provides an account for the general audience of how the brain is constantly 
fiƌiŶg, aĐĐoƌdiŶg to ͚ĐhaotiĐ͛44 electrical signals: 
͞Chaos geŶeƌates the disoƌdeƌ Ŷeeded foƌ ĐƌeatiŶg Ŷeǁ tƌials iŶ tƌial-and-error 
learning...Its high-frequency oscillations maximize the likelihood of firing coincidences, 
ǁhiĐh aƌe ƌeƋuiƌed duƌiŶg the pƌoĐess of HeďďiaŶ leaƌŶiŶg͟ (Freeman, 1999, p. 90) 
This firing is supported by some experimental evidence: Aihara (1995) found that giant squid 
axons displayed chaotic oscillation of membrane potentials suggesting that chaos plays a role 
in transferring impulses within neurons.  Glass (1995) notes that the evidence for continual 
chaotic firing at the synaptic level is far from conclusive.  Nevertheless, Freeman suggests that: 
͞ChaotiĐ dǇŶaŵiĐs ŵaǇ plaǇ a ĐƌitiĐal ƌole iŶ the HeďďiaŶ leaƌŶiŶg pƌoĐess, paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ 
in the construction of a new wing [new electrical pattern] that differs from any that 
haǀe Đoŵe ďefoƌe.͟ (Freeman & Barrie, 1994, p. 30) 
                                                          
43 See www.humanbrainproject.eu  
44  FƌeeŵaŶ uses the teƌŵ ͚ĐhaotiĐ dǇŶaŵiĐs͛ to talk aďout attƌaĐtoƌs aŶd ďifuƌĐatioŶs (Freeman & 
Barrie, 1994) within electrical signals within the brain and as such this is commensurate with our use of 
the teƌŵ  ͚Đoŵpleǆ͛ ǁithiŶ this thesis. 
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In experimental work with rabbits (Skarda & Freeman, 1987; Freeman & Barrie, 2000) and 
monkeys (Freeman & van Dijk, 1987), the electrical activity across a region of the brain (what 
FƌeeŵaŶ Đalls a ͞ďƌaiŶ ǁaǀe͟Ϳ is ƌeĐoƌded ďǇ eleĐtƌoeŶĐephalogƌaphiĐ ;EEGͿ aŶd ŵodels aƌe 
used to recreate such waves (Freeman, 1987).  By investigating the differences in these waves 
during the performing of tasks that the animals are trained for, versus in a rest state, Freeman 
models the brain as a self-organising system: electrical signals within the brain adapting in a 
complex way, with new EEG patterns emerging over time, indicating learning. 
However, Freeman does not see learning as a simple response to stimuli: intentional behaviour 
plays a key role. Considering how the adaptation of electrical patterns is based upon their 
eǆistiŶg foƌŵ, FƌeeŵaŶ giǀes a detailed aĐĐouŶt of hoǁ ͞IŶtelligeŶt ďehaǀiouƌ is ĐhaƌaĐteƌized 
ďǇ fleǆiďle aŶd Đƌeatiǀe puƌsuit of eŶdogeŶeouslǇ defiŶed goals͟ (Freeman, 2000, p.1).  These 
goals are emergent from the limbic system, which evolved in reptiles before forming a basis of 
the mammalian brain.  Freeman describes how this part of the brain forms feedback loops 
which involve motor systems but also the priming of sensory systems to expect stimuli.  Thus, 
Freeman explains, mammals continuously search for information in their environment by 
actions such as moving their gaze, and the limbic system continually generates neural activity 
ǁhiĐh alloǁs theŵ to ƌespoŶd to the suďseƋueŶt stiŵuli.  The geŶeƌatioŶ of ͚ƌeadiŶess͛ iŶ 
neural activity is known as reafference and Freeman describes how: 
͞EǀeƌǇthiŶg that a huŵaŶ oƌ aŶ aŶiŵal kŶoǁs Đoŵes fƌoŵ this iteƌatiǀe pƌoĐess of 
action, reafference, perception, and up-date.  It is done by successive frames that 
involve repeated state transitions and self-organized constructs in the sensory and 
liŵďiĐ ĐoƌtiĐes.͟ (Freeman, 2000, p. 4) 
FƌeeŵaŶ Đlaiŵs that suĐh a ŵodel of leaƌŶiŶg ͞ĐoƌƌespoŶds to Piaget͛s ĐǇĐle of ͞aĐtioŶ, 
assiŵilatioŶ, aŶd adaptatioŶ͟ iŶ the seŶsoƌiŵotoƌ stage of Đhildhood deǀelopŵeŶt.͟ (Freeman, 
2000, p. 4).  Without exploring this link in detail, it serves to both relate such a neural model 
with existing learning theory but also highlight the limitation of such a model in relation to the 
lateƌ stages of Piaget͛s (1929) developmental theory, in which symbolic though and abstract 
representation become important.  These cannot be explained by the limbic system alone.  
However, this ďƌiŶgs iŶto ƋuestioŶ Piaget͛s theoƌǇ as ŵuĐh as it does FƌeeŵaŶ͛s geŶeƌalisatioŶ 
of limbic intentionality (as we shall see in Section 7.2). 
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Von der Malsberg (1995) develops a similar model of learning in the brain to Freeman45.  He 
describes how fluctuations in electrical signals within the brain might propagate through 
neural networks and cause the weight of connections between neurons to increase.  Through 
the feedback process of signals increasing as connection strength increases, the neural 
network is able to self-organise with high sensitivity to signals from sensory neurons.   
Rather than focus on goal-orientated behaviour as Freeman does though, von der Malsberg 
discusses how there is genetic control of the interaction rules to favour useful connection 
patteƌŶs aŶd that theƌe is ĐoŶtƌol ďǇ ͞ĐeŶtƌal ďƌaiŶ stƌuĐtuƌes͟ iŶ oƌdeƌ to eǀaluate this 
usefulŶess.  If a paƌtiĐulaƌ Ŷeuƌal patteƌŶ is ĐoŶsideƌed useful theŶ a ͞gatiŶg sigŶal͟ is seŶt out 
to all of the brain to authorise synaptic plasticity and in this way the brain selects the useful 
patterns from the multitude of emergent patterns that are stimulated continuously.  Von der 
Malsďeƌg͛s ŵodel highlights ͞seleĐtiǀe plastiĐitǇ͟ ǁithiŶ the ďƌaiŶ: the eǆistiŶg stƌuĐtuƌe of the 
brain has a role to play in determining the learning that takes place by controlling the neural 
populations which adapt.  There are a number of ways at looking at this.  Firstly by considering 
it as ǀoŶ deƌ Malsďeƌg does, as a ͞ĐeŶtƌal ďƌaiŶ͟ ĐoŶtƌolliŶg ǁhat is leaƌŶt.  Thus as a Đhild 
develops they learn how to learn, by developing the capacity to choose what is important 
information and what is not.  At a physiological level, the existing structure of the brain, having 
emerged from genetics and experience, conditions how it will continue to develop.   
Selective plasticity also allows us to go some way towards addressing a further limitation of 
neural network models.   Geake (2009) draws attention to non-Hebbian learning in which a 
single high-impact event is enough to induce learning without the need for repetition, and 
describes the evolutionary necessity of such learning as well as questioning whether it might 
be an important way to promote learning in the classroom.  Although the mechanisms are far 
from clear, selective plasticity, along with our capacity to recall and relive key events, offers a 
partial explanation of learning from key events.  Although we will not fully develop it within 
this thesis, a relation can also be proposed between selective plasticity at the physiological 
level and goal-oriented behaviour.  Our goals may result in the selective plasticity of what we 
pay attention to and learn from.  However, we must caution that in considering the limbic 
sǇsteŵ pƌiŵaƌilǇ, FƌeeŵaŶ is ŵakiŶg a leap ďetǁeeŶ the ͞pƌiŵitiǀe͟ goals of reptiles and the 
ŵoƌe sophistiĐated goals of ǁhat he Đalls ͞higheƌ ŵaŵŵals͟. 
                                                          
45 VoŶ deƌ Malsďeƌg dƌaǁs oŶ PƌigogiŶe aŶd “teŶgeƌs͛ ;ϭϵϴϰͿ geŶeƌal desĐƌiptioŶ of ĐoŵpleǆitǇ, thus he 
specifically sets out to develop a complexity model. 
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Both Freeman and von der Malsberg develop models which go beyond the simple neural 
network model that Cilliers proposes.  Brains are constantly processing signals from external 
stimuli but are also self-organising through complex dynamics of electrical signals.  There 
appears to be adaptation at the level of populations of neurons which accounts for the 
adaptation of the brain to the world around.  At a physiological level therefore, this provides a 
model of learning as complex adaptation to the environment, but mediated through existing 
neural structure at the time of that stimuli.  This existing structure allows selective plasticity 
and may be related to goal-orientated behaviour.   
We are thus developing an account of the brain as adaptive to the experiences a person has, 
but with their unique histories playing a role in how that adaptation takes place.  This is 
allowing us to progress in developing an account of learning as a complex, yet material 
process. 
4.1.4 Similar Brains, Different Learning   
Whilst neuroscience supports a model of learning as the sophisticated adaptation to 
eǆpeƌieŶĐe, this ďegs the ƋuestioŶ as to ǁhǇ ǁe doŶ͛t all haǀe eŶtiƌelǇ diffeƌeŶt ƌespoŶses to 
the world.  Chapter 5 is devoted to considering how we have shared understandings through 
interaction with other people and the material world.  In relation to brain function however, 
we will here consider the role of genetics in determining similarities in our brain structure, and 
the role this plays in learning.   
Our brains do not begin as entirely undifferentiated neural networks which then learn.  The 
majority of contemporary neuroscience does not deal with individual neurons, or even neural 
systems, but instead focuses on specific areas or modules within the brain.  What can be 
drawn from this focus on brain areas is that if the same brain areas correspond to certain 
behaviours in different humans (Hawrylycz, et al., 2012), then the structure of the brain must 
be determined by biological processes emanating from our genetics; the brain cannot be 
considered as a system that is fully plastic with respect to stimuli.   
Cilliers (1998) recognises this and draws on Edelman (1987) and Changeaux (1984) in 
describing how the brain must have a first repertoire of structural organisation and a second 
repertoire of adaptation through experience.  However this provides little by the way of 
explaining the processes involved.  The interaction of genetics and experience as well as 
determining the level of plasticity in the brain presents significant experimental issues and 
conclusions are a long way off yet.  Despite this, over the last couple of decades there have 
been tremendous advances in the ability to investigate the brain in action and a corresponding 
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increase in models of this brain function which allow us to make tentative steps into further 
evaluating our neural model.   In what are known as large-scale brain network models, specific 
areas of the brain are treated as nodes and their interaction investigated (Bressler & Menon, 
2010; Bullmore & Sporns, 2009).  What constitutes a node can be defined in a number of 
different ways according to a range of properties of the brain (e.g. nodes as areas with a 
specific biochemical makeup or neuron density) and this yields a range of different models.  By 
greatly simplifying the internal processes of the nodes, the interactions between the nodes can 
be modelled in a similar way to the computational neural networks presented above.  Whilst 
cautioning that the isolation of specific neural networks in this way is still an inaccurate 
representation of brain function Bressler & Menon argue that: 
͞A Ŷeǁ paƌadigŵ is eŵeƌgiŶg iŶ ĐogŶitiǀe ŶeuƌosĐieŶĐe that ŵoǀes ďeǇoŶd the 
simplistic mapping of cognitive constructs onto individual brain areas and emphasizes 
instead the conjoint function of brain areas working together as large-sĐale Ŷetǁoƌks.͟ 
(Bressler & Menon, 2010, p. 277) 
There has already been promising work in identifying core functional brain networks (dealing 
with spatial attention, language, explicit memory, face-object recognition and working 
memory) and in relating these to disease and dementia.  The electrical activity of brains across 
the whole organ develops through genetic evolution over long timescales but in the short term 
develops through self-organisation in response to stimuli and feedback loops which determine 
action.   
The links between differences in micro-structure of brains and their activity is also gaining 
support (Pernice, et al., 2013).  Of relevance to this thesis is that despite people having 
common neural structures at the macroscopic level, connections both within and between 
populations of networks within these structures allow for adaptation: for learning.  This means 
the way we perceive the world and respond to certain stimuli will be conditioned by our 
evolutionary past.  However, whilst having shared biology necessarily conditions our learning it 
still allows for infinite adaptation to experience.  Contemporary neuroscience supports 
Freeman͛s model of adaptations across microscopic, mesoscopic and macroscopic levels of the 
brain, which differ in temporal and spatial scales.  We thus arrive at a model of brain function 
that echoes the notion of distributed representation: 
͞MesosĐopiĐ ďƌaiŶ states aƌe Ŷot ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶs of stiŵuli, Ŷoƌ aƌe theǇ siŵple 
effects caused by stimuli.  Each learned stimulus serves to elicit the construction of a 
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pattern that is shaped by synaptic modifications between cortical neurons from prior 
learning, which vastly outnumber the synapses formed by incoming sensory axons, 
and also by the brain stem nuclei that bathe the forebrain in neuromodulatory 
chemicals.  Each cortical activity pattern is a dynamic operator that carries the 
meanings of stimuli for the recipient animal.  It reflects the individual history, present 
context, and expectancy, corresponding to the unity and wholeness of intentionality.  
The patteƌŶs iŶ eaĐh Đoƌteǆ aƌe uŶiƋue to eaĐh aŶiŵal.͟ (Freeman, 2000, p. 3) 
“taƌtiŶg ǁith Cillieƌ͛s ŵodel of the ďƌaiŶ as a Ŷeuƌal Ŷetǁoƌk ;ϰ.ϭ.ϭͿ ǁe haǀe eǀaluated the 
support from contemporary neuroscience and developed a more sophisticated model of how 
brains adapt to experience over time.  Nevertheless this model supports the characterisation 
of understanding as distributed representations which develop as a material response to the 
world.  To summarise, contemporary neuroscience supports a model of individual learning 
with the following tenants: 
 Learning is not about simple representations of information within the brain but about 
patterns of neural activity which might be better described as distributed 
representation.  The overall structure of the brain and the regions pertaining to different functions are 
determined genetically and are common to all humans.  However, the specific patterns of neural activity which emerge from populations of 
synapses across the brain are unique to individuals.  These patterns of activity determine the actions of individuals and also prepare the 
brain to sense the impact of those actions on the environment.  In this way neural patterns are reinforced but there is also the possibility of new 
patterns emerging in what Freeman considers to be bifurcations of brain states.  This is 
learning. 
 
4.1.5 Learning as a Material Process 
In this section we have developed a model of learning as the adaptation of neural structure 
and electrical patterns within the brain, mediated by human biology.  It is worthwhile here 
expounding how this relates to the broader argument of this thesis: how such a model allows 
us to situate learning both as complex and as within a complex system.  We are now in a 
positioŶ to pƌoǀide speĐifiĐ ŵeĐhaŶisŵs foƌ Deleuze͛s Đlaiŵ that uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg eŵeƌges fƌoŵ 
experience (see Section 3.2).  What is at stake is not the role of experience in learning, which is 
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apparent.  It is the development a material process that is of importance, in allowing us to 
situate learning within and as part of a complex system such as a classroom.   
The model developed here suggests that the brain can be seen as a complex system which 
adapts iŶ ƌelatioŶ to eǆpeƌieŶĐe, ďut also thƌough ͚iŶteƌŶal͛ ŵeĐhaŶisŵs46.  However, this does 
not mean that experiences are encoded in a representational way, with neural networks or 
electrical patterns being stƌuĐtuƌed as the outside ǁoƌld is.  Cillieƌs͛ ;ϭϵϵϴͿ ŶotioŶ of 
distƌiďuted ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ aŶd FƌeeŵaŶ͛s ŵodel of eleĐtƌiĐal adaptatioŶ ĐaŶ Ŷoǁ ďe ƌelated to 
Deleuze͛s fƌaŵiŶg of eǆpeƌieŶĐe as the geŶetiĐ Đause of uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg (see 3.2.7).  Deleuze 
(2004a [ϭϵϲϴ]Ϳ deǀeloped a philosophiĐal aƌguŵeŶt foƌ hoǁ ƌepeated eǆposuƌe to ͚diffeƌeŶt͛ 
but similar events leads to the development of understanding.  Models of neural networks 
from Cilliers, Freeman and von der Malsberg show that the repeated exposure to similar 
situations leads to the adaptation of neural networks and the conditioning of responses to 
those situations.  However, the history of the situation and specifics of the context mean that 
this is not simple conditioning47.  By characterising the brain as a complex system we see that 
the minutiae of neural and electrical patterns may result in a nonlinear response to a stimulus 
such that there is significant change in brain structure, or there may be little impact at all.   
We may provisionally follow Freeman (1999) and Edelman & Tononi (2000) in claiming that 
consciousness is emergent from brains, whilst recalling that this is not the same as 
consciousness being reducible to neural structure (see 3.1.2).  Deleuze sees concepts as 
eŵeƌgeŶt fƌoŵ eǆpeƌieŶĐe, as ǁell as fƌoŵ the eǆistiŶg ͞iŵage of thought͟.  IŶ the ŵodels we 
have considered across this section, understandings can be related to the structure of neurons 
and electrical signals iŶ aŶ iŶdiǀidual͛s ďƌaiŶ at aŶǇ poiŶt.  Whilst ǁe ǁill do ŵoƌe to aĐĐouŶt 
for shared understandings in Chapter 5, we have already provided a material account of 
concepts in terms of brains48.  Learning is a material process by which our brains adapt to the 
rest of the world, but according to their existing structure. 
BǇ pƌoǀidiŶg a ŵateƌial ďasis foƌ Deleuze͛s ŵetaphǇsiĐs ǁe aƌe aďle to joiŶ post-structuralist 
thinkers in rejecting any fixed relationship between the world and our understandings, but 
without rejecting there being a relationship at all.  Our understandings are emergent from the 
history of our brains and the specifics of the contexts they experience.  In this section 
                                                          
46 Processes of reflection and consolidation, as well as forgetting are all processes which we might 
tentatively link to brain function, but which do not depend directly on stimuli at a particular moment.  
47 As behaviourist theorists may see it (e.g. Skinner, 1948) 
48 In subsection 7.2.3 we will develop further the relation between concepts and neural structure as we 
engage with contemporary issues in education, specifically literature on conceptual change.   
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therefore we have provided an account of brain function which both supports the materialist 
position developed in Chapter 3, but also furthers it for providing a specific account of how 
learning is material.   
We are thus making headway with the problem this thesis sets out to tackle (defined in Section 
1.3).  By adapting Deleuze͛s ŵateƌialist positioŶ ǁe aƌe aďle to pƌoǀide a souŶd theoƌetiĐal 
basis for bringing complexity theory to bear on learning.  The difficulties faced by existing 
accounts of social complexity (see Chapter 2) stem from their failure to situate human 
understanding as part of the material world, and thus part of complex systems.  If 
understanding is conceived of as relating to another realm of ideas, or as having a special 
position in relation to the material world, then it is not possible to maintain the complex 
interactions between experience and understanding.  By providing a material basis for learning 
we are now able to account for how learners interact with the environment, and why their 
responses are themselves complex.  Brains can be seen as complex entities which interact 
within complex systems. 
However, in developing a specific model to support the materialist position posed in this thesis 
ǁe aƌe Ǉet to aĐĐouŶt foƌ tǁo suďstaŶtial aƌeas.  FiƌstlǇ, ǁe aƌe Ǉet to oǀeƌĐoŵe Deleuze͛s 
reliance upon virtual causes to account for human creativity.  The picture painted so far is of 
brains as complex systems which respond to stimuli, and that picture needs to be developed in 
order to gain a fuller appreciation of how context influences learning.  Secondly, we are yet to 
account for how we have shared understandings.  Both of these are relevant to developing a 
material account of learning within classrooms as complex systems.  In Section 4.2 we will 
consider existing models of learning in context within the complexity literature.  This will allow 
us to develop an account of learning within classrooms in Chapter 5. 
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4.2 Behaviour as Complex 
4.2.1 Coordination Dynamics 
We have so far developed a materialist model of learning as the adaptation of brains.  
Considering how such learning takes place within context will allow us to further this thesis in a 
number of ways.  Firstly, it will allow us to consider learning within classrooms which will be 
developed in Chapter 5, by providing an account of how specific context influences learning.  
Secondly, we will draw upon a class of models associated with coordination dynamics, which 
offer greater potential utility to teachers and researchers than models of neural adaptation.  
Converse to the approach in the last section, these models begin with observed behaviour and 
describe it as a complex system.  As such, hypotheses based on these models have the 
potential to be tested, critiqued and falsified in relation to empirical observation.  Thirdly, in 
subsection 4.1.3 we ǁill ďe iŶ a positioŶ to oǀeƌĐoŵe Deleuze͛s ƌeliaŶĐe upoŶ the aďstƌaĐt 
notion of virtual causes (see 3.2.5) and instead provide a more concrete account of human 
agency within classrooms.  
As a leading proponent of the coordination dynamics approach, Kelso describes how there are 
observable patterns across human behaviour49: 
͞MuĐh eǀideŶĐe suggests that the dǇŶaŵiĐ laǁs of Ŷeuƌoďehaǀiouƌal ĐooƌdiŶatioŶ aƌe 
sui generis: they deal with collective properties that are repeatable from one system to 
another and emerge from microscopic dynamics but may not (even in principle) be 
deducible from them.  Nevertheless, it is useful to try and understand the relationship 
ďetǁeeŶ diffeƌeŶt leǀels ǁhile at the saŵe tiŵe ƌespeĐtiŶg the autoŶoŵǇ of eaĐh.͟ 
(Kelso, et al., 2013, p. 120) 
Theƌe is thus a teŶsioŶ iŶ Kelso͛s ǁoƌk iŶ that he is lookiŶg foƌ dǇŶaŵiĐal patteƌŶs ǁhiĐh aƌe 
common across different scales within the brain, behaviour, and even in the coordination of 
two or more individuals.  However Kelso is clear that our neural networks and behaviour are 
individual: 
͞A geŶeƌal theoƌǇ, theŶ, is Ŷot ;oƌ Ŷot oŶlǇͿ aďout the ĐoŶteŶts of ŵiŶd aŶd eŵotioŶs 
and their neural correlates, which are unique to each of us.  Rather it is about the 
dynamical processes of forming, breaking, uniting, dissolving, and harmonizing 
                                                          
49 Stacey (2003a) thus uses Kelso͛s ;ϭϵϵϱͿ ǁoƌk to suppoƌt his theoƌǇ of Đoŵpleǆ ƌespoŶsiǀe pƌoĐesses.  
However, the quote here shows that Kelso does not equate brain and behaviour as Stacey does, he 
merely claims there are common patterns of dynamics. 
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patteƌŶs of aĐtiǀitǇ that oĐĐuƌs at all leǀels, aŶd aƌe ĐoŵŵoŶ to all of us.͟ (Kelso, et al., 
2013, p. 129) 
Kelso͛s ĐoŶteŶtioŶ theƌefoƌe is that ǁhilst we are each unique, there are physiological 
mechanisms for how we learn which can be seen in our behaviour and which correlate to 
dynamic patterns in the brain (but are not represented by them).  In essence, the approach to 
investigating these mechanisms is to find some characteristic of behaviour which may be 
described by a mathematical parameter.  For example, the rhythmic tapping of a finger might 
be related to the motion of a virtual finger on a computer screen and the relative dynamics of 
each described by equations which model their coordination.  The frequencies at which the 
virtual and actual fingers go in and out of phase can then be investigated and this reveals 
phase transitions50 and attractors within the dynamic equations. 
In more sophisticated experiments, participants used customised joysticks and pressed 
buttons with their index fingers at increasing frequency, determined by a metronome (Kelso, 
1984).  It was found that above a certain critical frequency, participants are only able to press 
the buttons in phase (together) rather than out of phase (alternating fingers).  However, it has 
been shown more recently that practice allows participants to increase the frequency at which 
they resort to pressing the buttons together, as they learn to maintain an out of phase pattern 
(Temprado, et al., 2002).  This learning persists after seven days and thus such coordination 
becomes embedded in the nervous system in some way.  This clearly shows that coordination 
is learnt through experience and we may take it as a first step in considering learning within 
context. 
Such experiments show that human coordination can be described using nonlinear equations 
and that there are emergent phase transitions in coordinating movement in relation to stimuli.  
Hoǁeǀeƌ, suĐh ŵatheŵatiĐal desĐƌiptioŶs aƌe Ŷot liŵited to phǇsiĐal ŵoǀeŵeŶt.  ͚PeƌĐeptioŶ 
dǇŶaŵiĐs͛ is a field of iŶteƌest ǁithiŶ laŶguage leaƌŶiŶg.  Foƌ eǆaŵple, ǁheŶ a ƌaŶge of souŶds 
ǁeƌe plaǇed fƌoŵ a ƌaŶge ďetǁeeŶ the ǁoƌd ͚staǇ͛ aŶd the ǁoƌd ͚saǇ͛ iŶ a ƌaŶdoŵ oƌdeƌ aŶd 
participants had to decide which word was being played, it was found that there is a phase 
transition between the perception of these words (Case, et al., 1995).  However, by changing 
the order in which the synthesised words were played, Case et al. found that people tended to 
stick to the word they had previously reported in ambiguous cases, a phenomenon known as 
hysteresis.  More recent studies have built on this showing similar phase transitions (and 
                                                          
50 A phase transition is a qualitative change.  See Glossary. 
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hǇsteƌesisͿ iŶ peƌĐeiǀiŶg the diffeƌeŶĐe ďetǁeeŶ ͚ďag͛ aŶd ͚ďaĐk͛ (Dahan, et al., 2008) and in 
the peƌĐeptioŶ of ͚p͛ aŶd ͚ď͛ phoŶeŵes (Spivey, et al., 2009). 
So coordination dynamics describes how patterns of behaviour will depend upon the history of 
the learners within the context they find themselves.  The importance of context is further 
supported by the research of Thelen & Smith (1994), who model the development of young 
children as a dynamical system.  They reason that: 
͞Thought is eŵďodied, that is, the stƌuĐtuƌes used to put togetheƌ ouƌ ĐoŶĐeptual 
systems grow out of bodily experience and make seŶse iŶ teƌŵs of it; ŵoƌeoǀeƌ, the 
Đoƌe of ouƌ ĐoŶĐeptual sǇsteŵs is diƌeĐtlǇ gƌouŶded iŶ peƌĐeptioŶ, ďodǇ ŵoǀeŵeŶt, 
aŶd eǆpeƌieŶĐe of a phǇsiĐal aŶd soĐial ĐhaƌaĐteƌ.͟ (Thelen & Smith, 1994, p. 141) 
By saying that ͞thought is eŵďodied͟, TheleŶ & “ŵith aƌe suppoƌted ďǇ ĐoŶteŵpoƌaƌǇ 
ŶeuƌosĐieŶĐe ǁhiĐh postulates that ouƌ ďƌaiŶ fuŶĐtioŶs aƌe ͚ŵulti-ŵodal͛, that is, the saŵe 
systems are deployed for multiple purposes.  Gallesse & Lakoff (2005) argue that the same 
neural systems are used for action as they are for imagined action.  Thus the way we consider 
the ǁoƌld is ĐoŶditioŶed ďǇ ͞siŵulatioŶ͟ of aĐtioŶs51.   
Drawing on such considerations, Thelen and her colleagues moved away from modelling 
development as symbolic reasoning and instead considered intelligence as being both made 
and realised through physical actions in the world (Smith, 2006).  In this way, Thelen & Smith 
have investigated learning to crawl, walking and solving problems through observing the 
dynamics of limbs and eye movements (Thelen & Smith, 1994; Smith & Thelen, 2003; Beer, 
2000).  Thus, a developmental milestone such as crawling is seen as a self-organising solution 
to the problem of locomotion, before children have the strength and balance to walk.  By 
investigating the patterns of limb movement as a child learns to crawl or stand up, and relating 
it to environmental influences such as the position of a toy or parent, this approach models the 
emergence of behaviour.  Such studies draw on not only an appreciation of complex dynamics, 
but also a body of research into the mechanics of locomotion in animals such as horses (Hoyt 
& Taylor, 1981) and cockroaches (Full & Tu, 1991) which relates the configuration of limbs, 
body mass, forces and energy use to understand how animals change their mode of 
locomotion at different speeds.  Although not explicitly related to dynamical equations, such 
research shows that the emergence of different solutions to the problem of movement can be 
seen as embodied in the physical characteristics of the animal. 
                                                          
51 See 7.2.3 for further discussion. 
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To fuƌtheƌ uŶdeƌstaŶd this appƌoaĐh ǁheŶ applied to leaƌŶiŶg, ĐoŶsideƌ “ŵith & TheleŶ͛s 
(2003) investigation of an observation by Piaget (1963) that children between 8 and 10 months 
are not able to find a toy hidden in a new location, whereas by 12 months they are: the so 
Đalled ͞A-not-B eƌƌoƌ͟.  Afteƌ ďeiŶg shoǁŶ a toǇ ďeiŶg plaĐed uŶdeƌ Đup A seǀeƌal times, the 
toy is then placed under cup B.  Younger children still reach for cup A, even after having seen it 
go under cup B.  Piaget postulated that this is because children below a critical age do not 
understand that objects can exist independently of their own actions.  However, Smith & 
Thelen show that the outcomes of this task cannot be explained by cognitive development 
alone.  They altered the time delay between hiding the toy and moving the cups forward, the 
ease of reaching each cup (using masses attached to each arm), the position that the child was 
in during the trial, and also whether the child was distracted, by indicating another nearby 
object between trials.  They found that experimenters were able to produce the error in a 
range of different age children and indeed adults, but furthermore that an individual subject 
could be made to make the error or not according to the dynamics of particular factors in each 
trial. 
The model developed by Smith & Thelen (2003) to explain the A-not-B eƌƌoƌ uses a ͞dǇŶaŵiĐ 
field͟ to ƌepƌeseŶt a paƌaŵeteƌ that theǇ Đalled ͞aĐtiǀatioŶ͟.  This is aŶ appƌoaĐh ĐoŵŵoŶ iŶ 
physics which produces a multi-dimensional representation in which a range of influences are 
plotted against a dynamic parameter.  In this case, activation is a result of the spatial 
properties of each trial, the times over which influences appear and functions representing 
memory of hiding the toy under cup A, as well as memory of a visual cue to cup B.  Smith & 
Thelen (2003, p. 345) note that although iŶspiƌed ďǇ a Ŷeuƌal ŵodel, this field appƌoaĐh ͞is 
aďstƌaĐt aŶd Ŷot aŶatoŵiĐallǇ speĐifiĐ.͟  Heƌe ǁe see the use of a ĐƌitiĐal paƌaŵeteƌ to eǆplaiŶ 
behaviour without a specific claim about its meaning; in this case, the parameter shows that a 
number of influences interact dynamically as a child reaches for a particular cup.  There is no 
need to speculate about a single cause for this development or a separation of cognitive 
processing and action, instead the action can be seen as emergent from the dynamics of the 
situation at hand.  This is important for consideration of learning within classrooms, as it 
highlights the sensitivity that a learner has to specific context. 
Smith & Thelen explain how a dynamical systems approach allows us to transcend the tension 
between individual development and the global nature of development in which nearly all 
children eventually learn to solve problems such as the A-not-B error, learn to walk, speak 
their native language and form relationships.  They note that shared biological heritage and 
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similarities in environments allow for common development but nevertheless the socio-
economic background or even being a sibling is not enough to determine outright 
development: there is considerable indeterminacy. Dynamical approaches thus provide a way 
of linking different timescales:  
 ͞The ĐoheƌeŶĐe of tiŵe aŶd leǀels of the Đoŵpleǆ sǇsteŵ ŵeaŶ that dǇŶaŵiĐs of oŶe 
time-scale (e.g. neural activity) must be continuous with and nested within the 
dynamics of all other timescales (e.g. gƌoǁth, leaƌŶiŶg, aŶd deǀelopŵeŶtͿ.͟ (Smith & 
Thelen, 2003, p. 344) 
As such, learning can be characterised not as the progression of common stages of 
development, as Piaget (1929) suggested, or as the processing of information in increasingly 
sophisticated representations (Bruner, 1966; 1978), but as the self-organisation of behaviour 
in response to the environment and biology.   
Here though it could be contended that coordination dynamics deals with only developments 
which are determined by our biology, rather than by learning in social settings.  We need a 
more sophisticated model to account for symbolic and social learning (see Chapter 5).  
Nevertheless, these studies provide us with evidence that it is not just our biology which 
determines when we learn: it is also the precise interaction of influences within the 
environment.  As Beer suggests, this places cognition in a new light: 
͞Although a dǇŶaŵiĐal appƌoaĐh ĐaŶ ĐeƌtaiŶlǇ staŶd aloŶe, it is ŵost poǁeƌful aŶd 
distinctive when coupled with a situated, embodied perspective on cognition.  From 
this perspective, the principle aim of a situated agent is to take action appropriate to 
its circumstances and goals, and cognition is merely one resource amongst many in 
service of this objective.  Other important resources include the physical properties of 
aŶ ageŶt͛s ďodǇ, the stƌuĐtuƌe of its iŵŵediate eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt ;iŶĐludiŶg aƌtefaĐts suĐh 
as shopping lists, calendars, computers, etc.) and its social context.  In this sense, 
cognition can extend beyond an agent͛s ďƌaiŶ to ďe distƌiďuted oǀeƌ a sǇsteŵ of 
people aŶd oďjeĐts ǁithiŶ aŶ eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt.͟ (Beer, 2000, p. 97) 
Neural network models of the brain propose that learning is the adaptation of neurons and 
electrical patterns.  Coordination dynamics shows the role of the environment in developing 
new patterns of behaviour.  Both provide models of learning as a process taking place within 
complex systems.  We will now consider how these might be linked to form a more coherent 
picture of learning. 
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4.2.2 Linking Brain and Behaviour 
Within the literature there is a clear implication that artificial connectionist models, dynamical 
models of behaviour and neuroscientific research are scratching at the same problem from 
different angles: how do brain and behaviour develop?  As Beer comments above however, 
what would be most powerful is a model that links together brain and behaviour.   
In aiming for such a link, Beer (2000) describes a robot that uses a simple neural network and 
seven rays of light to sense and respond to shape.  The robot learns to move along a horizontal 
track in order to catch circular objects that fall from above, but not catch diamond shaped 
objects.  As such, theƌe is iŶteƌplaǇ of phǇsiĐal ͚liŵďs͛, Ŷeuƌal Ŷetǁoƌks aŶd the eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt.  
Beer cautions that connectionist models and brain function need to be very carefully related to 
such dynamical systems.  Nevertheless, the hope is that: 
͞BǇ supplǇiŶg a ĐoŵŵoŶ language for cognition, for the neurophysiological processes 
that support it, for non-cognitive behaviour, and for adaptive behaviour of simpler 
animals, a dynamical approach holds the promise of providing a unified theoretical 
framework for cognitive science, as well as an understanding of the emergence of 
ĐogŶitioŶ iŶ deǀelopŵeŶt aŶd eǀolutioŶ.͟ (Beer, 2000, p. 97) 
It is fair to say that there are still bridges to be built in order to link cognition, physiology and 
behaviour.  However, attempts are being made to bring together these fields to develop a 
coherent model of learning.  Of direct relevance to this thesis is the bridging of different 
approaches which all see learning as complex: emergent, dynamic and sensitive to context. 
The recurrence of phase transitions in different models is seen by Spivey et al. (2009) as a 
pheŶoŵeŶoŶ ǁhiĐh pƌoǀides a ďƌidgiŶg poiŶt.  TheǇ ƌelate FƌeeŵaŶ͛s ŵodels of phase 
transitions within neural EEG patterns to the bifurcation of behaviour seen within rhythmic 
movement, visual processing in optical illusions and interpretation of phonemes.  They also go 
fuƌtheƌ iŶ disĐussiŶg the dǇŶaŵiĐs of ͞iŶsight pƌoďleŵ solǀiŶg͟, aŶd giǀe the eǆaŵple of 
participants learning to predict the direction that a gear will move, when presented with a 
diagram of multiple gears.  Participants in their study initially rehearse the direction of each 
gear in sequence, as displayed by their eye and hand movements.  However, they soon realise 
that an even number of gears will result in the final gear moving in the opposite rotation to the 
drive gear and an odd number of gears will mean the opposite.  What is particularly interesting 
is that in the trials before the realisation comes, records of hand and eye movement show 
iŶĐƌeased ͞eŶtƌopǇ͟: they move more quickly around the scene, and this could be used as a 
reliable predictor of a new mode of solving the problem.   
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Spivey et al. (2009) further relate this to studies in which participants are able to predict which 
triplet of words could be linked together and which could not.  For example when presented 
with playing/credit/report and still/pages/music, the first triplet can be linked by the word 
͚Đaƌd͛, ďut the seĐoŶd tƌiplet has Ŷo liŶkiŶg ǁoƌd (Bowers, et al., 1990).  In such tasks, 
participants are able to predict the right solution, even if they are not able to solve it.  Bowden 
& Jung-Beeman (1998) use further studies to propose that there is a coarse processing of 
semantic information in the right hemisphere of the brain, which may recognise a solution 
before or even in the absence of the solution itself.  Finer processing in the left hemisphere 
provides the solution, if there is one.  Spivey et al, see the presence of phase transitions as a 
way of linking behaviour to dynamical systems.   
In this thesis, the presence of phase transitions in learning supports the argument that learning 
is emergent, rather than being related to task or context in simple way.  What is also 
noteworthy is that the cognitive processes being investigated could be classified as being 
symbolic or abstract in nature.  There seems to be a link between physical coordination of 
hand and eye movements and the adaptation of conceptual understanding.  This questions the 
separation of sensorimotor learning and abstract reasoning in existing learning (we will 
develop this argument in Chapter 7).   
Whilst the nature of the links between cognition and sensorimotor action are far from clear, 
common characteristics such as phase transitions are seen as the nucleation points around 
which multiple perspectives may be brought together in explaining learning as a complex 
system: 
͞IŶ ĐooƌdiŶatioŶ dǇŶaŵiĐs, phase tƌaŶsitioŶs aƌe eǆploited ďoth as a dǇŶaŵiĐal 
ŵeĐhaŶisŵ foƌ effeĐtiŶg ĐhaŶge ;͚sǁitĐhiŶg͛, ͚deĐisioŶ-ŵakiŶg͛Ϳ aŶd as a ŵethodologǇ 
to identify key collective variables and their dynamics. The reason is that in complex 
systems very many features can be measured but not all are relevant; coordination 
dynamics assumes that the variables that change qualitatively are the most important 
oŶes foƌ sǇsteŵ fuŶĐtioŶ ;aŶd, iŶĐideŶtallǇ, foƌ the sĐieŶtist tƌǇiŶg to uŶdeƌstaŶd itͿ.͟ 
(Kelso, et al., 2013, p. 122) 
Here we must remember that Kelso et al. recognise that each individual will have different 
brain patterns and different patterns of behaviour, but they are looking for the links between 
phase transitions at these two levels, as well as across different levels of brain analysis.  What 
is promising is the capacity of this research to link cognition, brain and behaviour, as well as 
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highlight the importance of context.  The picture being painted is one of a nest of complex 
systems which interact and coevolve.  Indeed, by adopting the materialist position developed 
in this thesis we can see this as a single system with interactions across various scales of 
heterogeneous elements. 
However, there is also reason for caution in relation to these studies.  Spivey et al. (2009) 
ŵake ƌefeƌeŶĐe to ͞uŶdeƌlǇiŶg ŵeĐhaŶisŵs͟ aŶd ǁe aƌe ƌeŵiŶded of ouƌ aĐĐouŶts iŶ “eĐtioŶ 
2.1 of how scientists default to such reductionist terminology.  Unlike, Spivey et al., Kelso and 
his collaborators are clearer about there not being an underlying mechanism to brain and 
behaviour, but rather there are multiple levels which can be linked together.  Their error 
however is to see phase transitions and  dynamic equations everywhere, describing language 
as a dynamical system ;‘ąĐzaszek-Leonardi & Kelso, 2008) aŶd also disĐussiŶg ͞the 
ĐoŵpleŵeŶtaƌǇ Ŷatuƌe͟ of ďiŶaƌǇ opposites (Engstrøm & Kelso, 2008).  Incredibly, Kelso uses 
the application of coordination dynamics across a range of scales to argue that we should shift 
our understanding of all binary opposite:   
 ͞IŶ ďoth ĐooƌdiŶatioŶ dǇŶaŵiĐs aŶd the philosophǇ of ĐoŵpleŵeŶtaƌǇ paiƌs, the 
squiggle character (~) signifies the symbolic punctuation of reconciled complementary 
pairs, as in whole~part, competition~cooperation, integration~segregation, 
time~space, and body~mind. The (~) character is neither trivial nor is it a fancy 
hyphen, but rather an indication of the complex, relational and complementary 
dǇŶaŵiĐs that eǆists ďetǁeeŶ ĐoŵpleŵeŶtaƌǇ aspeĐts͟ (Engstrøm & Kelso, 2008, p. 
123) 
They believe that the equations of coordination dynamics can shed light on why humans tend 
to consider binary opposites.  At best, this is a case of a scientist overstating the importance of 
his work and at worst it is the resurrection of Hegelian dialectics (see 2.2.6).  Engstrøm & Kelso 
offer no criteria for a binary pair, nor any description of how coordination dynamics is relevant. 
Work is still being undertaken on coordination dynamics and as results are published we must 
be cautious in evaluating the models and critiquing any assumptions about the universality of 
such dynamics.  What has already been demonstrated is that models of both brain and 
behaviour can be devised which exhibit dynamical phase transitions, resulting from 
interactions of different components.  Thus we are on safer ground if we propose that a phase 
transition in the brain may be linked to a phase transition in behaviour, although we cannot 
draw any simple conclusions about one causing the other.  We do not yet know the balance 
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between individual brain patterns and behaviour and shared biology underlying them, nor do 
we have a clear link between complexity at different levels, and this may be beyond our 
capacity. 
However, it is possible to use the links between neural network models, models of brain 
function, cognitive neuroscience and coordination of behaviour to support the argument that 
learning and interaction can be characterised as complex processes, but within a materialist 
frame.  The brain, cognition, behaviour and the environment can be seen as part of the same 
real world and indeed the same system.   
4.2.3 Agency and Virtual Causes 
In Section 4.2 we have presented models for learning being complex on a number of levels.  By 
usiŶg the teƌŵ ͚Đoŵpleǆ͛ heƌe ǁe aƌe dƌaǁiŶg atteŶtioŶ to featuƌes ǁithiŶ the dǇŶaŵiĐ 
systems models described.  Firstly, the reaction of an individual to a context will be historically 
contingent, both in terms of the neural structure of their brain, but also the hysteresis of their 
ƌeĐeŶt eǆpeƌieŶĐe.  “eĐoŶdlǇ, leaƌŶiŶg ŵaǇ ďe seeŶ as ͚ŶoŶliŶeaƌ͛ iŶ dǇŶaŵiĐ sǇsteŵs ŵodels: 
a child being able to solve the A-not-B problem or an adult being able to predict the motion of 
gears may happen suddenly, after a period of little change in their behaviour.  Thirdly, we are 
able to support the contention that specific context is important in learning52.  Whilst this may 
seem obvious, we will consider existing notions of curriculum and learning objectives in 
Chapter 7, and show that they overlook this insight.   
However, the picture that has emerged from the models presented so far is one of human 
learning as the adaptation of complex systems on a range of scales.  Recall from Section 2.3 
that Byrne & Callaghan (2014) (drawing on Bhaskar (2008 [1975]), are concerned that human 
agency is removed within conteŵpoƌaƌǇ sĐieŶtifiĐ ŵodels.  Fuƌtheƌŵoƌe, ƌeĐall that Deleuze͛s 
notion of virtual cause is partially53 concerned with the unpredictability of human recall and 
response, as exemplified by cobble stones invoking a memory of Venice (see 3.2.5).  As such 
we must consider how this thesis is characterising human agency. 
The models presented in this chapter see the response of humans as emergent from the 
specifics of context, including the positioning of the body, and the neural and electrical 
structure of the brain.  We have drawn attention also to continual processing within the brain 
of past eǀeŶts as ǁell as pƌeseŶt.  Fuƌtheƌŵoƌe, FƌeeŵaŶ͛s ;ϮϬϬϬͿ aƌguŵeŶt that thought aŶd 
                                                          
52 We might describe this as the system being open to the environment in complexity terms, or by 
seeing the context as part of the same system. 
53 As noted in 3.2.5, virtual causes also oǀeƌtuƌŶ the ƌeliaŶĐe upoŶ a ƌealŵ of ͚possiďilities͛.  
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action cannot be easily separated (see 4.1.3) has been furthered by models of thought as 
embodied.  Thus we have built a case for seeing the learning and response of humans as 
complex in the sense of being historically contingent, nonlinear, and sensitive to context.  It is 
therefore only a small step to assert that this picture is able to account for the unpredictability 
of human response.  The reason that cobble stones might inspire recall of Venice is because 
the Ŷeuƌal Ŷetǁoƌks ǁithiŶ a peƌsoŶ͛s ďƌaiŶ aƌe stƌuĐtuƌed suĐh that seeiŶg Đoďďle stoŶes ǁill 
evoke a response which was initially conditioned by experience of Venice, as well as the 
͚iŶteƌŶal͛ pƌoĐesses of the ďƌaiŶ iŶ ĐoŶsolidatiŶg this eǆpeƌieŶĐe.  “uĐh a ƌespoŶse is histoƌiĐallǇ 
contingent, nonlinear and context-specific. 
Of course, this account is a very long way from a full description of the workings of the mind.  
The point here though is that human agency and the unpredictability of human response can 
be explained by the complexity of brains and bodies within contexts.  As argued in 1.2.4, 
ǁhetheƌ Ǉou suďsĐƌiďe to ͞stƌoŶg eŵeƌgeŶĐe͟ oƌ ͞ǁeak eŵeƌgeŶĐe͟ ;Osďeƌg & Biesta, ϮϬϬϰͿ, 
complex systems are unpredictable because they cannot be reduced.  Therefore, it is not 
possible to predict what is important within the complex interactions of the brain, body and 
context.  Human agency can be accounted for as the novel response of individuals based upon 
their histories (in the fullest sense) and the specifics of context.  We do not need to distinguish 
between intensive and virtual causes to explain agency, as Deleuze does.  In Deleuze͛s teƌŵs 
agency is the affirmation of our immanent experience (see 3.2.3), within a material 
multiplicity.  We can account for the complexity of human response with intensive differences 
alone because the complexity of our brains interacting with the world allows for novel action. 
This discussion takes us perilously close to philosophical debates around free will.  However, 
we will only very tentatively situate the description of human agency developed here in 
relation to broader discussions around the mind.  Within this thesis we have rejected dualist 
positions which separate mind and matter, primarily because in a complex system it is 
impossible to delineate between interacting aspects of any system, let alone alternative 
ƌealŵs.  This eĐhoes ‘Ǉle͛s ;ϮϬϬϵ [1949], p. ϱͿ aƌguŵeŶt agaiŶst ͞the dogŵa of the Ghost iŶ 
the MaĐhiŶe͟ iŶ ƌelatioŶ to dualist aĐĐouŶts of ŵiŶd ;paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ DesĐaƌte͛sͿ.  He too ƌejeĐts 
the separation of mental and physical states.  At the other extreme of the debate is the belief 
that consciousness can be reduced to physical matter, so-Đalled ͞phǇsiĐalisŵ͟ ;Pautz, ϮϬϭϬͿ.  
The position developed in this thesis is different from physicalism in a subtle but important 
way.  Whilst we are arguing for a materialist ontology in which mind should be seen as 
constituted by the material of brains, bodies and contexts, this does not mean that we can 
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reduce it to these aspects.  The insight from complexity is that a system cannot be reduced to 
its component parts and emergence cannot be fully predicted.  This means that any attempt to 
explain human agency in terms of brain structure alone will significantly miss the point.   
By accounting for the reliance upon history and the sensitivity to specific context, as well as 
internal brain processes, we recover human agency within a materialist frame.  We have also 
oǀeƌĐoŵe this aspeĐt of ǀiƌtual Đauses ǁithiŶ Deleuze͛s sǇsteŵ ďǇ pƌoǀidiŶg ŵodels ǁhiĐh 
support the unpredictability of human behaviour.  However, human behaviour is not entirely 
unpredictable.  Whilst we have considered how shared genetics mean that our brains develop 
in similar ways, this is not sufficient to account for shared understanding.  This will be the 
subject of Chapter 5. 
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4.3 Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter has provided specific models of learning which support learning being seen as 
both a material process and as complex, that is, emergent and context-specific. 
IŶ Chapteƌ ϯ ǁe deǀeloped Deleuze͛s ĐoŶteŶtioŶ that huŵaŶs leaƌŶ fƌoŵ ͞ŵultipliĐities͟: 
repeated exposure to similar events.  We also began the process of showing the advantage of 
a materialist position in not requiring mind to be seen as belonging to a different realm, or 
meaning to be constantly deferred.  However, the account of learning remained philosophical 
in character and in need of specific mechanisms, which this chapter has provided.  Drawing 
iŶitiallǇ oŶ Cillieƌs͛ ;ϭϵϵϴͿ ŵodels of aƌtifiĐial Ŷeuƌal Ŷetǁoƌks ;suďseĐtioŶ ϰ.ϭ.ϭͿ aŶd theŶ 
relating this to contemporary neuroscientific understanding (4.1.2 to 4.1.5), we developed a 
model of learning as the adaptation of neural structure and electrical patterns.  In Section 4.2 
we then related this to observable behaviours and saw that learning is best considered as 
embodied.  Coordinated action and cognition cannot be separated from processes in the brain.  
Whilst much work is still to be done to provide a comprehensive model of the interaction of 
brain, body and context in learning, we have shown that models of each of these can be 
coherently linked to support a materialist view.  Learning is the co-adaptation of brains and 
bodies within the material world. 
As well as supporting a materialist view of learning, the models presented in this chapter have 
highlighted the complexity of learning in two ways.  Firstly by further supporting the realisation 
that asserting a material basis for learning is not the same as claiming it is reducible to that 
basis.  Cilliers (1998) draws attention to the distributed nature of representation in artificial 
neural networks.  There is not a clear relation between the world and neural structure.  
FƌeeŵaŶ͛s ;ϭϵϵϵͿ ǁoƌk paiŶts a piĐtuƌe of eleĐtƌiĐal patteƌŶs as uŶiƋue to iŶdiǀiduals, Ǉet 
adapting to new experiences.  Despite shared biology therefore every human has a different 
response to the world based upon their unique histories.  That experience cannot be 
reconstructed by looking at brain structure.  
This irreducibility is partially explained by the historic contingency of brains and bodies, which 
conditions theiƌ eǆaĐt ƌespoŶse, ďut ǁe haǀe also dƌaǁŶ atteŶtioŶ to ͚seleĐtiǀe plastiĐitǇ͛ 
which means that the way they develop is further conditioned by internal processes as well as 
response to new stimuli.  As well as historic contingency, the second way in which the 
complexity of learning has been highlighted is in relation to context-specificity.  Throughout 
Section 4.2 we saw a range of models in which the exact temporal and spatial aspects of how a 
problem is presented result in different outcomes.  This is the case for coordinated movement 
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of fingers (Kelso, 1984), perception of different words from ambiguous sounds (Case, et al., 
1995), solving the A-not-B cup problem (Smith & Thelen, 2003), predicting the motion of gears 
(Spivey et al., 2009) and predicting links between words (Bowers, et al., 1990).  We thus 
provided evidence that learning is not only dependent upon the history of the learner but on 
the specific context in which they are learning; learning is emergent from the material world.  
In this chapter therefore we have both supported the argument that learning should be 
characterised as a material (but irreducible) process, but have also shown how learning is 
complex in being emergent from specific context and dependent upon the unique history of 
learners.   
The picture developed in this chapter is one of our understandings pertaining to the material 
world through a distributed representation of experience.  Thus, learning is not the discovery 
of other-worldly truths but is the encoding of experience.  Human action is therefore 
conditioned by past experience but also by the specifics of the context in which that action 
takes plaĐe.  To ďe ͚ĐoŶditioŶed͛ ďǇ the past aŶd ďǇ ĐoŶteǆt hoǁeǀeƌ does Ŷot deny the 
pƌeseŶĐe of goals oƌ ͚iŶteƌŶal͛ thought pƌoĐesses, it is siŵplǇ to saǇ that these goals aŶd 
pƌoĐesses haǀe aŶ oƌigiŶ iŶ ďoth eǀolutioŶ aŶd iŶ a peƌsoŶ͛s life histoƌǇ.  “ituatiŶg leaƌŶiŶg as a 
material process therefore does not deny agency or attempt to characterise it as mechanistic.  
In the last chapter we explained that a materialist position escapes the need for meaning to be 
constantly deferred and instead that meaning is defined in a specific moment (see 3.2.7).  
Having developed a more concrete account of learning we are now able to see that the full 
ƌiĐhŶess of a peƌsoŶ͛s life eǆpeƌieŶĐe is ďƌought to ďeaƌ oŶ a paƌtiĐulaƌ ŵoŵeŶt, iŶ a paƌtiĐulaƌ 
context.  Humans have agency within complex systems: their responses are unique and 
emergent. 
Having recovered human agency within a materialist frame therefore we beg the question as 
to why so many of our actions are actually predictable.  How is it we have shared 
understandings of the world?  How are we able to collaborate and communicate?  It is to these 
issues that we will turn in Chapter 5. 
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5 Learning within Complex Classrooms 
5.0 Chapter Introduction 
In Chapter 4 we developed an account of learning as complex: historically contingent; 
nonlinear; sensitive to context.  This was developed by takiŶg Cillieƌs͛ ;ϭϵϵϴͿ ŵodel of Ŷeuƌal 
networks and then considering neuroscientific models of learning and emergent behaviour.  
From this we learnt two things which will be important in accounting for social learning.  
Firstly, neural models support the contention that brains are conditioned by patterns of 
stimuli54.  However, we also highlighted that brains do not just adapt to stimuli but also have 
͚iŶteƌŶal͛ pƌoĐesses ǁhiĐh ŵeaŶ that theǇ aƌe ĐoŶstaŶtlǇ pƌoĐessiŶg aŶd adaptiŶg.  The seĐoŶd 
insight for considering social learning is the importance of context, both in terms of embodied 
learning and the agency of humans in specific contexts (see 4.2).  Whilst we have thus 
provided a description of learning in context, what we also require is a description of learning 
from context.   
Having already established that pupils respond to patterns of stimuli, further elucidating what 
we mean by patterns will account for how we come to have shared understandings.  The job of 
this chapter is therefore to identify the patterns in the material world which influence us, and 
to characterise these within a materialist frame.  To do so we will go through a number of 
stages.  Firstly, Section 5.1 will establish how complex materialism allows an account of 
learning which does not rely on a categorical difference between learning in the natural world 
and learning in the social world.  Drawing upon the models discussed in Chapter 4, we will see 
that the brain is able to respond to patterns and associations within heterogeneous elements 
of the classroom: images, speech, text, body language, music, equipment, etc.  These all have a 
material basis and as such we are able to respond to, reproduce and manipulate the patterns 
we see in the classroom.   
Having developed the notion of patterns we will then consider how we learn from each other 
(Section 5.2).  We are able to learn by emulating others and coordinating our actions.  In 
Chapter 4 we saw that learning is context-specific and this also holds for social interactions.  
Thus patterns of behaviour are reproduced but also evolve. 
An advantage of seeing different aspects of the world as having a material basis is in being able 
to include learning from the classroom itself in an account of social learning (Section 5.3).  This 
includes learning from objects, be they pieces of scientific equipment or a football in physical 
                                                          
54 AdoptiŶg FƌeeŵaŶ͛s ;ϮϬϬϬͿ desĐƌiptioŶ of goal-orientation we may go further and say that humans 
actively seek patterns (see 4.1.3). 
149 
 
education.  However it also includes learning from the associations made to such items, for 
example the role of equipment in scientific experimentation or the rules of a game.  
Furthermore, we are able to include learning from symbolic systems as part of the material 
nature of learning, including learning from music, texts or mathematics.  We are thus able to 
use the complex materialist position as a springboard for developing an account of how we 
learn from the behaviour of others, the associations of heterogeneous aspects of a classroom 
and the symbolic systems inherent in our culture.      
As we cautioned at the beginning of Chapter 4, this thesis contains no primary empirical 
evidence.  As such we will not develop a precise formulation of how pupils learn, again 
recalling that each case of learning is unique.  This chapter will instead bring together a range 
of secondary evidence in order to show the plausibility and advantages of seeing classrooms, 
and pupils within them, as complex systems.   
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5.1 Learning from Patterns in the Material World 
5.1.1 Learning from Patterns 
It should already be clear that we wish to situate learning within a materialist frame, with 
shared understandings coming from interaction within the material world.  This of course 
includes interaction with other people, but also the heterogeneous elements of the social 
sphere, and classrooms in particular: musical sounds, text on a page, images and audio-visual 
media, scientific equipment, etc.  Recall the earlier quote from Beer (in 4.2.1): 
͞ĐogŶitioŶ is ŵeƌelǇ oŶe ƌesouƌĐe.. Otheƌ iŵpoƌtaŶt ƌesouƌĐes iŶĐlude the phǇsiĐal 
pƌopeƌties of aŶ ageŶt͛s ďodǇ, the stƌuĐtuƌe of its iŵŵediate eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt (including 
artefacts such as shopping lists, calendars, computers, etc.) and its social context.  In 
this seŶse, ĐogŶitioŶ ĐaŶ eǆteŶd ďeǇoŶd aŶ ageŶt͛s ďƌaiŶ to ďe distƌiďuted oǀeƌ a 
sǇsteŵ of people aŶd oďjeĐts ǁithiŶ aŶ eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt.͟ (Beer, 2000, p. 97) 
Heƌe Beeƌ ƌefeƌs to ͚aƌtefaĐts͛ ǁhiĐh foƌŵ paƌt of distƌiďuted sǇsteŵs of ĐogŶitioŶ.  To ĐoŶsideƌ 
the role of such artefacts in social learning, recall from Chapter 4 that humans respond to 
objects through neural patterns which have been condition by previous experience (as well as 
genetics).  When we see an object it is the pattern of light which our brains responds to, when 
we hear, touch, smell or taste something it is the patterns of stimuli that our brains respond 
to55.  
However, there is no reason for us to focus upon objects.  Manipulating a mathematical 
equation or writing a letter is to be seen as a practice embedded in the social world.  Forms 
and structures should be considered as social artefacts: the fourteen-lines of a traditional 
sonnet, or the stages of a scientific investigation.  Within the monist, materialist frame of this 
thesis these abstract forms can be seen to have a physical basis.  We can therefore propose 
that such patterns influence the neural networks of learners: that we can learn from the 
abstract forms in the social world in the same way as we learn from objects and equipment.  
Here we are developing the notion that patterns exist across a range of scales, but our brains 
are capable of responding to these.  Again, we encountered this in an earlier quote, when we 
were first developing the neural model of learning (see 4.1.2): 
͞Clusteƌs of iŶfoƌŵatioŶ fƌoŵ the eǆteƌŶal ǁoƌld floǁ iŶto the sǇsteŵ… if a ĐeƌtaiŶ 
cluster is present regularly, the system ǁill aĐƋuiƌe staďle ǁeights that ͚ƌepƌeseŶt͛ that 
cluster, i.e. a certain pattern of activity will be caused in the system each time that 
                                                          
55 Beyond the traditional five senses our brains also respond to a range of other influences: balance, 
motion, internal temperature, chemicals in the blood etc. 
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specific cluster is present.  If two clusters are regularly present together, the system 
will automatically develop an association between the two.  For example, if a certain 
state of affairs regularly causes harm to the system, the system will associate that 
condition with harm without having to know before hand that the condition is 
haƌŵful.͟ (Cilliers, 1998, p. 93) 
Heƌe ǁe see that ͚Đlusteƌs of iŶfoƌŵatioŶ͛ take a ǀaƌietǇ of foƌŵs, ǁith Ŷeuƌal Ŷetǁoƌks ďeiŶg 
aďle to assoĐiate ͚a state of affaiƌs͛ ǁith ͚haƌŵ͛.  The laŶguage ďeiŶg used is ŶeĐessaƌilǇ loose 
as it aims to capture the variety of possible stimuli that the brain can respond to, and form 
associations between.  However, we will use the term pattern to denote objects, forms and 
clusters of information across all scales.  The brain is able to respond to such patterns.  
Furthermore, we are not here restricting analysis to spatial patterns, but also referring to 
temporal patterns: patterns of behaviour.  Artificial neural networks are capable of predicting 
motion as well as recognising images (see 4.1.1) and it is therefore reasonable to assume that 
our brains are able to recognise and respond to chains of events.  Our experiences over varying 
timescales influence our understandings of the world. 
Pupils learn from patterns within classrooms, both by watching others and by direct 
communication with other pupils, teachers, teaching assistants etc.  By adopting a materialist 
position we are able to see that learning from the material world has the same character as 
social interactions, both in terms of experiencing the world of objects but also symbolic 
laŶguages.  FiƌstlǇ, ďǇ adaptiŶg Deleuze͛s ͚flat oŶtologǇ͛ ǁe aƌe aďle to situate sǇŵďols aŶd 
forms within the social world as being within the same ontological category as objects and 
people.  Secondly, the model we developed in Chapter 4 proposes that learning is the 
recognition of patterns within the material world and the adaptation of responses to these 
patterns.  Taken together we are able to assert that learning is the adaptation of brains to 
patterns, both within the natural and social world.  We will develop these arguments 
throughout this chapter.   
5.1.2 Patterns versus Objects 
Asserting the importance of patterns begs the question as to whether we should see these 
patteƌŶs as autoŶoŵous eŶtities iŶ theŵselǀes.  ‘eĐall HaƌŵaŶ͛s oďjection to monism, 
considered briefly in subsection 3.1.1: 
͞if the uŶdeƌǁoƌld is tƌulǇ uŶfoƌŵatted, theŶ it is haƌd to see ǁhǇ it should suddeŶlǇ 
be broken into parts by a human, who really ought to be just sleekly fused into the 
unformatted plasma as everythiŶg else.͟  (Harman, 2011, p. 61) 
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HaƌŵaŶ attaĐks Deleuze͛s56 foƌŵ of ŵateƌialisŵ ǁhiĐh he Đalls ͞uŶdeƌŵiŶiŶg͟ ďeĐause ƌealitǇ 
is ĐoŶsideƌed to ďe a siŶgle suďstaŶĐe.  He also disŵisses ͞oǀeƌŵiŶiŶg͟ positioŶs ǁhiĐh Đlaim 
that there are no characteristics implicit to objects and that they can only be defined by 
relations57.   
͞OǀeƌŵiŶiŶg has ďeĐoŵe the ĐeŶtƌal dogŵa of ouƌ tiŵe: eǀeƌǇthiŶg is ƌelatioŶs, oƌ 
language, or appearance to the mind.  This dogma cannot be countered with an 
undermining theory that views the world as a partless, rumbling depth.  What is 
missing in both cases is the autonomous reality of individual objects: dogs, trees, 
flaŵes, ŵoŶuŵeŶts, soĐieties, ghosts, gods, piƌates, ĐoiŶs, aŶd ƌuďies.͟ (Harman, 
2011, p. 71) 
Deleuze͛s Đlaiŵ that the ǁoƌld is ͞heteƌogeŶeous͟ aŶd ͞ĐoŶtiŶuous͟ is paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ upsettiŶg to 
Harman, as to him this becomes another form of dualism in which neither undermining nor 
overmining can account for the world of separate entities.  The focus is simply shifted to 
another division of reality.   
͞ǁe haǀe a heterogeneous-yet-continuous plane on one side and articulated entities 
on the other.  Now as before, no room is left for form or structure within the realm of 
aƌtiĐulated aĐtual eŶtities͟ (Harman, 2011, p. 63) 
We thus need to explain the seeming dualism in claiming the world has a singular substance 
and also asserting the importance of patterns in allowing human understanding.  To develop 
this positioŶ ǁe ǁill heƌe ĐoŶtƌast it to HaƌŵaŶ͛s pƌoposal that ǁe should ĐoŶsideƌ oďjeĐts as 
primary to understanding the world.  In the next subsection, we will consider how focusing on 
patterns provides a more concrete aĐĐouŶt thaŶ Bouƌdieu͛s ŶotioŶ of ͚soĐial fields͛, ǁhiĐh 
complex realists draw upon (see 2.3.2). 
HaƌŵaŶ͛s pƌoposal is that we should consider objects as autonomous entities.  However, the 
relations between our symbolic understandings and objects in the world are not accounted for 
iŶ HaƌŵaŶ͛s sǇsteŵ.  The insight from post-structuralist thinkers is that there is tension 
between fixed identities and the dynamic and nonlinear nature of the world (see Section 2.2).  
                                                          
56 HaƌŵaŶ ;ϮϬϭϭͿ aĐtuallǇ eŶgages diƌeĐtlǇ ǁith DeLaŶda͛s iŶteƌpƌetatioŶ of Deleuze. “ee ϲ.ϭ.Ϯ. 
57 This overmining is characteristic of post-structuralist positions (see Section 2.2).  
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Take the view from semiotics58 for example: if autonomous objects (the signified) have labels 
(signifiers), but these labels are not real, then we are returned to dualism.  If these labels are 
themselves autoŶoŵous ͚oďjeĐts͛, theŶ ǁe aƌe ƌetuƌŶed to a fiǆed aŶd statiĐ ǁoƌld in which 
labels represent objects.  The tension uncovered by post-structuralists becomes a full blown 
headache when we consider the relationships between mind and matter.  Whilst perception is 
seen to relate to autonomous objects, we are not able to situate perception itself: are 
concepts to be seen as objects also?  This is much the same issue that complex realists face in 
that understanding is not adequately situated as real (see Section 2.3). 
As well as the issue in situating understanding, HaƌŵaŶ͛s aƌguŵeŶt contains an implicit notion 
of scale: that undermining prioritises the sub-atomic and overmining prioritises a system of 
relations, and neither is able to account for the world of objects.  However, his solution of 
autonomous objects suffers from the same problem of accounting for scale.  Why is a legion 
just as real as a soldier, or a cell or an atom, and which is the autonomous object?  These 
characterisations fail to see the capacity for emergence to link these scales.  Deleuze proposes 
that the world is constituted by intensive differences, and we have suggested that this is 
commensurate with contemporary views from science (e.g. string theory).  Yet emergence 
provides us with an account of how the dogs, trees and flames that Harman talks of can be 
constituted by the subatomic.  There is nothing controversial in this claim.   
An insight from complexity is that the world being constituted by the subatomic is not a 
bottom-up, reductionist account.  Entities emerge which go on to have influence on differing 
temporal and spatial scales.  What we have added to this insight is an account of how the 
ǁoƌld is ͞ďƌokeŶ iŶto paƌts ďǇ a huŵaŶ͟ (Harman, 2011, p. 61).  Harman answers his own 
question in recognising that is humans who do the breaking apart.  Cilliers (1998) uses the 
example of an artificial network learning to recognise trees, and we can assume that our brains 
at least have this capacity.  Our evolutionary history means that we learn from our experiences 
and this includes identifying objects in the world.  There is no need for claiming a priori the 
autonomy of those objects, as Harman wants to.  Dogs, trees, flames, pirates, coins and rubies 
have a material basis but are not reducible to that basis; their identity is a facet of our 
perception, yet that perception is the response of brains to experience in the real world. 
What of the societies, ghosts and gods that Harman mentions though, are these also real?  
These have a material basis in two senses: in the electrical patterns in the brains of people and 
                                                          
58 Saussure separates signifiers and the signified and Derrida saw these as within a dynamic system.  
However, Deleuze argues that relations are context specific: relations do not have autonomous 
existence (Smith, 2009).  
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in social artefacts (music, words, images, mathematical symbols etc).  In this sense ghosts are 
real without the need for them being autonomous entities: ghosts exist in the patterns of the 
social world59.  We are thus arguing that patterns of behaviour and of communication through 
symbolic languages have a material basis.  Patterns can include heterogeneous elements so 
our understanding of pirates is conditioned by cartoon pirates as much as the contemporary 
pirates in the news.  Yet we respond to, reproduce and manipulate these patterns.   
5.1.3 Patterns versus Fields 
Here we will develop the notion of patterns further through contrasting it to accounts of 
human agency.  Considering patterns in the material world allows us to see how we learn from 
heterogeneous elements of a classroom and from patterns across different scales of social 
systems.  In this sense, to focus upon objects is too specific, as it considers just one aspect of 
reality and does not account for human understandings or the variety of what we can 
understand.   
Conversely however, existing accounts of human agency within complex systems are not 
specific enough.  So far within this thesis we have encountered several descriptions of human 
agency within the social world.  Cilliers (1998) argues that meaning is deferred across a 
complex social network (see 2.2.5); Deleuze ;ϮϬϬϰď [ϭϵϲϵ]Ϳ ĐoŶsideƌs aŶ ͞iŵage of thought͟ iŶ 
which the experiences we have are related to the existing understandings in society (see 
3.2.2); BǇƌŶe & CallaghaŶ ;ϮϬϭϰͿ dƌaǁ oŶ Bouƌdieu͛s ŶotioŶ of ͞fields͟ ǁhiĐh ĐoŶditioŶ huŵaŶ 
agency (see 2.3.2).  All of these are aimed at explaining how we have shared understandings 
and actions, yet also individual agency60.  We will not enter into detailed comparison between 
these social theories and the position developed in this thesis.  However, the intention here is 
to underline what is to be gained from characterising the patterns within classrooms as unique 
and context-specific. 
To exemplify this we will consider how a materialist position provides a more concrete and 
tangible description of classƌooŵs thaŶ Bouƌdieu͛s ŶotioŶ of ͞fields͟, as disĐussed ďǇ BǇƌŶe & 
Callaghan (2014, Chapter 5).  The notion of social fields is used broadly in sociology (see 
Fligstein & McAdam, 2012) and Byrne & Callaghan use it to situate human agency within social 
                                                          
59 Here we begin to recover aspects of the social constructionist argument that social entities are 
developed by people.  However, we have removed the untenable notion that the social and individual 
are the same, or the dialectic account of mind as privileged within the material world (see Section 2.4).   
60 There are of course other social theories which could be related to the arguments expressed in this 
thesis, foƌ eǆaŵple, Latouƌ͛s ;ϮϬϬϱͿ AĐtoƌ Netǁoƌk TheoƌǇ ;fuƌtheƌ ƌelated to Deleuze ďǇ Blake ;ϮϬϬϰͿͿ 
aŶd BaŶduƌa͛s (1999) Social Cognitive Theory.   
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influeŶĐes.  “ĐieŶtists use the teƌŵ ͚field͛ to defiŶe ƌegioŶs of spaĐe iŶ ǁhiĐh a foƌĐe aĐts, aŶd 
Bourdieu draws on this to describe social relations: 
͞The field, as a field of possiďle foƌĐes, pƌeseŶts itself to eaĐh ageŶt as a spaĐe of 
possibles which is defined in the relationship between the structure of average 
ĐhaŶĐes of aĐĐess to the diffeƌeŶt positioŶs… the oďjeĐtiǀe pƌoďaďilities ;of eĐoŶoŵiĐ 
or symbolic profit, for example) inscribed in the field at a given moment only become 
operative and active thƌough ͞ǀoĐatioŶs͟, ͞aspiƌatioŶs͟ aŶd ͞eǆpeĐtatioŶs͟, i.e. iŶsofaƌ 
as they are perceived and appreciated through the schemes of perception and 
appƌeĐiatioŶ ǁhiĐh ĐoŶstitute a haďitus.͟  Bouƌdieu ;ϭϵϴϯ, p.ϯϰϰͿ 
Bouƌdieu͛s sǇsteŵ iŶǀolǀes habitus as the ͞ǀoĐatioŶs͟, ͞aspiƌatioŶs͟ aŶd ͞eǆpeĐtatioŶs͟ a 
person brings to a situation.  However, whilst habitus conditions action, the potential for 
reflexivity allows self-aǁaƌeŶess aŶd ageŶĐǇ iŶ ƌelatioŶ to oŶe͛s oǁŶ haďitus ;Bourdieu & 
Wacquant, 1992).  Habitus is also related to the cultural capital that a person (or object) has, 
which determines social status, and changes over time (Bourdieu, 1986).  As such, Bourdieu 
sees thought and action as the continual struggle of people to achieve their goals within fields, 
but ĐoŶstƌaiŶed ďǇ haďitus aŶd Đapital.  Otheƌ ͚plaǇeƌs͛ oŶ the field aƌe eŶgaged in their own 
struggle and the field is therefore constantly changing. 
BǇƌŶe & CallaghaŶ ;ϮϬϭϰͿ see sǇŶeƌgǇ ďetǁeeŶ ĐoŵpleǆitǇ theoƌǇ aŶd Bouƌdieu͛s aĐĐouŶt: 
͞Both Bouƌdieu aŶd Archer would subscribe to a social sphere as a not necessarily 
planned or even wished for outcome of processes of struggle which include conflict 
and negotiation between individuals and groups in conditions of differential levels of 
power.  Both would see structure as having emergent properties whilst at the same 
time emergence is also evident, for Bourdieu particularly, in collective as well as 
individual action.  In these respects both theories seem consistent with a flexible 
ƌealist oŶtologǇ.͟ ;BǇƌŶe & Callaghan, 2014, p.124) 
The ƋuestioŶ is hoǁ ĐaŶ aŶ oŶtologǇ ďe ďoth ͞fleǆiďle͟ aŶd ͞ƌealist͟?  We aƌgued that Đoŵpleǆ 
realists do not adequately situate their own understandings as within complex social systems 
(see 2.3.3).  Here however we draw attention to the rather amorphous character of the term 
͚fields͛, ǁhiĐh iŵplies intangible forces conditioning human agency.  In the above quote we see 
a constant struggle between individual and groups with different levels of power whereby 
emergence is ever present.  We are left with only a general description of agency as within a 
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broader social system.  However, on closer inspection we see that fields are constituted by 
relations: 
͞ǁhat eǆist iŶ the soĐial ǁoƌld aƌe ƌelatioŶs – not interactions between agents or 
intersubjective ties between individuals, but objective relations͟ (Bourdieu & 
Wacquant, 1992, p. 97)61 
Bourdieu, Byrne and Callaghan are arguing for agency within a system of relations which is 
afforded an autonomous existence.  This becomes a metaphysical issue in that we must 
ponder the nature of these intangible yet real relations, but it also becomes a practical issue in 
that any researcher must define relations in the classroom.  Should we define a social relation 
in a brief glance, a conversation, a policy or written hierarchy, a family tree, by race or gender 
oƌ speĐies?  As ǁith Cillieƌs͛ sǇsteŵ of ƌelatioŶs, ǁe ƋuiĐklǇ Đoŵe to a ǁoƌld iŶ ǁhiĐh ageŶĐǇ 
involves the processing of infinite possible relations within social fields (see 2.2.5).  In the 
above quote we see that Bourdieu & Wacquant reject the subjectivity of relations, but we are 
offered no clues as to where we are to find objective relations. 
A monist, materialist frame provides a solution by recognising that when people interact with 
the world and with each other, it is actually an interaction of matter.  The relations we see in 
the world are encoded in our brains, as well as in the symbolic artefacts we have developed.  
This is not to return to a constructionist position in which relations are produced by us, it is 
instead a position which undermines the autonomy of relations beyond brains and symbols.  
For example, a relation between a teacher and pupil in conversation is the interaction of two 
embodied brains receiving and seeking stimuli from the senses.  The relationship has a history 
which will have contributed to the exact neural structures at the moment of interaction, and it 
will have symbolic correlates such as the clothing, body language, position in the classroom, 
names on a register etc.  These are all material though, and can be seen as the happenstance 
of matter in a particular moment.  We do not need to develop a separate ontological category 
for relations. 
Without entering into a full interrogatioŶ of Bouƌdieu͛s ǁoƌk, ǁe ĐaŶ see that oŶĐe ǁe ƌejeĐt 
the autonomous existence of relations then the notions of field, habitus and capital can all be 
afforded a material basis.  The patterns of behaviour, goals and expectations people bring to 
situations are encoded in their neural networks and will have developed through both their 
biological inheritance and their experience.  Habitus and capital provide useful models for 
                                                          
61 We earlier related this to network models (see 2.1.4) 
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exploring the patterns of behaviour and associations that people have, but we must recognise 
that each instance of these patterns is unique and has a material basis.   
So what are relations?  Whether we consider the relation between a label and an object, or 
between a teacher and a pupil, a materialist position proposes that we are seeing unique 
eǀeŶts.  OŶĐe agaiŶ, ǁe ŵust ƌeĐall Deleuze͛s ĐoŶteŶtioŶ that ĐoŶĐepts, iŶ this Đase ƌelatioŶs, 
come about through repeated exposure to similar circumstances.  In this way the power 
relations between teacher and pupil manifest in the expectations that each have and the way 
they interact.  So interaction between teacher and pupil develops over time.    Relations do not 
need to be afforded an autonomous existence. 
Deleuze͛s ǁoƌk theƌefoƌe giǀes us a ǁaǇ of seeiŶg that eaĐh iŶstaŶĐe of a patteƌŶ is uŶiƋue, yet 
repeated exposure to such patterns comes to define relations between aspects of the world.  
We have built upon this suggestion by providing specific mechanisms for how we come to 
recognise patterns in the world through the adaptation of brain and behaviour (Chapter 4).  
The position developed in this thesis thus provides a more concrete account of how humans 
ƌelate to eaĐh otheƌ thaŶ that pƌoǀided ďǇ Bouƌdieu͛s soĐial fields.  We haǀe ƌesolǀed the 
tension between recognising that each instance is unique and how we come to recognise, 
repeat and manipulate patterns in the social world.  In subsection 5.3.2 we will see that seeing 
patterns as unique but repeated allows us to provide a better description of how we learn 
from words and symbols than Cillieƌs͛ ;ϭϵϵϴͿ sǇsteŵs of distributed meaning.  We might also 
suggest that ǁe haǀe goŶe ďeǇoŶd Deleuze͛s (2004b [1969]) own notion of aŶ ͞iŵage of 
thought͟.  Relations, expectations and behaviours can be seen as repeated yet unique 
patterns.   
In the rest of this chapter we will further expound how we learn from these repeated patterns.  
In this section we have considered how patterns need not be restricted to autonomous 
objects: they pertain to heterogeneous elements within classrooms.  Conversely, we have seen 
how patterns provide a more tangible view of the social world than notions of social fields.  
We leaƌŶ fƌoŵ the ͚diffeƌeŶt Ǉet ƌepeated͛ patteƌŶs of the ŵateƌial ǁoƌld.  In Section 5.2 we 
will flesh out this claim through discussion of existing evidence that pupils within a classroom 
learn from each other and from teachers.  In Section 5.3 we will then consider how pupils learn 
from the social artefacts of the classroom: words, images, symbols, multimedia etc.  This will 
allow us to build on this section in which we have laid out the theoretical premise of the 
argument.  Recognising that learning is a process of our brains and behaviour adapting to our 
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experiences (mediated by our biology) allows us to see that we learn from patterns within the 
material world.   
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5.2 Learning from Each Other 
5.2.1 Empathy and Coordination 
In this section we will explore evidence that pupils learn from others through emulating 
patterns of behaviour and coordinating their actions.  This will demonstrate that it is possible 
to account for social aspects of learning within a materialist frame, but also highlight the 
importance of history and context in such learning. 
Recall from Section 2.4 that Stacey develops a social constructionist account of learning 
through empathy.  Drawing on Mead (1934), Stacey (2001, 2003a) claims that humans 
recognise actions in others and so assimilate these actions.  Whilst we have shown StaĐeǇ͛s 
position to be untenable, the importance of empathy in learning is highlighted.  This is not a 
Ŷeǁ iŶsight hoǁeǀeƌ.  EǆpeƌiŵeŶts iŶ the ϭϵϲϬs ǁith ͚Boďo dolls͛: iŶflataďle toǇs ǁhiĐh staǇ 
upright when struck, showed that after seeing an adult being aggressive towards the toy, 
children were more likely to act aggressively (Bandura, Ross & Ross, 1961).  Similar influences 
were seen using video footage of aggressive behaviour (Bandura, Grusec & Menlove, 1966).  
This immediately suggests the capacity of children62 to emulate observed behaviour without 
direct instruction.  In this sense they are reproducing the patterns they see.   
Other factors play a role in emulating, for example the reinforcement of patterns of behaviour 
with reward from parents or respected others.  It is also possible to describe action rather than 
demonstrate it and thus we must consider the role of language in allowing patterns of 
behaviour to be reproduced (in older children at least).  The capacity of people to recreate 
patterns of behaviour is important to this thesis and partially accounts for the existence of 
shared understandings, along with our common biology and capacity to learn from symbolic 
forms (which will be considered in Section 5.3). 
Unconscious mimicry also plays a role in learning and social interaction; for example the 
spontaneous replication of body position when sitting next to somebody, or face touching 
whilst speaking to others.  Van Baaren et. al. (2009) discuss the experimental evidence for 
social influences on this, for example: 
͞ǁheŶ ǁe aƌe ŵoƌe ĐoŶĐeƌŶed ǁith otheƌs, depeŶdeŶt oŶ theŵ, feel Đloseƌ to theŵ, 
oƌ ǁaŶt to ďe liked ďǇ theŵ, ǁe teŶd to take oǀeƌ theiƌ ďehaǀiouƌ to a gƌeateƌ eǆteŶt.͟ 
(van Baaren, et al., 2009, p. 2382) 
                                                          
62 The subjects were between 2 and 6 years old. 
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They also present evidence that mimicry is reduced when those interacting consider 
themselves to be from different social groups.  Being mimicked is likely to enhance or reduce 
your appreciation for someone, dependent on whether you identify with them or not.  
Furthermore, there seems to be a temporal effect in that after being mimicked by someone 
they respected, subjects were likely to be more helpful to others.   
Most teachers will be aware of non-verbal signals and the influence they have upon pupils: the 
way they position themselves in a room, the way they look at pupils, their body language.  
These patterns may be overt, as in the case of the Bobo dolls, or covert, as in the case of 
mimicry.  Teachers both consciously and unconsciously use patterns of behaviour to influence 
learning.  We need not see these patterns as anything other than material: enshrined in both 
our biological responses, and our learning within social settings, yet they influence behaviour 
in classrooms. 
In support of the biological and material basis of patterns of behaviour, van Baaren et. al. 
tentatively propose a neurological process for mimicry, involving the mirror systems of the 
brain.  His research group have undertaken a range of experiments looking at what happens in 
the brains of two people as they coordinate actions63.  One such experiment was the analysis 
of EEG patterns when two people, sat opposite each other, moved their fingers rhythmically.  
A liquid crystal screen between the two was made alternately opaque or transparent.  The 
researchers carefully tracked whether the fingers moved in phase and examined the neural 
correlates to coordinated and uncoordinated behaviour (Tognoli, 2008; Tognoli, et al., 2007; 
Tognoli & Kelso, 2015).  In line with previous studies, they found that alpha waves (with a 
mean frequency of 10.61Hz) and mu waves (9.63Hz) responded to the sight of the other 
person.  However, these were not directly correlated with coordinated behaviour.  Instead, a 
component of the waves that they called phi (9.2-11.5Hz) was found to change according to 
ǁhetheƌ the Đouple͛s fiŶgeƌ ŵotioŶs ǁeƌe ĐooƌdiŶated oƌ Ŷot.  IŶ uŶsǇŶĐhƌoŶised ďehaǀiouƌ, 
there is an increase in phi waves within the right hemisphere of the brain and a decrease in the 
left hemisphere.  During synchronised behaviour, the phi waves in the right hemisphere 
increase without a corresponding decrease in the left hemisphere. 
Tognoli (2008) suggests that coordinated behaviours are probably adaptive, for example when 
two people learn to walk whilst carrying a load.  He also suggests: 
                                                          
63 This field extends the research into coordination dynamics that we explored in subsection 4.2.1, 
whereby key parameters are sought which describe patterns within brains, but also within coordinated 
behaviour.   
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͞“oĐial iŶtegƌatioŶ is fuƌtheƌ eŶgaged iŶto high leǀel soĐial ďehaǀiouƌ: oǀeƌt 
adjustments has been suggested as a mechanism for social facilitation and empathy, 
covert adjustments (stimulation of the motor system by perceived action without 
associated production of a behaviour) for action understanding by direct matching of a 
ĐoŶspeĐifiĐ͛s ŵotoƌ ďehaǀiouƌ iŶto oŶe͛s ŵotoƌ sǇsteŵ, aŶd foƌ skill leaƌŶiŶg.͟ 
(Tognoli, 2008, p. 12) 
Neuroscience then, is able to provide hypotheses for particular aspects of human interaction 
and these may be of interest to educationalists.  Here they show a biological basis for pupils 
learning from and responding to the actions of others.  This is related to shared biology.  For 
example, Dumas et. al (2012) simulated the brains of two individuals interacting and compared 
it to Đoupled ďƌaiŶ sĐaŶs of paƌtiĐipaŶts, ǁho ǁeƌe aďle to see eaĐh otheƌ͛s haŶd ŵoǀement 
via video.  They argue that:  
͞the aŶatoŵiĐal fuŶĐtioŶal siŵilaƌitǇ aĐƌoss huŵaŶs Đould eǆplaiŶ a teŶdeŶĐǇ to eŶteƌ 
in synchronization while immersed in the same perceptual context or while doing the 
same perceptual-ŵotoƌ task.͟ (Dumas, et al., 2012, p. 9) 
Thus, they tentatively propose that because our brains are anatomically similar, we are likely 
to enter into coupling of movements when we share environments.  Although the modelling of 
precise mechanisms continues, what is striking is that there are clearly neurological correlates 
to social behaviour, and this supports a materialist picture in which learning cannot be 
separated from these neurological processes.  
However, we should not see social interaction as deterministic either.  Tognoli et al. (2007) 
found that 38% of their trials recorded no coordinated behaviour, 37% had only transient 
phase locking and therefore only 25% of the trials showed coordinated behaviour.  
Consideration of their methods shows that participants gave informed consent so we can 
speculate that they were conscious of their coordination and wilfully involved in coordination 
or otherwise.  Indeed, Tognoli (2008) suggests that ͞soĐial ŶegleĐt͟ pƌoďaďlǇ ƌeƋuiƌes suďjeĐts 
to ǁithdƌaǁ theiƌ atteŶtioŶ fƌoŵ eaĐh otheƌ͛s ŵotioŶ.  As suĐh the ideŶtifiĐatioŶ of possiďle 
mechanisms for coordination does not uncover deterministic rules of interaction. 
This further highlights the role of intention in human behaviour.  Gazzola, Rizzolatti, Wicker & 
Keysers (2007) detected differences in the level of activation of the neural mirror system, 
depending upon whether the observer understands the goals of the actions, and this shows 
that goals affect the neurological responses of individuals.  It is not just goals that make 
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classrooms difficult to relate to neuroscientific evidence however, both perspective and 
experience play a role.  Jackson, Meltzoff & Decety (2006) found that observing actions from a 
first-person perspective is more tightly coupled to the sensory-motor system than from a 
third-person perspective, which requires observers to also process visuospatial information.  
However, they also suggest that: 
͞the ƌote ƌepetitioŶ of kŶoǁŶ movements is faster and more efficient (in terms of 
recruiting the relevant motor representation/motor program) from the 1st-person 
perspective, while the learning of new actions might be more robust and generalize 
further if seen from the 3rd-person perspective (which requires some transformation) 
because this would lend itself to a more effortful and better understanding of the 
spatial configuration of the action.  The answer to the question of which perspective a 
teacher should take in modelling an action likely depends on the prior expertise of the 
student and the expected generalization and use of the learned response by the 
leaƌŶeƌ.͟ (Jackson, Meltzoff & Decety, 2006, p. 437) 
Although clearly an extrapolation from neuroscience to classrooms, suggestions of how 
teachers might model an action shows that the intentions of the teacher, experience of the 
student and location in the room all have bearing. 
Furthermore there are temporal effects to social interaction.  Oullier et al (2008) expand the 
work on coordinated finger movements to examine how the behaviour of each individual 
remains coordinated once they can no longer see each other.  They found that participants 
would  have related frequencies in just under a third of cases (31.3% ± 19.6) after they had 
seeŶ eaĐh otheƌ͛s ŵoǀeŵeŶts, as opposed to aƌouŶd oŶe siǆth of the tiŵe ďefoƌe ;ϭϳ.ϲ%± 
15.2).  Interestingly, they also found differences in how participants changed their frequencies, 
depending upon whether they had the slower or faster frequency to begin with. 
However, Oullier et al. note the experimental difficulties of investigating coordinated 
movement in larger groups in which interpersonal relationships become important.  It is 
difficult to distinguish whether behaviour is coordinated or being led by an individual, or even 
an external factor, such as the synchronisation of clapping when music is played.  Beek, 
Verchoor & Kelso warn: 
͞that the sheeƌ ĐoŵpleǆitǇ of soĐial psǇĐhologiĐal pheŶoŵeŶa Đalls for a more 
ƌeseƌǀed staŶĐe… BeĐause dǇŶaŵiĐal soĐial psǇĐhologǇ is ĐoŶĐeƌŶed ǁith ďehaǀiouƌal 
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patterns occurring in different situations, it will have to identify the situational 
pƌopeƌties that ĐoŶstƌaiŶ the ƌesultiŶg ďehaǀiouƌ͟ (Beek, et al., 1997, p. 102) 
They suggest that the way forward is still in looking for phase transitions in behaviour within 
social groups, but that this is only possible if we are able to account for differences in 
situations.  However, it seems unlikelǇ that it ǁill eǀeƌ ďe possiďle to ideŶtifǇ suĐh ͚situatioŶal 
pƌopeƌties͛ iŶ ƌeal soĐial situatioŶs ďeĐause theǇ aƌe ŵultiple, suďtle aŶd Đoŵpleǆ.    
Another area which needs further study is the exact role the mirror system plays.  Whilst it 
appears to have a central role in many aspects of social interactions, Barsalsou hints that this 
begs further questions: 
͞OŶe ĐeŶtƌal issue is assessiŶg ǁhetheƌ ŵiƌƌoƌ sǇsteŵs do iŶdeed plaǇ all these ƌoles, 
and perhaps others.  If so, then why do humans exhibit such different social abilities 
thaŶ ŶoŶhuŵaŶ pƌiŵates ǁho also haǀe ŵiƌƌoƌ sǇsteŵs?͟ (Barsalou, 2008, p. 634) 
Such questions fall well beyond current neuroscientific understanding, and the scope of this 
thesis.  Experimental work into the coordination of brains shows that there are neurological 
mechanisms which have a bearing on how people interact.  There is growing evidence that our 
interactions have a material basis, for example Apps, Lesage & Ramnani (2015) have shown 
that a specific area of the brain (the anterior cingulate cortex) responds to seeing other people 
make incorrect choices in a game, and suggest that this has relevance to teachers 
understanding what their pupils are thinking.  However, such studies are a long way from 
investigating the real time development and activation of brains during a lesson. 
Of direct relevance is the evidence that material processes influence social interaction.  Only 
accounts of the mind as existing within the material world can explain the complex and 
nuanced influences on human behaviour and learning.  Human interaction is highly sensitive to 
context and this supports the insight from complexity that it is nonlinear: small influences can 
have a big impact.  These aspects of learning cannot be explained by seeing a fixed relationship 
between the world and our understanding of it.  The brain has a complex response to its 
environment.  However, there are patterns of interaction which are part of the social world: 
repeating aggressive behaviour, mimicking position or face touching, coordinated movement.  
These patteƌŶs haǀe a ŵateƌial eǆisteŶĐe aŶd iŶflueŶĐe leaƌŶiŶg.  Whilst Mead͛s ;ϭϵϯϰͿ ͞ĐalliŶg 
foƌth iŶ otheƌs͟ is the ďasis foƌ soĐial ĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶist positioŶs theƌefoƌe, ǁe aƌe aďle to argue 
that such calling forth is based in the interaction of brains within the material world, and is 
context-specific.  Human learning has a basis in brains, bodies and patterns of behaviour. 
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5.2.2 Learning in Groups 
We concluded above that coordinated motion and study of mirror neurons is not yet advanced 
enough to be of direct use to educationalists.  Indeed, reducing learning to such aspects does 
not capture the complexity of classroom learning. 
However, educational theory has much to say already about social interactions.  One area in 
which this is apparent is in group work.  This ranges from pairs working on a worksheet to 
sophistiĐated ͞jigsaǁ tasks͟, ǁhere different group members complete aspects of the task 
before piecing the solution together (Slavin, 2010).  There is a broad range of research into the 
influence of factors on learning in group tasks.  For example, grouping pupils of different 
attainment levels gives different outcomes from grouping pupils with similar skill sets (Watson, 
1992; Thurston et al., 2010).  This suggests that the composition of groups makes a difference 
to the learning of the individuals within it.  Different members of the group complete different 
aspects of a group task, and thus learn different things.   
Teachers might use this to their advantage, presenting tasks which challenge different 
members of the group according to their needs.  Of interest here though is that learning within 
groups can be seen as a dynamic process in which the composition of groups influences the 
leaƌŶiŶg of iŶdiǀiduals.  We ŵight fuƌtheƌ ƌelate this to iŶsights aƌouŶd ͞tƌaŶsaĐtiǀe ŵeŵoƌǇ͟: 
͞iŶdiǀidual ŵeŵoƌǇ sǇsteŵs ĐaŶ ďeĐoŵe iŶǀolǀed iŶ laƌgeƌ, organized social memory 
sǇsteŵs that haǀe eŵeƌgeŶt gƌoup ŵiŶd pƌopeƌties Ŷot tƌaĐeaďle to the iŶdiǀiduals.͟  
(Wegner, Raymond & Erber, 1991) 
Wegner, Raymond & Erber studied young adults in close couples and found that they were 
able to remember a list of objects better than pairs made up of strangers were.  This supports 
the concept that people who are close develop a system of memory that is superior to that of 
individuals and newly formed groups.  Wegner, Raymond & Erber were able to disrupt the 
transactive memory of the couples by enforcing a system for remembering.  This implies that 
transactive memory develops unconsciously.  Again, our focus here is to support the argument 
that social learning involves patterns of behaviour which emerge within the real world, and 
transactive memory links group learning to the distribution of information across individuals.  
We ŵight teŶtatiǀelǇ pƌopose that the gƌoup is ͚leaƌŶiŶg͛ iŶ a diffeƌeŶt ǁaǇ to the iŶdiǀiduals 
within it.  However we do not need to see such a distributed memory system as anything other 
than emergent from material interactions. 
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A host of other influences have been recognised in group work in classrooms.  The 
collaborative skills that children have will determine how they perform on group tasks (Baines, 
Blatchford & Chowne, 2007). Furthermore, the way they talk to each other is important 
(Mercer, et al., 2004).  As Sampson and Clark (2009) conclude, the outcomes of pupil 
interaction depend upon the task and the context.  As such the pedagogical literature 
ƌeĐogŶises the iŵpoƌtaŶĐe of ͚gƌoup dǇŶaŵiĐs͛, a teƌŵ ofteŶ used ďǇ teaĐheƌs.  This suppoƌts a 
view of learning as resultant from the specific context of the learner, but highlights once again 
the importance of patterns of behaviour in social settings.   
Beyond psychological and pedagogical literature lies a whole host of further considerations 
around interaction.  Recall from 5.1.3 that Bouƌdieu ;ϭϵϴϲͿ ƌefeƌs to pupils͛ ͞Đultuƌal Đapital͟: 
the different experiences and parental expectations children bring to classrooms based on 
their socio-economic positions.  We must also consider power relations, confidence, charisma, 
͚ĐheŵistƌǇ͛, attƌaĐtioŶ aŶd aŶǇ otheƌ faĐtoƌ ǁhiĐh ŵaǇ iŶflueŶĐe iŶteƌaĐtioŶ iŶ gƌoups, as ǁell 
as consideration of how communication technology influences social interactions.  So too must 
we realise the capacity of humans to process and reflect, and to be oriented by goals as well as 
whims.  The point is not to provide an exhaustive list of influences on social interaction it is 
instead to highlight that interaction is context-specific, and historically contingent.   
Yet we are also concerned with how these influences can be seen as material.  In subsection 
5.1.3 we described, in general terms, how relations are emergent from the histories of the 
parties involved and the specific contexts in which they find themselves.  So relationships 
between people stem from both biology and experience; so too do expectations of behaviour.  
In this section we have provided specific examples of how this is the case. 
We have seen that learning through empathy is possible through witnessing certain behaviour, 
even through video media (Bandura, Grusec & Menlove, 1966).  Also, in simplistic, 
experimental setups coordinated behaviour has been found to have a basis in mirror neuron 
systems and correspond to specific frequencies of waves in the brain (Tognoli, 2008; Tognoli, 
et al., 2007; Tognoli & Kelso, 2015).  This leads Dumas et al. (2012) to conclude that our shared 
biology is instrumental in allowing such interaction.  However, work by van Baaren et. al. 
(2009) shows that emulating patterns of behaviour will depend upon the relationship between 
individuals and is influenced by prior interactions.  We have also highlighted the sensitivity of 
these processes to context, in terms of the relationships between people; the capacity of the 
individuals in a group; the use of first-person or third-person perspectives; the temporal 
effects of someone being helpful previously.  This sensitivity is further supported by 
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pedagogical literature which highlights the range of influences on pupils working in groups.  
Evidence for transactive memory (Wegner, Raymond & Erber, 1991), as well as literature 
around different outcomes during group work suggests that learning in groups might be seen 
as the adaptation of the group as a whole, as well as individual brains, during group tasks.  The 
learning of a pupil from other pupils or teachers within a classroom involves subtleties of 
coordination, body language, distributed information processing and emulating what we have 
seen others do.     
Taken together, the variety of studies referred to in this section allow us to argue that learning 
from other people within a classroom is a material process, involving the reproduction of, 
response to and manipulation of patterns of behaviour.  People learn from watching and 
iŶteƌaĐtiŶg ǁith eaĐh otheƌ, ďut this is Ŷot a siŵple pƌoĐess of ͞ĐalliŶg foƌth͟ as Mead ǁould 
have it.  Patterns of interaction are determined by our shared biology, but also by our unique 
histories and the specifics of the context at hand.  Separating social interaction from the 
contexts in which it takes place and the specific histories of the individuals involved is not 
possible.  This supports a view of learning from others as a complex yet material process.   
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5.3 Learning from the Classroom 
5.3.1 Learning from the Material of the Classroom 
People learn not just from direct social interactions, but also by engaging with books, music, 
images, buildings, technology and any other social artefact we might conceive of.  In a 
materialist frame we are able to see that learning from the world of objects, learning from 
other people and learning from social artefacts does not warrant different metaphysical 
categories.  Learning comes from experience in the material world.  This is not a controversial 
claim; few would deny that engaging with a measuring cylinder in science, a ball in physical 
education or a keyboard in music allows us to learn within these school subjects.  We have 
already provided an account of how we learn from experience, in Chapter 4.  There we argued 
that learning is the adaptation of neural networks.  Whilst the details of this model may be 
revised with new evidence, it does demonstrate that learning can be characterised as the 
response of an individual to the material world.  This response is complex, yet nevertheless 
material. 
We are thus able to account for the exploratory learning that takes place when a pupil is 
introduced to a new object, having never encountered it before, nor know its name or 
purpose.  Such learning is learning from the objects themselves64.  However, this type of 
learning is rare in classrooms:  most learning involves instruction and interaction, as well as 
engagement with media and equipment.  In Section 5.2 we argued that learning from other 
people fits within a materialist frame and involves biological mechanisms operating in specific 
contexts.  We must now extend this to the reality of classrooms.  People within classrooms do 
not just watch each other, or coordinate their movements, they interact with each other at the 
same time as interacting with social artefacts.  So whilst learning the game of football involves 
experience of kicking a ball, it also involves interaction with other players, understanding the 
rules, engaging in tactics and strategy, and might even be associated with learning gender 
roles, regional allegiances and aspirations for future earnings.  An experiment in science may 
involve genuinely novel findings but also learning the processes, historic context and social 
status of scientific endeavour.  The point is that all of this is learnt together through 
experience. 
In order to argue that learning is a complex yet material process therefore, we need to extend 
our account of learning from experience, and learning from other people, to include learning 
from the heterogeneous elements of classrooms: the words spoken, gestures and expressions 
                                                          
64 Learning from computers and other interactive media stretches this definition, as we may encounter 
novel responses from programs, or encounter social interaction in diffuse ways. 
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of otheƌs; the iŵages seeŶ; the souŶds heaƌd; the oďjeĐts aŶd eƋuipŵeŶt.  Deleuze͛s ;ϮϬϬϳͿ 
teƌŵ ͞hodgepodge͟ is oŶĐe agaiŶ useful iŶ ĐaptuƌiŶg the diǀeƌsitǇ of elements within 
classrooms.  We should also reiterate that we cannot give a specific account of how learning 
takes place in a classroom for two reasons: firstly because this is a theoretical study involving 
no primary empirical evidence, and secondly because we have already built a case for the 
importance of context, history and emergence in learning, making each instance unique.  
However, the aim here is to show that considering the hodgepodge of elements within a 
classroom as having a material basis allows us to understand how all of these contribute to the 
complexity of learning.     
We have proposed above that learning involves the reproduction of, response to and 
manipulation of patterns.  So far we have considered this in relation to witnessing the 
behaviour of other people and to the behaviour of objects.  As pupils learn they experience the 
patterns of association between aspects of a subject.  So in football, the ball, the utterances on 
the pitch and the aggressive behaviour become associated as patterns of heterogeneous 
elements.  Pupils then set about replicating those patterns.  In science we might see copper 
metal burn with a blue-green flame but associate this with the abstract notion of the periodic 
table, wearing white coats, and fireworks.  Learning is about developing patterns and links 
between diverse elements of experience.  When a pupil is asked how a firework gives a blue-
green explosion, they may recall the word copper and a range of associated notions.      
The picture emerging is one of our brains being able to recognise patterns within classrooms.  
We have considered patterns on a number of levels: in emulating patterns of behaviour and 
mimicry, in coordinated behaviour and transactive memory, and from the behaviour of 
equipment in the classroom.  However, by adopting the theoretical position developed in this 
thesis we are able to see that patterns of association between heterogeneous elements also 
leads to the adaptation of neural networks.  We learn from all aspects of the natural and social 
world and characterising this all as material allows us to see how words, numbers, musical 
notes and images all contribute to the adaptation of understandings, without invoking a 
separate realm of mind. 
There are a range of points to clarify following this theoretical description of classroom 
learning.  Firstly, that we are advocating a distributed representation of the material world on 
two levels.  An individual brain has a distributed representation of an association such as 
between copper and fireworks; there is not a neural pattern which corresponds directly to this 
understanding.  Furthermore, the faĐt that Đoppeƌ aŶd fiƌeǁoƌks aƌe liŶked is Ŷot aŶ ͚eǆteƌŶal͛ 
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truth that predates the invention of fireworks: it is an association which evolved in human 
history and is now encoded in numerous different forms in different brains, and in books and 
other media.  Everybody who knows about the association will have slightly different 
interpretations, but the pattern nevertheless allows a shared understanding.  We shall return 
to this in subsection 5.3.3.   
The second point of clarification is that in explaining how we associate heterogeneous 
elements of a classroom, we are not advocating the kind of operant conditioning that 
behaviourist theorists identified (e.g. Skinner, 1948).  Pupils will approach new experiences 
with the neural networks they already have, developed from prior experience.  So new 
experiences allow the adaptation of neural networks but based on their existing form.  Pupils 
are not conditioned by their experiences alone but their histories and context play a role.  On 
the cognitive level, motivation and reward are important in conditioning response65.  We also 
have the capacity to reflect: processing information over time and linking it to other 
experiences.  Both in this chapter and the last, we have stressed the importance of context in 
learning and the unique response that every learner will have.   
We are therefore arguing that each person has an individual interpretation based on their 
unique experience, yet there are patterns within the social world which lead to shared 
understandings.  We can all recognise a pigeon and discuss pigeons without each having the 
saŵe eǆpeƌieŶĐe of pigeoŶs.  Whilst this is oďǀious foƌ ͚oďjeĐts͛ suĐh a pigeoŶs, we have 
developed a theoretical position which allows us to propose that this is also the case for more 
amorphous patterns.  The behaviour of objects, animals and people may be seen as patterns 
but so too the association of heterogeneous aspects of the world, copper and blue-green 
fireworks for example.   
The third point of clarification is around the role of words and other abstract symbols 
(mathematics, logos, road signs etc.).  What most clearly sets human learning apart from most 
other animals is our use of a sophisticated symbolic language.  We learn from patterns of 
symbols in the same way as we learn from the natural world.  Recognising a pear tree and 
recognising a word, or number, or musical note do not need to be conceived of as different 
processes: each is the response to patterns of stimuli in the world.  In this way, humans are 
able to have shared yet unique understandings of the natural, social and symbolic world. 
                                                          
65 ‘eĐall ǀoŶ deƌ Malsďeƌg͛s ;ϭϵϵϱͿ suggestioŶ that seleĐtiǀe plastiĐitǇ pƌoǀides a ŵeĐhaŶisŵ foƌ ͚higheƌ 
ďƌaiŶ fuŶĐtioŶ͛ of this tǇpe.  “ee suďseĐtioŶ ϰ.ϭ.ϯ  
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To illustrate this, consider this thesis.  The specific combination of words is unique and yet the 
same words can be found across the world, and the overall form of the thesis has been 
produced many times.  The letters on this page have a material basis in the ink they are 
pƌiŶted ǁith aŶd the patteƌŶ of light iŶĐideŶt oŶ the ƌeadeƌ͛s eye.  The receptive organs of the 
eyes and overall brain structure of readers will also be similar, due to our shared biology.  The 
patterns of each word and their approximate meaning will be shared, allowing discussion of 
the thesis.   Yet the precise response of every reader will be different, based upon their unique 
histories and context.  The thesis has a material reality, and yet is a social artefact which 
supports both shared understanding and individual interpretations. 
IŶ suďseĐtioŶ ϯ.Ϯ.Ϯ ǁe outliŶed Deleuze͛s ;ϮϬϬϰa [ϭϵϲϴ]Ϳ ŶotioŶ of ideŶtitǇ steŵŵiŶg fƌoŵ the 
͞diffeƌeŶĐe aŶd ƌepetitioŶ͟ of eǆpeƌieŶĐe.  Thƌough Chapteƌ ϰ ǁe deǀeloped a ĐoŶĐƌete 
mechanism for this involving the adaptation of neural networks in the brain.  In this chapter so 
far, we have taken this further and outlined how treating every aspect of a classroom as having 
a material basis allows us to see how we learn from, reproduce and manipulate patterns 
within the material world.   
5.3.2 Learning from Words and Symbols 
HaǀiŶg outliŶed hoǁ ǁe should see patteƌŶs as ͚diffeƌeŶt ďut ƌepeated͛, ǁe ǁill Ŷoǁ ŵoƌe 
carefully develop the argument that seeing these patterns as material allows us to account for 
shared understandings.  To build this argument we will firstly consider how a symbol such as a 
word can be seen to have a material existence yet influence and encode the response of 
people in a classroom.  From this we will then consider how more nuanced patterns of 
heterogeneous elements can be seen as material, and allow shared understanding.  
In a classroom a word has a material basis as ink on a page, pixels on a screen or in sounds: 
vibrations of air.  Cilliers (1998, 2005a), drawing on Derrida, argues that meaning can only be 
resolved within a network, so a word can only be given meaning by relating it to all other 
words66 (see 2.2.3).  Whilst Cilliers argues for the boundaries of context making meaning 
intelligible in practice we pointed to the difficulty of this constant deferral, and the implication 
that a person interrogates relations and boundaries in real time (see 2.2.5).   
We have already seen that to Deleuze meaning is in the moment (see 3.2.7).  Making this more 
concrete we can argue that the response of members of the class to a word will be a product 
of the exact context and the (embodied) response of their brains, based upon their biology and 
                                                          
66 Derrida more broadly sees a system of signifiers and signified (see Section 2.2). 
171 
 
previous experiences.  The context will include the other words in a sentence, paragraph or 
discussion, the exact tone, the body language and relationships of those involved, the 
understanding of roles (e.g. teacher, student) that people have.  These influences, and many 
others, have a material basis in the specifics of the moment.  We do not process the material 
context in an exhaustive way, we simply respond to the patterns of stimuli.  Thus whilst we 
might discuss the relationship between two people, in a particular moment this is manifest in 
the response of one person to another, more fundamentally the pattern of light and sound 
from that person.  So too will expectation of roles be emergent from the brain patterns and 
details of the moment.  Relationships and expectations have a material basis, although we 
doŶ͛t deal ǁith theŵ oŶ this leǀel. 
Furthermore, an incidence of a particular word in a particular context is not just something 
people respond to, they also learn from it.  The way that the word is spelt, pronounced and 
used is also part of the learning: part of the experience which will lead to neural adaptation.  
From hearing or seeing a word used it is possible for a learner to begin to understand its 
pattern of usage.  Repeated use and exposure to the contexts in which it is used allows more 
nuanced understandings.  The learner may then go on to use the word themselves, thus 
reproducing the sound or pattern of ink.  The insight of post-structuralist thinkers such as 
Derrida is that our linguistic systems do not have access to a realm of truth (see section 2.2).  
We have recovered this insight without the need for a troubled metaphysics or constant 
deferral of meaning.  It is not just the post-structuralist tradition that has cast doubt on 
language being directly representative of the world however: 
͞Foƌ a laƌge Đlass of Đases of the eŵploǇŵeŶt of the ǁoƌd ͚ŵeaŶiŶg͛—though not for 
all—this way can be explained in this way: the meaning of a word is its use in the 
laŶguage͟ WittgeŶsteiŶ ;ϮϬϬϵ [ϭϵϱϯ], p. 43) 
Characterising words and linguistic forms as having a complex correspondence with the world 
allows us to see language as a complex system itself (‘ąĐzaszek-Leonardi & Kelso, 2008).  
However, by adopting a Deleuzian frame we are able to see symbols, words and linguistic 
forms as material.  As such, language can be seen to evolve as part of the material world, with 
people recognising, reproducing and adapting symbolic forms.   
Without fully entering into debates around language, the position being proposed here is that 
the pattern of a particular word comes to be recognised in relation to the contexts in which it 
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is experienced.  We have proposed that this is because these contexts result in adaptation of 
brain structures. 
So how should we characterise these patterns: words?  Firstly, we do not need to afford them 
an autonomous existence beyond specific contexts.  If all written instances and recordings of a 
word disappeared, and people who recall the word died, the word would cease to exist.  On 
the ͚huŵaŶ leǀel͛ ǁe eŶgage ǁith ǁoƌds as distiŶĐt eŶtities ďut Deleuze͛s iŶsight is that every 
instance of a word is diffeƌeŶt.  TheǇ do Ŷot peƌtaiŶ to aŶ Ideal ƌealŵ as Plato͛s ŵetaphǇsiĐs 
suggests, to a self-realising Spirit as Hegel has it, or to fundamental categories as Kant 
desĐƌiďes.  Woƌds aƌe ĐoŶstituted ďǇ the ͞diffeƌeŶĐe aŶd ƌepetitioŶ͟ that Deleuze ;ϮϬϬϰa 
[1968]) talks of.   
Words are not learned and (re)used by people in exactly the same context each time, but in 
contexts which are sufficiently similar to stimulate a response in the brain.  This 
characterisation of words has a synergy with complexity, as we see the persistence of forms 
but the potential for change.  For example, Larsen-Freeman (2012) draws on complexity theory 
in relation to language learning to propose that: 
͞ǁe should Ŷot thiŶk of ƌepetitioŶ as eǆaĐt ƌepliĐatioŶ, ďut ƌatheƌ ǁe should think of it 
as iteration that generates variation. Thus, what results from iteration is a mutable 
state. Iteration is one way that we create options in how to make meaning, position 
ourselves in the world as we want, understand the differences which we encounter in 
otheƌs, aŶd adapt to a ĐhaŶgiŶg ĐoŶteǆt.͟ ;LaƌseŶ-Freeman, 2012, p. 1) 
Each instance of a word is unique and has a unique context; equally, every brain that 
experiences a pattern has a unique history and neural structure at that moment.  Considering 
this, it is not surprising that new and novel interpretations, links and responses emerge.  Thus 
we might see human agency as the potential for emergence stemming from specific context 
and the specific histories of people present.  However, this is not to deny the potential for 
conscious manipulation of words.  In speech we can deliberately modify tone, volume, accent 
and written words can be given different styles, sizes, colours etc.   
To be clear about the argument so far, we are proposing that each instance of a word is unique 
and has a material basis.  The patterns of such words are recognised by humans because of 
their previous exposure to those patterns.  Words are repeated in similar but different 
contexts and as such the patterns of those words persist over time.  Shared understanding of 
words is therefore emergent from the use of reproduced patterns of those words.  The 
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response of each person to a word will depend upon the exact context and their embodied 
neural structure at that specific moment.   
Hoǁeǀeƌ, ǁe should Ŷot see ͚ƌespoŶse͛ as a ŵeĐhaŶistiĐ output ďased oŶ stiŵulus.  The 
response of an individual to a spoken word is related to their focus upon the speaker, 
relationship with that person, goals within the moment, understanding of roles, 
preconceptions about the situation and a myriad other considerations.  The ͚ƌespoŶse͛ of the 
listener is emergent from the material of the specific context and their embodied brains at that 
moment67.  Thus we are able to provide a material basis for human agency without diminishing 
the potential for novelty in any situation. 
Of course, word use does not constitute all of classroom practice.  The above was intended to 
provide an initial account of how words, as symbolic forms, have a material basis and a 
material influence: how they allow shared understandings yet allow novelty.  We must now 
expand this to consider less tangible patterns of behaviour and association.   
Whilst we have so far considered words, patterns of language might be best considered on the 
level of whole phrases, discussions or written texts.  Words are combined in a way that reflects 
the understandings and goals of the people involved and this provides a much larger scope for 
novelty and manipulation than using individual words.  We are here expanding our focus from 
a system of words, with their place in a sentence being considered as part of the context, to a 
focus on the broader system of language use.  We should be clear that we are therefore 
defining a different complex system, one which incorporates the use of words but also 
recognises the emergent influence of whole sentences, phrases, discussions etc.  In Chapter 6 
ǁe ǁill fuƌtheƌ eluĐidate hoǁ diffeƌeŶt ŵodels, of diffeƌeŶt ͚leǀels͛ of a Đlassƌooŵ, should be 
related.  Here it is important to show that emergence allows us to link different scales of 
analysis whilst recognising that this does not mean we can reduce one to another.  Whilst 
sentences are made of words, and therefore have a material basis, the influence of a sentence 
should not be seen as the aggregate of the influence of each word.  This is demonstrable by 
the use of the same word in sentences of very different meaning, and furthermore by words 
suĐh as ͚ŵateƌial͛ which have different meaning in different contexts. 
Patterns of word use: sentence structure and grammar, phrases, colloquialisms, all have a 
basis in the specific contexts in which they are used.  Again, the proposal is that these patterns 
need not be given an autonomous existence.  They are learned, repeated and adapted by 
                                                          
67 “ee ϴ.ϯ.Ϯ foƌ a ďƌoadeƌ ĐƌitiƋue of hoǁ ͚ƌespoŶse͛ is used ǁithiŶ this thesis. 
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people ǁithiŶ speĐifiĐ ĐoŶteǆts.  IŶ a Đlassƌooŵ, a phƌase suĐh as ͞I aŵ giǀiŶg Ǉou a Cϭ͟ ŵaǇ 
haǀe sigŶifiĐaŶĐe, ƌelatiŶg to the fiƌst ͚ĐautioŶ͛ iŶ a disĐipliŶaƌǇ sǇsteŵ.  Both teaĐheƌs aŶd 
pupils learn the usage and influence of such a phrase as it is repeated, and its usage is adapted 
to new situations.  Nevertheless it has a material existence in those specific situations, in 
written documentation and in the brains of people in the school.  We thus see that whilst 
phrases are less easily identified than specific words, they have a material basis and are 
learned, reproduced and manipulated in classrooms.  
It is easy to see that the analysis of words and phrases as material can be applied to 
mathematical symbols also.  Arguably, mathematical symbols have more specific rules for 
usage than words and we may thus see mathematics as a system with different dynamics to 
that of language.  Mathematical symbols have a correspondence to the material world in 
describing it, ďut it is also appaƌeŶt that, like laŶguage, ŵatheŵatiĐs ͚has a life of its oǁŶ͛: 
mathematical forms can be developed with very little correspondence to the broader world.  
Nevertheless, mathematics is manifest in the symbols which exist as patterns of ink, in 
computers and scratched on rocks, as well as in the brains of people who understand it.  New 
mathematical expressions are developed in relation to new contexts and this often involves 
the development of new symbols and terms.  Whilst far from a full account of mathematics, 
this highlights that symbolic systems of all types can be seen as having a material reality yet 
influence learning and action. 
5.3.3 Learning from Patterns 
In Section 5.2 we considered how behaviour might be learned from others, as well as from 
videos and media.  In this section so far we have considered how words and symbols are 
reproduced and manipulated within systems such as classrooms, and how they influence us.  
This has all been framed within the materialist position developed within this thesis.  We are 
now in the position to see how associations may be formed between behaviours, words, 
images and any other aspect of a classroom, and how these associations are reproduced. 
Recall the example of an association being made between the element copper and blue-green 
fireworks (subsection 5.3.1).  Complex materialism sees the heterogeneous aspects of a 
Đlassƌooŵ as haǀiŶg a ŵateƌial iŶflueŶĐe oŶ ďƌaiŶs aŶd ďodies.  “o the ǁoƌd ͚fiƌeǁoƌk͛, aŶ 
image of a blue-green plume in the night sky, a piece of copper and being in a science lesson 
ŵight ďeĐoŵe assoĐiated iŶ the eleĐtƌiĐal patteƌŶs of a pupil͛s ďƌaiŶ.  This assoĐiatioŶ Đould ďe 
reinforced by repeated exposure to these elements together, in presentation from a teacher, 
videos, activities which ask pupils to select from elements and colours, revision and 
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homework.  The point is that our brains are able to process these diverse elements, because 
what is actually being processed is a pattern of stimuli from the senses.   
As noted before, this is much more sophisticated than operant conditioning though.  Firstly, 
leaƌŶiŶg ďuilds oŶ eǆistiŶg assoĐiatioŶs.  “o a pupil pƌeseŶted ǁith the ǁoƌd ͚Đoppeƌ͛, a pieĐe 
of copper, the symbol Cu, or an image of copper filings, would all contribute to the association 
of copper with blue-green fireworks68.  This capacity for learning to accumulate is further 
highlighted when we recognise that older pupils are able to form associations just by being 
told something.  All literature is based on this very capacity to bring together new associations 
with nothing more than words.  The second distinction to be made between the picture of 
learning in this thesis and simple conditioning is that motivation, relationships, expectations, 
rewards and sanctions will all play a role.  These will condition the learning and reproduction 
of patterns of behaviour: object/equipment use, word use and associations.  The reward of a 
gestuƌe, ďeiŶg giǀeŶ a stiĐkeƌ oƌ heaƌiŶg ͞ǁell doŶe͟ ŵaǇ haǀe a sigŶifiĐaŶt iŶflueŶĐe oŶ 
consolidation of that particular behaviour and future goals in relation to it. 
Whilst the eǆaŵple of Đoppeƌ aŶd fiƌeǁoƌks is ƌelated to ͚ĐuƌƌiĐuluŵ ĐoŶteŶt͛69, we might 
eƋuallǇ ĐoŶsideƌ the foƌŵ of aŶ aĐtiǀitǇ.  Take the ŵuĐh oǀeƌused pƌaĐtiĐe of a ͚tƌue oƌ false͛ 
quiz at the end of a lesson.  Pupils learn the patterns of such events: that when they see 
seŶteŶĐes oŶ the ďoaƌd ǁith ͞tƌue/false͟ Ŷeǆt to theŵ theǇ Ŷeed to seleĐt oŶe of these 
options.  The response of a pupil to such an activity is a material response of their brains and 
bodies, within the specific context.   The repeated form of the activity is familiar despite it 
being applied to different subject matter, in a different time and place.  The pattern is 
͚ƌepeated ďut diffeƌeŶt͛ aŶd the ƌespoŶse is uŶiƋue to the circumstances.   
In recognising that our brains are dealing with heterogeneous patterns within the hodgepodge 
of classrooms we quickly lose the capacity to talk about easily definable patterns such as 
gestures, words and symbols.  So too do we soon exceed the capacity for simple experiments 
to support our arguments.  Our theoretical position explains why this is the case.  Each 
instance of a pattern, of an association between heterogonous elements, is unique, and we 
can only ever give a very general description of brain patterns or patterns in the broader 
world.  In Chapters 6 and 7 we will consider the implications of this for researchers and for 
teachers.  The argument of this chapter however is that complex materialism provides a 
theoretical basis for seeing how pupils come to learn from patterns within the material of 
                                                          
68 Whilst a mechanism for this lies way beyond the scope of this thesis, recall that Freeman (1999) 
suggests that new brain activity must be based on existing electrical patterns.   
69 See Section 7.3 for a discussion of the epistemology of curricula in light of complex materialism.  
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classrooms.  Shared understandings come from the behaviour of objects and people, but also 
the patterns of association between words, equations, actions, images, sounds and any other 
elements of the classroom.  Our brains respond to specific instances of these patterns and 
reproduce them, but this is not to deny continual novelty within a complex and dynamic 
system.  Characterising our brains as material systems which are continually processing and 
reprocessing stimuli allows us to see how we are part of the material world and so too are the 
patterns which allow our shared understandings.   
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5.4 Chapter Conclusion 
Here we will bring together the arguments across the last three chapters by summarising the 
position of complex materialism which has been developed, before considering the 
implications for researchers and teachers in Chapters 6 and 7 respectively.  
The problem posed by Chapters 1 and 2 was that of situating our understandings within a 
complex system such as a classroom.  Existing theoretical positions all have deficiencies in 
relating human understanding to the rest of the material world.  Learning, which we initially 
defined only as the development of understanding, is either characterised as a simple 
mechanistic process or neglected altogether by scientific accounts (Section 2.1).  Post-
structuralist thinkers (Section 2.2) see learning as complex and dynamic, and refute a simple 
relationship between the world and our understandings.  However, this becomes a limiting 
frame in which very little can be said beyond the difficulties of defining meaning.  In reaction 
to this, complex realists (Section 2.3) assert the importance of empirical evidence, but in so 
doing revert back to situating our understandings as somehow outside of the social systems 
they seek to investigate.  This is taken to extremes by social constructionists (Section 2.4), who 
favour mind and social understandings to the point that they neglect the real world altogether.  
From these issues we distilled the need for a theoretical position that accounts for the role 
that the real world plays in learning, that situates learning in relation to this real world and 
that is able to explain the relationship between our models of classrooms and the classrooms 
themselves.  Complex materialism is able to answer these requirements. 
In Chapter 3 we outlined a materialist position adapted from Deleuze.  This provided us with a 
way of seeing how our understandings could be situated within a complex social system, by 
recognising that our understandings are material and emerge from our experiences within a 
material world.  In a complex system, where nonlinear and dynamic interaction is taking place 
between our understandings and the broader world, it is untenable to situate our minds or 
ideas in some supernatural realm which only humans have access to.  Only by situating 
learning as a material process within a material world can you see how ideas and experience 
are related.   
As well as allowing us to see how understandings and experience are related, the materialist 
frame allows us to further escape the need for an inexhaustible system of relations in order to 
defiŶe ŵeaŶiŶg iŶ a Đoŵpleǆ sǇsteŵ.  Deleuze͛s positioŶ eǆposes the diffiĐultǇ of seeiŶg 
meaning as externally defined, beyond the specifics of each moment.  Whilst providing an 
advantageous position for considering learning within complex systems, our interpretation of 
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Deleuze alone was not sufficient to account for how learning emerges from experience.  The 
job of Chapter 4 was therefore to provide a specific process to support this. 
DƌaǁiŶg iŶitiallǇ upoŶ Cillieƌs͛ ŵodel of Ŷeuƌal Ŷetǁoƌks, ǁe shoǁed hoǁ ďƌaiŶs might be 
considered as pattern-processing machines.  Our neural structures and associated electrical 
activity adapts to the world around it, through the development of the body (nature) and the 
eǆpeƌieŶĐes ǁithiŶ a peƌsoŶ͛s life ;ŶuƌtuƌeͿ.  BǇ ƌelatiŶg this iŶitial ŵodel to a ƌaŶge of 
evidence from neurological studies, behavioural studies and cognitive science we developed a 
plausible account of how learning is the adaptation of brains and bodies within the specific 
contexts people experience.  This provided support for the materialist position, but also 
highlighted insights from complexity.  Firstly, that although learning is a material process in a 
material world, this does not mean that it can be reduced to material correlates.  Our 
understandings have a correlation to the material world in which they are formed but there is 
not a simple correspondence; theǇ do Ŷot ƌepƌeseŶt the ƌeal ǁoƌld ͚as it is͛.  Our 
understandings are complex and dynamic and so is the broader world in which they develop.  
Seeing learning as complex highlights its sensitivity to the specific context in which it takes 
place and also to the histories of pupils as they learn.  From this potential for novelty we began 
to recover a notion of human agency. 
However, accounting for the potential novelty of human learning and action in relation to the 
broader world begs the question as to how we come to have shared understandings.  This is a 
vital question in understanding education: how we learn what is already known by others.  
Chapter 5, this chapter, provides a broader view of learning from a material world in which 
there are shared understandings.  We explored how these understandings can be explained by 
patterns within the social world: patterns of behaviour, patterns of symbolic forms such as 
language and mathematics, but also patterns of associations between heterogeneous aspects 
of classrooms.  We learn from, reproduce and manipulate (both consciously and 
unconsciously) the patterns within the social world.  In drawing together Chapters 4 and 5 we 
can see that the specific contexts in which we learn, and specific histories we bring to those 
contexts, provides constant potential for novelty.  This includes the distribution of tasks 
amongst members of a group, the relationships, goals, motivations, schemas and expectations 
of the people in classrooms.   
Yet we have shared understandings because patterns of behaviour and associations are 
reproduced, albeit inexactly.  Within the complex materialist frame we again stressed our 
inability to reduce the social world to these patterns and expounded this further by 
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uŶdeƌliŶiŶg Deleuze͛s iŶsight that eaĐh iŶstaŶĐe of a patteƌŶ is uŶiƋue.  We Ŷeed not afford 
patterns a supernatural or autonomous status.  Whilst the social world is complex and 
irreducible it is nevertheless material. 
In defining complex materialism across Chapters 3, 4 and 5 we have therefore met two of the 
three criteria we set ourselves for a theoretical position equal to classroom learning.  We have 
situated learning as a material process within a material world.  In so doing we have 
characterised our understandings as having a complex and dynamic relation to the broader 
world.  However, in relation to the third criteria we are yet to fully expound how our models of 
classrooms should be characterised.  This is the basis of Chapter 6. 
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6 Implications: Understanding Classrooms 
6.0 Chapter Introduction 
At the end of Chapter 2 we argued that in order to meet the challenge of social complexity, a 
theoretical position must do three things: it must be able to account for the role that the real 
world plays in developing our understandings; it must situate our understandings relative to 
this real world; it must account for how our models and understandings are themselves within 
complex social systems.  So far we have situated learning as a material process within complex 
classrooms and this has allowed us to answer the first two challenges. We now turn to the 
challenge of situating our models of classroom learning, relative to classrooms themselves.  
As touched upon in 3.1.3, the solution will come from recognising our models as themselves 
specific and material, and therefore able to influence the broader world.  To establish this 
argument we will first of all show how models should be considered as material entities 
(subsection 6.1.1).  However, characterising models as material alone does not explain how 
models relate to what they model.  By ĐƌitiƋuiŶg DeLaŶda͛s aĐĐouŶt of ŵodels shaƌiŶg ͚virtual 
attractors͛, we will show how this thesis provides a better solution than is present in the 
existing literature (6.1.2).  The solution we will develop is that models reflect aspects of what 
they model through processes of their genesis.  Furthermore, they are judged to be similar by 
humans, who recognise and evaluate patterns between models and the modelled.  Thus we 
are able to recover the importance of empirical evidence in modelling, and the importance of 
constant critique in relation to the original phenomena (subsection 6.1.3).   
The characterisation of modelling (Section 6.1) provides the basis for discussion of how we 
should evaluate models of classrooms (Section 6.2).  We will begin by considering why 
modelling classrooms presents specific challenges over scientific forms of modelling (6.2.1) and 
ƌelate these to MoƌiŶ͛s (2007) Đall foƌ a ͞geŶeƌalized ĐoŵpleǆitǇ͟ ;see suďseĐtioŶ Ϯ.ϭ.ϭͿ.  By 
way of demonstrating how complex materialism approaches such a position, we will consider 
how it undermines focus upon a particular level of analysis (6.2.2), on defining boundaries 
(6.2.3) and on simple correspondence between models and classrooms (6.2.4).  We shall also 
discuss how teacher experience and reflection should be situated in relation to classroom 
learning (6.2.5). 
Thus the aim of this chapter is to show that our models of classrooms can be situated within a 
materialist frame and that doing so provides a number of advantages in relation to considering 
classroom learning.  
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6.1 Models as Material 
6.1.1 The Reality of Models 
We are now in a position to develop the argument first sketched out in subsection 3.1.3, that 
models are part of the material world and as such have influence.  The issue we outlined there 
is that having argued against our understandings having a special place in the world, or 
belonging to another realm, we need to account for how they relate to the world around us.  
We have already situated our understandings as within the material world (Chapter 3).  
Furthermore, we have suggested that our understandings are formed through experience in 
the material world (Chapters 4 and 5).  We must now explain how our models relate to the 
phenomena they model. 
FiƌstlǇ, ǁe ŵust ĐlaƌifǇ the teƌŵs ͚uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶgs͛ aŶd ͚ŵodels͛ aŶd the distiŶĐtioŶ ďeiŶg ŵade 
between them here.  In the introductory chapter to this thesis we adopted the term 
͚uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶgs͛ as suitaďlǇ ďƌoad to Đaptuƌe ďoth the ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶs that people within 
complex systems possess, and the representations people have of complex systems (see 1.3.3).  
In light of the position developed across Chapters 3, 4 and 5, we see that our understandings 
have a material basis and are always within complex systems. Understandings have been 
characterised as the configuration of the brain and body within a specific context.  Whereas 
understandings are associated with individuals, we defined models as also including verbal or 
written accounts or mathematical or computational descriptions of phenomena (see 1.3.1).  
GiǀeŶ the ͚flat oŶtologǇ͛ suppoƌted iŶ this thesis, ǁe ĐaŶ Ŷoǁ see ŵodels as also ďeiŶg ǁithiŶ 
the material world.  Our models are constituted by both individual understandings and the 
extended symbolic systems we use, including images, language, mathematics, computer code 
and art forms. 
This immediately stands against the implication from complex realists that our models can 
approach an objective reality, because we now see that both models and what they model are 
different material entities (see 2.3.3 & 2.4.4).  We are in agreement that social complexity has 
a reality and will support the call for empirical evidence in research (see 6.1.3).  However the 
subtle but important difference between complex realism and the position developed in this 
thesis is that we here reject the autonomy of social entities in and of themselves.  We cannot 
support the claim by authors such as Byrne & Callaghan that social entities across all scales 
have causal influence: 
 ͞The ƌeĐipƌoĐal/ƌeĐuƌsiǀe Ŷatuƌe of Đausality in complex systems is an essential 
characteristic of such systems and their relationships.  In the social world this is not 
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just a matter of individuals, the micro fallacy, but also of institutions and other social 
collectives having external causal powers in relations to entities which also have causal 
poǁeƌs iŶ ƌelatioŶ to theŵ.͟  ;BǇƌŶe & CallaghaŶ, ϮϬϭϰ, p. 180)   
To explain their position, Byrne & Callaghan give the example of how UK welfare reform is 
currently premised on getting more people into work, but this has a reciprocal causality with 
the Ŷeed foƌ a ŵoƌe ͚fleǆiďle͛ ǁoƌkfoƌĐe pƌepaƌed to do loǁ paid joďs.  Thus, theǇ aƌgue, theƌe 
is a reciprocal causation between the economic situation and the political drivers for change 
within the labour market.  If we take government policy and the labour market as social 
entities, they can be seen as influencing each other.  To develop an example more relevant to 
this thesis, consider the influence of a change in educational policy on an individual classroom.  
UŶdeƌ BǇƌŶe & CallaghaŶ͛s foƌŵulatioŶ ǁe ŵight see a ƌeĐipƌoĐal ĐausalitǇ ďetǁeeŶ poliĐǇ 
makers and classroom practice.   
There is indeed causal influence between policy and practice, but this is not because of the 
autonomy of these aspects of the world.  The key is in recognising policy makers and 
practitioners as people who interact with (and within) the material world.  A politician will be 
influenced by their understanding of classroom practice and this understanding should be seen 
as having developed through their direct experiences, discussions and engagement with other 
artefacts.  Policy writing is a response to the context, conditioned by these experiences.  As we 
know, policy is written without exhaustive experience of classrooms.  Conversely, a teacher 
will respond to a policy based upon their impressions of it (including its technical aspects, their 
attitudes to the policy makers, the responses of others etc.).  A policy is constituted by the 
understandings that people have of it and its encoding in symbols, media and artefacts in the 
material world.  
BǇƌŶe & CallaghaŶ talk of a ͞ŵiĐƌo fallaĐǇ͟ iŶ assuŵiŶg that the situatioŶ ĐaŶ ďe ƌeduĐed to the 
interaction of individuals and we have already agreed that this is not possible.  However, we 
do not need to afford social entities an ontological status as distinct from the material world.  
Complex realists give social entities causal powers because they are primarily concerned with 
upholding the capacity of social science methodologies to provide insight, and in order to 
aƌgue foƌ the iŵpoƌtaŶĐe of ƌelatiŶg ŵodels to the pheŶoŵeŶa theǇ ŵodel.  The desiƌe foƌ ͞a 
fleǆiďle ƌealist oŶtologǇ͟ is ďoƌŶ of the Ŷeed foƌ ŵodels to ƌelate to ƌeal pheŶoŵeŶa, ďut also 
an acceptance that the social world is complex.  However, there are two issues with their 
solution (detailed in Section 2.3).  Firstly, they do not go far enough in recognising that our 
models also need to be situated within those complex systems.  Secondly, they overstate the 
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reality of social entities by giving them causal powers of their own, rather than recognising the 
key role that humans play.  This has the potential to obfuscate the situation at hand. 
A hypothetical example will help to explain this second point.  Take a study of a particular 
school in which the performance in summative exams of each pupil at 16 years of age is 
compared to their performance in exams at 11 years old.  Using national data would allow the 
ĐalĐulatioŶ of a ͚ǀalue added͛ sĐoƌe foƌ eaĐh pupil, Đoŵpaƌed to aǀeƌage pƌogress made by 
pupils nationally.  If those value added scores were then related to the classes pupils had been 
iŶ ďetǁeeŶ the ages of ϭϭ aŶd ϭϲ ǁe Đould use ƌegƌessioŶ aŶalǇsis to deǀelop aŶ ͚iŵpaĐt 
faĐtoƌ͛ foƌ eaĐh Đlass.  IŶ this seŶse, a soĐial sĐieŶtist is able to claim that a classroom 
environment has an influence on pupil outcomes; a particular class may have scores 5% higher 
than average progress predicts.  Complex realists might therefore claim that by looking at the 
real system we can see the causal influence of class membership on pupils.  This is an 
abstraction however. 
Closer analysis reveals several modelling assumptions: that exam results alone indicate impact 
(which is not the same as learning); that it is just class membership that is having influence 
(compared to parental influence or attendance for example); that the average impact is 
meaningful; that regression allows the impact of having been in different classes over the 
years to be separated.  The actual influence of a classroom context on an individual is complex 
such that we cannot fully describe it.  Developing a relationship between class membership 
aŶd aǀeƌage ͚ǀalue added iŵpaĐt͛ theƌefoƌe is Ŷot us ĐaptuƌiŶg the ƌealitǇ of the situatioŶ: it is 
an abstraction, a model.  The point is that whilst the model has a relation to the system at 
haŶd, it does Ŷot ƌepƌeseŶt it ͚as it is͛.  It is poteŶtiallǇ haƌŵful to ĐoŶsideƌ a ŵodel as aŶ 
authoritative truth. 
How then should we characterise models?  A model has a material basis in the brains of the 
modellers and the artefacts and symbols they fashion, be they images, drawings, 
presentations, research papers, computer programs or even art forms such as sculpture, 
theatre or dance.  Models correlate to the phenomena they represent, but we should not see 
͚ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ͛ as a diƌeĐt liŶk ďetǁeeŶ the tǁo.  Models aƌe eŵeƌgeŶt fƌoŵ the thoughts 
and actions of people who experience a phenomena; they have a unique material reality of 
their own.  In subsection 3.1.3 we used the example of a photograph as a model of a scene and 
we can further develop that now.  At the moment a photograph it is taken the pattern of light 
is either incident on a film and causes a response of chemicals, or is incident on a digital sensor 
and causes an electrical current.  This is then processed by chemicals or computer to produce a 
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photograph.  There is no supernatural link between the photo and the scene at the time it was 
taken.  It is a material response, emergent from the complexity of the social sphere.  A 
computer simulation, verbal description or theatrical performance is not created in a specific 
moment as a photograph is, but nevertheless can be seen as emergent from the circumstances 
of its production.   
Models are material patterns within complex social systems, they have links to the phenomena 
they model but are not accurate reproductions of it.  We will develop the implications of this 
over the rest of the section. 
6.1.2 Models and the Virtual 
Seeing models as separate material entities begs the question as to why some models are 
better than others.  A first sketch of the solution to this was provided in 3.1.3 and rests upon 
our ability to recognise similarities between phenomena and models.  To develop such an 
aƌguŵeŶt fuƌtheƌ ǁe ǁill ĐoŶtƌast it to DeLaŶda͛s iŶteƌpretation of Deleuze, which is well 
respected within the complexity literature.   
IŶ ĐoŶsideƌiŶg ŵodels of Đoŵpleǆ sǇsteŵs, DeLaŶda ;ϮϬϭϭͿ takes Đues fƌoŵ Deleuze͛s 
extensive use of mathematical and topological concepts to relate virtual causes to phase-space 
and attractors (both introduced in subsection 1.2.1).  DeLanda argues that as a system 
develops, aspects of the phase-space are actualised, that is, the system develops according to 
movement within a space of possibilities70 (DeLanda, Protevi & Thanemet, 2004).  This space of 
possibilities contains ͚ǀiƌtual͛ attractors71 toward which ͚actual͛ systems tend.   
AttƌaĐtoƌs stƌuĐtuƌe the spaĐe of possiďilities aŶd so DeLaŶda uses Deleuze͛s ŶotioŶ of the 
virtual to assert the importance of attractors in guiding how the world (social and natural) 
develops.  This therefore provides an account of why there are repeated patterns in the world.  
The question to be asked though is how this avoids being another dualist account, requiring a 
supernatural world of attractors.   
͞The solutioŶ to this pƌoďleŵ, as DeLaŶda ŵakes Ƌuite Đleaƌ iŶ geŶeƌal teƌŵs, is to 
emphasize the notion of active transformation and to work out ways of recognising 
that ǁhiĐh is iŶǀaƌiaŶt͟ (Holdsworth, 2006, p. 147) 
                                                          
70 IŶ ƌelatiŶg ͚possiďilities͛ to phase-space, DeLanda attempts to remove the connotations of possibilities 
existing within another realm (see 3.2.5). 
71 As Ŷoted iŶ suďseĐtioŶ ϯ.Ϯ.ϱ, DeLaŶda ;ϮϬϬϮ, ϮϬϭϭͿ defiŶes attƌaĐtoƌs iŶ teƌŵs of ͞ĐapaĐities͟ aŶd 
͞teŶdeŶĐies͟.  ͞CapaĐities iŶǀolǀe a ŵuĐh laƌgeƌ set of possiďilities than tendencies because entities can 
eǆeƌĐise theiƌ ĐapaĐities iŶ iŶteƌaĐtioŶ ǁith a poteŶtiallǇ iŶŶuŵeƌaďle ǀaƌietǇ of otheƌ eŶtities.͟ 
(DeLanda, 2011, p. 20) 
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DeLanda is careful to promote the importance of genesis in all actual systems, which 
determines how they develop and what makes them individual.  He draws on both complexity 
theory and Deleuze͛s ǁoƌk heƌe.  IŶ ƌelatioŶ to the foƌŵeƌ, he Ŷotes that folloǁiŶg PƌigogiŶe͛s 
work we know that chance events or fluctuations cause structural changes (bifurcations), 
ǁhiĐh alteƌ the futuƌe tƌajeĐtoƌǇ of the sǇsteŵ.  IŶ adaptiŶg Deleuze͛s ǁoƌk, he aƌgues that: 
͞The ideŶtitǇ of aŶǇ ƌeal eŶtitǇ ŵust ďe aĐĐouŶted foƌ ďǇ a pƌoĐess, the pƌoĐess that 
produced that entity... When it comes to social science the idea is the same: families, 
institutional organizations, cities, nation states are all real entities that are the product 
of specific historical processes and whatever degree of identity they have it must be 
aĐĐouŶted foƌ ǀia the pƌoĐesses ǁhiĐh Đƌeated theŵ aŶd those that ŵaiŶtaiŶ theŵ.͟ 
(DeLanda, Protevi & Thanemet, 2004, p. 2) 
So DeLanda argues that there are attractors in the material world which condition, but do not 
determine, how an actual system will develop through chance events and historic 
contingency72.    
We aƌe Ŷoǁ iŶ a positioŶ to situate ŵodels ǁithiŶ DeLaŶda͛s aĐĐouŶt.  DeLaŶda ;ϮϬϭϭͿ 
explains that when a model reproduces the behaviour of a phenomenon, it is because the 
model and the phenomenon have similar attractors, despite different mechanisms of 
emergence.  
͞a ŵatheŵatiĐal ŵodel ĐaŶ Đaptuƌe the ďehaǀiouƌ of a ŵateƌial pƌoĐess ďeĐause the 
space of possible solutions overlaps the possibility space associated with the material 
pƌoĐess.  The tǁo possiďilitǇ spaĐes Ŷeed Ŷot ďe ideŶtiĐal… A suffiĐieŶt oǀeƌlap ĐaŶ 
nevertheless exist because the singularities that structure both spaces are 
independent of the causal mechanisms in a process and formal relations in an 
eƋuatioŶ.͟ (DeLanda, 2011, p. 19) 
Theƌe aƌe a Ŷuŵďeƌ of issues ǁith DeLaŶda͛s aĐĐouŶt of ŵodelliŶg.  Firstly, around exactly 
what attractors are; how are they manifest in the real world?  Secondly, around why they 
should be similar in systems with different processes of development; how do spaces of 
possibility overlap?  
IŶ DeLaŶda͛s aĐĐouŶt of ďifuƌĐation we see that tendencies and capacities change as the actual 
system follows a particular trajectory: 
                                                          
72 This ŵakes use of Deleuze͛s ŶotioŶ of ͚geŶetiĐ Đause͛.  “ee ϯ.Ϯ.ϳ. 
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͞ǁhiĐh speĐifiĐ distƌiďutioŶ of attƌaĐtoƌs a sǇsteŵ has aǀailaďle at aŶǇ oŶe poiŶt iŶ its 
histoƌǇ, ŵaǇ ďe ĐhaŶged ďǇ a ďifuƌĐatioŶ.͟ (DeLanda, 2002, p. 66) 
So attractors are dynamic and, we assume, historically and contextually specific.  This begs 
ƋuestioŶs as to hoǁ teŶdeŶĐies aŶd ĐapaĐities aƌe to ďe ĐoŶsideƌed as ͚ǀiƌtual͛ aŶd ǁheƌe 
attƌaĐtoƌs ƌeside.  “uĐh ƋuestioŶs aƌe uŶƌesolǀed iŶ DeLaŶda͛s ǁoƌk aŶd this leads to a 
suspiĐioŶ that DeLaŶda is ĐoŶĐeiǀiŶg of the ǀiƌtual as soŵe ͚otheƌ ǁoƌld͛, despite his Đlaiŵs 
that it is real.  It is also rather serendipitous that the contemporary notion of phase-space 
should describe the way the world works.  Byrne & Callaghan notice this also: 
͞DeLaŶda ;afteƌ DeleuzeͿ ŵakes gƌeat plaǇ of teƌŵiŶologǇ deƌiǀed fƌoŵ topologǇ 
including the notions of manifold, singularity and attractor.  For us this is a turn too far 
towards platonic assertion of the domain of mathematics as the doŵaiŶ of the ƌeal.͟ 
(Byrne & Callaghan, 2014, p. 157) 
DeLanda is trying to explain why phenomena and models of them have similar behaviours, 
despite upholdiŶg Deleuze͛s iŶsisteŶĐe oŶ the uŶiƋueŶess of geŶeƌatiǀe pƌoĐesses.  Whilst ǁe 
might propose that all ice has a tendency to melt in the same way, this does not explain why a 
computer simulation of ice melting runs as it does.  DeLanda (2002) develops the notion of 
͞ŵeĐhaŶisŵ iŶdepeŶdeŶĐe͟ to eǆplaiŶ that theƌe aƌe ŵaŶǇ diffeƌeŶt aĐtual Đauses ǁhiĐh 
would lead to the same emergent outcomes.  Interestingly, Sawyer (2004) independently73 
deǀelops the ŶotioŶ of ͞ŵultiple ƌealizaďilitǇ͟ to aĐĐouŶt foƌ hoǁ soĐial situatioŶs suĐh as 
͞ďeiŶg a ĐhuƌĐh͟ oƌ ͞haǀiŶg aŶ aƌguŵeŶt͟ haǀe ŵultiple Đausal ŵeĐhaŶisŵs ǁhich lead to the 
same state, yet may be wildly different.  Both DeLanda and Sawyer are seeking to explain why 
there are patterns in the world which, on closer inspection, emerge in very different ways.  
Hoǁeǀeƌ, iŶǀeŶtiŶg the teƌŵs ͞ŵeĐhaŶisŵ iŶdepeŶdeŶĐe͟ aŶd ͞ŵultiple ƌealizaďilitǇ͟ seƌǀes 
to highlight the problem rather than provide an explanation. 
Understanding the role of chance, history and context in the development of complex systems 
highlights a difficulty in explaining why we see similar forms in vastly different systems.  
DeLaŶda, iŶ dƌaǁiŶg oŶ Deleuze͛s ͚flat oŶtologǇ͛, ǁishes to aǀoid a ƌeliaŶĐe oŶ a ǁoƌld of 
͚possiďilities͛ ;see ϯ.Ϯ.5), or on a supernatural link between models and what they model.  The 
insistence on mathematical attractors being real and somehow common across systems does 
not provide an adequate replacement however. 
                                                          
73 ‘eĐall that “aǁǇeƌ ;ϮϬϬϰ, ϮϬϬϱͿ desĐƌiďes a ͚soĐial ŵeĐhaŶistiĐ͛ positioŶ ;see Ϯ.ϯ.ϮͿ. 
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6.1.3 Evaluating models  
IŶ suďseĐtioŶ ϰ.Ϯ.ϯ ǁe aƌgued that the ƌeasoŶ Pƌoust͛s Ŷaƌƌatoƌ is ƌeŵiŶded of Venice when he 
sees cobble stones is because his brain has a conditioned response to cobble stones that 
evokes ƌelated ŵeŵoƌies.  We thus oǀeƌĐaŵe Deleuze͛s Ŷeed foƌ ǀiƌtual differences by 
recognising the capacity of humans to respond to similar patterns.  This is also the key to 
describing the success of models.  In short, we recognise patterns which we consider to be 
similar.  
To describe why a model or description might apply to a number of different classrooms, we 
need to carefully delineate three influences.  Firstly there are processes of social reproduction 
which will result in classrooms containing shared features.  We touched upon these in Chapter 
5, where we considered replication of behaviour, expectations and associations.  Whilst we 
have only touched upon the processes involved, it is possible to see that classrooms look 
similar across the world partially because of replicated patterns of association: classrooms 
usually have desks, a teacher, a timetable and a curriculum.  People draw upon their 
experience and expectations in shaping their environment.   
The second influence on the success of models however is our capacity to recognise patterns 
between very different systems.  Returning to our simple example, recall that a photograph 
reproduces a pattern of light from the scene that it portrays; however in some circumstances a 
map would be more useful (see 3.1.3 and 6.1.1).  For a model or description of classroom 
learning to be deemed useful, it must have coherence with our experience of classrooms in 
some way.  The relationship between the model and the phenomenon is determined by us; we 
as observers conclude that the model and the phenomenon are similar in an aspect that we 
find important.  This can be explained by (but not reduced to) the responses of neural 
structure to similar patterns: patterns of light in an image; patterns of behaviour; patterns of 
association in a description.  So our brains allow us to see, and judge, coherent patterns in very 
different systems. 
The ƌeasoŶ foƌ ĐlaiŵiŶg oŶlǇ a ͚ĐoheƌeŶĐe͛ ďetǁeeŶ the ŵodel aŶd the pheŶoŵeŶoŶ is to 
allow for the all too common case that models do not correspond to experience in actual 
classrooms, but to other models and descriptions that have been experienced.  As we saw in 
ƌelatioŶ to sĐieŶtifiĐ ŵodelliŶg, the ĐoŶĐeƌŶ is ofteŶ foƌ aŶ ͚iŶteƌŶal ĐoŶsisteŶĐǇ͛ ďetǁeeŶ 
models rather than direct empirical evidence (Section 2.1).  Here we will support Byrne & 
UpƌiĐhaƌd͛s ;ϮϬϭϮ, p.ϭϮϰͿ aƌguŵeŶt ͞that ŵateƌialitǇ Ŷeeds to ďe ďƌought ďaĐk aŶd ŵade 
ĐeŶtƌal iŶ disĐussioŶ aďout soĐial ĐausalitǇ.͟  
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The third factor which relates models and the phenomenon they model is the process of their 
genesis.  In a photograph the pattern of light which is encoded in the photograph comes from 
the scene.  The pattern is an abstraction, not a full recreation of the scene, but it encodes 
something that we deem useful.  The best models have processes of genesis which draw 
salient features from the original phenomenon.  However we must remember that they are 
still abstractions and their value is still determined by us. 
Consider a researcher developing a network model of a classroom.  When the researcher 
draws a line between two people in a diagram, they are not representing a relation which 
eǆists ͚out theƌe͛ iŶ the ǁoƌld, oƌ oŶe ǁhiĐh eǆists iŶ aŶotheƌ ƌealŵ, theǇ aƌe pƌoduĐiŶg a 
ŵodel.  The liŶe, the ŵodel, is the pƌoduĐt of the ƌeseaƌĐheƌ͛s brain at the moment they make 
the link, and corresponds to a pattern they have seen, perhaps a teacher-pupil interaction.  
The researcher may make further lines, between symbols representing the teacher and other 
pupils, and produce a network model of teacher-pupil interaction in a lesson.  This 
hypothetical network model is built up by the researcher seeing repeated patterns within a 
classroom.  Of course, each teacher-pupil interaction is different in its detail, but the 
researcher nevertheless encodes them with a line.  Each of the three influences we have 
discussed plays a role here.  The teacher-pupil interactions are likely to be influenced by the 
expectations that teacher and pupils have, which in turn will be based upon their previous 
experiences.  Patterns such as raising a hand to speak, ways of responding to questions and 
eǆpeĐtatioŶs that teaĐheƌs haǀe ͚the aŶsǁeƌ͛ aƌe ƌepƌoduĐed iŶ Đlassƌooŵs, despite eaĐh 
instance being unique.  The researcher, based upon the understandings they bring to a 
classroom, will deem certain aspects of the classroom to be noteworthy.  They will then 
encode what they see in a line: a process of genesis by which a model is developed that the 
researcher considers to replicate a salient aspect of the phenomenon.  
To judge a model as successful, it must recreate some important aspect of the original 
phenomena.  In a materialist frame we can see that models and the phenomena they model 
are both material entities.  This means there is no link between models and a separate realm 
of ideas, nor do we need to claim that they have similar attractors in phase-space.  We just 
need one material entity to be similar enough to the other for our brains to have a similar 
response to them.   
We are thus in a position to propose that if a model recreates more of the original 
phenomenon, then we are able to judge it as a better model.  When a description of a 
classroom is based upon other descriptions of classrooms, rather than upon actual experience 
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within a classroom, we can see that the model loses its correspondence to classrooms.  This is 
Ŷot to saǇ that ŵodels ǁhiĐh ĐoŶtaiŶ ŵoƌe eŵpiƌiĐal eǀideŶĐe aƌe ͚ŵoƌe ƌealistiĐ͛ ;see Ϯ.ϯ.ϰͿ.  
Models are themselves material entities with their own complex dynamics.  However, we 
should evaluate models through comparing them to actual classrooms. 
͞IŶ shoƌt, the staŶdaƌd of judgeŵeŶt as to ǁhetheƌ the ŵodel is good oƌ ďad is 
grounded in how well the model answers our questions about the world of people, 
places, and things.͟ ;Casti, ϭϵϵϳ, p. ϰϲͿ 
6.1.4 The Ethics of Patterns 
Cilliers (2004) contends that modelling complex systems is necessarily an ethical act, because 
our understanding goes on to shape actions (see 2.2.5).  The position developed within this 
thesis provides a foundation for this claim, by showing how models are material entities 
themselves, situated within complex social systems.  So a model has the capacity to influence 
action because people are able to learn from the words and symbolic forms which constitute 
it.  Patterns of action and association that are encoded within a model may (or may not) be 
reproduced.  An account of the ethics of modelling classrooms lies beyond the scope of this 
this thesis.  Hoǁeǀeƌ, ǁe ǁill ďƌieflǇ shoǁ hoǁ Deleuze͛s positioŶ, which we have drawn on in 
developing a materialist position, supports the continual comparison of our models with the 
world we have experience of.   
Deleuze rejects the possibility of pre-deteƌŵiŶed ͚ŵoƌal͛ aĐtioŶ iŶ faǀouƌ of ͚ethiĐal͛ ageŶĐǇ iŶ 
each moment (Byrant, 2011; Spangenberg, 2009).  To return to the terms introduced in 
subsection 3.2.2, Deleuze suggests that ethical action is to be achieved through overcoming 
the ͞iŵage of thought͟ ďǇ eŶgagiŶg iŶstead ǁith ouƌ ͞iŵŵaŶeŶt͟ eǆpeƌieŶĐe74.  The point is 
that Deleuze sees our understandings as situated within a coherent system of thought which 
we all inhabit: 
͞It͛s just like theologǇ: eǀeƌǇthiŶg aďout it is Ƌuite ƌatioŶal if Ǉou aĐĐept siŶ, the 
immaculate conception, and the incarnation.  Reason is always a region carved out of 
the irrational – it is not sheltered from the irrational at all, but traversed by it and only 
defined by a particular kind of relationship among irrational factors.  Underneath 
ƌeasoŶ lies deliƌiuŵ aŶd dƌift.͟ ;Deleuze, ϮϬϬϰĐ, p. 262) 
                                                          
74 This ĐaŶ ďe ƌead iŶ seǀeƌal thƌeads iŶ Deleuzes ǁoƌk, aƌouŶd ͚desiƌe͛ ;“ŵith, ϮϬϭϭͿ, posiŶg ͚the ƌight 
pƌoďleŵ͛ ;BǇƌaŶt, ϮϬϭϭͿ, ͚eǆpeƌiŵeŶtatioŶ͛ ;JuŶ, ϮϬϭϭͿ.  “ee ϯ.2.3 for a fuller account of immanence in 
Deleuze͛s ǁoƌk. 
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If we focus on models, we ĐaŶ see that theǇ too aƌe ͞Đaƌǀed out of the iƌƌatioŶal͟ iŶ the seŶse 
that they are abstractions of the material world.  If we build models in relation to other models 
then, in Deleuze͛s terms, we ƋuiĐklǇ eŶteƌ iŶto aŶ ͞iŵage of thought͟ ǁhiĐh has Ŷo ƌelatioŶ to 
Đlassƌooŵs.  Deleuze͛s suggestion that ǁe should ďe ͞iŵŵaŶeŶt͟ to ouƌ eǆpeƌieŶĐes ĐaŶ ďe 
grounded in a more concrete account of how we should critically evaluate the relationships 
between our models and the classrooms they seek to model.   
This requires some clarification in relation to this thesis, where we have argued that people 
recognise patterns within the material; we need to consider how models relate to these 
patterns.  In Chapter 4 we considered how the brain adapts to stimuli and forms distributed 
representations of patterns in the world.  In Chapter 5 we then considered how these patterns 
are reproduced through our behaviour and symbolic language.  Although we may develop a 
model of a specific moment, most commonly researchers are trying to capture something 
which is common to different situations and therefore we can contend that models relate to 
patterns discerned in the world.  However we must clarify how seeking patterns in the 
material world differs from a positivist epistemology in which underlying relations or laws are 
sought.  Furthermore we must consider the ethical implication of seeking patterns in the social 
sphere. 
Whilst patterns have a material basis, they are never the same twice.  A key argument of this 
thesis is that ouƌ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶgs of the ǁoƌld Đoŵe fƌoŵ ͚diffeƌeŶĐe aŶd ƌepetitioŶ͛ of 
patterns in the world around us.  Patterns are therefore amorphous in the sense that they 
cannot be pinned down and fully described, despite their material basis.  Any act of describing 
a pattern we see in the world is therefore a model: an abstraction from experience.  For 
example, we might confidently propose a particular group of pupils will perform better than 
another group in academic tests, and this may be true over a number of tests.  The danger 
comes from therefore concluding that one group is necessarily better than the other (as 
happeŶs ǁheŶ ǁe laďel a gƌoup as a ͚top set͛Ϳ.  The piŶning down of a pattern of data into a 
model, and a label, has the potential to obfuscate understanding of how specific pupils in each 
group actually achieve comparable scores.  Furthermore, a teacher may treat the groups 
according to their label, or the pupils within the groups see themselves through that label.  The 
model, based on an abstraction becomes influential in itself.  
Complex materialism provides a basis for seeing that this is because a model is a material 
entity and has potential influence on the system.  However, our discussion of patterns does 
not imply that we can pin down the patterns which are reproduced and provide full 
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explications of them.  Each pinning down is the development of a model, and each model has 
the potential to obfuscate and do harm.  Patterns have a material basis but are irreducible and 
are constituted by a series of different but repeated instances, each in a unique context.  
Deleuze͛s suggestioŶ that ǁe should dƌaǁ oŶ ouƌ ͞iŵŵaŶeŶt͟ eǆpeƌieŶĐe ĐaŶ ďe iŶteƌpƌeted 
within this thesis as recognising that any model, any description of a pattern, is an abstraction 
and misses the complexity of the situation at hand. 
In this section we have characterised models as material entities which may themselves go on 
to influence action.  We will now turn to how characterising models in this way can help in 
investigating classroom learning. 
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6.2 Understanding Classrooms 
6.2.1 Models of Classrooms 
There is considerable work being done in developing methodological approaches in relation to 
complex social systems (e.g. Byrne & Uprichard, 2012, Edmonds, 2015).  Whilst this thesis is 
not primarily concerned with methodological issues, in this section we will draw together the 
insights which have emerged from the theoretical discussions thus far, with a view to further 
developing the implications of complex materialism75.  As such, this chapter and Chapter 7 take 
up the second focus of this thesis: evaluating the implications of complex materialism for how 
we consider classroom learning.   
Throughout this thesis we have been critical of accounts which draw upon complexity theory 
by attempting to adopt terms from the natural sciences and apply them to social situations.  
For example, in subsection 1.3.3, we argued that we cannot extrapolate from a concern for 
iŶteƌaĐtioŶs to ͞a Ŷeǁ, ĐoŵpleǆitǇ sĐieŶĐe of leaƌŶiŶg aŶd eduĐatioŶ͟ ;Jöƌg, Davis & Nickmans, 
2007, p. 145), and in 4.2.2 we saw that Engstrøm & Kelso (2008) move from espousing the 
utility of considering phase transitions to a claim that all binary opposites can be understood in 
this way.  The issue is that it is not enough to utilise the language of complexity or rely upon 
analogy or metaphor.  To describe classrooms as complex requires an explication of how 
emergence occurs in a particular setting.  Whilst the exact causal mechanisms will always be 
elusive, providing an account of what exactly we consider to be emergent, and what influences 
the situation, allows the development of models which can be evaluated through their relation 
to experience in classrooms. 
Developing models of classrooms presents specific issues which we have touched upon 
alƌeadǇ.  IŶ “eĐtioŶ ϭ.ϯ ǁe pƌeseŶted the pƌoďleŵ of Đlassƌooŵs ĐoŶtaiŶiŶg ĐoŶsĐious ͚ageŶts͛.  
We have now developed an account of how people within classrooms have distributed 
representations of the world, in that they are each conditioned by their past experiences and 
are sensitive to context.  Another key issue is how we might define the elements of a 
classroom within a model.  In building on a materialist position and developing an account of 
how symbolic forms and patterns of behaviour and association affect humans, we see that we 
cannot ignore discussion of meaning in complex social systems.  So whilst a network model 
might allow abstraction of an interaction between two people, that interaction will be defined 
by the meaning that each person attributes to it.  A researcher cannot reduce meaning to its 
material basis.  Over Chapters 4 and 5 we have seen that goals, motivations, relationships, 
                                                          
75 As will be discussed in Section 8.3, these implications can only be developed further in relation to real 
classrooms. 
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body language, mimicry, coordinated movement, position in a room, empathy, group 
structure, word distinction, and visual processing all influence human learning.  Complex 
materialism implores us to aĐĐept that ͚sĐieŶtifiĐ͛ appƌoaĐhes aƌe iŶsuffiĐieŶt iŶ desĐƌiďiŶg 
social complexity.  We cannot sit outside of a social system and reduce the understanding of 
others, nor can researchers escape their own interpretations of the situation at hand.  Every 
aspect of a classroom has a material basis yet we cannot engage with it in those terms.  We 
must engage with meaning ͚oŶ a huŵaŶ leǀel͛, drawing upon our own experiences and 
interpretations.   
Whilst we will not fully develop methodological issues here, we will draw attention to how 
complex materialism supports MoƌiŶ͛s ;ϮϬϬϳ, p.ϲͿ Đall foƌ aŶ ͞episteŵologiĐal ƌethiŶkiŶg͟ ;see 
subsection 2.1.1).  Complex materialism suggests that we will always see a situation through 
the lens of our prior experience and the patterns of understanding we have inherited.  It also 
highlights specific areas in rethinking how we characterise models.  We will develop this 
through the examples of how complex materialism allows us to reconsider levels of analysis, 
drawing boundaries and correspondence between models and variables.  We will then 
consider how teacher understandings, as a particular process of modelling, might be reframed. 
6.2.2 Levels of Analysis 
IŶ suďseĐtioŶ Ϯ.ϯ.Ϯ ǁe saǁ that Đoŵpleǆ ƌealists haǀe diffiĐultǇ iŶ ƌesolǀiŶg ǁhat ͚leǀel͛ of 
analysis should be considered real in social systems.  The issue at hand is that researchers 
ĐoŶsideƌ it iŵpoƌtaŶt to defiŶe a ͚leǀel of ƌealitǇ͛ upon which they focus their models.  For 
scientists this might be at the statistical level, the level of agents or the level of network 
relations (see Section 2.1).  Complex realists instead assert the reality of all levels of analysis, 
rejecting bottom-up and top-down approaches in favour of seeing real causal links between 
subsystems and with the environment (Byrne & Uprichard, 2012).  Within the literature there 
are a number of further attempts to resolve the issue of emergence on different levels of 
complex systems: Davis & Sumara (2006, p.ϵϭͿ ĐoŶsideƌ Đlassƌooŵs as ͞Ŷested͟ Đoŵpleǆ 
systems with different levels of reality developing over different timescales (see 2.2.2);  
DeLaŶda ;ϮϬϬϲͿ deǀelops ͞asseŵďlage theoƌǇ͟ ǁhiĐh aiŵs at aĐĐouŶtiŶg for how people, 
organisations, cities and nations can be seen as having mutual causal influence upon each 
otheƌ; “aǁǇeƌ ;ϮϬϬϰͿ desĐƌiďes a ͚soĐial ŵeĐhaŶistiĐ͛ aĐĐouŶt of eŵeƌgeŶĐe from agent 
interactions. 
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This thesis develops a different position.  By adopting a materialist frame we can see that at a 
fundamental level the complexity of a classroom should be seen as the interaction of matter76.  
However, humans cannot reduce classrooms to this level.  Instead we respond to, replicate 
and manipulate patterns of stimuli across all scales.  In Section 6.1 we developed this to argue 
that our models are all extractions which have their own existence.  The implication of this is 
that statistical equations, agents, network relations and macroscopic social entities (i.e. 
classrooms) are all human abstractions.  They have material reality in the brains and social 
aƌtefaĐts ǁe use, ďut theƌe is Ŷo ƌeasoŶ to faǀouƌ oŶe leǀel of ƌealitǇ oƌ fuŶdaŵeŶtal ͚uŶit͛ of 
analysis.  Complex systems are a hodgepodge of heterogeneous elements interacting across 
different temporal and spatial scales. 
Complex materialism thus frees us of the need to define a single level of reality within our 
descriptions of classrooms by recognising that all of our descriptions are abstractions.  The 
models discussed in Section 2.1 all have a specific focus: statistical relations; agents; network 
relations.  We must recognise that this is not because of the autonomous reality of these 
levels, although modellers may imply as such.  Instead this is born of the way the existing 
literature considers causal relations only on a particular scale.   
DeLanda (2002, p. 120) aƌgues that the ͞deduĐtiǀe-ŶoŵologiĐal appƌoaĐh͟ iŶ sĐieŶĐe ŵeaŶs 
that when B is seen to follow A, sĐieŶtists assuŵe A Đauses B.  Deleuze͛s ;1991 [1953]) reading 
of Hume suggests that these are instead regularities which result in an inductive link between 
them.  Here we can develop this further in proposing that seeing A followed by B allows 
adaptation of our neural networks to expect B each time we see A.  We can tentatively suggest 
that scientific models tend to focus on a single level of analysis because they are implicitly 
linked to an epistemology of discerning causal mechanisms.  Reducing a situation to a causal 
mechanism neglects the unique and historically contingent nature of complex systems.  So 
whilst a teacher praising a student may lead to a particular response, the response of other 
pupils in other settings might be vastly different.  As such, complex materialism promotes a 
rethinking of causal processes being focused upon a specific level of analysis and instead 
recognises the influence of heterogeneous elements across scales. 
6.2.3 Cases and Boundaries 
Social scientists are of course aware of the limitations of reducing situations to a single level of 
analysis.  Thus, approaches such as case study have been linked to complexity because they 
allow the influence of a greater range of heterogeneous elements on learning than many 
                                                          
76 IŶ the ďƌoadest seŶse of the teƌŵ ͚ŵatteƌ͛, to iŶĐlude light, eŶeƌgǇ, ǀiďƌations, etc. 
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scientific approaches would (Byrne, 2005; Hetherington, 2012, 2013; Haggis, 2008).  By 
allowing the influence of patterns of stimuli, this thesis supports the inclusion of a broad range 
of influences, on all scales, in describing how learning emerges.  However, whilst not 
necessarily focusing on a specific level of analysis, case study is still plagued by the related 
issue of defining boundaries:   
͞Paƌt of the pƌoďleŵ iŶ defiŶiŶg the Đase iŶ ĐoŵpleǆitǇ-theoretical research stems 
from the open, unbounded nature of a complex systems perspective, and relates to 
the problem of complexity reduction. Choosing boundaries to set around a case entails 
focusing in on particular aspects and thus excluding other aspects and therefore 
ƌeduĐiŶg the ĐoŵpleǆitǇ of the Đase.͟ (Hetherington, 2013, p. 79) 
Boundaries are usually cited in a temporal and spatial sense to define a system for study.  
Therefore when we focus on a classroom we set the systems of the whole school or the 
national school system as outside of the boundaries of study and ignore or reduce their 
influence.   
In subsection 2.2.3 we saw that Cilliers is careful to define boundaries when discussing 
complex systems, however in Chapter 3 we argued that when Cilliers draws on Derrida he 
elicits ŶotioŶs of ͚otheƌŶess͛ aŶd ǁhat is outside of the sǇsteŵ of ŵeaŶiŶg.  DƌaǁiŶg oŶ 
complex materialism we are now in a position to argue that such a notion of boundaries is 
outmoded and should be overcome.  Whilst Hetherington is careful to not define boundaries 
in a strictly spatial or temporal way, the implication cannot be escaped; her description 
invokes a sense of limits ǁhiĐh teŶds toǁaƌds igŶoƌiŶg the ͚gaps iŶ ďetǁeeŶ͛ ǁhat is ďeiŶg 
included in a case.  Reference to a boundary implies that we are capturing everything within it 
aŶd ǁe ĐaŶ Ŷo loŶgeƌ suppoƌt this ǀieǁ of ŵodels as ƌepƌeseŶtiŶg a Đlassƌooŵ ͚as it is͛.   
Recognising that a model is a separate entity to the phenomenon we are modelling highlights 
that it is an abstraction.  Once again drawing oŶ the diffeƌeŶĐes ďetǁeeŶ Deleuze͛s positioŶ 
and that inherited from Derrida (see 3.2.7), we are able to see that models are emergent from 
the contexts in which they are developed; they have an existence and influence of their own.  
Thus characterising boundaries as able to define what sits inside or outside of a model or 
description, rests upon a view of representation which can no longer be upheld.   
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6.2.4 Models Corresponding to the World   
Arguing against simple representation within models also changes the criteria for evaluating 
them, because we are no longer tied to each aspect of a model representing an aspect of the 
modelled system.  So in developing a network model to consider the influences on learning 
(Thagard, 1989) or to describe interaction in a classroom (Carolan, 2014) the links between 
influences or people need not be fully qualified and resolved and could, for example, be based 
on report of relationships by participants (Paradowski et al., 2012).  Likewise the use of 
parameters in dynamic coordination models to show phase transitions does not require 
specific understandings of the meaning of the parameters (see subsection 4.2.1).  So when 
Smith & Thelen (2003) explain the A-not-B eƌƌoƌ usiŶg a ͞dǇŶaŵiĐ field͟ oƌ Kelso et al. ;ϮϬϭϯͿ 
develop variables which model brain activity, but have no specific neurological correlate, we 
need not assume that one will be found.  These modelling features are abstractions.   
So too with dynamic systems models which describe interactions within the classroom. By 
developing coupled equations for the interaction of teacher and pupil, Van Geert and his 
colleagues have developed elegant models of scaffolding, whereby a teacher supports a pupil 
in learning (Van Geert & Steenbeck, 2005), of the development of reflective behaviour over 
time (Van Geert & Fischer, 2009; Fischer, 2008) and have modelled the developmental 
mechanisms described by Piaget and Vygotsky (van Geert, 2000; 2008)77.  These models, like 
dynamic coordination models, utilise parameters which need not have a specific correlate in 
the modelled phenomena: 
͞The poiŶt is Ŷot ǁhetheƌ pheŶoŵeŶa like ƌefleĐtiǀe judgeŵeŶt oƌ iŶtelligeŶĐe aƌe of 
the kind of physical phenomena the magnitudes of which demonstrably vary in 
accordance with a real-number line – it is most likely they are not.  What is at stake is 
whether variation in these phenomena can be sufficiently approximated by a real-
number line to make the application of dynamic systems model more than an empty 
exerĐise.͟ (van Geert & Fischer, 2009, p. 317) 
Dynamic systems models are deliberately non-representational, because this overcomes the 
need for simple causal mechanisms, instead recognising emergence from interactions and the 
eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt.  We ǁill ƌetuƌŶ to ǁhat ǀaŶ Geeƌt & FisĐheƌ ;ϮϬϬϵͿ Đall ͞uŶsoliĐited oŶtologiĐal 
Đlaiŵs͟ iŶ ƌelatioŶ to hoǁ ĐoŶteŵpoƌaƌǇ liteƌatuƌe ĐhaƌaĐteƌises ͚ĐoŶĐepts͛ ;seĐtioŶ ϳ.Ϯ.ϯͿ.  
Here though we are able to support the use of model parameters which do not have obvious 
                                                          
77 We will consider these development mechanisms further in subsection 7.2.4 
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correlates in classrooms, as well as rejecting the need to focus on a specific level of analysis or 
to define clear boundaries. 
6.2.5 Teacher Understanding 
There is an obvious tension between wanting models and descriptions to be supported by 
empirical evidence and the acceptance that models are abstractions, with elements that have 
no obvious link to the phenomenon being modelled.  The issue at hand is how we can generate 
models which are of greatest utility in describing classroom learning, without appeal to 
representation.  This is not just an issue for researchers however, and is of importance to 
teachers in evaluating and improving their lessons: 
͞EǀaluatioŶ is aďout ǁhat has ǁoƌked as a ďasis foƌ saǇiŶg ǁhat ǁill ǁoƌk͟ ;BǇƌŶe & 
Callaghan, 2014, pp. 195-6)  
This brings us to reflective processes such as those described by action research.  Without 
defining it fully here, action research can be seen as a cyclic process of teacher action and 
reflection on action, which is aimed at improving practice through better understanding it.  
AĐtioŶ ƌeseaƌĐh is seeŶ as a ͞liǀiŶg, eŵeƌgeŶt pƌoĐess͟ ;‘easoŶ & BƌadďuƌǇ, ϮϬϬϴ, p. ϰͿ, oƌ as 
deǀelopiŶg ͞liǀiŶg theoƌies of pƌaĐtiĐe.͟ ;Whitehead & MĐNiff, ϮϬϬϲ, p. ϮͿ.  This leads seǀeƌal 
authors to argue that it is complimentary to complexity theory (Davis & Sumara, 2005; Sumara 
& Davis, 2009; Phelps & Hase, 2002; Phelps & Graham, 2010; Boulton, 2011, Wood & Butt, 
2014).  These authors see our understandings as emergent within complex systems, which we 
have supported within this thesis.  However, they then make a leap in arguing that because 
classrooms are complex systems, we can best describe them through the emergent and 
participatory approach which action research implies.  This needs careful analysis.   
Both in relation to action research, and also in relation to case study (Hetherington, 2013; 
Byrne, 2005), it is argued that because a broader range of registers, across a broader range of 
sĐales aƌe iŶĐluded, these appƌoaĐhes aƌe ͚ŵoƌe Đoŵpleǆ͛.  As suĐh, it is Đlaiŵed that theǇ aƌe 
able to better model complex social systems.  In the last subsection we supported the 
importance of engaging with heterogeneous elements of a classroom.  However, a model 
being emergent from practice is not enough to guarantee it is a useful representation of that 
pƌaĐtiĐe.  The aƌguŵeŶt that a ͚ŵoƌe Đoŵpleǆ͛ ŵodel is ďetteƌ foƌ desĐƌiďiŶg a Đomplex system 
again implies representation (see 2.3.3).  In recognising models as material abstractions we see 
that a model being complex and a situation being complex does not mean that the former is 
best placed to describe the latter.  A football match and a thunder storm are both complex, 
this does not mean they are alike. 
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However, further dangers lurk in supporting models through appeal to their complexity.  For 
example, when Phelps & Graham (2010) use complexity theory as a justification for 
introducing ͞Ŷoise͟ iŶto Đlassƌooŵs: 
͞The ͚aĐtioŶ͛ iŶ aĐtioŶ ƌeseaƌĐh ŵight ďe ĐoŶĐeiǀed as aŶ eŶeƌgǇ iŶput, ǁhiĐh iŶ soŵe 
instances prompts a state of non-equilibrium. From this, new possibilities, and perhaps 
new stabilities, emerge. Thus, action research might be considered the vehicle to both 
pƌoŵote aŶd studǇ suĐh pƌoĐesses.͟ (Phelps & Graham, 2010, p. 511) 
Heƌe ǁe ƌeheaƌse the oďjeĐtioŶs to Daǀis & “uŵaƌa͛s ŶotioŶ of ͚ĐoŶditioŶs of eŵeƌgeŶĐe͛ 
which Phelps & Graham draw upon (see 2.2.2).  We cannot impose terminology and models of 
complexity on a situation and claim that they therefore represent the complexity of that 
situation (see 1.3.2).  There is no justification for trying to manipulate a system based on a 
general view of complexity.  Radford (2007) shows that action research actually aspires to 
control and simple causality, and that complexity theory poses a challenge to action research.  
Recognising models as real entities shows that an emergent model cannot be assumed to 
represent the system it emerged from, nor that it is a good model.  We must recall that each 
complex system is unique. 
With complex materialism as a theoretical basis, it is relatively easy to see that models do not 
provide simple representations of classrooms, because a model is a different entity altogether.  
What is less easy to resolve is how models relate to multiple instances of similar situations.  
Drawing on Chapters 4 and 5 we see that teachers will constantly be adapting to their 
experiences in classrooms, which leads to more nuanced and arguably more effective 
understandings and models over time.  How then are we to assert the importance of 
continually exposing models and understandings of classrooms to comparison with real 
classrooms, when we are also arguing that every classroom is unique?  
Haggis (2008) argues that in drawing similarities between cases we tend to develop 
͞tƌaŶsĐeŶdeŶt͟ aďstƌaĐtioŶs ǁhiĐh liŶk diffeƌeŶt ĐoŶteǆtual settiŶgs, for example when we 
code empirical data and assign a categoric similarity to two phenomena.  We decontextualize 
different events and ignore the differences between them.  Adopting the theoretical position 
in this thesis provides a basis for this in the adaptation of understandings and models to 
experience.  The key point is that our models emerge in specific contexts and are therefore in 
no way guaranteed to be useful in future contexts.  We must continually compare these 
models and the system at hand, in order to critically evaluate the model and its implications.  
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IŶ Deleuze͛s teƌŵs, ǁe should ďe ͚iŵŵaŶeŶt͛ to the situatioŶ at haŶd, aŶd see hoǁ it diffeƌs 
fƌoŵ the ͞iŵage of thought͟ ǁe possess ;see ϲ.ϭ.4). 
We have noted that there are processes which reproduce patterns of behaviour and 
association within the social sphere (6.1.3).  Yet these are linked by repeated but different 
processes of genesis, rather than by a universal law or mechanism.   Thus a model may develop 
over time which is useful in describing the patterns we see in classrooms, or in the broader 
world.  However this does not mean we have a more accurate representation of the real 
world.  Models are not just evaluated in relation to the systems they model, but also in 
relation to their coherence to other models, as well as in relation to the goals and experience 
of the person doing the evaluation.  Fads and trends within educational practice are not always 
based on evidence (see Goldacre, 2009).     
To answer the question posed at the beginning of this subsection, a call for empirical support 
for models can be reconciled with the acceptance of parameters which have no empirical 
correlate, through the recognition that all models are deficient.  Yet through continual 
evaluation of their utility (rather than their correspondence), we should be prepared to reject 
or adapt models and understandings in light of new experiences.  Teacher experience in 
understanding learning is therefore important, because the understandings teachers have will 
be constantly challenged by their experience in real classrooms.  However this does not 
guarantee a preferable view of learning.  In the next Chapter, we will consider contemporary 
views of learning in this light.  
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6.3 Chapter Conclusion 
In this chapter we have shown that our models and descriptions of classrooms should be seen 
as themselves part of complex social systems.  Models can be seen as abstractions within our 
brains and the broader material world, which emerge from our interaction with that world.  
This overturns a view of models as being direct representations of the phenomena they model 
and thus allows us to situate models within the frame we have called complex materialism.  
Models can be linked to the phenomena they model on three counts.  Firstly, in that people 
modify the world according to their understandings of it.  So classrooms come to have similar 
features and activities within them because pupils and teachers bring these expectations with 
them.  Secondly, in the best models there is some interaction between the phenomena and 
the model as it is produced.  A photograph captures light from a scene; a network model 
encodes a perceived connection between teacher and pupils.  However, this does not mean 
that a model is therefore fully representative of a phenomenon: it is an abstraction.  This begs 
the question as to how a model recreates something of what it models when it may take a very 
different form.  This brings us to the third link between models and the modelled: the capacity 
of humans to recognise patterns.  Across Chapters 4 and 5 we showed that humans are able to 
respond to patterns within heterogeneous elements of the social world.  In this chapter we 
have applied this in explaining how we come to judge diverse systems as related to each other.  
For example how a computer model or line drawing could be afforded a meaningful 
relationship to classroom learning.   
Models are thus evaluated according to their utility within the social sphere and this is a 
normative process.  This does not deny the importance of empirical evidence.  Generating 
models from processes which engage directly with classrooms is better than models which 
have only coherence with other descriptions of classrooms.  However, a model being itself 
complex does not mean that it necessarily captures the complexity of the original phenomena.  
“eeiŶg ŵodels as sepaƌate, ŵateƌial eŶtities uŶdeƌliŶes this poiŶt.  DƌaǁiŶg upoŶ Deleuze͛s 
ŶotioŶ of ͞iŵŵaŶeŶĐe͟ ǁe haǀe pƌoposed that ŵodels should ĐoŶtiŶuallǇ ďe eǆposed to 
critical comparison with the phenomena they seek to describe.  This does not entail every 
parameter of a model having a correlate with an aspect of a classroom, but it does mean that 
the utility of models in describing classroom learning is subjected to continual critique. 
In recognising that each instance of a pattern is unique we remove the connotation that 
models capture some universal quality of classrooms.  Furthermore, by asserting the 
importance of human pattern recognition in modelling, and indeed describing it in Chapters 4 
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and 5, we have overcome the need for DeLaŶda͛s ǀiƌtual attƌaĐtoƌs ǁhiĐh aƌe ĐoŵŵoŶ aĐƌoss 
diverse systems, or unhelpful ŶotioŶs of ͞ŵultiple realizability͟.  Thus ǁe haǀe deŵoŶstƌated 
that complex materialism, and considering models as material, has advantages over existing 
views of social complexity. 
In addition to theoretical advantages we have suggested practical advantages of such a 
position in relation to describing classrooms.  As well as judging modelling parameters by their 
utilitǇ ƌatheƌ thaŶ ĐoƌƌespoŶdeŶĐe, ǁe haǀe ͚opeŶed up͛ ŵodels to the inclusion of 
heterogonous elements of influence.  The requirement of focusing on a specific level of 
analysis is linked to a particular view of causality, inherent in viewing models as universally 
applicable.  So too have we challenged the notion of boundaries, which is impossible to sustain 
without connotations of representation.  In this chapter we have touched upon dynamic 
systems models, network models, case study and action research and begun to relate these 
approaches to the positon of complex materialism.   
Whilst not fully developing the methodological or ethical implications of complex materialism, 
this chapter has used examples to highlight hoǁ it ŵight alloǁ the ͞episteŵologiĐal 
ƌethiŶkiŶg͟ that MoƌiŶ ;ϮϬϬϳͿ Đalls for.  It has also answered the third criterion we set for a 
theoretical position equal to the challenge of describing classrooms in Chapter 2, by showing 
that a materialist position is able to situate our models of classroom learning within complex 
social systems.  This is advantageous to researchers and teachers alike. 
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7 Implications: Understanding Learning 
7.0 Chapter Introduction 
In Chapter 6 we situated models of classroom learning as themselves within social systems.  
We also explained how models of classrooms should be characterised as material entities 
themselves, and how they can go on to influence action and understanding.  As such we 
argued for the need to constantly critique our models of classrooms in relation to actual 
classrooms.  In this chapter we will consider existing notions of learning and compare them to 
the theoretical position developed in this thesis, in order to show how complexity sheds new 
light on learning within classrooms. 
Fƌoŵ the outset ǁe should ďe Đleaƌ that ͚applǇiŶg͛ a theoƌetiĐal positioŶ ĐaŶ only ever be a 
process of comparing existing models about the way a system functions with another model.  
Following the development of complex materialism in this thesis therefore, we are making a 
claim that a classroom is a hodgepodge of heterogeneous elements from which learning 
emerges.  In Chapter 4 we developed a model of learning as the adaptation of brain and 
behaviour to the experiences that a person has.  In Chapter 5 we also considered the role of 
repeated yet unique patterns in allowing shared understandings.  As such this chapter 
compares models of learning within the existing literature with the model of learning 
developed in this thesis: learning as nonlinear, material and contextual.   
In Section 7.1 we will consider existing models which characterise learning as a linear process.  
This ǁill ĐeŶtƌe oŶ ĐoŶĐeƌŶs foƌ ͚effeĐtiǀeŶess͛ iŶ the seŶse of leaƌŶiŶg oďjeĐtiǀes ďeiŶg 
fulfilled, or classroom processes identified as having a direct causal influence on outcomes.  
We will argue against this formulation of causality.   
Section 7.2 will challenge notions of learning as being primarily a process of mind.  We will 
dƌaǁ atteŶtioŶ to the iŵpossiďilitǇ of sepaƌatiŶg ͚ĐoŶĐepts͛ fƌoŵ pƌoĐesses iŶ the ďƌaiŶ aŶd 
body, but furthermore from material patterns in classrooms.  Indeed, some modellers 
deliberately avoid defining concepts on account of the difficulty in doing so.  We will show how 
Đoŵpleǆ ŵateƌialisŵ uŶdeƌŵiŶes eǆistiŶg ŶotioŶs of leaƌŶiŶg as ͞ĐoŶĐeptual ĐhaŶge͟. 
Finally, we will see how describing learning as nonlinear, and undermining the autonomy of 
mental concepts, challenges existing notions of schooling as the acquisition of facts and skills.  
We will build upon existing critique of the assumption that curricula represent the broader 
world (Osberg & Biesta, 2004, 2007; Osberg, 2005; Osberg, Biesta & Cilliers, 2008).  In doing so, 
we will deǀelop aŶ aĐĐouŶt of ͚eŵeƌgeŶtist ĐuƌƌiĐula͛ ďǇ situatiŶg eŵeƌgeŶĐe iŶ the 
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interpretation of curricula in classrooms, as well as seeing curricula themselves as within 
complex social systems.   
Thus the formulation of learning (Chapters 4 & 5) and the situating of models as material 
(Chapters 3 & 6) will be brought to bear on existing accounts of learning.  This will serve to 
both develop the position of complex materialism through its application (focus 1 of this 
thesis), as well as further expound its utility in relation to classroom learning (focus 2). 
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7.1 Learning as Nonlinear 
7.1.1 The Effectiveness of Activities 
As discussed in 1.2.1, the term nonlinear in relation to complex systems refers to the potential 
for multiple factors to influence a situation, such that we cannot attribute a single cause to a 
particular outcome: we cannot attribute a linear model of causality.  Because of this, a small 
input may (or may not) have a large influence upon a system, and this means that complex 
systems are unpredictable over long timescales.  In Chapter 4 we developed a model of 
learning as the adaptation of embodied neural systems to experience, and highlighted the role 
of context and history in the emergence of new electrical patterns in these neural systems. 
We are thus now in a position to underpin the argument made in subsection 1.2.5 that 
ĐoŵpleǆitǇ theoƌǇ offeƌs aŶ alteƌŶatiǀe disĐouƌse to the ͚liŶeaƌ͛ foƌŵulatioŶs of leaƌŶiŶg 
inherent in the National Strategies (DfES, 2003; Ofsted, 2010).  We are also now better 
positioned to argue against the conteŵpoƌaƌǇ foĐus upoŶ ͚eǀideŶĐe ďased pƌaĐtiĐe͛ aŶd the 
reliance upon monitoring and continual testing: 
͞the ǀieǁ that uŶdeƌlies these appƌoaĐhes is oŶe that ĐhaƌaĐteƌizes iŶdiǀidual studeŶts 
in terms of true scores on underlying latent variables, the variance of which is to a 
specifiable extent explained by the contribution of educational methods and practices 
that ĐaŶ ďe tƌeated as iŶdepeŶdeŶt ǀaƌiaďles͟ (Steenbeek & van Geert, 2013, p. 234).   
Radford (2008) also draws attention to this ͞pƌediĐtioŶ/control paradigm͟, which is centred on 
a ͚sĐieŶtifiĐ͛ appƌoaĐh to leaƌŶiŶg aŶd sĐhooliŶg.  To develop the challenge that complexity 
presents to such discourses we will consider ŶotioŶs of ͚effeĐtiǀeŶess͛ ǁhiĐh peƌǀade the 
education literature.  There are however, different accounts of effectiveness and here we shall 
draw on two: firstly a model of effectiveness in the specific area of practical investigations in 
school science and secondly to the statistical analysis of classroom practice. 
As an example of effectiveness in classrooms, Millar and Abrahams (2009) discuss practical 
work in school science.  They use the model in Figure 7a to describe effectiveness.  
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The objectives are what the teacher 
intends the pupils to learn, although this 
may be only implicitly stated.  These are 
then used to design an activity or task.  
When the activity is implemented, we are 
able to observe pupils and can then judge 
how closely pupil actions match what it 
was intended for them to do.  Millar and 
Abrahams label this as the first type of 
effectiveness in Figure 7a.  However, they 
note that when people talk of the 
effectiveness of a teaching activity they 
are discussing the relationship between 
the proposed learning, the objectives, 
aŶd the aĐtual leaƌŶiŶg, oƌ ͚leaƌŶiŶg 
outĐoŵes͛.  This is deŶoted as the seĐoŶd tǇpe of effectiveness in the figure.  
Millar and Abrahams discuss the range of different objectives that science teachers may have 
in mind and also the difficulty of measuring effectiveness, especially within the context of a 
longer sequence of lessons.  However, their discussion simply does not go far enough in 
recognising the intricate, interlinked and unpredictable nature of learning in practical 
activities.  The learning that takes place will depend upon the individual histories of each of the 
learners, the dynamics of interaction in the room and the context in which the activity takes 
place, down to the words used and the weather outside. 
We should note that Millar & Abrahams are clearly distinguishing between what teachers 
intend to happen and what actually happens; they recognise that there is a difference.  What is 
drawn into question by complexity theory is the capacity to make a value judgement about 
whether the intended learning has taken place.  Complex materialism offers a theoretical 
model with which to counter the claim that teacher objectives can ever be matched by pupil 
outcomes.  Both are part of the same complex dynamic system, so whilst the teacher may 
develop a lesson plan (a model), it will be constantly interacting with the events in the 
classroom as they unfold.  Conversely, pupil actions will of course be influenced by teacher 
intentions, but not in a simple way.  Teacher intentions and pupil actions do not exist in 
different realms; they are part of the same real system.  As such, evaluating the relationship 
 
 
Figure 7a - Model of Effectiveness reproduced 
from Millar & Abrahams (2009, p. 60) 
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between objectives and outcomes in a classroom might be seen as akin to evaluating the 
relationship between a rain cloud and the atmosphere.   
Millar and Abrahams are both prominent figures in science education and as such it is not 
surprising that their model of effectiveness aligns with the process of hypothesis testing in 
scientific endeavour78.  However, their model of effective practical work in science is aimed at 
practitioners (it is published in a journal for science teachers), and it was written in response to 
a great deal of school science lessons containing practical work which did not aid in making 
links between skills and understanding (Hodson, 1993, 1996; Abrahams & Millar, 2008).  In this 
context it is useful in providing the starting point for teachers to consider how they use 
practical work in science lessons.  Aiming to improve the quality of classroom activities is not 
something we should shy away from and this illustrates the potential of a simplistic model to 
be useful. 
However, Millar & Abrahams appear to be conceiving of learning as the acquisition of 
knowledge or skills as the teacher intends.  Learning within a complex system is an emergent 
process and is therefore unlikely to result in the same knowledge or skill being developed by 
different people in different situations.  This account of effectiveness may obfuscate learning 
by insisting upon and measuring only some simplistic confirmation of what a teacher is looking 
for, such as a key word being used or them finding the ͚ĐoƌƌeĐt͛ ƌesults iŶ aŶ eǆpeƌiŵeŶt.  Paƌt 
of the issue therefore is that this model of effectiveness promotes teachers seeking control of 
learning and evaluating their lessons on the basis of pre-determined objectives.  There is 
furthermore a range of ethical implications to this conceptualisation of learning in classrooms.  
For example, teacher self-efficacy may be negatively affected if they continually see their 
lessons deviating from their predictions, or managers may rely too heavily on meeting 
objectives as a measure of teacher performance. 
To illustƌate this, ĐoŶsideƌ the UK OffiĐe foƌ “taŶdaƌds iŶ EduĐatioŶ͛s ;OfstedͿ suggestioŶ iŶ 
their Framework for School Inspection that: 
͞The ŵost iŵpoƌtaŶt ƌole of teaĐhiŶg is to ƌaise pupils͛ aĐhieǀeŵeŶt. Theƌefore, 
inspectors consider the planning and implementation of learning activities across the 
ǁhole of the sĐhool͛s ĐuƌƌiĐuluŵ, togetheƌ ǁith ŵaƌkiŶg, assessŵeŶt aŶd feedďaĐk.͟ 
(Ofsted, 2012)     
                                                          
78 HǇpothesis testiŶg is ŵost ĐoŵŵoŶlǇ aligŶed ǁith Poppeƌ͛s ;ϭϵϱϵ, ϭϵϲϯ, ϭϵϳϮͿ ǀieǁ of sĐieŶtifiĐ 
development. 
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The implication here is that it is ͚aĐhieǀeŵeŶt͛, ďǇ ǁhiĐh theǇ ŵeaŶ eǆaŵiŶatioŶ ƌesults, aŶd 
not learning that is important and that through effective planning and assessment this 
achievement can be furthered.  However, in practice, the majority of school policies respond 
to such statemeŶts ďǇ foĐusiŶg oŶ ǁhat is peƌĐeiǀed as taŶgiďle ͚data͛ to deŵoŶstƌate pupil 
progress.  Here we see: 
͞the teŶsioŶ ďetǁeeŶ ƌigoƌ aŶd aĐĐouŶtaďilitǇ thƌough staŶdaƌds, ďeŶĐhŵaƌks, aŶd 
high stakes testing on the one hand and more progressive, student-centred 
appƌoaĐhes to teaĐhiŶg aŶd leaƌŶiŶg oŶ the otheƌ͟ (DeBoer, 2002, p. 405)  
AŶ adǀoĐate of leaƌŶiŶg oďjeĐtiǀes ŵaǇ aƌgue that ǁith Đaƌeful ͚diffeƌeŶtiatioŶ͛ oďjeĐtiǀes ĐaŶ 
ďe ŵade loose eŶough to aĐĐoŵŵodate diffeƌeŶt leaƌŶiŶg, aŶd ŵaǇ eǀeŶ ďe ͚peƌsoŶalised͛ so 
that individuals each take something different from the activity.  In contrast to tight prediction 
and control therefore, we see another extreme in highly personalised learning.  Beighton 
(2013) uses Deleuze͛s work to question whether we can really achieve individualised learning 
in a complex system.  We interact with each other and with the world and as such complexity 
eǆposes ͞the flaǁed iŶdiǀidualisŵ iŵpliĐit iŶ the ďuzzǁoƌds of ͚diffeƌeŶtiatioŶ͛, ͚IŶdiǀidual 
LearŶiŶg PlaŶs͛ oƌ ͚peƌsoŶalisatioŶ͛ ǁhiĐh aƌe supposed to iŶfoƌŵ pƌaĐtiĐe ďut ĐaŶ iŶstead 
ŵake it seeŵ tƌiǀial oƌ eǀeŶ ďaŶal.͟ (Beighton, 2013, p. 1297).  Where personalised learning 
actually takes the form of pupils being assigned different tasks according to assumptions about 
theiƌ ͚aďilitǇ͛ ǁe see that theǇ aƌe still ƌeliaŶt upoŶ aŶ assuŵptioŶ of pƌediĐtioŶ aŶd ĐoŶtƌol 
that is disputed by complexity theory.  
We have shown within this thesis that learning is historicallǇ ĐoŶtiŶgeŶt, ǁith eaĐh pupil͛s 
neural network being different.  This makes them sensitive to context and explains why every 
pupil learns differently.  However, we have also considered the reasons for shared 
understandings: repeated yet unique patterns of association and behaviour.  Conditioning 
pupils to respond in a particular way is possible, but this does not capture the sensitivity of 
learning.   This is not to say that learning is intangible.  Many teachers are skilled at probing 
pupil responses to particular tasks and providing feedback which helps further development.  
What is being rejected here is the application of simplistic assumptions about learning as a 
linear and predictable process, and evaluation of lessons being reduced to a simple measure of 
͚effeĐtiǀeŶess͛. 
7.1.2 The Effectiveness of Classrooms 
As ǁell as the use of ͚effeĐtiǀeŶess͛ to deŶote the suĐĐess of aŶ aĐtiǀitǇ iŶ a lessoŶ, ŶotioŶs of 
͚effeĐtiǀe sĐhools͛ foƌŵ a pƌoŵiŶeŶt aspeĐt of the ƌeseaƌĐh aŶd poliĐǇ laŶdsĐape: 
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͞The peƌǀasiǀe disĐouƌse of the ͚effeĐtiǀe sĐhool͛ aŶd ŵoƌe latteƌlǇ the ͚sĐhool 
iŵpƌoǀeŵeŶt͛ ŵoǀeŵeŶt ǁith its dƌiǀe foƌ ͚ĐoŶtiŶuous sĐhool iŵpƌoǀeŵeŶt͛ – a 
slogan whose simplistic impossibility wound render it risible had it not been spoken 
seriously by so many otherwise rational professionals – may impose a narrowly 
iŶstƌuŵeŶtal oƌ teĐhŶiĐist ageŶda… ǁhiĐh supƌesses the seaƌĐh foƌ diǀeƌsitǇ, ĐƌeatiǀitǇ 
aŶd adaptaďilitǇ, theƌeďǇ ƌeduĐiŶg its effeĐtiǀeŶess.͟ (Watson, 2014, p. 27) 
Creemers and Kyriakudes (2008) desĐƌiďe ͚eduĐatioŶal effeĐtiǀeŶess ƌeseaƌĐh͛ as a field ǁith a 
history of over forty years.  Whereas Miller & Abrahams use the term effectiveness to denote 
͚aĐhieǀiŶg ǁhat is iŶteŶded͛, eduĐatioŶal effectiveness research incorporates the statistical 
analysis of different teacher and classroom practices against dimensions of interest such as 
attainment.  In this way they believe it is possible to elucidate what is effective and what is not 
and thus proceed to develop educational practice in a pseudo-scientific way.  
However, Creemers and Kyriakudes (2008) note that the initial optimism in this approach has 
waned and attempt to identify the reasons for this.  They identify six factors which were not 
originally foreseen within the field: 
1) Studies focusing exclusively on teacher effectiveness and those focusing on school 
effeĐtiǀeŶess ǁeƌe ďoth liŵited.  ͞IŶ additioŶ to the ŵultileǀel Ŷatuƌe of 
effectiveness, the relationship between factors at different levels might be more 
Đoŵpleǆ thaŶ is assuŵed͟ ;Cƌeeŵeƌs & KǇƌiakides, ϮϬϬϴ, p. ϲͿ 
2) Teachers and schools actually perform differently across different pupil groupings. 
3) DiffeƌeŶt ͚effeĐtiǀeŶess faĐtoƌs͛ suĐh as aptitude, iŶstƌuĐtioŶ, aŶd ͚psǇĐhologiĐal 
enviroŶŵeŶt͛ aƌe aĐtuallǇ iŶteƌliŶked. 
4) Effectiveness research has focused narrowly on mathematics and language 
acquisition because such things are more easily measurable.  Education actually 
has a range of objectives and as such more sophisticated measures must be used. 
5) ͚EffeĐtiǀeŶess faĐtoƌs͛ suĐh as assessŵeŶt poliĐǇ haǀe ďeeŶ seeŶ as 
͞uŶidiŵeŶsioŶal ĐoŶstƌuĐts͟ ǁheŶ iŶ faĐt assessŵeŶt poliĐǇ ĐoŶtaiŶs ŵaŶǇ aspeĐts 
such as design of assessment instruments, record keeping, reporting etc. 
6) Effectiveness research has focused on comparisons of schools at one or two points 
in time which is not sufficient to capture the dynamic nature of schools. 
Cƌeeŵeƌs & KǇƌiakudes ;ϮϬϬϴ, p. ϵͿ Ŷote that ͞TeaĐhiŶg aŶd leaƌŶiŶg aƌe dǇŶaŵiĐ pƌoĐesses 
that are constantly adapting to chaŶgiŶg Ŷeeds aŶd oppoƌtuŶities.͟  Yet ďƌaǀelǇ theǇ speŶd 
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nearly three-hundred pages attempting to show how statistical models could be made more 
sophisticated in order to capture this dynamic nature.  They develop a comprehensive list of 
the factors which might influence learning at the student, classroom and school level and 
explore the use of comparative, experimental and statistical approaches to identify the relative 
influence of these.  Despite enviable attention to detail, the view from complexity theory 
suggests that they are somewhat missing the point.  Educational effectiveness research is not 
up to the task of capturing the complexity of classroom learning.   
As outlined in the introduction to this thesis, the growth of randomised control trials 
(Goldacre, 2013) and meta-analyses (Hattie, 2008, 2011) within educational research appears 
to be in response to superficial monitoring regimes such as that of The National Strategies.  
However, these reductionist approaches, like educational effectiveness research can only be 
useful if embedded in an understanding of their limitations.  Cook (2012) argues that 
randomised controlled trials and meta-analysis can provide insights into what works, for 
whom, and in what contexts.  However, he cautions that:  
͞EduĐatioŶal eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶts aƌe Đoŵpleǆ, iŶǀolǀiŶg Ŷuŵeƌous iŶteƌǁeaǀiŶg faĐtoƌs aŶd 
the sometimes idiosyncratic behaviours of multiple individuals. Research itself is highly 
context dependent, and strictly speaking, no studǇ͛s ƌesults applǇ outside of the 
unique environment within which it was conducted. Therefore, evidence does not 
speak for itself – it requires interpretation in light of its original context, limitations, 
aŶd ĐoŶĐeptual fƌaŵeǁoƌk͟ (Cook, 2012, p. 468) 
Biesta ;ϮϬϬϳͿ adds to this the aƌguŵeŶt that foĐus oŶ ͚effeĐtiǀeŶess͛ iŶ eduĐatioŶal ƌeseaƌĐh 
overlooks any concern for what is desirable in education:  
͞The ŵeaŶs ǁe use iŶ eduĐatioŶ aƌe Ŷot Ŷeutƌal ǁith ƌespeĐt to the eŶds ǁe ǁish to 
aĐhieǀe͟ ;Biesta, ϮϬϬϳ, p. 10) 
He gives the hypothetical example of physical punishment improving performance, yet 
teaching pupils that violence is justifiable.  We are returned to our argument in Chapter 6 that 
all models have ethical implications.  If simplistic notions of learning become the primary 
understanding in classrooms or at the policy level then there is potential for real damage to 
pupils, teachers and schools.  Success cannot be judged by assuming data points on a line 
represent learning; complex materialism provides a theoretical framework which highlights the 
challenge to such approaches.  Learning is sensitive to context and history, but furthermore 
our models of learning are real entities which interact with classroom practice. 
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Complexity poses a challenge to assumptions of learning as predictable and controllable.  
However, narratives around educational effectiveness also rest upon an assumption that 
learning is about the acquisition of ͚ĐoŶĐeptual uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg͛.  We will now turn to situating 
͚ĐoŶĐepts͛ ǁithiŶ a materialist frame. 
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7.2 Learning as Material 
7.2.1 Mental Images 
The ĐuƌƌeŶt ŶatioŶal ĐuƌƌiĐula foƌ EŶglaŶd list the ͞ĐoŶĐeptual uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg͟ that pupils ŵust 
gain (DfE, 2013a; 2013b), exemplifying contemporary concern for concepts.  We have already 
touched upon how concepts and consciousness might be seen as emergent from neural 
networks (see 4.1.5) and elsewhere that ͞the Đoƌe of ouƌ ĐoŶĐeptual sǇsteŵs is diƌeĐtlǇ 
grounded in perception, body movement, and experience of a physical and social ĐhaƌaĐteƌ͟ 
(Thelen & Smith, 1994, p. 141).  However this begs the question as to how we might define 
concepts if they are seen as emergent. 
We shall flesh out the issue by here considering the theories of Bruner (1966, 1978, 1983) and 
Piaget (1929, 1951), who are highly cited within educational literature.  These do not present a 
single view of learning (Shayer, 2003), however we will tentatively suggest that they share a 
notion of mental representation in which there is some image of reality in the mind.  As will 
already be clear, direct representation is challenged by complexity because there can be no 
simple relationship between a representation and the represented.   
Bruner (1966) describes different modes of representation with which children reason.  
Enactive representation, which develops from birth, is conceived of as unconscious learning 
associated with muscle movements.  Iconic and symbolic representation however, which first 
appear in later stages of development, are characterised by a representation of the world 
which has some correspondence to it.  Whilst enacted learning might be thought of as the 
adaptation of biological responses, iconic and symbolic representations imply an autonomous 
mental world.  The neural network models considered in Chapter 4 do not directly question 
the presence of mental images; they do however situate them as emergent properties of 
distƌiďuted Ŷetǁoƌks of ŶeuƌoŶs.  This does Ŷot deal a deathďloǁ to the utilitǇ of BƌuŶeƌ͛s 
theory in describing how we learn, but it does undermine the autonomy of these mental 
representations and instead characterises them as emergent from interactions of matter.   
Things are not as clear cut when we consider the often cited work of Piaget.  Take his 
description of the inner world of a child: 
͞Theƌe is ĐeƌtaiŶlǇ pƌeseŶt to the Đhild a ǁhole ǁoƌld of thought, iŶĐapaďle of 
formulation and made up of images and motor schemas combined.  Out of it issue, at 
least partially, ideas of force, life, weight, etc., and the relations of objects themselves 
are penetrated with these indefinable associations.  When the child is questioned he 
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tƌaŶslates his thought iŶto ǁoƌds, ďut these ǁoƌds aƌe ŶeĐessaƌilǇ iŶadeƋuate.͟ 
(Piaget, 1929, p. 27)  
Here we see an account iŶ ǁhiĐh the ͞ƌelatioŶs of oďjeĐts theŵselǀes͟ aƌe ƌepƌeseŶted iŶ the 
mind and the implication is that there is a correspondence between the relations in the world 
and the ͞ǁoƌld of thought͟, although the relationship is not a clear one.  Piaget͛s ;ϭϵϱϭͿ stage 
theory of development also treats the manipulation of mental imagery and symbols as the 
pinnacle of development, suggesting that these are conceived of as processes in an 
autonomous mind.  We have already challenged the separation of sensorimotor learning from 
͚sǇŵďoliĐ͛ pƌoĐesses of solǀiŶg problems with gears or with links between words (see 4.2.2).    
However, the argument that Piaget sees the mental world as autonomous is obfuscated by his 
cautious hints that the biological molecule RNA might be the physical seat of learned schema 
(Piaget, 1974).  Whilst the suggestion itself has been discredited, this does illustrate that Piaget 
was not opposed to considering biological mechanisms underlying mental processes.  Van der 
Veer (1996) also notes that Piaget criticised earlier psychological models for not accounting for 
the genesis of thoughts and thus Piaget focused on how understandings (schemas) come 
about through new experiences.  Thus Piaget related both the brain and the broader world to 
the development of the mental world.  Much more of Piaget͛s ǁoƌk Đould ďe ƌelated to 
complexity 79  and of Đouƌse, ďoth BƌuŶeƌ͛s aŶd Piaget͛s ǁoƌk pƌe-date contemporary 
neuroscience.  Nevertheless, what is brought into question by this thesis is the autonomy of 
the mental world from the neural processes within the brain: we cannot see the mental world 
as sepaƌate fƌoŵ the ͚ƌeal ǁoƌld͛ aŶd Ǉet iŶteƌaĐtiŶg ǁith it.  IŶ light of ĐoŵpleǆitǇ ǁe aƌe 
forced to re-evaluate what concepts are. 
7.2.2 Conceptual Change 
The contemporary field of conceptual change is of particular interest here, because it deals 
directly with classroom learning.  Conceptual change literature is gathering pace, particularly 
within science education, where Duit (2009) catalogues over 8000 articles on the conceptual 
change of both pupils and teachers.   
di“essa ;ϮϬϬϲͿ Đhaƌts the deǀelopŵeŶt of ĐoŶĐeptual ĐhaŶge liteƌatuƌe siŶĐe the ϭϵϴϬ͛s aŶd 
explores how initial research on misconceptions gave way to more nuanced models of how 
pupils͛ naïve and implicit understandings affect learning.  Today, the field is considered to be 
divided into three approaches to considering concepts (Brown, 2013; Brown & Hammer, 2008; 
                                                          
79 For example Van Geert (1998, 2000) uses dynamic equations to ƌeĐoŶsideƌ Piaget͛s ŶotioŶs of 
͚assiŵilatioŶ͛ aŶd ͚aĐĐoŵŵodatioŶ͛.    
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Bereiter & Scardamalia, 2008; diSessa, 2008).  Firstly, there are researchers that focus upon 
misconceptions which are static, predictable and separable.  For example, many children 
believe that rays come from our eyes in order for us to see (Driver, et al., 1994).  Such 
ŵisĐoŶĐeptioŶs aƌe ĐhaƌaĐteƌised as ͚ďloĐkiŶg͛ fuƌtheƌ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg aŶd ŵust ďe ƌeplaĐed oƌ 
removed.  Such a view accounts for many studies in which pupil ideas appear to be resistant to 
change (Brown, 2013).   However, two new approaches developed as many conceptual change 
researchers moved away from this static characterisation of misconceptions.  Both approaches 
focus on a more dynamic understanding of pupil concepts which may contain a synthesis of 
learning with what are now called naïve concepts.  For example, when asked to draw the earth 
pupils will often draw a circle, but when then asked to draw a human they draw them on a flat 
surface within the circle (Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992).  Two different interpretations of this 
developed: on the one hand there are researchers who believe that pupils have a coherent 
understanding of the world, which is generated froŵ ͚deepeƌ iŵpliĐit ĐoŶĐeptioŶs͛; on the 
other hand are those that believe that children (and adults) have a range of fragmented 
uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶgs, kŶoǁŶ iŶ the field as ͞pheŶoŵeŶologiĐal pƌiŵitiǀes͟ oƌ ͞p-pƌiŵs͟ ;BƌoǁŶ & 
Haŵŵeƌ, ϮϬϬϴͿ.  Vieǁs of ŵisĐoŶĐeptioŶs as ͚oďjeĐt like͛ ďloĐks to leaƌŶiŶg, ĐoheƌeŶt sǇsteŵs 
of understanding and fragmented partial understandings are thus opposed within the 
literature.  The issue being that in empirical studies of what pupils say and do it is impossible to 
investigate how they are actually thinking.   
Complexity theory provides a dynamic perspective from which to re-examine these different 
positions: 
͞If ŵisĐoŶĐeptioŶs, sǇsteŵs of eleŵeŶts, oƌ fƌagŵeŶts aƌe ǀieǁed as dǇŶaŵiĐallǇ 
emergent structures, the oppositions are lessened, and the integrated view has 
sigŶifiĐaŶt iŵpliĐatioŶs foƌ theoƌǇ aŶd pƌaĐtiĐe.͟ ;BƌoǁŶ, ϮϬϭϯ, p. ϭͿ 
Thus, by seeing concepts from a complexity perspective, Brown sees them as sometimes 
fragmented and incoherent, but at other times manifesting as a coherent system of 
understanding (which may contain seemingly static misconceptions).  Brown & Hammer (2008, 
p. ϭϮϱͿ go as faƌ as postulatiŶg ͞ĐoŶĐeptual attƌaĐtoƌs͟ ǁhiĐh aƌe suƌpƌisiŶglǇ ƌoďust, aŶd that 
account for empirical evidence that learning is in many cases not pƌopoƌtioŶal to ͞iŶstƌuĐtioŶal 
peƌtuƌďatioŶ͟80.  So learning is a process of moving between semi-stable understandings, 
which may be fragmented and intuitive, or may contain seemingly entrenched 
                                                          
80 Heywood & Parker (2010) also defiŶe ͞ĐogŶitiǀe ĐoŶfliĐt͟ as teŶsioŶ ďetǁeeŶ Ŷeǁ eǆpeƌieŶĐes aŶd 
existing concepts in the classroom. 
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misunderstandings.  Seeing learning as emergent reconciles different theoretical positions 
within the conceptual change field, but also provides a hypothesis for the importance of 
context in learning. 
On the surface then, adopting a complex systems view appears to be a way to significantly 
advance the field by allowing a range of empirical results to be explained with a single model.  
However, without an adequate account of how concepts relate to the material world the 
ŵodel of ͞ĐoŶĐeptual attƌaĐtoƌs͟ ďeĐoŵes daŶgeƌouslǇ ǀague, aŶd ƌests upoŶ the teƌŵiŶologǇ 
of complex systems rather than a specific account of emergence.  We therefore need to 
consider how concepts relate to brains and the broader context of the material world. 
7.2.3 Concepts and Brains 
Within the conceptual change literature there are suggestions that concepts exist as a level of 
reality: 
͞ĐoŶĐepts aƌe eŵeƌgeŶt, aƌisiŶg fƌoŵ a self-organizing process that at a micro level 
(but at a level still above that of brain processes) consists of ideational interactions 
that are uncontrollable and unknowable.  And these are not insignificant variations 
that all behaviour exhibits (you never pick up a teacup in exactly the same way twice); 
they are the very essence of semantic interactions from which emerges a new 
organization of some part of the conceptualized world.  That is the irreducible 
complexity of conceptual growth, when viewed from the dynamic systems 
peƌspeĐtiǀe.͟ ;Beƌeiteƌ & “Đaƌdaŵalia, ϮϬϬϴ, p. ϱϬϲͿ 
Here concepts are situated above the level of brain processes but equally not at the level of 
behaviour.  We are thus left with an account of something seemingly obvious but difficult to 
pin down, namely consciousness.  We will not attempt to resolve the ancient problem of 
defining consciousness here.  However, we will challenge how contemporary educational 
literature separates concepts from the physical world. 
In order to develop this challenge it is worthwhile considering how neuroscientists 
ĐhaƌaĐteƌise ĐoŶĐepts.  We haǀe dƌaǁŶ heaǀilǇ upoŶ FƌeeŵaŶ͛s disĐussioŶ of eleĐtƌiĐal 
patterns in the brain (see Chapter 4).  He describes, in a rather general way, how mind is 
emergent from brain dynamics at multiple levels (Freeman, 1999).  Freeman also draws links 
to existing learning theories, for example in saying that his model of action-response in the 
limbic systeŵ ͞ĐoƌƌespoŶds to Piaget͛s ĐǇĐle of ͞aĐtioŶ, assiŵilatioŶ, aŶd adaptatioŶ͟ iŶ the 
seŶsoƌiŵotoƌ stage of Đhildhood deǀelopŵeŶt.͟ (Freeman, 2000, p. 4).  Without engaging with 
215 
 
this claim, the relevant point here is that neuroscientists tend to extrapolate from well 
understood processes in the brain, such as those in the limbic system, to explain a broader 
conceptual world, such as that described by Piaget (see 7.2.1). 
Along these lines, Gallese & Lakoff (2005) provide substantial and convincing evidence that 
concepts are embodied in the function of the sensory-motor system within the brain, 
suggestiŶg that ͞the seŶsoƌǇ-motor system has the right kind of structure to characterise both 
sensory-ŵotoƌ aŶd ŵoƌe aďstƌaĐt ĐoŶĐepts͟ (Gallesse & Lakoff, 2005, p. 1).  They survey the 
particular clusters of action-location, canonical and mirror neurons to support the conclusion 
that the brain function involved in ͚siŵulatiŶg͛ oƌ iŵagiŶiŶg a possiďle aĐtioŶ is ĐloselǇ ƌelated 
to the process of actually doing that action.  As such they develop a model for what they call 
͞aĐtioŶ ĐoŶĐepts͟ as iŶǀolǀiŶg the seŶsoƌǇ-motor system.   
However, they go further in proposing that many aspects of our conceptualisation of the world 
are linked to motor actions through references to movement.  For example, in considering love 
as a journey: a long and bumpy road; at a crossroads; partners going in different directions, or 
in notions of grasping an idea or ďeiŶg kiĐked out of Đlass.  TheǇ also ƌelate NaƌaǇŶaŶ͛s (1997) 
analysis of action metaphors in economic news: France falling into a recession, being pulled 
out by Germany etc.  Whilst our brains using the motor-sensory system to understand the 
world is plausible, Gallese and Lakoff stray into unfounded arguments when they claim the 
autoŶoŵǇ of ͞ďasiĐ-leǀel͟ Đategoƌies: 
͞We haǀe ŵotoƌ pƌogƌaŵŵes foƌ iŶteƌaĐtiŶg ǁith Đhaiƌs aŶd Đaƌs, ďut Ŷot ǁith 
fuƌŶituƌe iŶ geŶeƌal oƌ ǀehiĐles iŶ geŶeƌal.͟ (Gallesse & Lakoff, 2005, p. 467) 
These aƌe ͞the leǀel at ǁhiĐh ǁe iŶteƌaĐt optiŵally in the world with our bodies͟ (Ibid).  This 
quickly approaches a dualist ontology in which a priori mental categories represent the 
world81.  More practically however, the choice of what is fundamental seems somewhat 
aƌďitƌaƌǇ.  “uƌelǇ ͚dƌiǀiŶg͛ is a ŵoƌe fuŶdaŵeŶtal eŵďodied ĐategoƌǇ thaŶ ͚Đaƌ͛ as one can 
drive a car or a lorry through roughly the same sensory-motor understanding?  There are clear 
problems with the extrapolation from sensory-motor function to broader arguments around 
ǁhat Gallese & Lakoff Đall ͞Ŷatuƌal laŶguage͟.  Hoǁeǀeƌ, Gallese & Lakoff aƌe Đleaƌ that ǁe 
cannot view concepts as separate from our brains or surroundings, instead favouring reference 
to ǁhat theǇ Đall ͞sĐheŵas͟:   
                                                          
81 This appƌoaĐhes KaŶt͛s positioŶ. 
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͞We haǀe hesitated to Đall sĐheŵas ͞ĐoŶĐepts͟, siŵplǇ ďeĐause ĐoŶĐepts haǀe loŶg 
been traditionally thought of as being direct reflections or representations of external 
reality.  Schemas are clearly not that at all.  Schemas are interactional, arising from (1) 
the nature of our bodies, (2) the nature of our brains, and (3) the nature of our social 
and physical interaction in the world.  Schemas are therefore not purely internal, nor 
aƌe theǇ puƌelǇ ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶs of eǆteƌŶal ƌealitǇ.͟ (Gallesse & Lakoff, 2005, p. 468) 
Such accounts show that neuroscience supports an interrelation between brain, mind and 
behaviour.  This challenges any belief that concepts are autonomous or primary to processes in 
the material world.  Furthermore, it provides tantalising suggestions as to how our brain 
fuŶĐtioŶ ĐoŶtƌiďutes to the ǁaǇ ǁe thiŶk.  If aĐtioŶ ŵetaphoƌs ĐaŶ ďe ƌelated to ͚iŵagiŶed 
ŵoǀiŶg͛ ǀia the seŶsoƌǇ-motor system, then we can speculate that other aspects of the brain 
ŵaǇ ďe iŶǀolǀed iŶ ͚iŵagiŶed talkiŶg͛ oƌ ͚iŵagiŶed seeiŶg͛.  Thus ĐoŶsĐious thought is the 
embodied response of the brain to what might happen.  This is supported by the 
contemporary view that ďƌaiŶ fuŶĐtioŶs aƌe ͚ŵulti-ŵodal͛, that is, the saŵe sǇsteŵs aƌe 
deployed for multiple purposes (Gallesse & Lakoff, 2005).  However, these descriptions also 
highlight our inability to reduce concepts to neural processes alone.   
7.2.4 Concepts and Context 
Van Geert & Fischer (2009) argue that much of the literature on learning assumes that there 
aƌe ͚ŵeŶtal ŵeĐhaŶisŵs͛ ǁhiĐh Đause oƌ pƌoduĐe ďehaǀiouƌ82.  We here join them in arguing 
against the primacy of mental processes and the separation of thought from action.  There is 
Ŷo siŵple ĐoƌƌespoŶdeŶĐe ďetǁeeŶ ƌealitǇ aŶd ͚ŵeŶtal iŵages͛ ǁhiĐh diƌeĐtlǇ ƌepƌeseŶt that 
reality in the brain.  Synaptic adaptations allow for distributed representation such that the 
relationships between experience and brain structure is complex.  This suggests that whilst our 
concepts cannot be seen as autonomous mental entities, they cannot be direct 
representations of the world either.  Concepts are not a simple encoding of the way the world 
really is: they are distributed representations that allow us to function in relation to the world 
around us.   
͞if Ǉou ďelieǀe that usiŶg a ŵeŶtal teƌŵ suĐh as ĐoŶĐept autoŵatiĐallǇ ŵakes Ǉou 
adhere to the unproved belief that it is some internal representational engine that 
manufactures behaviour and problem solving, you are making an unsolicited 
oŶtologiĐal Đlaiŵ.͟ ;ǀaŶ Geeƌt & FisĐheƌ, ϮϬϬϵ, p. ϯϮϬͿ 
                                                          
82 In relation to this, ǁe touĐhed upoŶ ‘Ǉle͛s ;ϮϬϬϵ [ϭϵϰϵ]Ϳ ͞Ghost iŶ the MaĐhiŶe͟ aƌguŵeŶt iŶ 
subsection 4.2.3 
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In critiques of coordination dynamics models, these unsolicited ontological claims are often 
made in relation to the use of parameters which have no obvious material correlate (as 
discussed in 6.2.2).  Not only does the view of models developed in Chapter 6 support the use 
of such parameters, but we should also recognise that coordination dynamics models 
deliberately stand against reliance upon specific mental processes (Smith & Thelen, 2003; 
Beeƌ, ϮϬϬϬͿ.  These appƌoaĐhes see ͞deǀelopŵeŶt as ƌelatiŶg to peƌsoŶ-context assemblies on 
ǀaƌious tiŵesĐales aŶd leǀels of aggƌegatioŶ͟ (van Geert & Fischer, 2009, p. 327).  The 
characterisation of concepts as mental entities or simple representations is explicitly rejected 
within the field of coordination dynamics. 
Van Geert and his colleagues build models which account for the development of a person as 
specified by an arraǇ of ĐhaƌaĐteƌistiĐs iŶ ƌelatioŶ to a ͚ĐoŶteǆt͛; ďoth iŶdiǀidual aŶd ĐoŶteǆt 
are dynamically coupled and co-develop.  For example, Van Geert & Steenbeck (2005) develop 
a model of teacher support (scaffolding) in relation to empirical data from a class of 9 pupils 
aged between 8 and 10 years, within a school for special needs.  The model has obvious 
simplifications, with level of understanding being related to workbooks being used and pupil-
teacher interaction being purely one to one.  Nevertheless, such models show that learning 
can be described through the response of pupils within classroom contexts, without 
developing a specific account of concepts, relying upon mental mechanism, or even defining 
concepts.   
Having overcome the primacy of any specific level of analysis (see 6.2.2), we are in a position 
to argue that human learning is best seen as emergent from a range of different scales.  The 
teƌŵ ͚ĐoŶĐept͛ is too closely related to a dualist or dialectic position in which mental processes 
are separated from brain, but also from the contexts in which those brains act.  There is 
growing evidence that brain, body and behaviour are linked and researchers are developing 
approaches to viewing these as parts of one and the same system, overcoming the need to 
refer to concepts.  For example Fischer (2008) relates the punctuated development of 
connections between cortical brain areas with the development of cognitive skills over time.   
Another approach is to develop network models of the various influences upon a learner at a 
particular moment: 
͞foƌ thiŶkiŶg aďout eduĐatioŶal pƌoĐesses the ŵost useful tǇpe of ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ is a 
connectionist network in which all or some of the nodes are assigned identities as 
people, ideas, faĐts oƌ otheƌ ŵeaŶiŶgful eŶtities.͟ (Bereiter & Scardamalia, 2008, p. 
506) 
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Thagard (1989) develops perhaps the most comprehensive model of this type, in which a 
network represents the relationships between different propositions and observations that a 
pupil ŵaǇ ŵake.  EsseŶtiallǇ, the Ŷetǁoƌk theŶ settles oŶ a solutioŶ, a ͚deĐisioŶ͛, ďased upoŶ 
the coherence of propositions in the network.  Thagaƌd͛s ŵodel of eǆplaŶatoƌǇ ĐoheƌeŶĐe ǁas 
published with no less than 27 commentaries pointing out the difficulties with such a model, 
and is still the subject of critique (e.g. van Geert & Fischer, 2009).  However it does raise the 
possibility of seeing decision making as emergent from a range of heterogeneous influences. 
In the above quote, Beƌeiteƌ & “Đaƌdŵalia ĐhaƌaĐteƌise people, ideas aŶd faĐts as ͞ŵeaŶiŶgful 
eŶtities͟ aŶd heƌe theƌe is a teŶsioŶ ďetǁeeŶ ƌeĐogŶisiŶg that leaƌŶiŶg is eŵeƌgeŶt aŶd an 
epistemology which implies that facts are distinct entities, given a universal character.  We can 
only speculate as to how the focus on concepts as mental representations developed in 
history, but there appear to be traces of Platonic archetypes in which Ideal forms reside 
somewhere beyond the material world.  In a complex and material frame, concepts can no 
longer be seen as relating to some other realm, but nor can they be seen as primary to brain or 
to behaviour.  There are many aspects of our brain function which we are not conscious of, 
and there is some evidence that we only become conscious of decisions after our brains have 
made them (Soon, et al., 2013).  But whilst we might do without ͚concepts͛ at all, it is evident 
that conscious mental processes do exist. 
In this thesis we will only go as far as proposing that cognition is emergent from brain, body 
and context, and that ŵodels ǁhiĐh ƌelǇ upoŶ ͚concepts͛ aƌe ďƌought iŶto ƋuestioŶ ďǇ both 
complexity and materialism.  Considerable work is required to overcome reliance upon 
͚ĐoŶĐeptual uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg͛ iŶ eduĐatioŶ aŶd ƌeplaĐe it ǁith aŶ aĐĐouŶt of hoǁ leaƌŶiŶg 
involves brains, bodies and the context of classrooms. 
7.2.5 Concepts and Patterns 
In Chapter 5 we considered how pupils learn from context, and there concluded that patterns 
of behaviour and patterns of association are reproduced in classrooms.  Thus, in any attempt 
to ĐhalleŶge ͚ĐoŶĐepts͛ ǁe ŵust also consider these patterns within the social world. 
It is clear that mental processes are linked to our shared understandings.  People have internal 
monologues which rely upon language, and those linguistic forms are learned from the world 
around us.  Furthermore, our imaginations draw upon experience83.  If cognition is related to 
shared understandings (as well as brains, bodies and context), then this includes the unique 
                                                          
83 For example, the relationship between fiction and social understanding has long been acknowledged 
(Inglis, 1938). 
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but repeated patterns of behaviour and association that exist within the social realm (see 
Chapter 5).   
To account for these patterns, let us reconsider the eǆaŵple that ͚blue-green fireworks contain 
Đoppeƌ͛.  In the terminology used within this thesis (see Glossary), an individual pupil may have 
aŶ ͚uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg͛ of this association.  This understanding has a basis in the neural networks 
of that pupil; it is not an autonomous mental image.  When the pupil expresses this association 
through speech or a diagram, ǁe ǁould heƌe laďel that as a ͚ŵodel͛, ďeĐause it has a ŵateƌial 
existence beyond brain and body.  The model may affect other people, for example a teacher 
may respond to the words/diagram.  Hoǁeǀeƌ, ͚ďlue-gƌeeŶ fiƌeǁoƌks ĐoŶtaiŶ Đoppeƌ͛ is a 
stateŵeŶt of assoĐiatioŶ that is ƌepeated aĐƌoss the ǁoƌld.  IŶ this seŶse it is a ͚patteƌŶ͛ aŶd 
we have said that patterns are repeated but different.  In this case, the association may be 
related to vastly different fireworks, or expressed in different languages, media etc.  The 
association between blue-green fireworks and copper is a pattern which is manifest in a 
multitude of models and understandings.  Within a materialist frame therefore we are able to 
leave behind the connotations that concepts exist within an autonomous mental world and 
that concepts are universal or reside in some other realm. 
As was noted in subsection 7.2.2, the conceptual change literature struggles to define 
͚ŵisĐoŶĐeptioŶs͛, and ǁe ŵight teŶtatiǀelǇ suggest that this is ďeĐause ͚ĐoŶĐepts͛ aƌe ďeiŶg 
conceived of as being beyond the material world.  A pupil may ͚haǀe the ĐoŶĐept͛ that blue-
green fireworks contain copper but still ͚haǀe the ŵisĐoŶĐeptioŶ͛ that Đoppeƌ ŵetal itself is 
blue-green.  Only in a theoretical frame which aspires to universal ideas which are correct (the 
aĐƋuisitioŶ of ͚faĐts͛Ϳ do we need to separate out concepts and misconceptions.  In a complex 
and material frame we see that each individual has a unique understanding born of their past 
experience, and the models they present emerge within specific contexts.  Our shared 
understanding comes about through the repeated but different forms, behaviours and 
associations within the material world.  Recognising these patterns as such removes the need 
for concepts as universal mental entities which are acquired during learning.  Yet, reference to 
concepts is so engrained in the way we model leaƌŶiŶg that is it diffiĐult to ͚ĐoŶĐeiǀe of͛ 
education without it. 
Across Section 7.2 we have shown how learning involves brains and bodies engaging with 
material contexts, including the different but repeated patterns of abstract forms, behaviour 
and association which make up the human sphere.  In so doing we have seen how a materialist 
fƌaŵe plaĐes ͚ĐoŶĐepts͛ in contention: how they cannot be viewed as independent from 
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brains, bodies, contexts or the different yet repeated patterns which constitute social 
understandings.   
At the beginning of this section we highlighted the foĐus oŶ ͞ĐoŶĐeptual uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg͟ within 
the current national curricula for England (DfE, 2013a; 2013b).  In the next section we will 
explore how contemporary curricula characterising learning.  This will allow us to show further 
how a complex and materialist frame challenges existing models of learning as the acquisition 
of concepts. 
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7.3 Learning as Contextual 
7.3.1 Representational and Presentational Curricula 
Having aƌgued that ͚ĐoŶĐeptual uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg͛ is aŶ outŵoded ǁaǇ of ĐoŶsideƌiŶg cognition, 
we will here relate this further to processes of education.  We have already seen that learning 
is not a simple, linear process (Section 7.1) and that we cannot assume the primacy of a mental 
world, autonomous from brain, behaviour and context.  The view of learning as the acquisition 
of concepts is thus brought into question (Section 7.2).  However, we are reminded that 
learning and education are not the same things: education involves intention on the part of 
educators (Osberg & Biesta, 2008).  Therefore we should question not just how concepts relate 
to learning but also how they relate to education.  In order to consider how complex 
materialism furthers this argument we will dƌaǁ upoŶ Osďeƌg͛s ĐƌitiƋue of sĐhooliŶg as 
representational (Osberg, 2005; Osberg & Biesta, 2004, 2007; Osberg, Biesta & Cilliers, 2008). 
Mollenhauer (1983) argues that in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, children were first 
separated from the world they were to learn about.  Since that time, curricula have been 
developed which are aimed at providing children with the knowledge that they will require for 
their adult lives.  Education in most Western societies is concerned with the representation of 
the ͚ƌeal ǁoƌld͛ iŶ a ǁaǇ that alloǁs studeŶts to leaƌŶ aďout that ǁoƌld ͚as it is͛ (Osberg & 
Biesta, 2004).  Osberg, Biesta & Cilliers desĐƌiďe this as a ͚spatial episteŵologǇ͛ iŶ ǁhiĐh theƌe 
is a correspondence between the world and knowledge of it.  However, they go further in 
showing that not only the representation of a knowable world is brought into question by 
ĐoŵpleǆitǇ thiŶkiŶg ďut also ͚pƌeseŶtatioŶal͛ eduĐatioŶal pƌaĐtiĐes.  These aƌe pƌaĐtiĐes ǁhiĐh 
allow that pupils learn about the world bǇ iŶteƌaĐtioŶ ǁith it, oƌ ǁhiĐh aiŵ at a ͚Đultuƌal 
appƌeŶtiĐeship͛ as ǁell as a tƌaditioŶal kŶoǁledge ďase.  LeaƌŶeƌs aƌe Ŷot ǀessels ǁhiĐh ĐaŶ ďe 
filled up by experience in the real world but they shape the world as they interact with it.   
͞a ͚ĐoŵpleǆitǇ ďased͛ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of kŶoǁledge helps us toǁaƌds aŶ ͚eŵeƌgeŶtist͛ 
episteŵologǇ iŶ ǁhiĐh ͚the ǁoƌld͛ aŶd ouƌ ͚kŶoǁledge͛ of it aƌe paƌt of the saŵe 
complex system (rather than being two separate complex systems, which we 
somehow need to get into alignmentͿ.͟ (Osberg, Biesta & Cilliers, 2008, p. 223) 
Subject content therefore emerges from the particular educational context in which it is found.  
Osberg, Biesta & Cilliers advocate: 
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͞sĐhooliŶg as a pƌaĐtiĐe ǁhiĐh ŵakes possiďle a dǇŶaŵiĐ, self-renewing and creative 
eŶgageŵeŶt ǁith ͚ĐoŶteŶt͛ oƌ ͚ĐuƌƌiĐuluŵ͛ ďǇ ŵeaŶs of ǁhiĐh sĐhool-goers are able to 
ƌespoŶd, aŶd heŶĐe ďƌiŶg foƌth Ŷeǁ ǁoƌlds.͟ (Osberg, Biesta & Cilliers, 2008, p. 225) 
They aƌgue foƌ ͞emergent curricula͟ in which the specifics of what should be engaged with 
emerges through participation and context.  This is subtly different from interacting with a 
ǁoƌld ǁhiĐh is ͚pƌeseŶted͛ to pupils.   
Before considering how a materialist position furthers this argument, we must evaluate the 
characterisation of contemporary curricula that Osberg and her colleagues develop.  Osberg, 
Biesta & Cilliers recognise exceptions to simple representation in forms of progressive 
education.  However, they are not clear as to how we should situate the development of skills 
as part of curricula.  Take the example of the recently replaced science curriculum (QCA, 2007), 
which aiŵs foƌ a ďƌoad ͚sĐieŶtifiĐ liteƌaĐǇ͛ and promotes critical evaluation of scientific 
information in contemporary media84.  Simons & Olssen (2010) suggest that employability has 
become a key concern over the last two decades, and discourses around the ͚ĐoŵpeteŶĐǇ͛ of 
the future workforce.  The aspiration of ͚sĐieŶtifiĐ liteƌaĐǇ͛ ĐaŶ ďe ƌead iŶ these teƌŵs.  Whilst 
some aspects of curricula are not simply representational therefore, they still rely upon a 
projection of what will be needed in later life. 
We should also relate representational curricula to distinctions made between intended, 
planned, enacted, assessed, and learned curricula (Porter, 2004; Kurz, et al., 2010).  Osberg, 
Biesta & Cillieƌs͛ argument seems to be against representation within intended curricula 
whereas many teachers are aware that learning in school is not confined to what is intended, 
seeing their role within the holistic development of a young person.  Although this softens the 
edges of the argument it does not deal a knockout blow however.  Enacted curricula and 
schooling more generally are emergent, but this does not detract from their 
representational/presentational framing.   
7.3.2 Emergent Curricula 
The position developed within this thesis supports the rejection of representational or 
presentational curricula on the grounds that learning is contextual, but also that we can no 
longer see facts, skills and concepts as entities which exist beyond the material world and can  
                                                          
84 The new 2014 National Curriculum for Science (DfE, 2013a) reduces the scope for critical skills and 
returns to more prescriptive statements of knowledge, highlighting the continual relevanĐe of Osďeƌg͛s 
argument. 
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be transmitted or transferred.  This begs the question as to what an emergentist curriculum 
would entail though: 
͞Osďeƌg & Biesta ;ϮϬϬϴ, ϮϬϭϬͿ outliŶe a foƌŵ of eŵeƌgeŶtist ĐuƌƌiĐuluŵ… “uĐh aŶ 
emergentist curriculum is not possible in the current English system as external factors 
to the classroom, such as examinations and an imposed curriculum document ensure 
at least a degree of enculturation and goal-oƌieŶtated aĐtiǀitǇ͟ ;Wood & Butt, ϮϬϭϰ, 
p16) 
We haǀe alƌeadǇ aƌgued agaiŶst foƌŵs of ĐoŶtƌol aŶd assessŵeŶt ďased upoŶ ͚effeĐtiǀeŶess͛ 
(Section 7.1).  Thus we will look past the current, practical difficulties to consideration of what 
emergentist curricula might look like in principle, and how they could be evaluated.  Osberg & 
Biesta (2007) are clear that:   
͞aŶ eŵeƌgeŶtist ĐoŶĐeptioŶ of ŵeaŶiŶg is Ŷot suffiĐieŶt to release education from the 
logic of socialization/enculturation. Because the emergence of meaning cannot be 
separated from the emergence of human subjectivity we see that in trying to produce 
a certain kind of subject educators are still trying to reproduce a particular meaning (or 
set of ŵeaŶiŶgsͿ ǁhiĐh theǇ ďelieǀe is ͚good͛ oƌ ͚ƌight͛ oƌ ͚pƌopeƌ͛.͟ ;Osďeƌg & Biesta, 
2007, pp. 319-320) 
Whilst they recognise that enculturation cannot be escaped, Osberg & Biesta (2007) argue that 
the issue is with pre-planned enculturation, aimed at developing a particular type of person.  
IŶstead, if huŵaŶ suďjeĐtiǀitǇ is seeŶ as eŵeƌgeŶt theŶ ͞the Đlassƌooŵ ŵust ďe a spaĐe of 
diffeƌeŶĐe, of otheƌŶess, a ͚puďliĐ͛ oƌ ͚ǁoƌldlǇ spaĐe͛͟ ;Osďeƌg & Biesta, ϮϬϬϴ, p. 324).  In 
relation to the epistemology of schools, they suggest that:  
͞This eŵeƌgeŶtist uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of kŶoǁledge, so ǁe ďelieǀe, Đoŵes Đlose to keǇ 
iŶsights deǀeloped ďǇ Deƌƌida, uŶdeƌ the laďel of ͞deĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ͟ ǁhiĐh he defiŶes as 
͞the eǆpeƌieŶĐe of the iŵpossiďle͟͟ ;Osďeƌg & Biesta, ϮϬϬϳ, p. 44) 
We touĐhed upoŶ Biesta͛s ;ϭϵϵϴ, ϮϬϬϭͿ ƌelatioŶ of ͚otheƌŶess͛ to Deƌƌida͛s ǁoƌk eaƌlieƌ, aŶd 
highlighted the issues with it in relation to ethical action in classrooms (see 2.2.6 and 3.2.7).  
Without rehearsing these aƌguŵeŶts heƌe, the issue is iŶ ĐoŶĐeiǀiŶg of this ͚otheƌ͛.  Osďeƌg & 
Biesta (2007) advocate allowing for the unforeseeable, which sidesteps the metaphysical 
issues of ͚eǆpeƌieŶĐiŶg the iŵpossiďle͛.  Hoǁeǀeƌ oŶ this pƌaĐtiĐal leǀel ǁe aƌe still left ǁithout 
a clear way forward in allowing for the unknown. 
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Furthermore, there is a risk of throwing the baby out with the bathwater.  We are to assume 
that Osberg, Biesta & Cilliers do not wish to do away with all contemporary models in favour of 
a classroom in which meaning is completely freeform.  Osborne (1996) argues that we cannot 
expect pupils to rediscover the structure of the atom; we must accept schooling as an 
͚appƌeŶtiĐeship͛ iŶ ĐoŶteŵpoƌaƌǇ theoƌies aŶd pƌaĐtiĐes ǁhiĐh haǀe ďeeŶ haƌd ǁoŶ oǀeƌ 
history.  WithiŶ the ĐoŶfiŶes of a suďjeĐt disĐipliŶe theƌe ǁill ďe ͚ĐoƌƌeĐt͛ aŶsǁeƌs iŶ ƌelatioŶ to 
the solving of an equation, the number of wives Henry VIII had or the form of a Spanish 
phƌase.  It is iŶ the situatiŶg of these ͚faĐts͛ ǁithiŶ a dǇŶaŵiĐ ǁoƌldǀieǁ that complexity 
thiŶkiŶg ĐoŶĐeƌŶs itself.  Whilst ǁe ƌejeĐted the siŵplistiĐ ŵodel of ͞Ŷested͟ Đoŵpleǆ sǇsteŵs 
that Davis & Sumara (2006) propose, we can uphold their contention that curriculum 
structures and fields (such as mathematics) themselves develop over time (see 2.2.2).  The 
issue at hand is that we cannot see our curriculum structures as representational of the fields 
they are related to, or even assume that traditional school subjects are necessarily useful to 
pupils (divided into English, mathematics, geography etc.). 
This thesis provides a different way of looking at the issue.  In Chapter 5 we discussed patterns 
of behaviour and patterns of association which are recognised, reproduced and manipulated.  
In this light we can see curricula as the specification and encoding of the patterns which are to 
be reproduced.  However, in a complex materialist frame we see that each instance of a 
patteƌŶ is uŶiƋue.  This plaĐes the site of eŵeƌgeŶĐe ǁithiŶ the ͚diffeƌeŶĐe aŶd ƌepetitioŶ͛ of 
patterns within the classroom.  So the enacted curriculum is always emergent, because 
patterns of behaviour and of association are always unique, contextual and historically 
contingent.   
Curricula are also emergent from the social systems in which they are produced.  Whilst their 
authoƌitǇ ŵaǇ ďe seeŶ to steŵ fƌoŵ theiƌ ƌelatioŶ to the ͚ƌeal ǁoƌld͛, it is aĐtuallǇ iŵposed ďǇ 
government, examination boards or schools who determine the patterns which are important.  
There is perhaps hope in the realisation that curricula are always subverted in their 
interpretation in context.  Within this thesis we can characterise a curriculum as a model.  It is 
embedded within complex social systems and, at best, is a model with empirical referents to 
the world we are trying to prepare pupils for.   
Osberg and her collaborators are certainly right to argue against the assumptions of 
representational and presentational curricula.  However, by characterising curricula as 
emergent models we are also offered a way forward which does not rely upon what is 
uŶkŶoǁaďle.  If ǁe adapt Deleuze͛s ethiĐal positioŶ theŶ ǁe ĐaŶ aƌgue that oǀeƌĐoŵiŶg 
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representational curricula should be about comparing those curricula to our immanent 
experience of the world they seek to model (see 6.1.4Ϳ.  As ǁith Osďeƌg & Biesta͛s ;ϮϬϬϴͿ 
position, this would allow curricula which were responsive to an emergent and diverse world.  
Our curricula are models which will never correspond fully to the world they model.   
We can see that the patterns of schooling, encoded in curricula and policy, take on a life of 
theiƌ oǁŶ.  The ĐategoƌisatioŶ of kŶoǁledge iŶto sĐhool suďjeĐts aŶd the iŶĐlusioŶ of ͚faĐts͛, 
which have long since been rendered irrelevant, are reproduced within the educational 
system.  Beyond curricula we see that behavioural expectations, power relations, forms of 
assessment, pedagogy and many other aspects of schooling have their own patterns which are 
reproduced yet develop over time.  The patterns of schooling do not necessarily relate to the 
patterns of the broader world.  Without providing any empirical evidence here, we can 
propose that pupils will be learning from these patterns: they learn how to deal with school.  
Their experiences lead them to adapt their behaviours such that they give the right response in 
the right context, but there is no reason to believe this will help them in the future.  Whilst the 
adaptations of their neural systems will be carried into new contexts there is no guarantee 
that new context will trigger a useful response.   
The theoretical position developed in this thesis allows us to reject representational and 
presentational curricula.  However, by providing an account of the unique yet repeated 
patterns of schooling we can situate emergence within classrooms relative to historic patterns 
of ͚kŶoǁledge͛ aŶd ďehaǀiouƌ.  Thus ǁe ĐaŶ ĐƌitiƋue Ŷot just the episteŵologǇ of sĐhooliŶg ďut 
the patterns of educational practice more broadly.   
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7.4 Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter has shown how complex materialism challenges existing accounts of learning.  
However, we have also furthered the utility of the position by showing how it allows us to 
conceive of emergence in a more concrete way than existing views from complexity do. 
We have contrasted emergence to disĐouƌses of pƌediĐtioŶ aŶd ĐoŶtƌol iŶ ͚effeĐtiǀe͛ 
classrooms (Section 7.1).  Rather than relying upon a general account of learning as emergent 
however, we explained that each individual pupil will bring with them a neural network 
conditioned by their past experiences.  Thus, learning will be sensitive to these histories as well 
as to context.  Furthermore, a materialist position highlights the deficiency of comparisons 
between what a teacher intends and what actually takes place.  Teacher intention and the 
objectives they present are a dynamic part of the classroom system.  We also saw that 
statistical analysis is not up to the task of reducing classrooms to linear causal mechanisms.  
What is required is an acceptance of the unique nature of classrooms and the learning that 
takes place within them.    
The dynamics of learning were also contrasted to accounts of learning as the acquisition of 
concepts (Section 7.2).  We tentatively related concepts to dualist epistemologies in which 
ideas are separate from brains and bodies and considered how Piaget and Bruner situate 
abstract thoughts as belonging to a different category to sensorimotor actions.  Drawing upon 
Chapter 4 we challenged this separation of learning from brains and bodies, but also from the 
contexts in which people learn.  Therefore, we suggested that issues within conceptual change 
literature stem from the implication that concepts and misconceptions have an autonomous 
existence, and an epistemology of comparing them to truths which reside beyond the material 
realm.  We showed how using the language deployed in this thesis of understandings, models 
and patterns we are able to account for learning as a material process. 
However, learning is not the same as education.  In Section 7.3 we took up the challenge posed 
by Osberg, Biesta & Cilliers of considering emergent curricula.  This thesis supports the 
rejection of curricula as representations of the real world and instead advocates curricula as 
emergent within social systems themselves.  However, a materialist position, and the model of 
learning within this thesis, provides a more specific account of emergence in relation to 
curricula85.  Emergence is situated in the brains and symbolic representations of people, within 
the unique contexts of classrooms.  This provides an account of emergent curricula which does 
not rely upon the unknowable. 
                                                          
85 See subsection 8.1.2 for a concise account of emergence under complex materialism. 
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By seeing curricula as models of the world, as an encoding of patterns which are deemed 
important, we promote the critical comparison of these models to what they seek to model: 
the world beyond school.  Yet we also highlighted the fact that patterns of schooling take on a 
life of their own, and may be premised more on coherence with previous understandings than 
relation to the broader world.  
Overall then we see that complex materialism provides a frame for critiquing existing notions 
within education.  In Chapter 6 we saw that existing characterisations of models are brought 
into question and here we have challenged existing notions of effectiveness, concepts and 
representational curricula.  However complex materialism also provides an alternative picture 
of classroom learning, one in which the uniqueness of each context is to be engaged with.         
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8 Conclusions and Evaluation 
8.0 Chapter Introduction 
The two focuses of this thesis were to: 
1. Establish an ontological and epistemological basis for the application of complexity theory 
to classroom learning. 
2. Evaluate the implications of this theoretical position in understanding classroom learning.  
The position of complex materialism has been defined in order to meet the first focus.  This 
was developed across Chapters 3, 4 and 5 and is summarised in Section 8.1 below.  The second 
focus was resolved in Chapters 6 and 7 where the implications of complex materialism for 
considering classrooms and considering learning were exemplified.  In Section 8.2 we will 
evaluate how the position developed within this thesis relates to the existing positions 
discussed in Chapter 2.  This will show that it might be considered as an original synthesis 
between concerns across this literature and the materialist ontology which has been adapted 
from Deleuze.  In bringing this to bear on classroom learning we have developed a new frame 
for seeing learning as material, sensitive to context and historically contingent.  However we 
have only provided a theoretical account of this, drawing upon existing complexity models.  In 
Section 8.3 we will outline how both the theoretical position and description of learning might 
be furthered.  
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8.1 The Position Developed  
8.1.1 Complex Materialism 
In situating learning within complex social systems we can no longer support the separation of 
mind from the material world.  Assuming we believe in a real world, and we must, then any 
attempt to separate mind and matter is unable to account for how our understandings are 
constantly adapting through the physical stimuli that our brains receive.  Complexity theory 
puts in motion both the material world and our understandings and in so doing forces us to 
break the implication that there is a simple relationship between the two.  We have shown 
that the only way to resolve the relationship between the world and our understandings of it is 
to see the latter as every bit as material as the former.  It is absurd to assign our thoughts and 
ideas to some supernatural realm, to afford them a privileged position in the world or to 
believe that they are preconditioned by universal categories86.  This thesis offers a more 
elegant solution in that our understandings, like everything else, have a material basis. 
In light of complexity theory, materialism does not equate to reductionism however.  Learning 
within classrooms is emergent from the material world but we can never fully describe how.  
Complexity theory tells us that the finest detail, stemming from context or history, may 
influence a system.  We have evolved neural networks which allow us to adapt to experiences 
and thus carry that learning into new situations.  This characterises learning as the adaptation 
of neural networks to experience, which challenges views of learning as the development of 
aĐĐuƌate ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶs of the ǁoƌld ͚as it is͛.  Neitheƌ is leaƌŶiŶg the disĐeƌŶiŶg of siŵple 
causal links which exist in the world; it is the recognition of different events as similar enough 
to be considered a pattern.  In this way the human brain is able to deal with patterns across 
vastly different temporal and spatial scales; we recognise patterns and associations between 
heterogeneous elements of classrooms, be they facial expressions, position in the room, body 
language, words, mathematical symbols, images, sounds, equipment, feelings and anything 
else we can name.  When these are seen to all have a material basis, and our understandings 
to be a material response to them, the full complexity of human learning becomes apparent. 
Whilst the above provides an account of how learning is material and allows us to situate 
understandings within complex social systems, it is only part of the story in relation to human 
learning.  We learn from each other, both directly and through the symbolic and linguistic 
systems that have evolved within our cultures.  By characterising learning as the adaptation of 
brain and behaviour to patterns amongst heterogeneous elements of classrooms, we have 
                                                          
86 These positions relate to Plato, Hegel and Kant respectively. 
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already paved the way for considering how we develop shared understandings.  Learning from 
the natural world, from each other and from the world of symbolic artefacts can all be 
characterised as a fundamentally material process.  The key to seeing how we have shared 
understandings comes from recognising that the patterns of behaviour and association which 
we learn from are not exactly the same each time they occur.  Processes of replication mean 
that behaviour, symbolic forms (such as words and phrases) and associations are reproduced 
in new contexts.  However, these are deemed as repetitions in the eye of the beholder.  In this 
ǁaǇ the huŵaŶ spheƌe is ĐhaƌaĐteƌised ďǇ ͞diffeƌeŶĐe aŶd ƌepetitioŶ͟ ;Deleuze, ϮϬϬϰa [ϭϵϲϴ]Ϳ.   
We aƌe thus aďle to distiŶguish iŶdiǀidual ͚uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶgs͛ fƌoŵ ͚ŵodels͛.  Models may include 
the understandings of individuals but also the words, mathematics, computer programs, art 
forms and other symbolic artefacts which exist beyond brains and behaviour.  Models, like 
understandings, have a material basis and may (or may not) go on to influence the social 
systems that contain them.  This sheds new light on our models in general, but in this thesis we 
have focused on the implications of this for understanding classrooms.  Our models of 
classrooms are linked to those classrooms not through some supernatural connection, but 
through the processes of their genesis and through our evaluating them as useful. 
Complex materialism has at its heart the ontological claim that the world is composed of a 
single, complex system of material.  Through considering processes of neural and behavioural 
adaptation this is combined with an epistemological position which sees learning as the 
adaptation of understandings and models which have a material basis.  These models and 
understandings are not related to another realm of truth, universal ideas or a priori categories 
of reality, they are constantly adapting in relation to the natural and social world in which they 
exist.  The ontological and epistemological positions cannot be separated within a monist, 
materialist frame which sees learning as emergent from the interaction of matter.  The 
combination of an account of the world as fundamentally material and an account of how 
learning can be seen as a process of adaptation within classrooms allows us to align complexity 
theory with learning.   
8.1.2 The Emergence of Learning 
Throughout this thesis we have been critical of claims that learning is emergent which do not 
provide a specific account of how this is the case, or which rely upon the language of 
complexity alone (see 1.3, 2.2.2 and 2.3.3).  It is therefore appropriate to here state how this 
thesis considers learning to be emergent.   
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A pupil in a classroom has a brain and body which reflects both their biological inheritance and 
the experiences they have had thus far in life.  This is manifest in a neural network which has a 
macroscopic structure similar to all other humans, yet the exact configuration and structure of 
neurons will be unique.  To build on an example we used in Chapter 5, take the hypothetical 
situation that a teacher asks pupils to match together pieces of paper which each have the 
name of a metal on, with further pieces of paper showing firework plumes of different colours.  
Although the exact image of the blue-green firework might be new, the prior experience of the 
pupil means that her brain has a response to that image: she recognises it as a blue-green 
fiƌeǁoƌk.  “o too the ǁoƌd ͚Đoppeƌ͛ is recognisable despite being a unique instance of ink on 
paper.  Let us suppose that the pupil has not yet experienced the association between blue-
green fireworks and copper metal, but that during the task one of her friends puts the picture 
of the blue-gƌeeŶ fiƌeǁoƌk aŶd the ǁoƌd ͚Đoppeƌ͛ togetheƌ.  The pupil Ŷoǁ eǆpeƌieŶĐes the 
image and the word together, and this experience has the potential to stimulate a response in 
the pupil͛s Ŷeuƌal networks which we might label as learning.  Through unique instances of 
patterns which a pupil has encountered before (firework plumes and the word copper), the 
pupils is able to learn from the material of the classroom. 
However, we have said that there is only potential for the pupil to learn from this event.  
Contemporary models of neural processes are not detailed enough to conclude whether 
neural adaptation occurs to every stimulus, so we learn from all our experiences, or whether 
pƌoĐesses of seleĐtiǀe plastiĐitǇ, ƌeiŶfoƌĐeŵeŶt aŶd pathǁaǇ degƌadatioŶ ;͚foƌgettiŶg͛Ϳ ŵeaŶ 
that adaptatioŶ is ŵoƌe ͚seleĐtiǀe͛ (see Chapter 4).  However we have identified a range of 
influences which will affect how learning takes place (detailed across Chapters 4 and 5).  
Focusing on the individual pupil we can see that her unique history will influence her response.  
This includes her goals and motivations, how hungry she is, and ongoing processes of 
consolidation, but also her prior understanding of copper and fireworks.  All of these are 
manifest in the neural responses already developed to these patterns.  This historic 
contingency is furthermore situated in a specific context and we have drawn attention to how 
relationships, empathy, mimicry, coordinated motion, position in the room, transactive 
memory in groups, praise and the equipment and environment of the classroom might 
influence the pupil.  So whether the pupil is engaged in the task about fireworks, has 
confidence in her friend or values the praise of the teacher could all influence learning.   
The interaction of historic contingency and specific context make emergence ever likely 
though the nonlinear interaction of a myriad of influences in any moment.  Yet this can be 
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accommodated within a materialist frame and supported through models of neural 
adaptation.  As well as providing a specific account of emergence, this thesis suggests that we 
have shared understanding because of the repeated patterns of symbolic and abstract forms, 
of behaviour and of associations within the social sphere.  Thus we have given an account of 
both difference and repetition. 
The above is a hypothetical model, and we have argued that the details of a specific situation 
will never be fully recognised by a model.  However, here we must also recall that this thesis 
contains no primary empirical evidence, and that it draws upon models of neural and 
behavioural adaptation which are themselves tentative.  Nevertheless, the account of 
emergence above is itself emergent from this doctoral study and should be compared to 
existing models (see 6.1.4).  In the next section we will do just that by comparing it to the 
existing accounts of human understanding within the complexity literature.  This will also allow 
us to evaluate the originality of complex materialism and the above model of emergence. 
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8.2 Originality and Relation to Existing Work 
8.2.1 Relation to Complexity Science 
In order to evaluate the originality and contribution of this thesis it is fruitful to consider here 
how the position developed relates to the existing positions discussed in Chapter 2.  Table 2, a 
summary of these positions and associated issues, is reproduced here for ease of reference: 
Table 2 – Overview of Complexity Approaches and Theoretical Issues 
Complexity 
Approach 
Features Theoretical Issues 
Complexity Science  Generation of models using 
scientific processes.  Often claims to be 
͚pƌagŵatiĐ͛. 
 
 Inherits positivist 
terminology such as 
͚uŶiǀeƌsal laǁs͛.   Models often lack empirical 
referents.  Theoretical basis of models 
often neglected. 
Post-structuralist 
Complexity Thinking 
 Rejection of representation.  Blurring of epistemology and 
ontology as mind/matter 
seen as same system.  Recognition that 
understandings are transient. 
 Rejection of empirical 
evidence removes criteria for 
assessing models.  Unable to resolve how 
people act in complex 
systems with only partial 
understandings. 
Complex Realism  Asserts the causal influence 
of macroscopic social entities, 
e.g. a classroom, school, 
society.  Asserts importance of 
empirical referents. 
 Inherits separation of mind 
and matter.  Aspiƌes to ͚ŵoƌe ƌealistiĐ͛ 
models which is problematic 
in complex systems. 
Complex Responsive 
Processes 
 Mind situated as outside 
brain.  Accounts for shared 
understanding. 
 Equating minds and the 
social is untenable.  Cannot account for learning 
which is not social. 
IŶ “eĐtioŶ Ϯ.ϭ ǁe ĐoŶsideƌed appƌoaĐhes to soĐial ĐoŵpleǆitǇ ǁhiĐh ǁe laďelled as ͚sĐieŶtifiĐ͛ 
in that they utilise mathematical, computational and experimental approaches which inherit a 
positivist epistemology and/or a reductionist approach (see 2.1.1).  There we saw a range of 
approaches to situating understanding: characterising humans as agents who undertake 
ŵeĐhaŶistiĐ pƌoĐesses; as folloǁiŶg ͚uŶiǀeƌsal͛ sĐaliŶg laǁs; as opeƌatiŶg ǁithiŶ Ŷetǁoƌks of 
relations.  Models of learning within contemporary scientific literature are yet to be of utility 
to educationalists because of these simplistic accounts of learning.  Through contrasting them 
to a broader view of how learning emerges from individual histories and specific contexts the 
reduction within existing models becomes apparent. 
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We argued that it is simplistic to say that scientists are unaware of the limitations of their 
models.  However scientists need to more fully consider how they are situating human 
understanding within their models, as well as how they situate models themselves.  The latter 
requires a greater explanation of how models relate to the phenomena they model.  We noted 
that theƌe is aŶ ͚iŶteƌŶal ĐoŶsisteŶĐǇ͛ of ŵodels ǁhiĐh suppoƌt otheƌ ŵodels aŶd often the 
original phenomenon is not referred to at all (See 2.1.5).  Even when sophisticated models of 
aĐtioŶ aƌe deǀeloped iŶ ƌelatioŶ to eŵpiƌiĐal eǀideŶĐe ;e.g. Hall et al.͛s ;ϮϬϭϭͿ ŵodel of ďaďooŶ 
behaviour), these models at best generate hypotheses around processes and influences within 
social settings. 
This thesis does not provide advances in the practice of modelling but instead allows us to 
better situate models within a coherent theoretical frame.  Models are emergent from 
complex social systems, such as science, and may go on to influence those systems.  In Chapter 
6 we developed this characterisation of models to show that they can be linked to the 
phenomena they model on three counts.  Firstly, in relation to social settings we suggested 
that people tend to recreate the situations they expect to find, for example classrooms come 
to look similar because people draw on models of how classrooms should be.  In considering 
this in relation to science we can tentatively suggest that models are developed through the 
understandings of the scientists involved, so may recreate what is expected.  Secondly, 
through processes of their genesis, models can abstract some aspect of a phenomenon.  We 
have used the example of a photograph replicating the pattern of light from a scene, but an 
agent-based model might abstract from an observed course of action; a statistical law might 
abstract a relation between data points; a network might abstract perceived links between 
people.  The third way a model may be linked to a phenomenon is through judgement, after its 
genesis, that it repeats some important pattern (see subsection 6.1.3).   
Seeing models as material entities challenges a distinction between ontology and 
epistemology because processes of knowing become processes of emergence from the 
material world.  In relation to scientific approaches to social complexity we see that processes 
of genesis are important and this will allow us to uphold the call from complex realists that 
empirical evidence is important (we shall discuss this shortly in 8.2.3).  It also highlights the 
importance of scientists recognising the fields in which they operate and the inheritance of 
techniques and existing models on which they draw.  Evaluating models becomes not about 
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how accurate it is iŶ ƌelatioŶ to the ͚ƌeal͛ pheŶoŵeŶoŶ ďut aďout utilitǇ, ǁhiĐh is ŶeĐessaƌilǇ a 
normative concern. 
In relation to models of classrooms we developed a number of further insights from this 
account of modelling as the emergence of material abstractions (see Section 6.2).  Firstly, 
theƌe is Ŷo Ŷeed to foĐus oŶ a speĐifiĐ ͚leǀel͛ of aŶalǇsis.  IŶ Chapteƌs ϰ aŶd ϱ ǁe desĐƌiďed hoǁ 
humans are able to respond to heterogeneous patterns across a broad range of temporal and 
spatial scales.  Scientists tend to focus on a single unit of analysis and we suggested that this 
may be due to a focus on causal links rather than inductive patterns (see 6.2.2).  A second 
iŵpliĐatioŶ of seeiŶg ŵodels as Đoŵpleǆ aŶd ŵateƌial is that the ŶotioŶ of ͚ďouŶdaƌies͛ is 
outmoded; it does not adeƋuatelǇ ƌeĐogŶise the ͚gaps iŶ ďetǁeeŶ͛ the patteƌŶs ďeiŶg 
delineated.  Thirdly, we argued that models may contain parameters which have no immediate 
empirical correlate.  We have seen that every model is an abstraction and as such does not 
evolve as the original phenomenon does.  Importance should be placed on recreating patterns 
of interest and not on an unachievable quest for accurate representation.  
Complex materialism therefore provides a basis for reconsidering scientific models of social 
phenomena: it recognises the potential utility of these models whilst highlighting the need to 
elucidate processes of their genesis and evaluation.  SeeiŶg ŵodels as ŵateƌial also ͚opeŶs up͛ 
processes of modelling classrooms, allowing consideration of heterogeneous elements and 
modelling parameters by overcoming concern for boundaries and specific levels of causal 
analysis.  We have also suggested that comparing models to actual phenomena is an ethical 
imperative (see 6.1.4). 
8.2.2 Relation to Post-structuralist Complexity Thinking 
Complex materialism is able to uphold many of the concerns of authors who we have labelled 
as post-structuralist.  As was expounded in Section 2.2, the linking of complexity with post-
structuralism is concerned with recognising the provisional and dynamic nature of our 
understandings, as well as challenging a view of representation as a simple correspondence 
between a phenomenon and our understandings of it.  As was discussed above, if we see 
understandings and models as emergent then there can be no simple relationship between 
thoughts, language, symbolic abstractions and the broader world.  In Chapter 4 we showed 
how our understandings and responses are distributed across our neural systems and 
embodied in our actions.  This challenges the view that we can accurately represent the 
complex world.  Furthermore, in Chapter 5 we extended this argument by showing that 
learning from other people and from symbolic language means that each of us has a view of 
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the world conditioned by our unique experiences, rather than through approaching a complete 
representation of the world.  
Despite complementarity between some aspects of post-structuralist complexity and the 
position developed in this thesis, there are also sites of disagreement.  The differences were 
discussed in subsection 3.2.7 and we shall summarise them here only insofar as to allow 
eǀaluatioŶ of oƌigiŶalitǇ.  IŶ shoƌt, ǁe aƌgued that ďǇ dƌaǁiŶg oŶ Deƌƌida͛s deĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ, 
authors such as Cilliers also inherit an unresolved metaphysical issue.  Deƌƌida takes oŶ Hegel͛s 
dialectical philosophy by showing that binary opposites cannot be resolved and meaning is 
constantly deferred (see 2.2.6).  In drawing on deconstruction Cilliers inherits this issue, 
despite developing a much more concrete account of how meaning is distributed across 
networks.  Meaning is constantly deferred within a network so we are forced to accept that 
such networks are interrogated in real time in some way.  Cilliers recognises this issue and 
talks of boundaries in making sense of statements, as well as recognising what is outside of 
these ďouŶdaƌies: ǁhat is ͚otheƌ͛.  We aƌgued iŶ suďseĐtioŶ Ϯ.Ϯ.ϰ that iŶ pƌaĐtiĐe this ĐoŶĐeƌŶ 
for boundaries does not escape the issue of how we make decisions in real time.  We cannot 
accept what Derrida (1990, p. 967) calls the ͞madness͟ of making a just decision.   
These issues aƌe ƌesolǀed ǁithiŶ this thesis ďǇ adaptiŶg Deleuze͛s ŵoŶist positioŶ.  The keǇ to 
characterising meaning is to reject the supernatural connotations of relations within ͚sǇsteŵs 
of ŵeaŶiŶg͛ and instead see meaning as emerging from the specifics of a moment.  In a 
position which sees the world as a single, complex and material system we see that each 
instance of a repeated pattern is unique.  Deleuze argues that this ͞difference and repetition͟ 
explains why we associate similar events with a specific label.  This position is developed and 
related to specific processes over Chapters 4, 5 and 6.  Perhaps ironically therefore, drawing 
initially on Cilliers͛ model of distributed representation within neural networks we have 
eventually rejected his application of a neural picture to human symbolic systems.  Our brains 
use networks to discern and respond to patterns but there are no physical connections 
between words in a language or concepts in a system of thought.  We have suggested that 
there are processes of replication which facilitate the repetition of similar patterns within the 
social world but we should not see these as connected metaphysically.  This thesis offers a 
more concrete and specific explanation of why we should reject assumptions of representation 
and see human understandings as tentative, dynamic and partial.   
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8.2.3 Relation to Complex Realism 
Coŵpleǆ ƌealists situate theŵselǀes as oĐĐupǇiŶg a ͚ŵiddle gƌouŶd͛ ďetǁeeŶ post-structuralist 
accounts of dynamic understanding and scientific reductionism (see 2.3.1).  As such, many of 
the comparisons made above between these positions and complex materialism apply to our 
analysis of complex realism.  Here however we will consider the primary concern of reinstating 
the reality of social entities, as well as the failure of complex realists to situate their own 
models. 
As discussed in relation to complexity science above, within this thesis we have upheld the call 
for models to have material correlates in the phenomena they model.  In attempting to 
reclaim the importance of empirical evidence however, complex realists go too far in accepting 
the separation of their models from the world they model.  In seeking to reclaim scientific and 
social scientific processes they allow positivist assumptions back in by not adequately 
accounting for how models are themselves within social systems.  In subsection 2.3.4 we 
suggested that this is to do with an insistence on separating ontology from epistemology.  
Whilst asserting that the world consists of complex systems, complex realists see our theory 
aŶd ŵodels as ͞disĐuƌsiǀe ǁith͟ that ǁoƌld ;BǇƌŶe & CallaghaŶ, ϮϬϭϰ, p. 110).  Complex realism 
attempts to maintain that we can have an objective understanding of the complex social 
world, yet fails to recognise that all understandings are partial and dynamic, and should be 
situated within complex social systems. 
By asserting that all aspects of social systems should be considered real, Byrne & Callaghan 
(2014) argue that social entities (e.g. welfare reform or social class) should be seen as having 
causal influence.  As was argued in subsection 6.1.1, this affords these entities causal powers 
when in fact they are abstractions.  A policy may influence classroom practice but this is 
through the myriad understandings of individual people and the symbolic language they 
deploy.  For example, in saying that a change to a curriculum benefits working class boys, a 
complex realist may claim a causal link between the curriculum and a social entity: working 
class boys.  As we saw in Section 7.3, a curriculum is not an autonomous entity in itself but has 
emergent influence in a multitude of specific settings; the aggregate of all working class boys is 
not an autonomous entity, but an abstraction based upon some criteria.  The simple causal 
influence is in our model, not in the broader world.   
Complex realists do get very close to situating their models as within complex social systems: 
Allen & Boulton (2011) characterise models as different from the real world; Byrne & Callaghan 
draw on notions of social fields which condition agency (see 5.1.3).  However they don͛t Ƌuite 
238 
 
get there; theǇ doŶ͛t discuss how their own models are conditioned by the social world as well 
as the phenomena they seek to investigate.  Complex materialism provides a way of upholding 
the need for empirical evidence whilst also recognising models as emergent and incomplete.  It 
foƌĐes Đoŵpleǆ ƌealists to ƌethiŶk the iŵpliĐatioŶ that ouƌ ŵodels ĐaŶ ďe ͚ŵoƌe ƌealistiĐ͛ aŶd 
instead recognise their models as abstractions which must be evaluated as such. 
8.2.4 Relation to Social Construction 
We have argued that both scientists and complex realists (who are primarily social scientists) 
separate the material world from our understandings and models of it.  Furthermore, Cilliers 
does not give sufficient account of how the social and material worlds are related.  Social 
ĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶist positioŶs, ǁhiĐh ǁe eǆeŵplified ǁith “taĐeǇ͛s ;ϮϬϬϭ, ϮϬϬϯa, ϮϬϬϯď, ϮϬϬϱͿ 
work, offer a solution to this by equating the social world with the understandings of 
individuals.  This position has particular relevance to education, firstly because it can be linked 
to social constructivist accounts of learning and secondly because it is able to account for why 
we have shared understandings. 
In SeĐtioŶ Ϯ.ϰ ǁe shoǁed that “taĐeǇ͛s model of ͚Đoŵpleǆ ƌespoŶsiǀe pƌoĐesses͛ suffeƌs fƌoŵ 
an inability to account for the world beyond social interaction.  If we accept that there is a 
material world then we must also accept variations in time and space which influence how 
social understandings develop.  Put simply, once you introduce a dynamic, nonlinear account 
of social construction you are forced to confront the material world.  The interactions between 
this material world and a shared social mind cannot be resolved.  Furthermore, social 
construction relies upon Hegelian dialectics and this is to be overcome (see 2.4.3).  As was 
noted in subsection 3.2.6, a materialist position cuts through this by recognising the social as 
having a material basis, so mind and matter are part of the same systems and can interact. 
As well as being unable to reĐoŶĐile dǇŶaŵiĐs aŶd ͚soĐial ŵiŶd͛, social construction is not able 
to account for how we learn from the world around us, be it through exploratory learning with 
new objects and equipment, or in learning from the words, symbols and patterns of the social 
world (see Section 5.3).  However, for all its issues the social constructionist position does 
account for why we have shared understandings within social systems.  It is thus important to 
show how complex materialism is able to recover this notion of shared understanding but also 
account for how we learn from the broader world.  The narrative of this ran through the 
middle part of the thesis: subsection 3.2.6 showed how mind and matter should be considered 
as part of the same system; Chapter 4 then provided a process by which we are able to 
recognise patterns within heterogeneous elements of classrooms; Chapter 5 built on this by 
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showing how we are able to recognise, respond to and manipulate patterns of behaviour and 
association which exist in society.  This is not to afford a supernatural quality to these patterns, 
they all have a material basis, but it is to recognise that shared understandings are important 
in how we learn (see 5.3.3).   
Complex materialism sees shared understandings as emergent from repeated patterns which 
are manifest in specific situations.  In recovering these concerns from social constructionist 
positions it is able to account for learning in the social sphere as well as the broader material 
world. 
8.2.5 Originality 
In relating complex materialism to existing accounts of social complexity above, we see that it 
provides a coherent account of how understandings and models can be situated within 
complex social systems.  However, we can also see that the position developed is a synthesis 
of existing concerns and its originality should be evaluated as such: an original synthesis.  
Prominent in this synthesis is the post-structuralist concern for the tentative and incomplete 
nature of our understandings, and view of our symbolic and linguistic systems87 as dynamic.  
The concern from complex realism for empirical evidence and importance of engaging with the 
real world is also supported, as is the constructionist concern for shared understandings.  
However, we have not allowed the differences between these positions to be swept aside 
through appeal to analogy or a general view of complexity: specific processes have been 
described. 
AŶotheƌ keǇ eleŵeŶt of this thesis is the iŶspiƌatioŶ it takes fƌoŵ Deleuze͛s ŵetaphǇsiĐal 
sǇsteŵ.  As ǁas Ŷoted iŶ suďseĐtioŶ ϯ.ϭ.ϭ, the iŶteƌpƌetatioŶ of Deleuze͛s ǁoƌk ǁithiŶ this 
thesis would be unpalatable to many Deleuze scholars.  However, in several respects the thesis 
also leaǀes Deleuze͛s ŶotioŶs ďehiŶd.  BǇ seekiŶg a ĐoŶĐƌete pƌoĐess ďǇ ǁhiĐh ǁe ƌeĐogŶise 
͚ƌepeated ďut diffeƌeŶt͛ patteƌŶs ǁe foĐused contemporary literature around the complexity 
of brain and behaviour.  This provided ŵoƌe taŶgiďle pƌoĐesses foƌ Deleuze͛s Đlaiŵs and also 
removed reliance upon the ͚ǀiƌtual diffeƌeŶĐes͛: both in accounting for human agency and in 
how our models replicate aspects of phenomena (see 4.2.3 and 6.1.2 respectively). 
Furthermore, in developing our notion of patterns of behaviour and associations in Chapter 5 
ǁe haǀe takeŶ Deleuze͛s empirical relationship between experience and our concepts and 
subjected it to several other aspects of the complexity literature: models of mimicry, group 
                                                          
87 FolloǁiŶg Deleuze͛s positioŶ, ǁe ŵaǇ fuƌtheƌ ŵoǀe aǁaǇ fƌoŵ the ĐoŶŶotatioŶ that a ͚sǇsteŵ͛ is 
iŶteƌĐoŶŶeĐted iŶ a ǁaǇ ǁhiĐh affoƌds ͚ƌelatioŶs͛ aŶ autoŶoŵous existence. 
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learning, and neural coordination; discussions of sensitivity to context and history; distinctions 
between learning and education.  We have certainly not engaged with even a majority of 
Deleuze͛s thought aŶd therefore, whilst Deleuze͛s work is pivotal to this thesis, it is the 
interpretation and synthesis of it with complexity models which provides originality. 
As well as synthesising concerns from different aspects of contemporary literature with an 
iŶteƌpƌetatioŶ of Deleuze͛s ǁork, this thesis is original in bringing that all to bear on classroom 
learning.  The application of complexity theory to classroom learning is certainly not unique 
and we have drawn on several accounts within this thesis.  However, the combination of 
compleǆitǇ theoƌǇ, Deleuze͛s ŵetaphǇsiĐs aŶd a foĐus oŶ Đlassƌooŵ leaƌŶiŶg is new.  Of 
course, combining three seemingly disparate areas of study is likely to create novelty, but the 
contribution to educational discourses lies in the capacity of complex materialism to offer a 
critical perspective.  In the introduction to this thesis we cautioned that ǁe aƌe faƌ fƌoŵ ͞a 
Ŷeǁ sĐieŶĐe of eduĐatioŶ͟ (subsection 1.3.3).  However, through the lens of complex 
materialism we have provided grounds for challenging simplistic notions of learning as a linear 
process, as the acquisition of conceptual understandings and as the representation of the 
world beyond curricula (see Chapter 7).  We have also highlighted the importance of both 
teachers and researchers recognising their understandings of classrooms as abstraction 
(Chapter 6). 
The originality of this thesis lies in a synthesis of existing positions to develop a coherent basis 
for bringing complexity to bear on classroom learning, and as such has advantages over 
existing accounts of social complexity. 
8.2.6 Contribution 
Whilst the above discussion of originality relates to existing accounts of social complexity, we 
will here situate this thesis within broader educational discourses.  In Chapter 1 we outlined 
both the appeal of complexity theory and the issues which have resulted in its remaining 
marginal.  The appeal of complexity is an ability to move beyond simple cause and effect and 
to recognise the dynamic, sensitive and specific nature of classrooms.  It also has the capacity 
to ĐhalleŶge the ĐoŶteŵpoƌaƌǇ foĐus upoŶ ͚eǀideŶĐe ďased teaĐhiŶg͛, Ŷot thƌough deŶǇiŶg the 
utility of evidence, but by situating it within the complex systems we inhabit.  We proposed 
that complexity remains marginal within education because of the difficulties in developing a 
coherent theoretical framework which is able to capture the unique nature of classrooms, and 
because of the specific issues of accounting for human understandings.  Humans have partial 
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understandings within complex systems but we cannot escape those understandings in 
conceiving of complexity. 
As stated from the outset, the contribution of this thesis lies in firstly expounding these 
challenges and secondly providing a solution to them.  Complex materialism provides a basis 
for situating learning within complex social systems and this has extended to both 
understanding within classrooms, but also our understanding and models of classrooms.  
Indeed it allows us to see why these issues cannot be separated: our understandings are 
always part of the world and are constantly evolving with it. 
Characterising social complexity as we have within this thesis therefore provides an argument 
for moving out of the shadow of the scientific disciplines in which complexity was first 
discussed.  Complexity theory necessitates holding a mirror up to processes of understanding 
and modelling, as well as a rethinking of epistemology and ontology.  Fields such as education 
yield greater experience of engaging with human agency, social entities, politics and ethics, 
and these are essential parts of this rethinking.  By situating modelling within the material 
world, and providing a specific account of how understanding emerges, it is hoped that this 
thesis might be a first step in moving out of the shadow.  We must cast off appeal to analogy 
and the restricted processes of traditional science and recognise the potential of complexity as 
a discourse of learning and education. 
Under the umbrella of this broader hope for educational discourses, this thesis has provided a 
model of learning as emergent within the specific contexts and specific histories of classrooms, 
and it has grounded this within a coherent materialist ontology.  In drawing on contemporary 
neuroscience, computational models and studies of behaviour and development, we must 
recognise that the arguments of this thesis are historically situated.  However, by showing how 
we might challenge contemporary ideas of effectiveness, conceptual understanding and 
representation we have shown how this thesis has direct relevance to contemporary 
discourses.  Therefore, by providing a specific account of learning as complex, a coherent 
theoretical basis for this account, and situating it relevant to contemporary discourses, we 
have laid a foundation on which to build new understandings of classroom learning.   
However, there is still plenty to be done, and we will now turn to considering what has been 
omitted from this thesis and what the next steps might be. 
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8.3 Omissions and Areas for Further Development 
8.3.1 Boundaries and Omissions 
In subsection 6.2.3 we argued that the notion of boundaries implies a spatial or temporal 
ƌegioŶ ǁhiĐh ŵisses the ͚gaps iŶ ďetǁeeŶ͛ ŵodels as aďstƌaĐtioŶs.  If ǁe iŶdulge that this 
document is an abstraction of a doctoral study, and in turn that study is an abstraction of the 
fields of complexity and education, then it would be inconsistent to attempt to here define 
what has not been included in this thesis.  However, in the development of this thesis a 
number of conscious decisions were made as to what would be excluded as the thesis was 
edited down from a considerably larger body of writing.  As such a few autobiographical notes 
may be helpful in describing omissions from the final thesis.  These were in the specific models 
of human agency utilised, in the methodological approaches to complexity considered and the 
sociological and learning theories touched upon. 
The background of the author as a physicist goes some way to explaining why the models of 
human agency explored in Section 2.1 could be classified as originating primarily within physics 
and why the models of neural adaptation considered in Chapter 4 stem from network analysis.  
However Maturana & Verala͛s (1980) ŵoƌe ͚ďiologiĐal͛ description of complexity is of potential 
relevance to this thesis, stemming from descriptions of ͚autopioesis͛: self-maintenance of a 
system.  Maturana & Verala focused upon the adaptation of the nervous system to experience 
and, like Cilliers, argued against representation within the nervous system.  As such parallels 
may be drawn to the models developed in this thesis.  However, their model is one of 
environmental pressures causing an autopioetic response within the nervous system such that 
the real world is not represented at all: an extreme form of social constructivism.  As well as 
the difficulty in resolving the world outside of the brain, Maturana & Verala focus on cellular 
processes within the brain, and it was felt that this did not adequately account for the 
electrical patterns which form the basis of much of contemporary neuroscience.  Whilst there 
aƌe uŶdouďtedlǇ poiŶts of siŵilaƌitǇ theƌefoƌe, MatuƌaŶa & Veƌala͛s ǁoƌk ŵight ďe ĐoŶsideƌed 
as an alternative to the models explored in Chapter 4, but relates to an epistemological 
position which is not supported in a materialist frame. 
Another notable figure is Juarrero (1999) who develops an account of action as determined by 
dynamic constraints and utilises a range of complexity science notions to support the role of 
narrative in understanding the historically determined and context-specific nature of these 
constraints.  This thesis has instead focused upon describing the processes by which 
understandings emerge in a theoretical capacity.  No doubt Juarreƌo͛s autoďiogƌaphiĐal 
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approach would be useful to both researchers and teachers considering specific classrooms.  
Within the doctoral study, a great deal of time was spent understanding methodological issues 
around agent-based models, network analyses, case study, action research, dynamic equation 
models and autobiographical accounts.  Discussion of this has been reduced in order to allow 
clearer focus upon a theoretical basis for complexity in classrooms. 
As well as models of adaptation and detail of methodological issues, specific theories of social 
learning have been downplayed or omitted from the final thesis.  Although we have related 
Đoŵpleǆ ŵateƌialisŵ to Bouƌdieu͛s ͞soĐial fields͟ (see 5.1.3), we noted that there are a range 
of sociological theories which might account for human agency within complex systems, for 
example Actor Network Theory (Latour, 2005; Blake; 2004) or Social Cognitive Theory 
(Bandura, 1999).  Of particular interest is Deleuze & Guattari͛s (2004b [1980]) notion of 
͚asseŵďlages͛ as loose organisations of heterogeneous elements, although they do not 
develop this fully.  DeLaŶda ;ϮϬϬϲa, ϮϬϬϲďͿ espouses the ĐapaĐitǇ of ͚asseŵďlage theoƌǇ͛ to 
link levels of reality.  However, his interpretation is haunted by a sense of hierarchy and misses 
the iŶteƌdepeŶdeŶĐe of diffeƌeŶt teŵpoƌal aŶd spatial sĐales ;see ϲ.Ϯ.ϮͿ.  DeLaŶda͛s 
interpretation of assemblages also misses a sense in which these hodgepodges of people, 
symbols and objects are self-sustaining, coevolve and have a role in normativity88.  In 
considering learning within classrooms this thesis has necessarily focused on how individuals 
respond to patterns within the social world (Chapter 5).  However, this does not preclude the 
utility of considering social entities and, indeed, it may provide a specific material basis for 
such consideration.  
As well as social theories, we have encountered learning theories, particularly those of Piaget, 
Vygotsky, Bruner and Skinner in several places and noted the links made to complexity in the 
existing literature89.  However we have not developed a full relationship between complex 
materialism and learning theories in contemporary use.  The relation of both existing social 
theories and contemporary learning theories to complex materialism was viewed as secondary 
to elucidating the theoretical position itself.  Developing these relationships may be 
considered as an area for further study.  We will now turn to two additional areas in which this 
thesis might be further developed. 
                                                          
88 Asseŵďlages ŵaǇ also ďe teŶtatiǀelǇ liŶked to FouĐault͛s ŶotioŶ of ͚appaƌatus͛ ;“iŵoŶs & OlsseŶ, 
2010). 
89 The fullest liŶkiŶg of ĐoŵpleǆitǇ to Piaget aŶd BƌuŶeƌ͛s ǁoƌk is iŶ suďseĐtioŶ ϳ.Ϯ.ϭ, hoǁeǀeƌ Piaget is 
mentioned in no fewer than nine subsections and Vygotsky and Skinner are cited on multiple occasions 
also. 
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8.3.2 The Language of Representation and Response 
An area of development worth detailed consideration is the tension within this thesis between 
the situating of models as themselves material entities and the language of representation and 
͚response͛ ǁhiĐh oƌigiŶates from the accounts of brain, behaviour and social interaction.  We 
must be absolutely clear that when we consider the understandings of individuals, or models 
more broadly, we are not characterising them as fixed responses, which emerged from 
experience: a one-way street.  Furthermore, in Chapter 3 we highlighted the ethical necessity 
of comparing models with the phenomena they pertain to, but this should not be seen as a 
simple feedback loop in which a model emerges and then comes to influence a future 
situation. 
There is much already within the thesis that undermines the characterisation of 
understandings and models as simply emergent responses.  We have seen that brain, body and 
behaviour are linked in a complex way such that understandings, as manifest in brains, cannot 
ďe diǀoƌĐed fƌoŵ aĐtioŶ ;see ϰ.Ϯ.ϮͿ.  This ďuilt upoŶ FƌeeŵaŶ͛s ;ϮϬϬϬͿ aĐĐouŶt of ƌeaffeƌeŶĐe 
in relation to brain function: the continual searching for information within the environment 
according to the endogenously defined goals of the individual (see 4.1.3).  Such goals highlight 
the importance of understandings in resulting actions.  Furthermore, drawing upon Gallesse & 
Lakoff (2005), we have considered how multimodality within brain function means that we are 
ĐoŶstaŶtlǇ ͚iŵagiŶiŶg͛ the future (see 7.2.3).   
Nevertheless, the characterisation of learning within this thesis has predominantly been one of 
learning from.  This stems from the scientific conceptualisation of time as the stepping through 
of processes which underpins key models ǁithiŶ this thesis, foƌ eǆaŵple, Cillieƌs͛ aĐĐouŶt of 
adapting of neural structure (see Chapter 4).  Although we will not fully overcome the 
language of response here, we will here highlight ways of doing so. 
IŶ suďseĐtioŶ Ϯ.ϭ.ϱ ǁe ĐoŶsideƌed DeǁeǇ͛s ͚tƌaŶsaĐtioŶal theoƌǇ of kŶoǁiŶg͛ aŶd hoǁ it 
ĐhalleŶges a sepaƌatioŶ of ŵiŶd fƌoŵ ǁoƌld ;Biesta, ϮϬϭϭ; OlsseŶ, ϮϬϭϭͿ.  DeǁeǇ͛s positioŶ 
provides a way of characterising experience as part of the situation in which it occurs: 
͞AŶ eǆpeƌieŶĐe is alǁaǇs ǁhat it is because of a transaction taking place between an 
individual and what, at the time, constitutes his environment, whether the latter consists 
of persons with whom he is taking about some topic or event, the subject talked about 
also being part of the situation; or the toys he is playing with; the book he is reading (in 
which the environing conditions at the time may be England or ancient Greece or an 
imaginary region); or the materials of an experiment he is performing.  The environment, 
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in other words, is whatever conditions interact with personal needs, desires, purposes, and 
ĐapaĐities to Đƌeate the eǆpeƌieŶĐe ǁhiĐh is had.͟ (Dewey, 1938a, p. 41-42) 
Dewey includes imaginary places, desires and purposes in this interaction, in echo of the flat 
ontology which we have supported within this thesis.  Furthermore, experience cannot be 
seen as a progression of temporal frames: 
͞the pƌiŶĐiple of ĐoŶtiŶuitǇ of eǆpeƌieŶĐe ŵeaŶs that eǀeƌǇ eǆpeƌieŶĐe ďoth takes up 
something from those which have gone before and modifies in some way the quality of 
those ǁhiĐh Đoŵe afteƌ.͟ (Dewey, 1938a, p. 27) 
Dewey and Bergson corresponded (e.g. Bergson 1999) and their sensibilities around 
eǆpeƌieŶĐe aŶd tiŵe aƌe ĐoŵŵeŶsuƌate, as eǆeŵplified ďǇ DeǁeǇ͛s desĐƌiptioŶ of the ͚feeliŶg 
qualities͛ of pƌiŵaƌǇ eǆpeƌieŶĐe, pƌioƌ to seŶsatioŶs:   
͞PƌiŵaƌǇ eǆpeƌieŶĐe is ďoth the staƌtiŶg poiŶt aŶd the eŶd poiŶt if iŶƋuiƌǇ; iŶƋuiƌǇ is 
critical, reflective, knowledge yielding process; and this reflective process is what Dewey 
means by secondary experieŶĐe.͟ (Skilbeck, 1970, p. 14). 
Thus DeǁeǇ͛s theoƌǇ of iŶƋuiƌǇ staƌts ǁith Ƌualitatiǀe eǆpeƌieŶĐe fƌoŵ ǁhiĐh kŶoǁledge is 
generated through reflection.  However, Dewey situates personal needs, desires, purposes and 
capacities as constantly interacting with the environment which is experienced.  Skilbeck 
;ϭϵϳϬ, p. ϭϰͿ suggests that ͞Like KaŶt, he ďelieǀed the ŵiŶd plaǇs aŶ aĐtiǀe paƌt iŶ the 
deteƌŵiŶatioŶs of the ĐhaƌaĐteƌ of its oǁŶ eǆpeƌieŶĐes͟.  Hoǁeǀeƌ, ĐoŶsideƌatioŶ of DeǁeǇ͛s 
body of work shows that he does not deal in universals as Kant does. 
͞The Đhild does Ŷot haǀe to ďe dƌilled iŶto the faĐt that sŶoǁ is Đold aŶd iĐe is good to 
skate on; his experience is connected with those things, they mean something to him, 
and if the appropriate stimulus presents itself with any kind of frequency, anything 
approaching frequency, the experience, the meaning, the truth of it carries itself along 
iŶ his ŵiŶd aŶd ďeĐoŵes the ĐeŶteƌ foƌ the aĐĐƌetioŶ of otheƌ eǆpeƌieŶĐes.͟ (Dewey, 
1966, pp. 313-314) 
Heƌe ǁe see that eǆpeƌieŶĐe is ĐoŶditioŶed ďǇ the ͚ŵeaŶiŶg͛ of the stimulus for the child.  In 
Chapteƌ ϰ ǁe ƌefeƌƌed to the ͚iŶteƌŶal ŵeĐhaŶisŵs͛ ǁithiŶ the ďƌaiŶ ǁhiĐh ĐoŶditioŶ the 
seaƌĐhiŶg foƌ aŶd adaptatioŶ to stiŵulus.  DeǁeǇ͛s ǁoƌk suƌpasses this thesis iŶ ĐoŶsideƌiŶg at 
length the motivations, habits and desires of pupils and how they develop, albeit on a 
psychological rather than neurological basis.  These develop through interaction with a world 
246 
 
that theǇ aƌe paƌt of, ǁithout ƌeduĐiŶg this to siŵple ĐausalitǇ.  This ŵakes DeǁeǇ͛s laŶguage 
of ͚tƌaŶsaĐtioŶs͛ appropriate in relation to the theoretical position developed within this 
thesis.   
A fuƌtheƌ ƌesoŶaŶĐe ďetǁeeŶ this thesis aŶd DeǁeǇ͛s is appaƌeŶt ǁheŶ ǁe see that the latteƌ 
͞agƌees ǁith ĐlassiĐ teaĐhiŶg, aĐĐoƌdiŶg to ǁhiĐh peƌĐeptioŶ, appƌeheŶsioŶ, laǇs hold of form, 
Ŷot ŵatteƌ.͟ (Dewey, 1938a, p. 240).  Biosǀeƌt͛s (1988) analysis suggests that Dewey favours 
leaƌŶiŶg fƌoŵ ͚foƌŵs͛ iŶ Ŷatuƌe aŶd this is ǁoƌthǁhile ĐoŶsideƌiŶg iŶ ƌelatioŶ to ouƌ 
characterisation of patterns within this thesis.  Dewey is clear that forms and relations are not 
universals: 
͞The ƌelatioŶ is thus iŶǀaƌiaŶt.  It is eteƌŶal, Ŷot iŶ the seŶse of eŶduƌiŶg thƌoughout 
time, or being everlasting like an Aristolean species or Netwontian substance, but in 
the sense that an operation as a relation which is grasped in thought is independent of 
the instances in which it is overtly exemplified, although its meaning is found only in 
the possibility of these aĐtualizatioŶs.͟ (Dewey, 1984, p. 130) 
However, the consideration of actualizations also iŶǀokes Deleuze͛s ŶotioŶ of the event, which 
we touched upon in subsection 3.2.390.  Semetsky (2006, 2008) at leŶgth shoǁs hoǁ ͞Foƌ 
Deleuze, as for Dewey, thinking depends on our coordinates in space-tiŵe.͟ (Semetsky, 2006, 
p. 81).  Therefore, whilst ŵaiŶtaiŶiŶg that DeǁeǇ͛s fƌaŵiŶg of tƌaŶsaĐtioŶal leaƌŶiŶg pƌoǀides a 
ǁaǇ out of the laŶguage of ƌespoŶse, ǁe ǁill heƌe sketĐh out hoǁ Deleuze͛s positioŶ fuƌtheƌs 
this. 
In relation to the quote from Dewey above, we have seen already that Deleuze seeks to escape 
the dualist/dialeĐtiĐal tƌappiŶgs of ͚possiďilities͛ ;see ϯ.Ϯ.ϱͿ.  IŶ this seŶse, Deleuze͛s foƌŵ of 
ŵateƌialisŵ is ŵoƌe fullǇ ƌeŶdeƌed thaŶ DeǁeǇ͛s ďeĐause it ƌeĐogŶises the dualist/dialeĐtiĐal 
iŵpliĐatioŶ of possiďilities.  IŶ defiŶiŶg aŶ ͞iŶteƌaĐtioŶ͟ DeǁeǇ (1938a, pp. 38-39) argues that 
aŶǇ eǆpeƌieŶĐe is aŶ iŶteƌplaǇ of ͞oďjeĐtiǀe aŶd iŶteƌŶal ĐoŶditioŶs͟ aŶd thƌoughout his ǁoƌk 
desĐƌiďes hoǁ desiƌes, effoƌts aŶd haďits ĐoŶtƌiďute to the ͚gƌoǁth͛ of the Đhild.  DeǁeǇ is 
clear that inquiry involves the constant reconstruction and reorganisation of our past 
experiences as well as anticipation of the future, the latter being changed by the very act of 
reflection.  Nevertheless, it is the individual which is growing, and there remains a trace of 
what Hollins (1977, p. 59) Đalls DeǁeǇ͛s ͞HegeliaŶ upďƌiŶgiŶg͟.  Theƌe is aŶ iŵpliĐitlǇ dialeĐtiĐal 
ƌelatioŶship ďetǁeeŶ the oďjeĐtiǀe aŶd the iŶteƌŶal iŶ DeǁeǇ͛s ǁoƌk. 
                                                          
90 We ŵight also ƌelate DeǁeǇ͛s ͚opeƌatioŶ͛ to Bhaskaƌ͛s ;ϮϬϬϴ [ϭϵϳϰ]Ϳ ͚ŵeĐhaŶisŵ͛ ǁhiĐh is ƌeal 
whether actualised or not (see 2.3.2). 
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In the terminology deployed within this thesis, Dewey focuses upon how the understandings of 
individuals develop in interaction with their environment.  Drawing on Deleuze however allows 
us to see beyond the individual to the models which exist within the broader material world.  
Recall from subsection 3.2.3 that Deleuze replaces essence with event (Smith & Protevi 2015) 
aŶd that this oǁes a deďt to BeƌgsoŶ͛s duƌatioŶ.  Hoǁeǀeƌ, BeƌgsoŶ͛s duƌatioŶ aŶd DeǁeǇ͛s 
transactions both focus upon the individual, whereas to Deleuze individual thought is part of 
the event.  To Deleuze (2005 [1995], p. 31) ͞The immanent event is actualized in a state of 
things and of the lived that make it happen.  The plane of immanence is itself actualized in an 
oďjeĐt aŶd a suďjeĐt to ǁhiĐh it attƌiďutes itself͟.   To Deleuze, eǀeŶts ĐaŶ oŶlǇ eǀeƌ ďe 
actualized.  This takes us beyond the individual and situates thought as part of the ever 
changing material world. 
Both Byrant (2011) and Patton (1997) use the example of battles to explain actualization in 
Deleuze͛s ǁoƌk:  the ǁeapoŶs, people aŶd otheƌ ŵateƌial eŶtities iŶǀolǀed constitute the pure 
event but the concept of the battle itself becomes one of the actors in the situation and guides 
the actions and analyses of those involved.  Deleuze (2004b [1969]) talks of the ͚ĐouŶteƌ-
aĐtualizatioŶ͛ of eǀeŶts iŶto dǇŶaŵiĐ ĐoŶĐepts ǁhich then escape the spatio-temporal 
circumstances of the initial event and persist in time.  The battle of Waterloo persists as a 
concept long after the events of 1815 and might still inform the actions of a military strategist, 
a scholar or a conversationalist.  Deleuze denotes influence of the concept on a new state of 
affaiƌs as ͚ƌe-aĐtualizatioŶ͛.   
͞EǀeŶts aƌe Đoŵpleǆ iŶ the seŶse that theǇ aƌe alǁaǇs Đoŵposed of otheƌ eǀeŶts, hoǁeǀeƌ 
minimal or momentary. They are structured both internally and by their relations to other 
eǀeŶts.͟ ;PattoŶ, ϭϵϵϳ, paƌaϭϲͿ  
However, given our discussion of models (primarily in Chapter 3) we might add that the 
relations that Patton talks of should not be given an autonomous existence; relations within a 
ŵodel aƌe ͚ĐouŶteƌ-aĐtualizatioŶs͛ iŶ Deleuze͛s teƌŵs. 
Deleuze͛s ŶotioŶ of eǀeŶt pƌoǀides a ǁaǇ of esĐapiŶg the siŵplistiĐ laŶguage of ƌespoŶse ďǇ 
recognising that human thought systems are part of a continuously emergent material world in 
which the pure event, the state of affaiƌs ͚as it is͛ ĐaŶ Ŷeǀeƌ ďe appƌoaĐhed.  The ͚sĐieŶtifiĐ͛ 
characterisation of time as a sequence of moments must be left behind in recognising that 
ďoth the past aŶd the futuƌe aƌe iŶtegƌated iŶto the aĐtualized eǀeŶts of the pƌeseŶt.  DeǁeǇ͛s 
recognition that we are part of the world and that learning should be seen as transactional is 
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furthered when we recognise that those transactions are not just with the natural world but 
aƌe also ǁith the ͚iŵage of thought͛ ǁhiĐh peƌŵeates the huŵaŶ spheƌe.  Models both exist 
beyond and include human understandings, all of which form a complex material. 
By drawing on accounts from the neurological, cognitive and behavioural sciences this thesis 
has taken on the characterisation of learning as the response to the environment.  As 
Rajchman (2005, p. 20) notes, Deleuze was concerned with reintroducing movement into 
thought at a time when accounts from neuroscience threatened to reduce thought.  This thesis 
goes some way to showing how contemporary neuroscience and Deleuze͛s thought ŵight 
reinforce each other, but what is required is a furthering of the language used to describe how 
we learn as part of a complex and material world. 
8.3.2 Comparing Models to Classrooms 
In furthering the language used to describe learning as within the material world, we would 
further our account of how models interact with the broader world in which they exist.  
Drawing upon our arguments in subsection 6.1.4, we can also propose that the models within 
this thesis are best advanced by comparison to actual classrooms.  Whilst the details of how 
this takes place will emerge from context, we can here propose four aspects of this thesis 
which might be advanced by such a comparison.  
Firstly, we have developed an account of learning as the interaction of brain, behaviour and 
context.  This is sufficiently broad to allow almost any classroom event to be viewed in these 
terms and therefore needs to be related to how specific learning emerges from a particular 
classroom at a particular moment.  Only through repeated exposure to incidences of learning 
in classrooms can the specifics of such a model be developed and tested.  We have also 
proposed that learning is sensitive to context and history and this may be supported in relation 
to seeing how similar activities and settings may result in very different learning. 
Secondly, in Chapter 5 we proposed that we learn through interaction with repeated but 
different patterns within the social world: linguistic and symbolic patterns; patterns of 
behaviour; patterns of association.  This way of viewing learning can only be developed 
through describing patterns within real classrooms. 
Thirdly, Chapter 6 suggested a number of ways that we should reconsider how we characterise 
models.  We suggested that a broader range of heterogeneous elements could be included 
once we escape concerns for boundaries and specific levels of analysis, as well as the inclusion 
of modelling parameters without specific correlates.  Theƌe is a teŶsioŶ ďetǁeeŶ this ͚opeŶiŶg 
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up͛ of ŵodelliŶg pƌoĐesses aŶd the Ŷeed to ĐoŶstaŶtlǇ ƌelate ŵodels to ƌeal Đlassƌooŵs.  This 
tension needs further exploration which can only come through the development of such 
models in practice. 
Fourthly the comparison of models to actual classrooms is advocated on the basis of an ethical 
position which is currently underdeveloped.  We have supported Cilliers (2004) contention 
that modelling is a necessarily ethical process and drawn on an interpretation of Deleuze͛s 
suggestioŶ that ǁe aƌe ͞iŵŵaŶeŶt͟ to the sǇsteŵs ǁe ŵodel ;see ϲ.ϭ.3).  This needs to be 
developed further in terms of how we can compare models and the systems they model.  We 
consider models to be material entities which include neural networks within the brain, so this 
is not a straightforward question.  However we must also be aware that any description of 
classroom learning has the potential to do harm, including the descriptions within this thesis.  
As this thesis is read and hopefully the patterns within it spread, we must therefore recall that: 
͞A theoƌǇ does Ŷot totalise; it is aŶ iŶstƌuŵeŶt foƌ ŵultipliĐatioŶ aŶd it also ŵultiplies 
itself.͟ (Deleuze & Foucault, 1972) 
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Glossary of Key Terms 
Throughout this thesis a number of key words are used in specific ways.  Definitions are given 
here in order to aid the reader: 
Bifurcation The point at which a system may develop in two or more possible 
ways.  This is usually represented as different pathways on a phase 
space diagram. 
Complexity Complexity refers to systems in which multiple influences interact 
with each other and with the environment such that causal 
processes cannot be discerned. 
Complexity Theory Complexity theory is defined within this thesis as the set of all 
models which describe complexity (see 1.3.1).  
Complex Realism Complex Realism is the position that the world is real and consists of 
complex systems (see 2.3). 
Concept Whilst the teƌŵ ĐoŶĐept is used iŶ its eǀeƌǇ daǇ usage as ͚aŶ 
aďstƌaĐt idea͛ iŶ the first part of this thesis, this definition is 
deliberately put in contention in Section 7.2, where the autonomy 
of ideas and mental representation is challenged. 
Constructionism The co-development of social understandings through interaction. 
Constructivism How an individual develops a view of the world through interaction 
with it and other people.  Distinguished from constructionism in 
focusing on individuals.   
Dynamic Beyond just denoting constant change, dynamic refers to variables 
altering on temporal and spatial scales such that the same event 
may result in different effects if it occurs in a different time or place 
(see 1.2.4). 
Emergence The development of a structure, form, understanding or model 
within a complex system such that the causal mechanisms cannot 
be discerned.  See 1.2.3 for history of the term. 
Epistemology Philosophical discussion of how humans understand the world. 
Historically Contingent The system contains elements or has structures that have 
developed within its history and which may come to influence 
future development.  
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Materialism The ontological position that the world consists of a single 
substance at the fundamental level.  Matter, energy and forces are 
emergent from this substance.  String theory offers a contemporary 
model of this (see 3.1.1). 
Model Models become defined as material entities which consist of the 
understandings of individuals but also symbolic forms: words, 
mathematics, computer programs, media and art forms.  These are 
related to the phenomenon they model in both the way they are 
developed and in the way they are evaluated (see Chapter 6). 
Multiplicity A set of multiple instances of a similar experience which become 
associated with a particular label or behaviour.  Deleuze (2004a 
[1968]) use this notion to show how understanding emerges from 
qualitative experience.  
Nonlinear Originally from the mathematical field of nonlinear dynamics this is 
given a broader definition in this thesis as denoting the presence of 
multiple influences such that simple causal processes cannot be 
discerned  (see 1.2.1 and 1.2.4) 
Ontology Philosophical discussion of what exists. 
Phase Transition When a system undertakes a qualitative transformation.  For 
example ice becoming water above zero degrees Celsius (a 
transition point). 
Phase Space A multidimensional space which is used to represent a number of 
variables (dimensions) of a system.  For example, a five dimensional 
space might represent three dimensions of physical space, time and 
temperature. 
Positivism The epistemological position that humans can discern fundamental 
truths about the world. 
Post-structuralism A school of thought originating in the mid twentieth century which 
questions the simple correspondence between our linguistic and 
symbolic systems and the world they relate to. 
Pragmatism OfteŶ used ďǇ sĐieŶtists iŶ the seŶse of ͚ǁhat is pƌaĐtiĐal͛ aŶd/oƌ to 
sidestep philosophical issues.  Also a specific school of thought 
originating in the late nineteenth century which considers the utility 
of thought. 
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Representation Different forms of representation are discussed within this thesis.  
Simple representation refers to the assumption that there is simple 
relationship between the world and our understandings or models 
of it.  In contrast, distributed representation refers to the structure 
of a network having no clear relation to the structure of a 
phenomenon and yet having a conditioned response to it. 
Understanding In Chapter 2 the term understandings is utilised as sufficiently broad 
to allow consideration of the way human thought and action are 
characterised within the existing literature; pertaining to both 
thought within complex systems and notions of complex systems.  
From Chapter 4 onwards the term is used to denote the emergent 
ƌespoŶse of aŶ iŶdiǀidual͛s eŵďodied Ŷeuƌal sǇsteŵ at a paƌtiĐulaƌ 
moment.   
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